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CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER LABOR TROOPS

BY ALFRED VAGTS

The use of civilian construction and other labor troops by the German Army during World War II has brought forth much discussion and a great deal of writing on the subject, but the practice of employing civilians in military operations is not a new one. In its present form it can be traced back to the early seventeenth century when the most immediate contribution of civilians in direct war effort was as train personnel or as wielders of digging and entrenching tools.

War history from the seventeenth century includes typical scenes of non-combatants being pressed into such work by home authorities or by a foreign military power using its right, or might, as an occupant. For example, during the two and a half months of the long armistice concluded between Napoleon and his adversaries in the summer of 1813, the Emperor drew upon the population of occupied Saxony, then still allied to him, in order to strengthen his lines and the bridgehead of Dresden in particular. Following the battle of Leipzig he impressed such craft as carpenters and fishermen to build bridges across the Saale on his line of retreat to the west, their work enabling him to escape with large parts of his army to the Rhine and beyond.

Such war services by civilians might be rendered either in the form of voluntary, contractual labor or as required or requisitioned by the war *imperium* of an occupant or other military governor. The first kind of labor is illustrated by the waggoners or land transport corps which in the case of certain armies lasted well beyond the middle of the 19th century. These drivers and their carriages were provided by private contractors and labor, often enough to the despair of the military who thought them undisciplined and inclined towards panic. When the trains were at last made part of the regular establishments, their late coming put them at the lower rungs of the ladder of honor and respect, an evaluation expressed clearly by the German army jingle:

<i>Der Train, der Train,</i>	<i>The trains, the trains,</i>
<i>Der führt den Säbel nur zum Schein.</i>	<i>They carry their sabre in make-believe.</i>

The German and Austrian forces in the East during the First World War claimed the compulsory furnishing of relays, of "carriage and arriage," *Vorspanndienste*, quite regularly and in fact exhaustively

from the Russo-Polish peasantry after their own supply trains and types of carriages and horses had proved quite insufficient or inadequate on Russian roads.

During the wars of the later 19th century, the civilians, in keeping with the general humanitarian tendency of the age, were spared most of the immediate war duties. The Hague Convention of 1899 provided that requisition of services by an occupant, including work with spade and axe or teams in the possession of the inhabitants, must be limited so that the population was not obligated to share in the operations against their own country. Still, the increasing number and scale of war engineering tasks often proved beyond the powers of regular engineering, pioneer, or *sappeur* troops, though these grew in numbers within the modern armies. It became necessary to import additional labor into the war zone, largely for pioneering purposes, pioneers being originally foot troops (from French *pion*, a foot soldier, from Latin *pes*, foot) to prepare roads for the troops.

The Industrial Revolution called forth the navvies to build the roads, canals, ports and railways over which raw materials, labor and finished products were moved. Navvies of all sorts, co-national or foreigners, were employed by the industrial nations who were allied in the Crimean War against non-industrial Russia in order to perform some of the heavy siege work. Among them were Croats from neutral, or not so neutral, Austria-Hungary whom their British employers found "strong enough to carry shot and shell," but also much in need of being humored and protected from the cupidity and roguery of their *padrones*. The proposals of the Prince-Consort to employ British convict labor in the Crimea apparently found more favor with the home authorities than with those before Sevastopol. Most of the latter clearly disliked even the navvies, of whom the ministers thought very highly after all they had done to build Britain's railroads in the past 25 years. Opposition was strong against them, long before they arrived on the scene, and the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, had to write Lord Raglan: "So you don't like my navvies! Believe me you are wrong, and you will do yourself and your Army great injustice to refuse them. They will not disgrace you, and will do all sorts of work in advance of the Army. They carry with them artificers of all kinds, and they will run you up an encampment and build you huts on a line of march in no time. They will fight if you let them, and, armed with pikes, will defend a trench as well as the best of them. I sincerely hope you will have them, or, if I send them on my own responsibility, that

you will give them a fair trial" (June 1, 1855). Despite such good hopes on the part of a minister who had been one of the directors of the London & North-Western Railway Company, the navvies of the Army Work Corps in the Crimea proved hard to manage, were repeatedly found "in a state of mutiny" and had then to be threatened with the punishing powers of the Provost-Marshal. They irritated the regular soldiers who had to perform similar labors, in addition to their more dangerous front-line duties, at far lower wages, which in cases were only a fifth of what the Army Work Corps members drew. No wonder that Raglan's successors wrote home: "The Army Work Corps are by far the worst lot of men ever yet sent here. It is ruin to our soldiers to be placed in contact with such a set of people receiving higher pay than themselves." With absence of full disciplinary powers over them until near the end of the siege of Sevastopol, "beyond a fine which they cared little about," combined the want of many, if not most, of the usual incitement towards hard work. "With bread, beef, vegetables, and a 5 s. a-day secured to a man without effort, what is his particular inducement to work?" the commander of the British forces in the Crimea asked his chief. On the whole, the experience with the free industrial laborer in immediate war work seemed unsatisfactory to British army officers and some of the civilian governors as well, including Prince Albert, who thought the Army Work Corps would "never be really fit for much as long as they are not soldiers, receiving the same pay and standing under the same discipline, regulations, etc., etc., as the rest of the Army—in fact as long as they are not an integral part of the Army. . . . They should require total remodeling hereafter."¹

The foremost purpose of employing such labor in the war zone was on the one hand to spare the civilian who wanted to have nothing to do with the war and on the other hand the soldier. The latter was to remain free or be freed for his principal duty, fighting. As the experience during the Crimea had indicated, completely or even partially free labor was hardly suitable for this purpose, whatever small groups of specialist labor such as railway personnel, might have contributed to the activities within the war zones here and there. That railways were increasingly nationalized by the great military powers was not only for the purpose of ensuring the strategic character of routes, it was also to make railroad labor official, bureaucratic, unfree. The military organ-

¹For the above see *The Panmure Papers* (London, 1908), Vol. I, 94, 222, 252, 278, 286, 328, 352, 394, 429; Vol. II, 164-5, 189, 235-7, 248 9.

ization of whatever labor was to be used in the war zones seemed unavoidable. The consequence of this conviction on the part of the war-preparing authorities was on the one hand the raising of special troops such as railway troops, telegraph troops, etc., on the other the organization of labor battalions.

Like a few other military institutions, the modern militarized labor forces were first introduced along the so-called frontier of civilization, in the Far East, by the Japanese in the War of 1904-5. This action was taken for the avowed purpose of freeing combat troops from laboring duties and burdens of various kinds. Conscripts, physically not quite fit for combat duties but otherwise able-bodied, were called up for labor service duty, gathered in companies and given slight military training. Infantry and artillery regiments received such a company of 3-400 men each, usually under the command of a retired officer supported by reliable non-coms. The regimental commander gave the orders as to the daily employment of these companies which was most often trench work but might also extend to any other activities that might ease the duties of the regiment.²

This Japanese experience was not taken into consideration by the Western powers in their war plans or early war measures. Only slowly did they realize as Lloyd George put it on February 28, 1915, that "this war is an engineer's war." For the BEF in France the need of labor forces became urgent after trench warfare had come about and the first attempts were made to break the stalemate. The vast numbers of men and masses of materiel and stores required put the communications in France including highroads under such a strain that for the purpose of their maintenance, several labor battalions of navvies had to be formed in June 1915, altogether eleven at first, composed of men of above military age and attached to the Royal Engineers Corps. The ever increasing work for military purposes in docks and dumps led to the setting up of Army Service Corps companies. Both formations were transferred to the Labour Corps in 1917 when the importation of colored labor also was started. The standard unit in the Labour Corps was the labor company of 500 men, of a size that indicates that in non-combat units a lesser number of officers and non-coms will suffice to observe order and economy.

The Western Allies, their peoples willing to be conscripted if need be for combat but not for working duties, drew in addition to home

²Franke (ed.), *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, II, 30-32.

forces on such distant populations as the Chinese (95,000), Indo-chinese, South Africans, Egyptians, for their navvies. These performed for them some of the war work that required large numbers of hands, even if on the whole unskilled. It was work that carried these helpers occasionally close to or even into the firing line and generally speaking through the whole zone from the French ports to the front. During the German offensive of March 1918 labor companies of the British Labor Corps which at that time included 348,555 men, were among "the odds & ends of men who were not in the fighting ranks at all," but picked up rifles, lined trenches and helped to stem the German advance.³ Somewhat differently computed, approximately 900,000 were raised at one time or another by the British alone for war labor purposes. Since in the nature of things the majority of these workers were "cheap labor," the awkward problem of the Crimean War when civilian labor was so much better paid than soldiers whose resentment was thereby aroused, did not arise again. The AEF, as far as it did not avail itself of the services of the labor corps of the Associated Powers or of their own "general service" force included in the Corps of Engineers, often employed negro troops to perform similar labors.⁴

Without an opportunity of their own to draw on "colored help," the Germans felt the more justified to raise their outcry about "race shame," presumably committed by their enemies in employing these peoples. For their own part, they were forced to use for war labor the population of the occupied territories, in which they went easily as far as the Hague Convention allowed, if not beyond, or they had to draw upon civilian labor of their own, leaving alone the work of the numerous prisoners of war who were employed by them even more extensively than by their adversaries. Altogether too often did they have to employ front troops for spade and other work during their supposed rest periods. Some of the military causation of German race theories might be illustrated by a lecture of Rudolf Hess, delivered before Wehrmacht officers in January 1937, when he spoke about the causes of Germany's defeat in 1918. Said Hess:

The failure of our people towards the end of the war was in part the consequence of our numerical inferiority which called for a taxing of the strength of the individual amounting to several times the taxing put on enemy strength. The enemy relieved his troops in order to give them a real rest. Trenching and digging he had done by special working troops who often consisted of distant tribes. We on the other hand stayed

³David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, V, 155, and VI, 21.

⁴Some data on "Construction in the AEF" are to be found in Leonard P. Ayres, *The War with Germany*, pp. 59-60.

almost continually in mud and dirt and had to be led into the fire again and again; during the so-called rest periods we were trenching and transporting materials; we were often forced to forego the most indispensable sleep. All that, of course, was bound to produce its consequences.⁵

In the beginning of the First World War the Germans used some of their own civilian workers, largely such as were unfit for immediate military service or were thought at first to be unsuitable for such service. This was done while they were building the first large improvised fortification lines against the Russians in Eastern Prussia in 1914. The experiences made with their worker groups were found unsatisfactory and consequently the so-called *Armierungstruppen* or *Schippers* (shovelers) in popular language, were set up. They were "labor troops used in the construction of fortifications during the war," as the U. S. War Department's Military Dictionary (TM 30-255) defines them, which is quite correct as far as their original employ and purpose are concerned, though the definition does not cover the variety of additional tasks for which these troops were subsequently used, such as loading and unloading, handling of the munitions and tools depots, road building and other menial work. They were put into uniforms of the shabbiest kind, "combed thru" again and again for men who might be found suitable to do front service after all, and placed under officers for whom there was no better employment to be found. They received no military training to speak of beyond saluting and were generally ranked lowest in estimation among all the German formations raised during the First World War.⁶

The dissatisfaction with labor in war and between wars, with labor's generally strong stand against the war, is a notorious factor in making officers of divers European armies inclined towards Fascist movements. Fascism, once in power, proceeded to militarize labor in peace time for the purposes of war to be made sooner or later. Such military organizations of labor were the German Labor Service or *Arbeitsdienst*, the so-called Todt Organization, the German Labor Front, the *Technische Nothilfe*, originally an anti-strikers' organization.⁷ In the first open war of Fascism, the conquest of Ethiopia, no less than 118,450 men were employed by the Italian military in labor battalions.

⁵*Neuer Vorwärts*, October 10, 1937.

⁶Much about the activities, morale, etc., of these troops might be learned from Arnold Zweig's *Education before Verdun*.

⁷For detailed description and history of these forces see Vagts' *Hitler's Second Army*, chapters VI-IX; a resumé of the non-German labor services might be found in an article by Müller-Brandenburg, "Der Arbeitsdienst bei den Anderen," in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Vol. 23, November-December, 1933.

Thanks to their far-reaching mobilization and militarization of labor before and at the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Germans were from the outset provided with a variety of labor troops. Their original enemies in the West did not at once follow or imitate them in these measures. This was also part of the Chamberlainian unwillingness of allowing the war to become total, a determination which came unfortunately far too late and the true military implementation of which would have been to make the preventive war against Germany and thus against total war. In his first published dispatch, covering the period from September 3, 1939, to January 31, 1940, Viscount Gort as C-in-C of the BEF in France reminded his superiors in London that the labor problem bids fair to become one of great magnitude, and its solution might be difficult. As no adequate labor force was available on mobilization, the gap was filled by the temporary use of cavalry and infantry reservists. Later, the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps absorbed the various labor units already in France. This corps has carried out cheerfully and efficiently the important but often unexciting tasks allotted to its units.⁸

The French, with their under-population problem, it is evident were no better supplied with labor troops. The distrust of foreign refugees, who formed practically the only labor reserve at their disposal, many or most of them strongly anti-Fascist, drove more men into concentration camps than into France's auxiliary forces. This xenophobia, to a moderate extent only shared in Britain, proved definitely prejudicial to the war potential of the Allies at the same time when the Nazis began to use any numbers and kinds of non-German workers and soldiers, willing or only half-willing, to serve them in their various organizations.

The British eventually made their Pioneer Corps the *omnium gatherum* organization for the employment of auxiliary laborers in the combat and rear zones. The nucleus of this Corps was largely formed by soldiers "excluded from combat work because of bad eye sight" under officers too old for full field service. Under its direction a polyglot force of some 42,000 laborers were employed in North Africa during the summer of 1943 and in addition 30,000 casual laborers. The former included four "alien companies" composed of Czechs, Austrians and Germans whom Vichy France had interned in North Africa whence they had fled after the defeat of France in 1940, one or more Maltese companies, more than 40 native labor companies, headed by British,

⁸Supplement to *The London Gazette* of October 10, 1941, No. 35, 305, p. 590.

American or French officers and composed of Berbers, Kabyles and other North African elements.⁹

The use of labor troops in modern war raises inevitably questions like these: Is their complete or partial militarization preferable to a private status? Is full militarization required to hold troops together that may have to work under fire, far from home or under other demoralizing circumstances? Or does it constitute a waste of precious time and of equally precious training and overseer personnel to have these troops organized in a strictly and completely military way? The Germans, ahead of and during the present war have come to the conclusion that militarization of such workers must vary and can in fact decrease as the distance of their employ from the front line grows. That is to say: there may be considerably less of a military set-up in the Reich Labor Service than among the front engineers, though, nowadays, due to bombing and other factors, the fire effect no longer decreases in direct relation to the distance from the front line. Again, partisans and guerrillas may force only partly militarized formations working in rear zones to take to the rifle and defend themselves. As a German Propaganda Company reporter put the situation in the Eastern theater in November 1942: "The winter campaign of 1941 put an end to the idea that the supply columns' only enemy was mud and snow and that they never had to fight a human enemy. Actually it became the rule for supply units, building battalions, bakers' and butchers' companies to have to repulse bands of partisans who had seeped through the lines, fighting often against a tenfold superiority and with the same heroic determination which is commonly ascribed to the fighting units."

At this point two further features of war employment and labor economy enter: (a) that of the best use of never too numerous skilled labor and (b) that of raising engineering troops in war time. As to (a): Would it be necessary to have skilled laborers undergo complete military training? Would it be preferable to make use of their special skill at once rather than later, after more than a modicum of military training? Would it not be more economical when such specialist workers who were to be employed on work usually done by military engineers should dispense with the general engineers' training and proceed more or less immediately from their civilian tasks to more or less identical ones in the war zone? Generally speaking, the U. S. Navy, which had employed large numbers of civilian construction workers on those

⁹*New York Times*, July 20, 1943.

Pacific islands which were to be put into a state of defense before Pearl Harbor and of whom a few thousands were made prisoners by the Japanese, has answered these questions in the affirmative; and the answer is the Seabees, the navvies of the Navy, the naval construction battalions, with an authorized strength of 245,000, a quota nearly reached by the end of 1943 when 222 such battalions of nearly 200,000 were in existence.¹⁰

Thorough military training, ranking, uniformity, etc., in spite of modern selective methods has the hardly avoidable tendency of overlooking and disregarding special skills and talents. As the Director of Fortifications and Works in the British War Office from 1911 to 1918, Major General Sir George Kenneth Scott-Moncrieff has indicated, the later use to which the British put the original eleven labor battalions of the First World War, "all of the professional navy class, all over military age, and officered by civil engineers, architects, surveyors, doing excellent work and of a nature by no means unskilled," through their inclusion in labor battalions that did absolutely unskilled work, such as the unloading of ships, proved a rather unwise policy, removing "from the engineers' control a very valuable body of men."¹¹

Among the "expansion coefficients" of the various branches of the armies, that is to say, the expansion resulting from the change from peace footing to full war footing, that of the engineers has always been high. In many, if not most, of the old peace time armies it would seem to the highest command and general staffs that the numbers of the "tinkers" need not be "unduly" large. In Prussia, for instance, for quite some time after and before 1871 the ratio of infantry to engineers or pioneers was as 24:1; at the mobilization in 1914 that ratio was 15.5:1 for the active corps, but only 22:1 for the reserve and *Landwehr* corps. This changed, of course, considerably in favor of the engineers before the war was over. (Incidentally, this was decidedly less than what "old soldiers and experienced captains" of earlier centuries had believed necessary, according to whom an army of 30,000 foot and 6,000 horse required 8,000 pioneers, a branch then considered especially cheap compared with the other expensive mercenaries.)¹² The "expansion coefficient of the Royal Engineers was very high, though not quite the highest among the various British corps, the Corps growing from a strength of 24,035 (including 13,808 Territorials) in Au-

¹⁰For more details see UP dispatch from Washington, October 29, 1943.

¹¹See *Encyclopedia Britannica*, XIth ed., Vol. XXX, 977, art. Military Engineers.

¹²Laurens, Melliet, *Discours politiques et militaires sur Corneille Tacite*, pp. 765-56.

gust 1914 to 304,241 in March 1918, a thirteenfold growth against a twofold one on the part of the cavalry and a sixfold increase in the infantry on the one hand and "the augmentation of the mechanical power of our forces 14 times," whatever that may mean in detail, on the other.¹³ The authorized strength of the U. S. Engineers to 1916 had been 248 officers and 1,968 enlisted men; by November 1918 their total enlisted strength had risen to 285,000 men, or 145 times as many as in 1916, and 10,886 officers.

Bearing in mind that despite the vast expansion of engineering troops in war time there are never enough engineers, that full engineer training is time-consuming, that special skills might be more promptly and immediately put to military uses, the *Wehrmacht* has set up its so-called *Bautruppen* or Construction Troops. They go back to the very first months of the war, if not slightly before. They are fully uniformed troops, wearing infantry uniform with the black tab, marking German engineering units, on the collar of their uniform; they have acquired a motto, indicative of a definite labor rhythm, a *Kampfruf* or battle cry: "Hauruck," (Hit-Pull, if a translation is possible).

Their first purpose was to provide relief for the fighting engineers who were rapidly growing rarer and more precious as losses mounted and tasks grew in size and variety. In order to relieve them of at least a few duties and to keep them available at all times for front purposes, the *Bautruppe* is given the construction work originally performed by the general engineering troops, such tasks as the building of fortifications and, during the war of movements and sieges, the construction of bridges, roads, narrow-gauge field railways, within or without the range of enemy fire. In close keeping with their specialists' tasks these troops are organized as construction or *Bau* battalions in the narrower sense of the word, bridge building battalions, road building battalions, railroad and fortress construction battalions, air force construction battalions (*Luftwaffenbaubataillone*), and naval construction battalions, apparently army forces working for the navy which was originally entrusted with coastal defense. They are prepared for these specific jobs and provided with the necessary tools—and not also with the unnecessary tools, which have all grown more precious with every month of the war. This would leave to the front engineer such activities as demolition, land-mining, handling of flame throwers, river-crossing in boats of one kind or another, pontooning, etc.

¹³Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, V, 155.

In order to give these construction troops the discipline and cohesion required under fire, they receive instead of the regular and elaborate engineer training a short basic infantry drill and are equipped with carbines and light machine guns. German military writers emphasize that in order to preserve this cohesion the construction troops should not be used and used up in small units as is so often done by employers who are not themselves engineers. Their combat training was to go no farther than in the group of eight and the platoon; no fighting in larger units need be envisaged, but march discipline, security service, the use of patrols while in quarters and on the march should be emphasized. The fact that, somewhat contrary to the original notions and intentions, construction troops had to be used in "the hard defensive fighting in the front lines" as early as the winter of 1941-2, led to discussions in the German military press and to "hints and suggestions for the combat employ of Army Construction troops," proposals which stressed that these troops must at least learn how to take care of their own safety while on the march or when employed on construction projects of one kind or another.

A fairly detailed account of the *Bautruppen* activities has been rendered as part of the German descriptions of the siege of Sevastopol which fell on September 1, 1942, after a 35 days' struggle as compared with the eleven months of siege by the Allies in 1854-5 as the Germans were fond of pointing out at the time. As Lieutenant Colonel Klingbeil, the foremost publicity writer for the engineering branch of the Wehrmacht, has described the performances of the *Bautruppen* in the preparation of the attack and its support, their strength before Sevastopol was 1½ bridge-construction battalions, 1 highway-construction battalion, 1 construction battalion, and 3 fortification-construction companies, all under a special commander of the construction forces and a higher construction staff. Investment had begun in November 1941 and since the supply routes of the besiegers were only three, extensive road building had to be undertaken following geological and aerial reconnaissance. From the middle of November to the end of May the construction troops under severe weather conditions and often under fire from the fortress or guerrilla formations, laid out 101 kms of new roads, either two-lane or one-lane roads with sidings, while widening and improving 87 kms of existing roads, repairing 161 kms, and maintaining 87 kms of existing roads. The less noble work of the construction battalions according to the Russians

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included the slaughter of those Poles whom they had found in a Russian prisoners' camp at Smolensk in July 1941, though, in the German version, the Russians had already slain these victims before their arrival.¹⁴

The German war concept was from the outset based on an extreme economy of means, time, raw materials, manpower, with division and specialization of labor as one of the multipliers of an essentially slender war potential. It indicated the beginning of a reversal of these arrangements, more specifically a scarcity of German manpower for field service, when construction units came to be seen in action in the field and during sieges, such as Stalingrad where, after the tide had turned and the besiegers had become the besieged and at last the captives, "members of construction and police detachments" were found among the prisoners (Russian communiqué of January 31, 1943). In their subsequent defeats in the East the Germans were repeatedly forced to use special troops for purposes other than those for which they had been raised and trained. During the final contest for the Donets basin in August 1943, they were reported as throwing "construction battalions and other rearguard units" into the desperate fighting,¹⁵ and similar reports were included in a Russian communiqué of July 6, 1944, referring to fighting northwest of Minsk where the Germans were "endeavoring in every way to stem the advance of our troops." Much that began with far-going specialization in the German war-making arrangements is bound to end in the indiscriminate use of troops and other means of combat. Total war on the part of those who conceived it, thus winds up in primitivism, the level on which war presumably began, before the division of war labor.

¹⁴See for some more detailed doubts *Time* for February 1, 1944.

¹⁵Associated Press dispatch from London, August 30, 1943.

TECHNICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE SELECTION OF TROOPS

BY LAWRENCE S. KUBIE

(CONCLUSION)

IV. THE ROLE OF THE REGULAR MEDICAL OFFICER IN THE PROCESS OF SELECTION

A. In Peacetime Recruiting

No one can doubt that if wartime induction procedures grow out of unsatisfactory and ineffective peacetime recruiting methods, the defects of the latter will be magnified a thousandfold in a period of emergency. Therefore our analysis of the problem as it presents itself in wartime must include at least a brief comment on the defects of our peacetime recruiting procedures. Fortunately these defects have been described carefully by authoritative members of the regular armed forces.

In 1933, writing in *The Military Surgeon*, Major General George F. Lull (then Major) discussed the problem of "Disability Discharges."¹⁶ General Lull pointed out that between 1920 and 1930, 26,688 enlisted men were given certificates of discharge for disability ("CDD's"). Of these 68% were for conditions not incurred in line of duty: 60% occurred during the first year, and 12% during the first month after enlistment. Of the whole number a large majority were for neuro-psychiatric conditions. Furthermore, of all CDD's occurring between 1910 and 1930 (excluding the war years), 25% to 59% were discharged year by year for conditions which had existed prior to their enlistment. From one year to another there was a wide scatter in this percentage; but over the twenty years no improvement was manifested in the success of peacetime medical screening. Just as many recognizable disabilities were slipping through the recruiting office in 1930 as in 1910. Furthermore, General Lull adds that these percentages are conservative. He points out that a large addition to this record of failure must be made if one includes those who were discharged under Sections VI and VII (AR 615-360). According to General Lull, these "should not have been accepted," and most of them "should have been rejected by the recruiting officer or medical examiner."¹⁷

¹⁶Major George F. Lull, "Disability Discharges," in *The Military Surgeon*. Vol. 72 (April 1933), p. 297.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 303.

In addition to this significant study by General Lull, a few other frank appraisals of our peacetime recruiting methods were published in the journals of military medicine during the years between the two wars. These make it clear that the defects are due not to the calibre of our regular medical officers but to the organizational set-up in which they are forced to function.

Major Boyle, for instance, emphasized the need for a closer co-operation between the recruiting officer and the medical officer in place of the traditional conflict in purposes and in authority between the two.¹⁸ He stated that the non-medical officer at the recruiting station is interested primarily in quantity and resents the doctor's insistence on quality. Major Boyle deplored further the lack of social and medical histories, and urged the use of records of schools, jobs, and social adjustment.

Major Wilde wrote of the "weakness apparently inherent in our present recruiting system."¹⁹ He pointed out that physical and mental fitness was subordinated to the number of recruits enrolled, *because the efficiency of the recruiting officer was judged by the volume of the men enlisted rather than by the percentage of those who are later discharged.*

He stressed a number of circumstances which added to the difficulties of making adequate medical evaluations, and which are of importance to this study only insofar as they indicate that a general attitude of aloofness from the problem tended to pervade the Army in times of peace. Thus the working conditions were often impossible. The rooms were so small, noisy, dark, and congested as to render auscultation, percussion, and even adequate visual inspection impossible. There were no trained psychologists and no social service investigators on duty even in the largest centers. Because there was no systematic check-up, lax examinations carried no stigma; and although on paper financial penalties could be imposed, this was rarely done in fact. Conversely, careful work was not appreciated and received no reward. Recruits sometimes were even coached in the answers to questions. Healthy men have been substituted for sick men; normal urines or even tap-water for the applicant's urine. Men have been taught how to screen out signs of infection by urinating through a silk handkerchief, and the like.

Of more fundamental significance, as Wilde pointed out, was the in-

¹⁸Major W. A. Boyle, "The Problem of the Constitutional Psychopath," in *ibid.*, Vol. 68 (April 1931), p. 546.

¹⁹Major A. G. Wilde, "A Few Recruiting Difficulties," in *ibid.*, Vol. 67 (October 1930), p. 435.

adequacy of the general physician everywhere when he attempted to select personnel from among a group of apparently normal men who acknowledged no complaints and who volunteered no history of illness (cf. the problem of screening methods, p. 26 below). Finally and most important, was his emphasis on the fact that the recruiting officer and the examining surgeon tended constantly to work at cross purposes.

Lieutenant Colonel Strickland urged more psychiatric education for the examining doctors, and for all of the examining personnel, opportunities for *study and research in methods of quick diagnosis, the formulation of definite methods of procedure both for intellectual and for personality appraisal*, the assignment of psychiatrists to all large recruiting centers, and a period of probation and observation for all recruits.²⁰

These quotations, and especially the statistics presented by General Lull, would indicate that the medical selection of recruits for the Army is a problem which has not been solved by the Army even in peace times. Neither the methods employed nor the type of organization which should carry them out has been adequate. Certainly this situation could and should be changed so that *peacetime recruiting stations serve as laboratories in which methods are worked out and tested for the medical evaluation of recruits in wartime*. How this can be done will be discussed below.

It must be borne in mind, however, that even if our peacetime recruiting methods were perfect, the enlisted soldier of our regular army in times of peace is different from the type who enlists for war. Recruiting officers, line officers, and medical officers inevitably build up an attitude towards the peacetime soldier which they then carry over automatically in their dealing with the wartime soldier. They become habituated to the peacetime type. They learn to put up with him. They deal with him by means of punishments which are inappropriate for war, and they become indulgent towards violations which in time of war are unacceptable. Universal military service could remedy this by presenting the regular officer with a truer cross-section of the country's manpower. Even then, the peacetime army could never serve as a perfect laboratory for the prediction of *combat neuroses*. If properly organized, however, it could serve as a laboratory for working out methods by which potential training camp casualties could be spotted and rejected at the induction station. And numerically this constitutes much the larger problem.

²⁰Lieutenant Colonel Strickland, "The Importance of Psychiatry in Military Medicine," in *ibid.*, Vol. 83 (1939), p. 83.

B. The Role of the Regular Medical Officer in Preparing for Wartime Selective Procedures

The defects of our peacetime recruiting procedures make it all the more striking, therefore, that between Armistice Day, November 11th, 1918, and Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, *only one study*²¹ *was published in any United States journal of military medicine on basic organizational and technical problems of wartime medical selection.*²²

In 1924 Surgeon General Ireland wrote on the duties of the Medical Department in the formulation of mobilization plans but failed to make any mention either of technical methods or of organizational plans for Selective Procedures.²³

Similarly in 1933, Colonel Skinner wrote a most excellent article on the medical profession in national defense without taking up any aspect of these problems.²⁴

Colonel Hilton, in discussing the procurement of medical personnel for the National Guard during an emergency,²⁵ and Major General Patterson (then Surgeon-General), writing on the systematic training of medical officers,²⁶ also fail to make any reference to the problems of selection in general or to the special problems of training medical personnel in selective procedures. Furthermore, in the lengthy discussion that is included, no reference is made to these problems by any of the military discussants.

The cumulative effect of these striking omissions is to convince one that in times of peace the medical department of the Army gives little thought to the problems of wartime selection, and conducts no research in this field.

Yet this is not strange. Out of the one hundred and seventy odd years during which this country has had a standing army, this army has seen active warfare during less than ten. For over one hundred and sixty of these years the selection of recruits has been a relatively indolent peacetime procedure. Mistakes were not unduly costly either to the individual or to the community. Care for the health of troops

²¹Articles on selection of flying personnel are omitted from this discussion.

²²Captain Harry G. Armstrong, "The Importance of Coordinating the Military and Naval Medical Services with the Civilian Medical Profession," in *The Military Surgeon*, Vol. 80 (1937), p. 171.

²³Major General M. W. Ireland, "The Duties and Responsibilities of the Medical Department in the Formulation of Mobilization Laws," in *ibid.*, Vol. 55 (1924), p. 1.

²⁴Colonel G. A. Skinner, "The Great Importance of the Medical Profession in the Scheme of National Defense," in *Journal Iowa State Medical Society*, Vol. 23 (January 1933), p. 1.

²⁵Colonel David C. Hilton, "Additional Medical Department Officer Procurement in the National Guard for a Major Emergency," in *The Military Surgeon*, Vol. 74 (January 1934), p. 1.

²⁶Major General Robert U. Patterson, "The Development of the Plan for Systematic Training of Officers in the Medical Department Army," in *ibid.*, Vol. 76 (May 1935), p. 229.

was on the other hand a constant and primary concern of the medical personnel. From the Surgeon-General down to the most recently inducted medical officer, all thoughts are focussed on sanitation, prevention, and treatment. What is more, this is quite as it should be. Like civilian doctors, regular medical officers are therapeutically-minded. Neither in civilian life nor in the armed services are doctors trained to think in terms of the selection and screening of individuals for special tasks. This is why the moment that a war is over, even military physicians tend to forget all about the problems of screening, their attention turning again to the therapeutic problems which are the normal and natural preoccupation of every earnest physician.

Therefore, it is no criticism of our regular medical officers when we say that selection has been the step-child of the medical department. Nonetheless it is a fact which has had serious consequences and which creates a situation for which a remedy must be found.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the *technique of selection is a specialty in itself, not identical with the practice of medicine, surgery, psychology, whether civilian or military.* These disciplines give little or no experience in the procedures of selection, screening, or rejection. Indeed, during times of peace, there is no body of men with wide experience in performing these functions. Even civilian personnel officers can do their choosing at leisure from among small numbers; and academic psychologists who are adept and experienced in devising tests, rarely if ever have occasion to try out the validity of these tests in choosing personnel in huge numbers and rapidly.

This leads us to two further conclusions: (1) Because there is no experienced body of men ready at hand to do this work, special screening methods must be developed through researches conducted by the Armed Services themselves, designed specifically for their own use in the rapid expansion of the armed forces in times of emergency. (2) Thereupon competent teams of reserve officers, consisting of general physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, etc., must be trained in the use of these methods; so that a trained selection personnel will be ready for instant mobilization in time of need. Alone among writers on this subject, Armstrong²⁷ and McBride²⁸ have recognized, either directly or by implication, the fact that selection of personnel for the armed services requires the organization of civilians into

²⁷Armstrong, *op. cit.*

²⁸George A. McBride, "The Civilian Doctor's Part in a National Military Emergency," in *The Military Surgeon*, Vol. 76 (1935), p. 191.

a corps of trained reserve officers to function in an emergency. On page 267 McBride writes: "It is the civilian doctors who will have to discern and discard (the potential casualties) from the raw human material out of which armies are made." The tables of organization of the Army must be altered sufficiently to make these two goals possible.

In 1925, Dr. Mahlon Ashford (now Editor of the Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, then Major, MC USA, Acting Corps Area Surgeon) proposed that the army should establish "standards of mental and moral examination for applicants for enlistment." These recommendations were promptly approved and the standards established. As far as can be ascertained, this was the first move in this direction in our peacetime army organization.

Also, when General Ainsworth, originally a medical officer, was Adjutant General, he instituted a system closely comparable to that which was used in the navy during peacetime. Under this system all men, upon original enlistment, were sent to Recruit Depots for three months' screening and training. At these depots a group of doctors were assembled who were specialists in the examination of men accepted for enlistment. Under this system, although the applicant was accepted at the recruiting office, he was not regularly enlisted until he had passed through the Recruit Depot.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF SELECTION PROCEDURES

Total war demands total selection of the manpower (and ultimately womanpower) of the nation. At such times, the manpower of the nation must be allocated so as to serve several basic functions: the armed forces, government, essential social services, education, industry, agriculture, and transportation. Health counts in all of these activities, but *medical evaluation for combat duty* must take precedence: (a) because the armed forces are the first line of defense behind which all others must operate; (b) because of the speed with which the armed forces must be recruited in times of danger; (c) because of the special stresses and dangers to which the combatant is exposed and the consequent special strains on his physical and nervous system; (d) because of the special destructiveness of the misfit in combatant units; (e) because of the long and costly investment in training, equipment, transportation, and pensions which each such misfit involves; (f) because of the difficulty of replacement, of return to base, and of rehabilitation of

such casualties, (g) because of the waste of industrial manpower which results from sending men from industry to camp only to break down in camp. All of these considerations give priority to the problem of medical selection for the armed forces: and it is mainly towards this that our recommendations are focussed. These recommendations have the further advantage, however, that the information gathered and the criteria established by the proposed procedures could be used not only by the armed forces, but also to guide into essential industry and agriculture those who prove to be medically unfit for combatant service.

What then are the changes and developments which are the essential prerequisites to competent Selection Procedures?

A. In the Over-all Organization: Civil and Military

(1) Selection for service with the Armed Forces is a function of the Federal Government alone, in which the dogma of "State Patronage," usually miscalled "States' Rights," should have no voice.

(2) The determination of *Social Availability* is a civilian function to be carried out by a permanent civilian agency: whereas the determination of *Medical Suitability* is a military function to be carried out by a permanent military agency.

(3) Therefore, a federal civilian governmental agency should be established, the Selective Service System, whose duty shall be (a) the determination of *Social Availability* for service with the Armed Forces, and (b) the allocation to essential industries of all manpower not available or suitable for duty in the Armed Forces.

(4) This Agency should be set up by the process of Amendment to the Federal Constitution, so as to make it impossible for Congress to use it as a political football in election years, as the WMC and the Selective Service System have been used in the last two years.

(5) The Armed Forces themselves should create a basic command force to be known as the Army Personnel Force to parallel the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. (See Figures II and III, pp. 21-22.) The Army Personnel Forces should have sole jurisdiction, among other things, over every phase of the determination of *Medical Suitability* for service with the Armed Forces. The Commanding General of the Army Personnel Forces should be a member of the General Staff.

(6) The Army Personnel Forces should have command function throughout the period of induction, classification, and basic training, and again throughout every phase of reclassification, and finally

throughout the process of discharge and retirement, exercising that command as at present through the Adjutant General's office via the usual chain of command to the line officers who would be in direct command of troop units. (See Figure I.)

B. The Division on Selection of the Army Personnel Forces

(1) Within the Army Personnel Forces all medical functions would be under the Surgeon General; but Selection would function not under the Surgeon General, but as a separate, parallel, medically-led division of its own within the Army Personnel Forces. (See Figures II and III.)

It is proposed therefore that G-1 (the present Division on Personnel), shall become a new and more comprehensive G-1: to operate under an Assistant Chief of Staff for Selection, Classification and Personnel, and under an Assistant Secretary of War for Personnel. The Commanding General shall be a *medical officer* and a member of the General Staff. The present Personnel Division (G-1), would become one of the subdivisions of this new division: others being, Selection, Classification, Personnel, Basic Training, etc., etc. (See Figure III.)

(2) To ensure that the importance of Selection shall never again be forgotten in times of peace, a permanent corps of regular medical officers shall be specially trained for performing these tasks, and for research in this field, not subject to calls to other forms of medical duty. It has been a universal experience both in the past war and in the present one that just as soon as any group of medical officers is thoroughly trained and experienced in this work, they are rewarded by being moved on to something else. The process of selection and induction is usually looked upon as an unfortunate assignment, a mere stepping stone towards bigger things. It is inevitable, therefore, that it is always on these "bigger things" that thoughts are focussed. If the art and science of military selection is ever to be developed adequately, a career must be made possible in the field of military selection itself.

The process of selection is a full-time job. Its problems are varied and complicated, and no man can consider himself a master of them who does not devote himself to them as a specialty. It is a life task and not a job to which a man can be assigned for a few months here and there during the course of a varied career in military medicine. Therefore the proper administration and execution of the process of selection require that within the organizational tables of the army there should be a large, specially trained *permanent* corps of regulars assigned to these tasks alone.

FIGURE I






FIGURE II *



(DOTTED LINES INDICATE SUGGESTED ADDITIONS TO OR CHANGES IN THE EXISTING TABLE OF ORGANIZATION.)

* Modified from Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 250-251.



(3) In addition there should be a large corps of reserve officers, composed of *specialty trained* men and women, all of whom would be activated during an emergency: some for full service by the side of the regulars, and some for part-time service in the vicinity of their civilian homes and jobs. Age and ill-health should not bar men and women from serving in this special reserve corps.

(4) Since the major issue which has to be decided in ascertaining suitability for combat duty is a medical military issue, the Selection Personnel should be led by medical officers: but in close association with them there must be psychologists, physiologists, medical-field workers, statisticians, polling experts, finger-print experts, etc., with equivalent commissioned ranks and non-commissioned ratings.

C. The Reorganization of the Induction Station

In the Induction Station in wartime, as in the Recruiting Station in peace, there is a conflict both in formal authority and in purpose between the medical officer and the recruiting officer. The non-medical officer aims at quantity: the medical officer at quality. In the end, when badly selected recruits reach the front, the line officer shares the medical officer's point of view and sends urgent appeals from the fighting front to stop sending up men who are physically or psychologically

incapable of taking the strain of battle. This conflict in purpose and authority should be eliminated. As General Lull points out, the selection of troops must be a medical responsibility.²⁹ *Therefore, the selection specialist of the Army Personnel Forces should have authority over the intake of men*; and the administrative officer at the Recruiting or Induction Station should be subordinate in the chain of command to the Personnel Officer. Furthermore, the medical officers who are attached to the Service Commands should have nothing to do with induction (or as will be explained below, with the processes of discharge).

This change would take recruiting offices and induction stations entirely out of the Adjutant General's department, and would furthermore remove them entirely from the control of the Commanding Generals of the several Service Commands, placing them under the command of the Army Personnel Forces.

D. Special Functions of the Division on Selection of the Army Personnel Forces

(1) As already explained, the special Division on Selection would have a permanent peacetime personnel, which in addition to its medical officers would include among the commissioned personnel: psychologists, social workers, statisticians, and administrative officers; and among its non-commissioned personnel, specially trained technical and clerical aides. In periods of peace it would have the right to train its own reserve corps of women, and of men available only for limited service because of age or physical disabilities. Such civilians would come from all relevant civilian activities and would be enrolled in the reserve corps of this division. They could be given short periods of special training each year, so as to keep their methods up to date; and they would be available for active service when an emergency arises.

(2) The division would have to have funds at its disposal adequate to assist states, large cities and other communities in the organization and maintaining of master files.

(3) The division would have to maintain a number of mobile units, consisting of physicians, psychologists, social workers, and clerical and technical assistants, who would be ready to go into communities where the available local personnel was too inadequate to make possible the accumulation of medical, educational, and social histories without outside aid.

(4) In times of peace the division could work up actuarial data to

²⁹See Lull, *op. cit.*

indicate how many disabled or partially disabled individuals were to be expected among men of service age, for each of the statistically important causes for rejection. Thus Congress and Selective Service could be told ahead of time precisely how many individuals within a specified age range would have to be sent up for medical examination in order to build an army of any desired size. Automatically this would make clear how the manpower of the nation would have to be divided between the armed forces and all other essential activities.

(5) The division would hold peacetime test "mobilizations" in which the adequacy of its methods of assembling medical and social histories would be tested in various parts of the country—without actually calling up any individual except the trained Selection Reserve Officers, a part of whose training would be given in this way.

(6) The division would be able to keep a unitary cumulative medical and psychological record on all soldiers. This would check the accuracy of the selection procedure. It would assist in the allocation of men within the Army and in the diagnosis of any disability which might arise; and it would assist finally in the proper placement of the discharged soldier in industry (as is now done in Canada).

E. Inter-relationship between the Selection Agencies of the Army and Navy

The question of whether in an emergency there should be separate selective agencies for the Army, the Navy, and perhaps the Air Forces, or whether there should be one over-all agency, is an issue which can be determined only by consultation between the services, and in the light of experience. It is recognized that there are differences in the physiological and psychological requirements of different types of service within the armed forces. These differences are equally great, however, between different subdivisions of each major arm. A well-planned over-all selective agency, in which every category of service was adequately represented, should be able to take care of these varying needs. There is not so much talent available in the field of personnel selection as to make it wise to scatter and subdivide this talent into too many separate agencies, with the inevitable duplication of activity and wasteful use of personnel which this entails. If administrative obstacles can be overcome, and if the organizational details can be worked out, there would seem to be many advantages of economy and efficiency to be derived from pooling the selective personnel and resources of the different services during an emergency, thus creating a common agency

for medical selection. Certainly this would be better than the subtle and undemocratic competition for men which at times has taken place between different branches of the services.

There might be a combined army and navy recruiting division for the combined General Staffs of the army and navy. The officer in command would have to hold equal rank with the chiefs of all other sections, so as to be able to speak to them with equal authority. If he is from the army his executive officer would be from the navy, and vice versa. All of these issues can be wisely settled, however, only after a sound foundation for Selective Procedures is created both in its civilian aspects and within the military establishments.

F. The Division on Classification

The Division on Classification would absorb the existing Personnel Classification Section of the Adjutant General's office, which would thus be taken over into the Army Personnel Forces where it would belong.

The changes here suggested should greatly enhance the effectiveness of the classification procedures of the army. The history of the struggle of psychologists and personnel experts to establish military job analysis and army personnel classification on a permanent basis parallels closely the history of the efforts of physicians to improve selection and induction procedures. As one reads between the lines of the quasi-official pamphlet on the army personnel system, one recognizes again the tendency in times of peace to forget the lessons learned painfully during war.³⁰

No matter how sound a plan may be on paper it can operate only as well as the channels of command permit; and, like the physician, the personnel classification officer lacks the direct authority which would enable him to ensure that classification tests are always administered and that their results are always taken into consideration. *It is disconcerting to learn that something over one-half of all inductees are never sent to replacement centers for classification during basic training,* but instead are assigned directly to units where little or no effort at classification is possible. Only when the classification officer functions under a Personnel Force which has actual command of all troops who are being classified will he be in a position to correct such errors.

The proposed changes would bring a further advantage to classification procedures through the fact that the classification personnel would

³⁰Adjutant General School: Lecture Series, *The Army Personnel System*. December, 1942.

be under its own command. This would make it possible to hold this group of highly trained specialists together throughout the war, instead of allowing them to be dispersed and used for other purposes as is occurring at present. Thus they would always be available for the important task of reclassifying men who are being discharged, both during the war and throughout the period of demobilization.

Therefore, the work of the classification officer would benefit greatly if all interrelated personnel functions, which are now scattered and subdivided among different divisions of the general staff, were brought together into one over-all staff division which would exercise command functions during the basic training and classifying period. This is the rationale behind the suggested change which would bring together under one Assistant Chief of Staff the interrelated processes of Procurement (selection, screening and rejection), of Progressive Classification, of Basic Training, and of Morale Indoctrination.

It is proposed here that the commanding general, i.e., the Assistant Chief of Staff, should be a physician. On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary of War for Personnel should not be too closely identified with any one of the several special disciplines whose efforts he would coordinate. This should make it possible for physicians, psychologists, personnel workers, medical and psychiatric social investigators, and statisticians to be able to cooperate harmoniously and without petty rivalries and jealousies.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE MEDICAL TECHNIQUES OF SELECTIVE PROCEDURES

A. *The Role of Group Screening Devices*

Civilian medicine and military medicine have been equally unprepared for the task of selection. In the writings of regular medical officers of the Army we have seen that even in times of peace the medical selection of troops has been unsatisfactory. Furthermore, civilian physicians are never confronted with comparable tasks. There is a reason for this.

Whether he is a soldier, a sailor, or civilian, when of his own accord a patient comes to a doctor he is already a *selected* individual. He has been selected by his sickness, that is by the disability or suffering which sent him to the doctor. Or if he goes to a specialist, he has been "selected" for the specialist by the doctor who referred him. In the practice of peacetime medicine, whether military or civilian, no doctor

is confronted by hundreds of healthy-looking young adults who are often trying to hide any symptoms which they may have or less often may be trying to simulate illness. No doctor is challenged to choose out of such a crowd those in whom there lurk the subtle evidences of potential physical or mental illness. It is precisely for this purpose that screening devices are needed. They are not meant to supplant direct individual examination. It is their function rather to pick the suspects out of the crowd, just as the patient's subjective complaints and disabilities select him when he presents himself at a clinic or in a physician's private office.

Therefore, for the purposes of military selection, group screening methods must be developed to single out for special study those about whose suitability for the services there is reasonable doubt, either on physiological or on psychological grounds. It is during peacetimes that such methods must be developed and tested on large bodies of men. *Therefore a permanent agency is needed* (and not merely a hastily-gathered wartime emergency body) to conduct pilot tests during times of peace on groups of men in industry, and on entire regiments of the regular Army and of the National Guard, and the like. In such pilot tests, certain features of wartime conditions could be stimulated by rushing the men through the tests as rapidly as the testers wish. Subsequently, however, as much time as is needed could be used to examine each man individually in order to see how many men with lurking difficulties had been detected and how many had been missed by the screening devices. Experiments such as these in times of peace could equip us with tried and proved screening methods for use in emergencies. A permanent army agency must be developed whose sole duty will be scientific research and practical development along these lines.

B. The Gathering of Histories

There is no process of examination, either physical or psychological, which can eliminate the necessity for *adequate histories*. It is an ancient truism that a physician is only as good as the medical history that he takes. Without such histories, efforts at selection even by the most expert examiners have been proven statistically to be only slightly more effective than random choice. Specifically with regard to all psychosomatic disorders it is evident that no one can gauge a man's susceptibility except on the basis of his past illnesses. Without a full social history, no one can make the vital decision as to whether potential neurotic difficulties are such as will be intensified or lessened by army life.

Yet the induction station *as at present constituted* is a bottleneck where the human stream flows at maximal speed and where no history-taking and no history-checking is possible.

History forms can be prepared in such a fashion that every significant positive fact can be indicated by an appropriate mark in a column at the right hand margin of each page. Such a form can be given to every individual as he registers, to be filled out under oath by his physician or by a hospital clinic, and to be sent in before the man appears for examination together with a signed waiver for all medical information which may be needed thereafter. In many cases the scrutiny of such a history form might make it possible to reject a man without detailed examination, thus saving time and expense both to the individual and to the personnel of the Induction Station, and reducing to a minimum the avoidable losses in industrial man hours.

A simpler form of the same kind could be filled out by the man himself while he is sitting around awaiting examination. To assist men who had difficulty in reading or writing or in understanding even simple medical questions, a corps of lay assistants (properly trained young women, ex-nurses, etc.) can assist such men in the correct scoring of the history forms. Again the forms could have two columns to the right, the inner one for all the "No's" and the outer one for all the "Yes's," which would thereby make it possible for the medical examiner to pick out for further questioning all significant data simply by running his eye down the right-hand margin of the page. This plan has been used successfully in certain Canadian induction stations.³¹

It has been calculated that social histories can be cleared through central exchanges at a cost of 25c per man. For an army of 10 millions, an expenditure of two and a half million dollars would help to save hundreds of millions in waste, illness, losses of manpower, and pensions.

At present, the process of history gathering falls between the Army and Selective Service. The latter is in the anomalous position of having to collect data which it cannot use itself (see Medical Circular No. 4, issued by National Headquarters, Selective Service, October 18, 1943). Under the present set-up this is unavoidable. Selective Service is not a purely medical organization, and medical histories are "privileged" and cannot legally be turned over to any agency that is not purely medical. This is a further reason why the proposed new divi-

³¹L. S. Kubie, "The Detection of Potential Psychosomatic Breakdowns in the Selection of Men for the Armed Services," in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 44 (December 22, 1943), pp. 605-24.

sion should be under medical leadership, in order to give it the legal right to gather and receive privileged medical information.

C. The General Waiver

How, then, can histories be gathered? Obviously from physicians, educational institutions, hospitals, clinics, court records, institutional records, social welfare agencies, employers. Therefore, the first step to take is to require that every registrant give a list of educational institutions, special classes, hospitals, clinics, private physicians, employers, club and work associates, and relatives, from whom relevant information can be obtained, together with a general waiver empowering these individuals and institutions to give such information in confidence to the properly accredited representatives of the *Medical Selective Agency* of the Army. Because this would be a medical organization, and because all such information would remain entirely in medical hands and in medical files, to be used only for a medical purpose, namely for the appraisal of the man's medical suitability for service in the armed forces, no medical confidence would be violated, any more than a medical confidence is violated when one physician gives another physician information about a patient who is being treated by both. Furthermore, since the decision of the Medical Selective Agency would be final, no facts would have to be disclosed to any layman.

D. Assistance to States and Communities

As has already been indicated, no selective procedure can function effectively unless it makes possible the assembling and the rapid scoring of histories. Therefore the organization responsible for gathering histories must secure the cooperation of appropriate agencies in communities throughout the country, and must be prepared to assist states and communities in setting up standardized and unified record systems and methods of identification which can make rapidly available all of the data which is essential for the compilation of social and medical histories on potential soldiers. This will require ample funds and personnel for the development of:

(1) Methods of identification of individuals: such as, standardized identification cards for filing, universal registration (?), universal fingerprinting (?).

(2) Master files in every state and every large city for police records, social service exchanges, welfare agencies, all mental hospitals (including private hospitals and those for alcoholics and drug addicts),

all general hospitals, homes for the mentally retarded, special classes for the retarded, and a central registry for private psychiatric patients and for patients with incapacitating but obscure organic conditions.³²

(3) A trained and confidential personnel that can be sent to the record rooms of such institutions to gather necessary information where the institutions themselves lack adequate trained workers to clear their own files.

E. M-Day Tests

Having assisted in the development of such methods and of such files, the Selective Agency would then be in a position to hold test mobilizations in any part of the country at any time, in which without actually mobilizing a single man, a test could be made to see how rapidly complete social and medical histories could be assembled on a thousand, ten thousand, or one hundred thousand sample names.

F. The Interdependence of Selection, Classification, Rehabilitation, and Discharge

Just as medicine has learned its greatest lesson through the study of pathology, so the processes of selection for armed services can be improved only by the study of its failures. This means that all men who slip through the selection screen only to break down subsequently, should be returned to the jurisdiction of the selection agency for further study. In the Tables of Organization the selection and classification of troops must therefore be integrated with the functions of discharge and rehabilitation.

In fact, whenever a member of the armed forces is to be surveyed for discharge because of mental or physical disability, irrespective of whether this disability arose during training or in combat duty, the recommendations of the Board of Survey should never be accepted as final; nor should such a man ever be discharged from a military hospital directly to civil life. He should be sent first to a camp attached to a hospital situated near his home station, and under the command of the appropriate Section of the Army Personnel Forces. Here he should be re-examined, his physical and mental status compared with the records of his condition on induction, and appraised in terms of his rehabilitation and future usefulness either in the armed services or in

³²The objection is raised to master files, universal registration, or universal finger-printing, that these can be used as gestapo devices for the infringement of personal liberties. These objections can be met by imposing uniform Federal and State restrictions on accessibility to these files, limiting accessibility to medical social service organizations, to courts (by the process of subpoena), and to the medically led Division on Selection of the Army Personnel Forces.

civilian life. If he is found useful for some other branch of service he would then be reclassified for this branch. If he is found to be totally unfit for service in the armed forces, he would then be discharged after a suitable period of training and rehabilitation for civilian life.

G. Coordination of Medical and Non-Medical Disciplines

It is evident that although the organization which appraises a man's capacity to serve in the armed forces must be under medical leadership, non-medical problems are involved which doctors are entirely incapable of solving alone and which require the coordinated efforts of other special skills. Psychological tests are needed as well as devices for rapid personality appraisal. Simple, rapid, standardized physiological tests are needed. Experienced social work administrators are necessary to guide the rapid accumulation of personal medical histories, and the records of social, school, work and home adjustments. Methods for the use of automatic scoring machines must be worked out and adapted to the special requirements of the armed forces. Therefore, in addition to the medical officers, officers will be needed who are experienced psychologists, physiologists, and statisticians, others who are experienced in the field of medico-psychiatric social investigations, in the appraisal of educational records and test instruments, in all of the techniques of individual and group psychological evaluation, and finally in the use of punch card systems and all automatic scoring and computing devices.

H. Summary

I. The selecting process thus envisaged would consist of a series of progressive steps:

a. Before the registrant appears at the Induction Station

(1) The gathering and evaluation of a social history (school, family, work, and general community adjustment).

(2) The gathering and evaluation of a medical history.

b. At the Induction Station

(1) The use of coarse group screening devices.

(2) Finally, in all doubtful cases and in the case of those who are not eliminated by the earlier stages of the screening process, a physiological and psychiatric appraisal of the individual.

The advantages of the recommended procedures are many. Of great importance is the over-all economy of medical personnel that would be achieved. The use of social and medical histories and the use of group screening devices before examination would together re-

duce the number of individual physical and psychiatric examinations needed. This would economize the time of the personnel at the Induction Station. Furthermore, the better the screening, the lower will be the incidence of training camp casualties. This in turn would reduce the number of physicians needed to take care of troops in the armed forces, and would make it possible to allow a larger proportion of physicians to remain in civilian practice.

II. This plan aims to achieve the following important objectives:

(a) To create a permanent agency within the armed forces whose sole concern would at all times be the development and improvement of all selection methods.

(b) To make adequate use of existing sources of social information.

(c) To supplement existing sources of social information.

(d) To provide adequate medical histories prior to direct examination.

(e) To give an opportunity for the development, testing, validation and use of group screening devices.

(f) To set up a system under which the results of the process of selection and induction would automatically be checked by the referral of failures back to the original selecting officers and methods.

(g) To reduce the number of individual examinations of all kinds (physical and psychiatric) which would have to be made, and at the same time to provide an adequately trained examining personnel, and more time for such examinations.

(h) To provide for less dislocation of the medical forces of the country during periods of emergency, and at the same time for more adequate medical coverage within the army, in the induction process, and in the civilian community.

(i) Within the armed services to make possible the progressive development and utilization of more precise methods of classification and selection in terms of precise job analyses, and job needs.

(j) To provide automatically for a cumulative medical and psychiatric record on every soldier.

(k) To eliminate the existing areas of conflicting authority and responsibility for medical selection.

(l) To make possible the coordination of medical techniques with those of allied disciplines: i.e., psychology, social work, etc.

(m) To provide for the establishment of a corps of permanent specialists in the field of military selection, and in addition, for the training of a corps of reserve officers in every aspect of the same specialty.

"LUCK TO THE FIGHTERS"

BY GEORGE WELLER

PART TWO

THE BATTLE FOR JAVA

It is testimony of the lag which is necessary in describing to the public the deterioration of any military situation that at this time, in early February of 1942, when encouraging statements were coming out about the prospect of Singapore holding, the Japanese fighters were already busy sawing off the arterial system of supplying fighters upon which the fate of the whole Dutch East Indies depended. New reinforcements were on the way from Darwin. After the raids on Koepang and Bali every flier knew that there was no more safety in the Darwin-Soerabaya insular stepping stones.

Down in Australia Major Legg was working to do the impossible and keep the planes flowing. Not only P-40 Kittyhawks but also the navy-built A-24 Dauntless dive bomber, a squadron of which had been diverted from the Philippines, were urgently needed to stop the convoys that the Japanese were even then assembling in Singapore Straits and the Jolo Sea for the invasion of Java. Neither the British nor the Dutch possessed any dive bombers whatever.

The American mechanics in Australia were diligently trying to put together this navy dive bomber and army appurtenances. A dealer in old iron was patching up new gun mountings for the rear cockpit, in order to fit the army machine guns on the navy supports. Hammering things out by hand blacksmith fashion, he was also attempting, under Legg's direction, to make navy bomb catches over to hold army bombs. The army was paying, in those feverish hours of makeshift in Australia, for its reluctance to accept the ten year old navy experience in dive bombing, just as the navy was tardy in discovering the value of the great landbased reconnaissance bombers used by the army.

When the dive bombers, which were to be operated out of Java under top cover furnished by the 17th, finally started to fly to Java, they faced all the same difficulties of having no intermediate bases worthy of the name through which their P-40 predecessors had wriggled. If the P-40 sprinters did not have their wind greatly improved by beginning their battle with a 3,500-mile flight over a waste of desert and islands where even mighty four-motored flying boats got lost, the A-24 high divers, virtually unarmed and without protection

of armor, were like champions of the springboard forced to swim the English Channel as a warmup for their diving.

One A-24 in a flight across northern Australia lost its way and came down in the desert with a belly landing, scraping off its lower pan and bending its propeller. The pilot began sending telegrams back to the miniature American headquarters on Queensland's reef-lined coast. He imagined he was still in the middle of the American system of supply and behaved accordingly. His first telegram went like this:

FORCE LANDED PLEASE SEND GROUND CREW.

This message being unanswered, he sent another:

WASHED OUT BELLY PAN AND PROP PLEASE SEND SPARES.

There were none to send, and Legg made no reply. The flier in the bush waited another couple of days and then had the Australian homesteader who was boarding him send another:

STILL GROUNDED HERE WHAT SHALL EYE DO? .

Legg, who had neither aircraft nor replacements, replied:

WHY DONT YOU MARRY AND SETTLE DOWN?

The lieutenant thereupon took part of the corrugated iron roof from the farmer's shed and made himself a new belly pan. He removed the propeller, drove to town and stood by while the local blacksmith hammered it roughly into shape. Then he flew the plane back. He was learning how wars are fought.

How far the Japanese used their stepping stone line of Versailles-acquired mandated islands for overwater hops by fighters is not certain. The consistent sinking of small Japanese mother ships for planes, and the frequent sight of destroyers with crated planes on their decks, seems to argue that few Zero pilots have ever had to face what the pilots and ground crew of the 17th faced in flying from eastern Australia to Java.

What is certain is this:

Just as no other bombers of any nation had previously moved by air distances even comparable to those flown by the B-17 and B-24 to their battlegrounds all over the globe, so no other fighters—and that goes for the Germans in Russia and the Italians in Ethiopia, the British in Africa and the Dutch in Borneo—and it also goes for the Flying Tigers in Burma—no substantial group of fighting planes had ever before traveled to battle so far under their power as did the 17th in its effort to save Java. If they had never brought down in flames a single Jap, if they had failed entirely to delay the enemy's onslaught, a forefinger

following on a map the crooked and death-strewn line of their travel would necessarily pause in awe at their achievement.

In another part of Australia a big transport plane was about to leave for Java with 24 "odds and sods" of servicemen. The colonel in charge accidentally learned that the fighters en route there in P-40s were going to leave without parachutes, because none had yet arrived.

"I don't order or even suggest that you give up your 'chutes," he said to his fellow passengers. "I merely put the situation before you, and ask you to do as you see fit."

Every man entered the transport, took the 'chute that was to have been his, carried it out and threw it on the fighter sector truck nearby. A 'chute was dropped at each fighter revetment. The fighters took off for the long seat-pounding race for Java, and there was a reassuring 'chute under every pilot.

The Japs were using Messerschmitt 110s for reconnaissance over the eastern chain of islands. Between Koepang and Waigapoe one of the flights coming from Australia met an ex-German scout.

The 'Schmitter, looking for easy game, tried to attack the old Philippine Beechcraft that with a veteran of the islands at the controls had been the bellwether of the file of P-40s to Java. Three itinerant fliers, stocky blond Hubert I. Egenes of Storey City, Illinois, Andrew J. ("Ray") Reynolds of Seminole, Oklahoma—a dogfighting expert in training school—and skinny, sharp featured Bob McWherter of Paris, Texas, who had practically fixed himself by landing in some cordwood in the Louisiana maneuvers, all lodged American fifty calibers in this Japanese-German. He fell into the Savu Sea, and the three troubadors landed at Soerabaya smiling, with one third of a Photo Joe each to whet their appetites.

But the route took its toll. Philip T. Metsker, a Chicago boy who had starred as a swimmer at Indiana University and worked for United Airlines in Los Angeles, lost his way trying to find the coral runway at Koepang and fell on February 9th in Timor.

Though Soerabaya was only a tree-top jump from Blimbing, the newcomers had to be guided in personally, because Blimbing was almost unfindable in the cushioned Javanese hills. Somebody always had to go over to Soerabaya to bring in the new boys. On the morning of February 7th, for example, Walt Coss and Jack Dale both flew over and brought back eight and four newcomers respectively, while Elwin Jackson of Glendale, California, brought back Muckley's wounded plane of the Bali encounter.

What had been the newcomers were now the oldtimers. They gave hints about what to do and what not to do. The food in the hotel at Djombang was terrible, but you weren't supposed to complain about it. Every third day or so you could go into Soerabaya and fill up on the delicious twenty course *Rijstaffel*. The unit of Dutch money was a guilder but it was never referred to by this name; it was always called a glider. And it glided away, just like that. At the Hotel Oranje, famous for its *rijstaffel*, Major Legg paid nine gliders, or about five dollars, to sleep in a room with a dozen strangers.

Nine new pilots brought the fighting strength of the squadron to twenty-two. They were (besides Egenes, Reynolds, McWherter and Jackson) blond and blue-eyed Wallace J. Hoskyn of Seattle, Lester J. Johnsen of South Bend, Washington (a gay sprite of Norwegian descent who had been a champion relay runner at Stanford), stocky Bernard J. Oliver of Prescott, Arizona, short, thin-haired James F. Ryan of Oklahoma and talkative little Roger H. Williams of Sterling City, Texas, of whom hangar fliers said, "That guy jumps around like spit on a hot stove."

Again one morning the old hands led by Sprague took off at ten past eleven to find a bomber that air direction control reported coming in over Soerabaya. This intruder proved to be a decoy, because five minutes later another flight led by Captain Coss took off to chase what was reported to be an enemy pursuit formation. Shortly after, two more flights, led by Captain Lane and Lieutenant Gerald McCallum of Rustow, Louisiana, went up from Blimbing. The whole movement was apparently a mistake, because no enemy activity whatever occurred over Soerabaya that day nor did the Seventeenth find either bombers or fighters after patrolling Soerabaya between twenty and twenty-four thousand feet for two hours. "I guess we must have been chasing ourselves," said one pilot as he pulled himself out of the cockpit. Actually the Japanese were testing the fighter defenses for their coming onslaughts.

In order to accommodate the new arrivals from Darwin a new field was ready. There was one thing the Dutch were rich in, and that was air fields. The field at Gnoro between Djombang and Soerabaya, about ten miles from Blimbing, became the second American field, not to be found by the Japs till the day of their landing.

As afternoon wore on Sprague received word that Eubank's fortresses were coming in from a raid against the Japanese bases, landing at 4 o'clock. Coss, Hennon, Kiser, Bill Stauter, of Hammond, Indiana, and

Joe Kruzel of Wilkes-Barre doubled back and laced the sky over Malang for about two hours until the big B-17s came over the mountains like trolley cars and landed.

The fighters were up and active by 6 o'clock on the morning of February 9th. Cy Blanton went to Soerabaya to bring back muscular Bill Turner of Lubbock and George W. Hynes of San Antonio, two wandering Texan lieutenants, to Gnoro, and tested the radio defenses en route.

Just before 11 o'clock the expected warning came.

Even when the air defense control was not working well, the Dutch were heartening to work with. They were full of fire and it was catching.

"Do you see them, fighters?" the call would come over the little phones in the cockpits in a strong Dutch accent. "Look a little north and east of where you are. Do you see them now?"

And whoever was leading the flights—Sprague, Coss, Dale, Lane, McCallum or Kiser—would answer: "Sure, we see them! Here we go."

And then the never-failing Dutch answer would come back, clear for everyone to hear:

"Luck to the fighters!"

(The Dutch said later, "We liked to hear them answer. They often said: 'Okey-doke! We see them.' And then we would say again: 'Luck to the Yanks! Luck to the fighters!'")

All four flights set off to meet the Japs. In the first there was Oliver, Blanton and Parker led by McCallum. Walt Coss led the second, with Gilmore and Hague behind him. Jackson, Kruzel and Williams were in the third led by Jack Dale, and "Kay" Kiser was boss of D flight with Hoskyn, Stauter and Ryan around him.

This time it was eighteen Mitsubishis. Williams was the first to sight them, but his "enemy bombers ahead" was not clearly heard by all the pilots, partly because the P-40s were scattered out to cover the square of danger as broadly as possible.

Five of the fighters got into the bombers, which split upon being attacked into two flights of nine each. The attack was made at 24,000 feet and Coss, Williams, Jackson and Hague all got in at least one pass, while McWherter, using tactics invented by himself, got in four. The left engine of one Mitsubishi began to smoke under McWherter's bullets, but cleared up again.

Then the Dutch lookouts reported that they saw a bomber go down

into the sea northwest of the naval yard. It was given to McWherter in view of his having made more passes than anyone else.

By this time the Seventeenth had its own bulletin board and Sprague had scribbled the total upon it. It read:

One Seversky

One Messerschmitt 110

Two Mitsubishi 96 heavy bombers

Three Zeros

On February 10th the fighters began to clear decks for action. Wasted hours of operation against non-existent bombers had to be eliminated. The proof thereof was that of twenty-three P40Es, only sixteen were in operation. Two more were added when Hennon and Egenes went over to Djember and brought back two ships that had been forced down there. But they were not ready for combat. Fighter planes are delicate creatures, even when as heavily armed and underhung as the P-40s. The red-headed major and Cy Blanton spent a half hour each of early daylight testing the Dutch radio checking system and trying to screw up the loose places.

Even more P-40s were on their way, this time including several veterans of the Philippines, led by the slim, handsome Grant Mahoney of Vallejo, California. Most of them had fought against shoals of Zeros and bombers in the Philippines. Mahoney had once done a double circuit around a Philippine mountain in order to escape a whole flight of faster Zeros.

They came in and landed at Pasirian. Two ships, those of Lieutenant Quanah "Chief" P. Fields and Frank Adkins, could not be flown from Pasirian, suffering not from the usual travel ailments but from a belly landing and a nose up. But there were seven that landed at Gnoro: Mahoney and Lieutenants Robert S. Johnson of Mesa, Arizona, Robert B. Dockstader of Long Beach, California, Eugene A. Wahl of Indianapolis, Harold G. Lund of San Francisco, Ben S. Irvin of Washington, Georgia, and Morris C. "Jock" Caldwell of Tokio.

Yes, Tokio.

Jock Caldwell was one of the most interesting of the newcomers. He was an old China hand. He spoke Japanese. He had taught at the University of Tokio, but had dropped being a college instructor to go back to the States and enter the army. He was an ideal intelligence officer, but he insisted upon fighting, too. And in those days in Java you could have your way. Anybody who wanted a crack at the Japs could take it.

The day of this big arrival Hague celebrated by attacking a flight of Jap bombers trying to raid the fortresses at Malang. He chopped himself a Mitsubishi out of the raiders.

The next day, February 12th, the fighters went up to Malang and patrolled over the main fortress field there and awaited enemy bombers that were expected over. The bombers never appeared.

The squadron was feeling its strength and was eager for battle. There were now 47 officers, including two transport pilots and two Dutch liaison officers. There were three Dutch radiomen but only 81 American ground crewmen—less than two to a plane. Two pilots were still marooned in Bali and two were in a Soerabaya hospital.

It was sixty miles to Soerabaya, and the enlisted men went to town whenever they could borrow a jeep, or a truck. Once in Soerabaya, as Perry said: "When you wanted to go somewhere, you gave a native boy a Dutch five cent piece to hail a taxi, then you hung onto your hat and prayed, while the driver drove through streets crowded with hundreds of bicycles, oxcarts, and pedestrians at a pace twice as fast as the traffic would permit. A driver that honked his horn first had the right of way. The horn was continually blaring and beeping and many times two taxis could not come to an agreement on who hit the horn first.

"We had learned by this time to pay the driver, then turn and walk off. We used to ask them: 'How much?' and paid them according to the number of fingers they held up. It was usually four times too much, and the Dutch people told us the average rate was a guilder an hour. So after that we would pay them what we thought it was worth and walk off. They never got underpaid.

"We learned other things about associating with natives. Another thing was: Never give a native beggar money. Many times syphilitic beggars would approach us for money, and finally a young Dutch soldier told us to tell them in no uncertain terms to be on their way. 'The government takes care of them,' he said. He told us to say *pikki!* when they came around. Pronounced *peegy*, it meant 'Get the hell outa here.' They knew very well what it meant; they were used to it.

"One night a couple of us went to a native stage show. Against a background of fantastically weird, unforgettable music, on a stage elaborately decorated with beautiful curtains and brilliant colors, native actors, dressed in the most luxurious of costumes, acted with grotesque and exaggerated motions, telling the old story of the eternal triangle. Man's wife has another man; man kills other man in a terrific sword fight. It was the most amazing thing I had ever seen, and I knew I

would never forget it. A Dutch friend translated the words of the actors to us as best he could, so we were able to follow the story quite well. It was fascinating and alone paid for all the discomforts we had had before. I will never be able to forget the beauty and luxury—for natives—of the spectacle. A movie could never reproduce it."

Lincoln's Birthday was a big day for the 17th Pursuit, because important visitors were coming. They were billed in advance only as more P-40Es, but they turned out to be A-25s. They dove fast, all right, but you had to start pulling them out of the dive so far from the ground that your bombing was liable to be inaccurate. The A-25s were destined to take part in the first dive bombing raid in the history of the United States army. The writer was on the field at Malang to watch this inaugural effort, described later herein.

The wet fields, due to the monsoon rains—which lasted intermittently all the afternoon and much of the evening—were causing as much trouble as the lack of prepared facilities for repairing the temperamental Kittys. For example, when the hydraulic system in the plane of Lieutenant Ray Thompson of Leona, Texas, gave out, he flew up to the auxiliary fortress base at Madioen, another big and elaborate Dutch bomber field used by only a half dozen American fortresses. The field was flooded, and skiddy. Thompson's wheels swung around and threw him into a truck, killing a Javanese and wiping out the Kitty. Thompson, unhurt, motored back to Blimbing.

The squadron now had 24 flyable planes for its 47 pilots, and 7 more under repair. This single squadron comprised the only fighter force-in-being to protect an island of forty million people against the assault of the empire of Japan. The ground men puttered and adjusted and soon there were two more Kittys ready to fight.

The Japs, however, having tested Soerabaya's fighting strength, had apparently decided to postpone their bombing activities in the eastern part of Java in order to concentrate upon the situation at the west created by the fall of Singapore. At this time the Japs were already nearly a week on Singapore island, and the overcrowded garrison, with its backs to the sea and the wharves, knew that it was doomed.

Timing two blows to fall at once, the Japs prepared their parachutists on the western side of Borneo for an airborne attack across the Bangka Straits against Palembang, home of the Dutch and American oil refineries in Sumatra. Already the Japanese invasion fleet had left the Anambas islands in the South China Sea, and ignoring burning

Singapore, was feeling its way southward to reach Palembang.

A mixed naval force of American, Dutch, and British destroyers and cruisers was hunting for this force in the waters between Sumatra and Borneo, but had to steal its way by day because the Japanese bombers shuttling across between Borneo and the Bangka Straits—having already destroyed some of the finest coastal vessels that ever dropped anchor at Singapore—were in control of the waters around Bangka and Billiton islands, where the convoy had to pass to attack Palembang.

Of all this the men of the Seventeenth Pursuit knew nothing. But on the night of February 14th, during the afternoon of which the canopies of Jap parachutes first mushroomed in the blue sky over Palembang's oil refineries, Sprague was summoned to Bandoeng, headquarters of the joint American-British-Dutch-Australian command.

When Bud Sprague took off from Blimbing on Sunday morning at 6:30 two ugly things were happening.

(1) An officer with a white flag from the camp of Lieutenant General A. E. Percival had asked for terms for the surrender of Singapore from General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and a sad cavalcade of defeat was on its way to the Ford factory on the northern flank of Singapore island and

(2) The Japanese invasion fleet from the Anambas islands had reached the mouth of the Moesi River and started up toward Palembang, co-ordinating its attack with the parachutists who were struggling with the Dutch ground forces for possession of Palembang's two great refineries.

The airdromes at Palembang, called familiarly P1 and P2, were already deserted. Although the Dutch eventually wiped out every one of the Jap parachutists, the godowns of Palembang's Chinatown were burning in a great fire of which the refineries of Standard and Shell were the tinder. On the Sunday previously the Japanese had caught on the ground most of three squadrons of Hurricanes that had escaped the fate of those burned on the Singapore docks, and destroyed them, too.

If fighter planes were to defend the skies over Java, it would have to be those of the 17th. Of the handful that had reached Batavia for the RAF about six had been assembled. The RAF had lost most of its records and nearly all its procedure books for the Hurricane in Singapore and Palembang. In the backyards of cottages around the Batavia airdrome, raided sometimes at high noon by the Jap low level strafers, the British mechanics were assembling Hurricanes at a rate of one every

24 hours. It was like whittling out a wooden gun to halt a task force.

Even as Bud Sprague landed in Bandoeng and stepped into a staff car to be run to the Wavell-Brett headquarters at Lembang, the Dutch pilot ship at the mouth of the Moesi, overcome by scores of heavily gunned Japanese water craft, flashed its signal of goodbye. Defenseless before the Japanese amphibious force, the little harbor craft went down at its post.

Sumatra was falling, and it was up to the Americans to do something about it.

But Palembang, for a P-40, was many tactical miles away, around the elbow angle of Java, Sunda Strait and Sumatra.

At Lembang in the air operations' room, "a special mission" was mounted, with Sprague aiding the plan. An order was flashed to Blimbing.

At Blimbing the first team of the Seventeenth Pursuit took off for Batavia. Two hours later they landed.

The manager of the Hotel des Indes at Batavia could accept no more guests. The dining room was closed at nine o'clock. There was no more food. Well, perhaps he could get some food. But there was no room; there was positively no room. All the hotels in Batavia were overcrowded. There were so many refugees, from Singapore and Sumatra. There were British refugees, Dutch refugees, American refugees from the big ship that tried to leave Padang and was bombed before it got its anchors up. The manager would be glad to help if he **could**, but he could not eject guests from their rooms. The crew of the American fortress would have to go elsewhere.

The Seventeenth Pursuit was not too pleased at being called a bomber crew. The point of view of a fighter pilot toward a bomber is sometimes—though not always—like that of a despatch rider toward a brigadier's chauffeur. The Indies, delighted by the long range raids of the fortresses against Sungei Patani and Kuala Lumpur in northern and middle Malaya, had gone a little fortress crazy. In Soerabaya the Dutch women knitted sweaters for the "Yankee fighters," whom they had seen fighting overhead; in Batavia, however, people thought that the Seventeenth Pursuit was just some little adjunct of the B-17s.

(The fortresses served their uses to the "Forties," though. When Stauter got his flying jacket riddled and his messkit shot up—at Blimbing men and officers lined up together, tin pans and cup in hand—and there were no replacements, an enlisted man thought of an errand over at the bombers' field at Singosari. **He came back with a new**

jacket and shining mess gear. The bigger the bombers the more they have of everything. From him that hath should be taken away. Fighters are fundamentally predatory.)

The boys who had come in to the des Indes were too tired to tell the manager they were fighters. They were grimy with the long dirty flight from Soerabaya. They had no ground men of their own to service their planes. Batavia was a strange and dark city, and everything was closed.

On the way over, the eight pilots—Bud Sprague was to meet them in Batavia—had actually stopped at Madoen to get themselves transformed into bomber pilots at this sub-field of the fortresses. Bending the makeshift bomb catches a little here, manipulating a little there, they somehow managed to attach to the wings of each plane four twenty kilo bombs, presents for Palembang, and set out and made Batavia. Most of all they wanted to get out of their clothes and get into bed.

This time the lineup was Captains Coss and Mahoney, with Egenes, Kiser, Joe Kruzel of Wilkes-Barre, Hennon, McCallum and Muckley. Muckley, however, put himself out of the running, cracking up his Kitty on the unfamiliar Batavia field.

An American war correspondent,¹ one of those who maintained simultaneous quarters in Soerabaya, Bandoeng and Batavia, heard that a "fortress crew" were in the dining room of the Hotel des Indes. It seemed like a lot of men even for a fortress. He went in and sat down with them. They looked tired and he asked them where they were going to sleep. They replied: "It looks as though we'll have to go back to the field and sleep under the plane." The American correspondent went to the manager, who said he could do nothing. Then the correspondent began to move things around.

First he wandered through the darkened rear arcades of the des Indes to the door of big Bill Dunn of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, who looks so much like Hermann Goering that few can believe him to be a son of a midwestern minister. Bill was sharing a room with Sydney Albright of NBC. While the fighter pilots were finishing up their rice and chicken the three correspondents set out to prowl the dark arcades of the Hotel des Indes. In some rooms there were two beds and only one person sleeping. In some rooms there was no one, the army or navy officer incumbent having gone up to the mountains to Bandoeng to confer with the ABDA command.

¹George Weller of the *Chicago Daily News*.

Where there was a single vacant bed, it was quietly commandeered. Where there were double beds, and only one occupied, the man who hired the room for his exclusive use woke up to find himself rooming with a war correspondent. And the fighter pilots moved into the rooms of the war correspondents themselves.

You could hardly tell the leader of the raid from his officers, except by his red hair. None of them wore any insignia of rank. They all looked like a tug-of-war team at the end of a fraternity picnic. They were not too dirty or tired, however, not to be curious where they were going. When the correspondents told them of the 'chutists over Palembang one said: "Oh—oh, so that's it."

It was.

Mahoney, being Irish, stayed up a little longer than the others, and so did the slit-eyed and quiet Coss. Mahoney told how Coss had escaped the Zeros over the northern shore of Luzon. It was just after one of his pals, dying, had signed a statement that he had been machine gunned after bailing out.

When the Zeros caught Coss their first bullets chopped into his tail, then bit into his cooling system.

Coss climbed over the side and bailed out, but kept his clenched finger on his rip cord without pulling. When the waves began to look toothy and white, he had to open up. The canopy snapped out just in time.

The Zero chased him down to the water and the canopy lit flapping on the waves beside him. Coss struggled out of his yellow swimming jacket as the Jap's bullets began to eat into the canopy.

His lungs were suffering. But he dove under, hearing the rap of bullets on the water.

When he came up there were holes in both parachute and yellow vest. Every time the Jap dived, Coss dived. Finally he reached the beach at Aparri and walked all the way around to Baguio, where he reported for duty again.

Mahoney could not be induced to talk about his Philippine days, but finally one of the things that happened to him was pulled out little by little.

It seems that as soon as the Japs got their hands on Legaspi field in Northern Luzon they began trying to jam the radio communications of the American fighters which were engaged in interception there. They used the former American radio at Legaspi field to do this.

Mahoney knew the station well, and was even acquainted with the

Filipino who, before the Japs came, had lived in the small shack by the field with his family. Mahoney decided to eliminate the jamming nuisance by a one man raid.

Dodging around bays and valleys he managed safely to reach the field. He came down on the radio shack in a howling, house clearing dive.

"What happened was like one of those old two reelers of Mack Sennett's that we used to go see as kids on Saturday afternoons," he said, grinning a little. "Remember? The first shot would be just a telegraph pole standing on a street corner. Then the head of a cop would stick out from behind the pole. Then he would put out his whole torso and look around. Then he would step out himself. Then he would go back behind the telegraph pole and ride out on a motor cycle. Then he would beckon to someone behind the pole. Finally a whole patrol wagon full of cops would ride out in a big open truck, all waving their nightsticks and yelling—all of them coming from that one skinny telegraph pole.

"It was like that when I dived on the Legaspi radio shack. The Japs came pouring out of that little building first by ones and twos, then by half dozens, then by what looked like scores. Maybe I'm exaggerating, but it certainly looked to me like at least a hundred of them came out the windows and through the doors and went tearing down the hill to take cover in fox holes.

"As soon as I began my dive their AA gunners began winking little lights at me from over in the corner of the field. I turned away, but they kept on winking at me.

"I dove down to swing over the trees. What should I see tucked away very cutely in a corner of the drome but twelve big bombers of the kind that were hitting Cavite, about 28 Zeros, and a Lockheed transport of the kind the Japs bought from us before the war to use as a model for construction.

"I thought: *This is mine*. I was just putting my stick over to go for them when I took a quick look up just to be sure everything was all right.

"Everything was not all right. There were four Zeros standing straight up and down, falling on my tail as perpendicularly as rain-drops.

"I swung over toward the parked bombers and fighters, leading the reception committee out of the line of their dive.

"We reached a place over the aircraft about the same time, and

everybody was shooting, the Japs at me, and I at the Mitsubishis and fighters. I don't know whose bullets did more damage to the aircraft. But they hardly touched me.

"I went over Mount Mayan, and they were still chasing me. They could do everything better and faster than I could and I thought I was a goner.

"I decided to try to confuse them by playing ring around a rosy. The mountain is about a mile high and has a perfect cone shaped peak like a giant pylon. I went around it twice, while they hunted me in both directions. But they got so confused guessing which was themselves and which was me that I was able the second time around to slip down to tree top level and make a getaway through the valleys."

Mahoney's escape ended with one of those cops and robbers tallyhos of chase and subterfuge so dear to Sennett's heart. And it had a happy ending. He got away.

"Kay" Kiser, the dark haired kid who had studied pharmacy before he got wings—known to the records as George F. Kiser of Somerset, Kentucky—had served a year in the Philippines. His first fight there was like this:

"I was on a reconnaissance mission, flying over a little buoy along the coast when a single Nip seaplane came up on my tail. I was so busy looking everywhere else I didn't see him until I heard his guns going.

"He was way out of range and didn't hit me. So I made a chandelle and went for him, both of us firing headon at each other. But I had instructions not to dogfight with anyone on reco mission, so I dived away and went about my business.

"I'm flying along like this when I catch up to a Nip flying an old type pursuit ship, and heading in the same direction. Well, I had my instructions, but hell! I couldn't just let him go like that. So I pulled up and had a shot at him. He did a shallow turn to the left, firing at me until he burst into flames."

The weather was misty with monsoon clouds and rain the next morning, a providential consideration for the Japanese unloading their barges at Palembang. Monday was ugly weather too. Over the low land between Batavia and its port of Tanjong Priok, whose canals gave it a strange resemblance to Holland, a low soft mist lay upon the rice fields and the godowns. For the P-40s it was no use taking off to find a place one had never seen, under weather where the landing

parties could not be observed even if one knew where they were.

But the delay meant that the Japs would have established their fighter protection on P1, Palembang's fighter 'drome where most of the British Hurricanes had been destroyed a week before the parachutists fell upon Palembang.

It was a little after 7:30 on the morning of Tuesday, February 17th when Sprague's fighters, himself at their head, looked down on Sumatra. Eight Japanese fighters met the Seventeenth as the Americans came in from the Java Sea, taking their approach from the lie of the River Moesi.

This time the Japs had no bombers to protect, only a safely landed party. The Americans were at a disadvantage. They had bombers to protect. The bombers were themselves. On the last day in Madioen they had become dive bombers.

Fortunately the Jap fighters were not Zeros, but Nakajima 97s. This plane is a low-winged monoplane with cuff pants on its wheels. It is used principally for ground strafing, scouting and light bombing jobs, such as troops on a tropical highway.

Six of these 97s came in on the heavily laden Kittyhawks. Bud Sprague shook off the weight of his bombs, and Coss, McCallum, Kruzel and Egenes got rid of their own to fight as the 97s closed. Egenes coolly made a good bombing run first.

Sprague got one 97 immediately. McCallum and Kruzel, now feeling light as angels, went into the 97s with their fingers on the button. Two more 97s went down.

The 97s did not blow up like a Zero in a puffball of flame; they fell away smoking like matches fallen to the ground.

Mahoney had already led the dive down onto the Japanese ships in the river. His bombs fell away among the landing barges on the Moesi bank. He lightened his wings of machine gun bullets, and emptied his cannon. Meantime Egenes was perforating another Nakajima.

Kentucky "Kay" Kiser wanted to be in on both strikes, fighting and bombing too. Even though he knew what would happen if a Jap bullet should hit one of his bombs he went in among the three 97s that were left. He held greedily to his bombs.

He got the cone of his fire leading one of the 97s the right number of inches and sawed him apart. Then he threw rudder and stick around, peeled off and went down among the river craft with his bombs. Happily he distributed them on the Japanese barges.

The Seventeenth were satisfied when they got back to Batavia. Sprague had brought everybody home. They were no longer merely a defensive force; they saw they had punitive power, too.

The divebombing of Palembang had been a peculiar mission for fighters. But it was typical of the shoestring methods that were necessary then to stop the leaky Dutch dike, towards which the waters released by the fall of the dam of Singapore were now rushing.

Meantime, while Sprague had been leading his pilots over the smoking refineries of Palembang, things had been happening at the two home fields of Soerabaya. The Dutch handed over operation of the interceptor control at Soerabaya to Major William P. Fisher. This transfer was made with the best of good will on both sides. Bill Fisher was an alert, physically slight officer who had been with the American bomber command in Manila. His P-40 had suffered motor trouble when he started out from Darwin after escaping from the Philippines, and finally he had come up in a B-17.

By this time there were no Dutch Brewster fighters at Soerabaya that were capable of being sent up against the Zeros. Cavite had fallen. Singapore had fallen. The defense of the only naval base that remained in allied hands was up to the American fighters.

The change did not remedy the basic need of a radar. The Japs possessing Palembang, were ready to go to work on the eastern half of the pincers round Java. In spite of their daily reconnaissance flights over Soerabaya to check up on what American submarines and other craft were in the harbor, they did not intend to strike Soerabaya yet with full force.

The Dutch bases at Ambon and Koepang in Timor, meant to defend the Indies as far east as Guinea, were already swept clear of fighters. Furthermore a Japanese aircraft carrier had crept down into the Arafura Sea, and was awaiting a chance to strike Darwin.

The Japs were preparing, on this eastern arm of the greater outside pincers embracing Borneo and Australia, a raid against Darwin that was to be one of the most terrible and tragic of the war.

The Japanese plan was to begin at the outside and work across the stepping stones of islands from Darwin through Timor, Sembawa and Bali to Soerabaya. The intention was slowly to cut off Java from the eastern or Australian side, stop the flow of fighters at their source, and cut off in Java and the whole crammed bag of forces withdrawn from Singapore, of military and civilian refugees.

In this scheme the Japs were in general successful.

The Allies had anticipated this plan in part, but not completely. The American aircraft tender *Langley*, formerly an aircraft carrier but now possessing only 60% of its original flight deck, had already left Darwin and gone to Fremantle. From Fremantle it was due to sail with 32 more Kittyhawks and 32 pilots destined for Burma. Some of these planes had been flown across the South Australian desert by pilots led by Buzz Wagner, who had lost the toss with Sprague for command of the Seventeenth.

The line of the *Langley's* course from Fremantle and Colombo was close enough to Java so that if necessary the *Langley* could turn off toward Java and drop her fighters there. This was what she eventually attempted to do, when her Burma-bound orders were changed in the Indian Ocean after Van Mook's intercession with Roosevelt in Washington.

The Japs usually sent off their bombers from Kendari in the southeastern Celebes—possibly also from Balikpapan in eastern Borneo—and allowed the Zero fighters, with their belly tanks hung beneath, to overtake the bombers somewhere over the target. At that time there was enough nickel in Japan so that belly tanks could be made of an alloy rather than the plywood which appeared in later campaigns.

Japanese timing of attack was excellent. One noonday in this same week the writer saw four Zeros run off a beautiful criss cross play on the airdrome at Batavia, piercing the warning system completely and raking the Hurricanes and Brewsters on the field with two 90° sweeps within two minutes of each other. But this day of attack on Soerabaya, for once, the Japanese timing did not function perfectly, and the new Dutch-American warning system did.

Japan, winding up her left arm for Darwin, threw only nine heavies at Soerabaya with her right.

The heavies were punctual in arrival over Java, but the Zeros were late. It was the first case of poor Jap planning.

Because Bud Sprague was in Bandoeng, Cy Blanton, who came from Earlsboro, Oklahoma and was very proud of it, got his chance to play quarterback.

Cy was a boy with thin blond hair and a tremendously friendly manner. He was a little older than the others, and that was why he got the call to lead the squadron into battle.

The Japanese bombers were caught in the unhappy position of having their arrival forewarned adequately for the first time, without their fighters having yet reached the rendezvous. The first flights left

Blimbing and Gnoro at quarter past 11, zipping down the field with their tails high and leaping up over the terraced rice fields. Even Mahoney, the first to get back from Palembang, got himself into the scramble.

When the Japanese bombers saw them and knew their own nakedness without fighters they must have breathed whatever is the Japanese farewell to the flesh. For they were about to become gods, and they must have known it.

What happened in that melee of spitting machine guns was this:

The Japs knew that they could not turn away. Blanton led the four flights in, and got his own bomber immediately. His was the lead bomber, and it fell in smoke.

The formation began to break up.

The Japs were in the position of flying toward the sun and toward Soerabaya, with more enemies concealed in each than they could see or guess at. Almost every Kittyhawk got in one, two or three passes at the bombers. The Japanese turret and belly gunners fought back, but there were simply too many P-40s around them.

Following Blanton's attack, Ben S. Irvin of Washington, Georgia, followed by his friend Edwin C. Gilmore, who flew a plane on which the legend "Drummer Boy," with drum and sticks, had been painted by his armorer, Sergeant Foy, got on the tails of the Mitsubishis and began cutting them to pieces. Mahoney, rather drawn and tired from Palembang, went in, too.

"We could see them running around inside the bombers," said one of the pilots later. "If they possessed parachutes, they would have used them then. They knew they were burning."

What happens inside a Japanese bomber when attacked like this? What happens to the hard morale and the desire for self-sacrifice for the Emperor?

Ordinarily it would be pretty hard to say. The processes of the Japanese mind are alien to ours. But one of the principal diversions of fighter pilots is listening to each other's radios, and it so happens that a Japanese-speaking American naval aviator who listened in on one such conversation during the battles over the Pacific is able to furnish us with a pretty good idea of what goes on inside the bomber.

This American fighter pilot dived in upon a bomber and set it aflame and had the unusual experience of overhearing—and understanding—what the Japanese commander said to the tail gunner. It went like this:

Pilot: "We have been hit. We are burning. For the eternal honor of the Emperor and the glory of Japan I am about to cause this plane to dive upon that American warship down there."

Tail Gunner: "I don't care what you are going to do for the honor of Japan and the glory of the Emperor, but this plane is burning and I am going to leave it by parachute immediately."

If any conversations like that went on in the nine burning bombers that fell outside Soerabaya that day the Seventeenth did not know about them.

Yes, nine. The Dutch counted them all falling and saw them coming flaming down. At least 45 Japanese crewmen fell to death. Fuchs and Williams got their first officially credited bombers.

Another nine bombers were reported approaching Soerabaya, apparently ignorant of what happened to their predecessors. But by this time the twelve tardy Zeros that were to have furnished "cover underneath" had appeared, and rolled into the Americans in a wildcat fight.

Jock Caldwell, flying in close as usual, had several tail trifles of his plane (what is called in flying language, *empennage*) entirely shot away. It happened this way:

The Japs were flying a stepdown formation of nine bombers in line, each tailgunner in the staircase protecting the belly of the bomber above. To attack meant to face the concentrated fire of all the tail gunners. Caldwell, the student of the Orient, whose perfect physique had given the name of "Little Tarzan," decided to attack.

He made his way straight down the staircase. He set the top bomber afire, and the bottom one. The staircase lost its upper and lowermost treads; they fell away in flame and smoke into the sea. The staircase flew on. But the massed fire of the staircase had hit the P-40. Jock stretched his dive to take him over the rice paddies, and bailed out. Somebody saw him; someone else picked him up.

Caldwell got a severely wrenched back out of his two bombers. Nevertheless he often helped his armorer plugging in cartridges. He did not smoke or drink himself, and when he heard that the merry McNeil was slightly awash, whether at the Trocadero in Brisbane or the Shanghai, the Cafe Royal or (till the Japs hit it with a bomb) the Tiptop Cafe in Soerabaya, he would find a rickshaw or taxi, whatever the hour of day or night, and bring the errant home.

Caldwell was the one to whom the squadron looked for its slight political education, because he had been brought up in China, and taught and studied in Japan. "I've seen Japs at war for five years and

I know what to expect from them as enemies," he used to say. "That's why I want you to be a good soldier as well as a good armorer," he would tell McNeil. On his own exploits, Caldwell was non-committal.

Of his parachute jump after being shot at by the nine Jap bombers Caldwell said merely: "I found I was in the cockpit, falling to pieces, but still indicating 450 an hour. I tried to get out, and the slipstream pushed me back. I decided it was all over and that I might as well let it happen. Then I thought: 'What the hell, let's have another try.' That time I managed to get out."

Although himself a teetotaler, Caldwell was no absolute puritan. He had McNeil paint the names of girls he knew on his wing guns. They read, left to right, Lois, Beatrice, Helen, and on the smoky other wing Elizabeth, Ruth and Lavelle. "Beatrice jammed up on me today," he would say after landing, pulling back his canopy. "Beatrice always was a bitch," McNeil would answer. . . . The Jap thinks of the Anglo-Saxon, particularly the American, as weakly luxurious. But there are reasons why a pilot may name his guns after women that are not purely affectionate.

That day Jock, who was just 23 years old, earned the Silver Star that General Brett was to give him. "Little Tarzan's" armorer, square-built Sergeant Lewis C. McNeil of Lubbock, Texas, was not the only member of the squadron for whom Caldwell was an unforgettable leader. There is a tendency, after death strikes a group of fliers, to elevate those who have offered their lives, and to give them in death an influence in the squadron's life that they did not possess except by reminiscence. Such artificial reverence was not the lot of Jock Caldwell. Although he never became squadron leader, he might very likely have carried that responsibility. He was perhaps the most respected officer in the squadron.

* * *

The Japanese bomber rarely bursts into flames immediately on attack. Instead the motors begin to smoke. The head of the bomber droops as though weary. The glossed-in nose sinks, nods drunkenly.

Rarely does the fire spread. But the smoke from the engines gets thicker. The nose of the fuselage seems to get heavier and heavier, nods lower and lower, until the bomber slopes away obliquely, sags and droops until it passes the oblique angle and becomes perpendicular. Then it goes down, straight down. When it begins to fall, the first flames are born.

Four were flaming as they fell.

This was the first time that the American pilots, free of the buzzing Zeros, were able to meet the bombers on something the same terms as the Japanese fighter pilots met the fortresses over Macassar, Palembang and central Malaya. The fortresses were unescorted; this time, although it was unintentional, the Japanese bombers were also fighterless.

As far as this correspondent has been able to keep record, this was the first time in the Pacific war that Japs failed to provide top or bottom cover for their bombers by daylight.

Even over Singapore, when the Japanese were positive that they had grounded all but a scattered residue of Hurricanes, they never failed to send a protective sheet of fighters across the island under the blanket of bombers. The Japanese commander is a good top sergeant; when he knows the bottom sheet of fighters is already on the bed, he always separates his blanket of bombers with another sheet of fighters. Sometimes he puts another sheet on top of the blanket, just to be sure that nothing gets close to those precious bombers, whose defensive armament is so light.

When you lose Zero pilots, as the Japs figure, you lose nothing. You simply throw butterflies into a furnace. But when you lose bomber crews you lose a *team* of men. And however much fighters may protect and use their interphones, there is far more team play required within the big and complicated mechanism of the bomber than in the wasplike fighter.

An attack by fighters starts orderly and ends disorderly; there are only about two seconds when interplay counts (though some commanders believe formations can and should be drawn up again.) A bomber crew is functioning as a team from the moment it leaves the airdrome, and the battle itself is only an accentuated form of that team play.

The bomber cannot dodge; each bomber is a Greek phalanx in the air, the phalanx crew within each fuselage is only a part of the greater phalanx of the bomber formation itself. If Lemuel Watertown of Mean Money, Arkansas, tail gunner in a new B-17, happens to have his mind on something else when he should be watching the sky, it's just as bad luck for his whole formation as well as for his crew. Setso Hayakami, Jap radioman, who may have gone to Hollywood High School before being yanked back to Japan, is handicapped in the same way.

The difference between the gunners of American bombers and the

gunners of Japanese bombers is that American gunners have to take handling Zeros as a matter of course, and have learned to rely upon their own fire power. The Japanese bomber crews have not yet been pushed to this point, because the Japanese air generals have followed—necessarily—the principle of not sending their bombers where they could not be accompanied by Zeros.

Seen over a long range of time, this appears to be a good way to conserve bomber reserves and keep crews intact. It is sometimes called the Seversky system, because this exponent of the independent air force also was one of the first to rationalize the idea of the fighter ranging equal distances with the bomber it accompanies. (His theory was later modified into advocacy of the self-protected, long range super-bomber.)

The Seversky system is ideal for a nation like Japan, to which Ambassador Grew correctly applied the adjective "frugal." The equi-range fighter-bomber plan is frugal. The fighters get no bigger; they merely carry more fuel slung underneath in their nacelle shaped tanks.

The big economy comes in the size of the bombers, and their equipment. The bombers cut down on armament and defensive armor, while increasing the proportionate bombload. Although the Jap bombers do have machine gun blisters and tail gunners, their fire power is relatively weak compared with the B-17 and B-24. This means that they can be built much smaller, effecting great economies of metal, and still carrying an efficient bombload. For night raiding they can do just as good a job—providing no night fighters arise to meet them—as the big American bombers.

The Seversky system, then, is ideal for the small hard hitting nation which is short of raw materials, but hopes to get them by the stab-in-the-back method. If she can catch her enemy bending, as the army unadornedly puts it, and can get her sources of raw materials, she may be able to change over to the big bomber plan of production when she enters her defensive phase.

But the Seversky system is harder to work out than it sounds. There are rendezvous difficulties. A fighter must be built to fly fast; a bomber, however fast in the pinches, cannot cruise long distances at fighter speeds. Therefore the two planes cannot start together; they must rendezvous. And anyone who has tried to make a rendezvous in the sky, even by good weather and broadest daylight and predetermined altitudes, knows how difficult it can be.

Another difficulty with the Japanese system when it faces a fully

alert and equally armed enemy is the number of imponderables that go into computing fuel for the fighters. Britain lost most of her Hurricanes in the battle of Crete through their being based in Africa and falling into the sea halfway home, or even within sight of their own beaches, because fighting over Malemi had used up their homing fuel. When the Japs tried to raid Darwin by day after American fighters and American warning planes had been put into operation there, the same thing happened; the Zeros, chased to sea by the P-40s of Brigadier General Paul B. Wurtsmith, fell like the dry and weary flies of autumn into the Timor Sea.

In other words, the Seversky system, with which the Japs *opened* their war, places almost the whole burden on the Zero pilot. When good planes and fast-working warning systems put him to the test, the disadvantages of interdependence begin to show up.

Fortresses, Liberators and even Super-fortresses have taken their occasional lickings. But they have initiated a new period of commerce-raiding, self-protected heavy bombers which, operating like submarines of the air, can go by daylight anywhere along the enemy's coasts—anywhere, that is, except actually within the circle of his anti-aircraft fringed harbors—and persecute any unescorted freighter or transport ship. This commerce-raiding, also effective in knocking out isolated enemy dumps and garrisons where inadequate anti-aircraft is present, is something that the Japs cannot do.

It was entirely possible, until Germany yielded, that the Japanese might, given their great new riches, have evolved a heavily armed long range bomber—Germany could have given Japan her Focke-Wulf *Kurier* plans, for example, as she did her Messerschmitt designs—but at the turn of the war in the south Pacific the Japanese had still not disclosed any long range, heavily armed bomber to compare with those made by American workers. Japan was still raiding at sea with light float planes and the big two and four motored Kawanisi flying boats, both so vulnerable that they did not dare to approach hostile shores except by night.

Bomber crews want fighters overhead whenever they can get them; it is difficult to be in the middle of a bombing run over the little smoking volcano at Rabaul and to be attacked and to keep on the target while fighting off a hornet swarm of Zeros.

But whereas at the beginning of the war the bombers were asking, sometimes a little querulously, for fighter escort both ways to any targets that fighters could reach, toward its end all they asked was pro-

tection when actually making their bombing runs. Give them peace for these three minutes, and the 50 calibers would take care of the Zeros the rest of the time.

So much for the contrasted views of Jap and American bombing techniques. We liked fighter protection; they had to have it, or their bomber force would melt away.

For better or worse the Japs, in preparing their plans of conquest, used the Seversky idea of the long range fighter protecting the long range bomber. When the fighters start dropping belly tanks to fight in defense of the bombers, their fuel margin gets narrow even though their first intake is from the belly tank. This cascade of torpedoes—"it's raining Jap bellytanks," the Seventeenth's pilots used to say—occurs at the end of extreme range of the mission, and just when the fighter is avidly pulling gasoline for fighting speed.

Japan, during her offensive phase, bet everything on interdependence. She could have shifted, as America did, to independently armored, self-defending bombers, during her defensive phase, when she was better able to pay the price in raw materials of the huge bomber. But Germany fell before she could take advantage of the Luftwaffe's losses in the Battle of Britain, which resulted in the shift to the big 4-motored *Kurier*.

When, the afternoon after the big morning interception under Blanton's leadership, the Palembang force came back home to Blimbing, there were handshakes given and taken. The little force had tried to plug two places in the Dutch dike 600 miles apart. That it was intact, and had caused the enemy loss, was reason for satisfaction.

So far the score in favor of the Seventeenth definitely confirmed and ascertained—which meant watching them all the way down to the water—was 4 Zeros, 4 97s, one Messerschmitt 110, and 15—officially credited—heavy bombers.

It was impossible for the Seventeenth to intercept the raids that occurred over the middle of Java. Java was simply too big for a single dwindling squadron to hold everybody off everywhere. They were stopping everything thrown at Soerabaya, when they had time to climb up high enough. With more planes they might even have protected Batavia and Bandoeng, at the other end of the 600-mile island.

But the Japs had to strike Soerabaya again and again, regardless of loss. The moment was coming for the big attempt to break the life-line of the barrier islands. Soerabaya was the last unburned hangar of allied air strength. Soerabaya had to be silenced.

There were times when the Seventeenth sought Soerabaya to forget Blimbing. At Blimbing there were planes with 400 hours on them that should have been taken down 200 hours earlier. You shouted at the coolies all day as they rolled the big gasoline drums across the field, and you watched to see that the gas did not dribble onto the field as they pumped, their brown backs running with sweat. The planes had brakes that were worn out; the tachometers were gone or broken. "Wild Man" Morehead, wild no longer, was the thrifty armament officer who kept reminding the armorers as he walked in the sun from revetment to revetment: "Save every loose round. We might not get any more. The ammo isn't coming through from Australia. Keep looking around the grass and pick up any lost rounds you can see. Never let a round get corroded. We need every round. We might never get any more."

We might never get any more . . . we won't get any more . . . there's no more coming . . . when this is gone, we won't get any more . . .

No wonder they had to go to Soerabaya, sometimes.

The ships had to be kept on alert, and when they got rusted, the armorers were hard put to keep any guns firing at all. There were too few ships, that was all; there was no relief. When an engine had to be taken out, the crews rigged a pulley under a tree and hoisted it that way.

Often the pilots had to attack the Japs from right or left wing, instead of aiming the nose dead on, because only half the guns were working. When "enemy aircraft sighted" came to the little thatched shack of operations, the pilots had to be reminded before they ran for their ships to clear their guns at every 5,000 foot level of climb; otherwise they would freeze up.

And we probably won't get any more . . . no more . . .

So they went to Soerabaya.

Red Sprague used to get them together, when messline was over—"and I've seen the major standing twenty-fifth in line, messkit in hand"—and talk to them. His talks came about two or three times a week. They met in the room of the abandoned sugar factory where the Dutch had installed a pingpong table and pooltable. The windows of the room were blacked out with paper, and it had a tile floor.

"I just called you in to say that you needn't be worried if the Japs come here," Sprague would say. "This isn't the best that America can do; you know that. It just happens to be the best right now. But don't think you're going to be just sacrificed to this thing. We'll fight as

long as we can. But if things get hot, we'll leave with three days' start. This war is just beginning and we're going to be in it for a long time."

They could not know, then, that they would get away, but he, their commander, would be the one left behind.

Anyhow, they went to Soerabaya. Some of them looked at the brown girls. Most of them, however, did things like Sergeant Perry:

"We visited the famous Soerabaya zoo, the aquarium and the city in general. We were ceremoniously presented with an Air Raid Warden's badge. A Dutch friend of ours very gravely pinned it on our shirt and explained that we were the first ones ever made 'Honorary Air Raid Wardens.'"

Air raid wardens they were indeed, guardians of Soerabaya.

"After we got our badges pinned on, our Dutch friend took us to his home and introduced us to his daughter Doreen and his wife. Doreen was a little taller than me, with long blonde hair and more on the beautiful side than cute or pretty. I stayed there until late that night, talking to Doreen, she telling me Dutch words and I telling her the English counterparts. We really had a good time and I promised myself to see her again.

"Later we found out the *Polk*, on which we had crossed, was in the harbor and so a gang of us went down to see our old friends. We saw Smitty and the rest of the boys and had chow on board.

"I was down in the storeroom helping myself to some American apples when I was interrupted by the terrifying clanging of the ship's alarm bell. I rushed upstairs and noticed everybody rushing around with their life preservers on. At the same time I heard the mournful rise and fall of the wailing sirens in town. Air Raid!!!"

The newly created Honorary Air Raid Wardens had been given the dignity of and perquisites of office without having its duties explained to them. Perhaps there were no duties. At any rate the Honorary Air Raid Wardens decided to behave in a completely free and unwardenly manner.

"I thought, *good Lord, will the Polk take me to sea?* Then I went toward the gangplank, the uppermost thought in my mind being: *There's a cargo of 2,000 tons of high explosive, a harbor full of ships, let me off of here!*

"So I started down the gangplank, accelerated to a running pace by the Honorary Air Raid Wardens in back of me. I was running behind Langjahr (Herman E. Langjahr of Pine Hill, N. J., who after-

ward became one of the most successful bombardier officers in the fortresses flying against Rabaul from New Guinea) and Deyo (Corporal Frederick J. Deyo of St. Paul) was right up with me.

"Together we ran a long way down the road to get away from the ships and stopped near a native store between the harbor and the army runway. We listened and could hear nothing. The fighters had taken off. There was hardly a sound anywhere.

"'Dry run,' Langjahr laughed. 'False alarm.' We had a laugh over our scare and went into the store to recuperate with a bottle of beer. Suddenly there was a whine of engines and a rattle of machine gun fire. We rushed out and looked up. It was a dogfight, two Japs and one Dutchman.

"Just as suddenly we heard an ominous rumbling and whirled around. There they are! We looked up. Two waves of twenty-seven bombers each, coming directly overhead, barely discernible against the intermittent clouds. Then there was a WHUMP—a heavy vibrating sound that was followed by a second and a third. 'Duck!' It was Deyo who yelled.

"We ran across the road and flattened out in a small sewage ditch. Langjahr was still walking around looking for a bottle opener. He was a little drunk. We yelled to him, but our words were cut off by the terrific series of explosions. They were going to fall close, we knew.

"We stayed in the ditch. The succession of WHUMPS grew louder. Suddenly the ground shook and a terrific pressure left our ears ringing and lungs gasping for breath. They had gone over. We jumped up. We ran to where Langjahr was picking himself up, unhurt. The last bomb, a 500 pounder, had hit too close for comfort. The Japs had gone on over, but we could still hear bombs exploding in the middle of Soerabaya."

On the 19th February, a black day for Darwin, the Japs went for both Soerabaya and Darwin simultaneously. The Australians had no radar to give Darwin any warning and paid dearly for the omission.

In Darwin there were four members of the Seventeenth who should have reached Soerabaya but never did because of a combination of hard luck and unequal odds. They were Major Floyd Pell, to whom Sprague had telephoned urgently a week before asking for reinforcements, and 2nd Lieutenants Charles Hughes, Jack Peres and Elton Perry. They set off for Koepang on that day of Australia's tardy awakening but had to turn back when they were twelve minutes out

because ugly clouds were piling up over the Timor Sea.

They slipped back to the RAAF 'drome at Darwin, and were replenishing their fuel on the Darwin airdrome at the moment that Japan launched its only successful attack against Australia. Seventeen heavy bombers probably from Ambon, fifty-four dive bombers from an aircraft carrier and seventeen Zeros attacked the crowded harbor and the airdrome. The four pilots got their planes off the ground but three of them were shot down while rising. Pell, "Slugger" to his friends, tried to do a pull-out from his cockpit 50 feet off the ground, but failed and died in Darwin's red clay.

Peres, ex-Randolph and Kelly Field graduate of twenty-three, got farthest off the ground, but was never heard from again until September when aborigines catching crabs in an inlet twenty miles from Darwin found his body in his burned plane.

Such was the price of the lack of any warning system. Actually a missionary priest on Melville Island, outside Darwin, had tapped out a warning an hour beforehand on his pedal radio, but it was ignored at Darwin in true Pearl Harbor fashion.

Although they died without knowing it, Major Pell and his flight members were to be revenged within a matter of minutes by their comrades at the faroff Javanese end of the Dutch island chain, whose links were already virtually severed. The day at Blimbing began with a false alarm, the squadron taking the air at nine and getting back at 10:30 without any bombers coming over. At noon they were up again and two flights of ours met eight Zeros: exactly even terms numerically.

Half the Zeros were shot down. Mahoney and Lane each got one. So did Hague, whose plane was called "Kathleen." Kruzel, whose armorer, Lyman S. Goltry of Glenwood, Iowa, loved a girl in a San Rafael chainstore, and who therefore carried into battle against the mystified Japs a sharkface with the inscription "J. C. Penny—Lou," got himself a positive, too. The other two flights moved in on the bombers, and the bombers turned tail and fled without opening their hatches.

But when it came to nose counting time on the fields at Blimbing and Gnoro, there were three pilots missing: Gilmore, Blanton and Fields. Gilmore was shot down and was burned, but the Dutch doctors took care of him and saved his life. Blanton was thought to be lost, but it turned out that he had only brought down his ship on a beach along the Straits of Madura. But Fields never came back.

Fields was the first American Indian flyer lost in the war. He was a full-blooded Cherokee tribesman from Ponca City with the curious first name of Quanah. He got out of his plane alive, but when they found him he had bullet holes through the canopy of his parachute. One of the bullets had gone through his head.

The Indian was buried like the others, by Major N. B. Sauve of Denver, the army liaison officer with the Dutch, in the Graafplaats Kembang Koening in Soerabaya. He went to his rest in the wet dark soil of Java. Like the Maori pilots from New Zealand who in aged Brewsters met the Zeros over Singapore, flying wingtip to wingtip with the white *kiwis*, the American Indian died a warrior.

It was another broken plane of "Chief" Fields, sitting helpless on the field at Pasirian, 60 miles southeast of Malang by the shores of the Indian Ocean, which served to bring honors to the only three enlisted men of the 17th whose labors were crowned with medals. Their story is another of the unaffected and almost unknown heroisms of the obscure 17th.

On the 20th, the day after Darwin, Sprague told those in the mess-line at Blimbing: "It looks as though we're going to catch it." That was the day when the convoy began stealing down from Macassar against Bali. The parachutists had already landed at Koepang the day before, and Darwin was a smoking pile, with eleven ships at the bottom of its harbor. To land on Bali would be to cut off the tail of Indonesian islands close to Java's rump.

Every plane was precious, and Sprague wanted to save the Chief's, if he could. So he told three enlisted men, Staff Sergeant James L. Swanson of Oakland, California, Corporal Selby E. Cockcroft of Sherman, Texas, and Corporal Angelo V. Prioreschi—the same mechanic who had played jumping flea in the hangar at Koepang in Timor during a Jap strafing raid—to take a car next day to Pasirian and repair the Chief's ownerless plane.

The Dutch anticipated Japanese landings in this southeastern corner of Java, but were uncertain whether they would come on Java itself or on Bali. They thought the Japs might try to land parachutists or perhaps troop transports on this secluded field by Indian Ocean. It was in line with a favorite Japanese tactic: approach from the rear.

For that reason the native troops had arranged X-frames all over the Pasirian Field, each one strung with barbed wire. A constant force of coolies was kept on hand, like a stage shifter's crew. If a descend-

ing aircraft gave the right signal, the coolies would run out on the field and remove the X-frames. This was the regular arrangement on the smaller Dutch fields; the X-frames not only made landing impossible, but made the runway seem less obvious, breaking up the long continuous green strip.

On this field were five American B-17s waiting repair and two Dutch American-built B-10s. It was absolutely necessary to repair these planes if possible, for on them depended the hope of evacuating from Java the chief Dutch political figures to carry on the war, as well as the military leaders like Wavell.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

At the annual election of officers of the American Military Institute held on February 1, 1945, Brigadier General Donald Armstrong was elected President of the Institute, succeeding Dr. Robert Albion, who had served in that capacity for the last three years. General Armstrong, Commandant of the Army Industrial College, has gained wide renown for his part in the development of the study of military affairs.

Other officers elected were Colonel Joseph I. Greene, Editor of the *Infantry Journal*, to the position of Vice-President and Lieutenant Thurman S. Wilkins, the Adjutant General's Office, War Department, Secretary-Treasurer. Colonel Greene succeeds Major General Frank R. McCoy and Lieutenant Wilkins succeeds Major Hugh Flick.

Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, Dr. Stuart Portner, and George J. Stansfield continue as Provost, Editor, and Librarian respectively.

A new panel of Trustees, serving for the three year term ending December 31, 1947, were elected at the annual meeting of the membership of the Institute held December 15, 1944. Newly elected trustees are General Armstrong; Dr. James Phinney Baxter III, President of Williams College; and Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus of the Navy Department. Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick P. Todd were reelected.

* * *

At a meeting of the Institute, held in Washington on March 22, 1945, Lieutenant Bernard Bodie, author of a *Guide to Naval Strategy* and *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, spoke on "Changes in Naval War."

* * *

Colonel John M. Kemper, Trustee of the Institute and former Chief of the G-2 Historical Branch, recently was awarded the Legion of Merit for outstanding service in the development and operation of that Branch. Colonel Kemper now is serving overseas and Colonel A. F. Clark, Jr., has assumed direction of the Branch.

* * *

Word has been received from Indianapolis that Colonel Thomas M. Owen, Jr., National Historian of the American Legion, is work-

ing on a history of the Legion, to be released this fall. An advisory committee consisting of Allan Nevins, Kenneth Roberts, Karl Detzer, James Street, and Marquis James has been assisting Colonel Owen in the project.

* * *

An exhibit of rare imprints in the Institute Library was recently opened at the National Archives. As developed by Colonel Spaulding and Mr. Stansfield, it is planned to exhibit one or two outstanding pieces each fortnight. Currently on exhibit are: GULIELMUS DONDINUS, *Historia de Rebus in Gallia Gestis*, Rome, 1673; and LODOVICO MELZO, *Reglo Militare Sopra il Governo e Servizio Delia Caulleria*, Antwerp, 1611.

* * *

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Alfred Vagts, former trustee of the Institute, is an outstanding authority on military history.

Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie has made significant contributions to the study of the problem of the selection of troops.

George Weller is the well-known *Chicago Daily News* war correspondent and recent Pulitzer Prize winner.

Lieutenant M. K. Dziewanowski, formerly aide to the Military Attache of the Polish Embassy in Washington, now is on duty in London.

Among our book reviewers Colonel Swindler is Editor of the American Battle Monuments Commission series of histories of World War I Army divisions; General Armstrong is President of the Institute; Dr. Horniker, a specialist on economic warfare, is a frequent contributor to MILITARY AFFAIRS; General Ely is a former divisional commander in World War I; Lieutenant Wilkins is Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute. Dr. Roucek is an authority on the history of Eastern Europe. Colonel Goddard is head of the Executive Section, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, War Department. Mr. Roudman is an associate editor of MILITARY AFFAIRS, as is Captain Gondos.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. III, by Douglas Southall Freeman. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1944. Pp. 752. \$5.00.)

In reviewing this volume, the final one of the trilogy, it is necessary to infringe somewhat on the preceding ones. The work was undertaken because the author wished to bring into sharper focus the many worthy men who were being thrust into oblivion by the towering figure of Lee. These men, he felt, deserved a better fate, for it was they who, in the final analysis, had been responsible for the training and morale of the troops, and had placed upon the Army of Northern Virginia the unmistakable stamp of excellence which it bore.

The difficult problem of presenting military portraits of more than half a hundred individuals who served in the same theatre of operations, without repetition or confusion, was solved by the author in a unique and effective manner. The text was cast in the form of an account of the command, rather than of the operations, and the characters portrayed appear and disappear with the changing situations. The separated portions of text dealing with the same individual were then tied together with footnotes.

Through this medium the reader sees, painted in colors vivid and subdued, warm and somber: Beauregard, of the Napoleonic complex, planning on a grand scale unhampered by logistics; Longstreet, the nerveless wheel horse who, unfortunately, has aspirations in the realm of strategy; "Jeb" Stuart, the flamboyant exhibitionist and superb intelligence officer; Ewell, once hailed as a second Jackson, fumbling his way into a Union prison camp at Saylor's Creek: "Ramrod" Gordon, self-made soldier whose actions outdo his exhortations; William Pegram, retiring, studious artillerist whose passion is for his guns and the roar of battle; "Billy" Mahone, small and lean, whose last battle is always his best; and a host of others who add and detract, succeed and fail.

In the first two volumes, the author traces the development of the Army of Northern Virginia from Manassas to the zenith of its power at Chancellorsville. Its battles of this period rank among the most celebrated of the nineteenth century, but their cost was high. However, no apprehension was felt that casualties among the general officers could not be readily replaced from the host of veteran colonels.

As the third volume opens, we find the army, again reorganized, on the march into Pennsylvania. It could not be foreseen that, of all the generals promoted in the reorganization of May 1863, only two, Gordon and Mahone, were destined to add vigor to the command, and that other promising young officers such as Ramseur, Rodes and Pender were to die in battle. The catastrophe of Gettysburg was not to be measured, even primarily, by the losses of men and matériel. Of the fifty-two generals who reached Pennsylvania, a third became casualties. Their replacement was difficult. Decline had definitely begun. Nevertheless, in May 1864, the army hurled itself against the flank of the Union columns in the Wilderness with its old fire and élan, but this time its smoothness of operation was lacking, decisions were often slowly made and defective. At the end of the bloody days of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor, the army command stood a virtual ruin. Qualified replacements could not be found. During the dreary months of the Siege of Petersburg, high officers, even the stalwart Longstreet, began to lose hope. With the withdrawal from Richmond, effective command collapsed. Nevertheless, even on the fatal 9th of April at Appomattox, stout soldiers such as Longstreet, Gordon and Mahone had their minds and troops under control and were ready and willing to fight it out in the best tradition of a gallant army.

The author finds that military training fully vindicated itself, but gave no guarantee of success. The one thousand graduates of West Point and the Military Academies of Virginia and South Carolina became the backbone of command, especially in the Army of Northern Virginia, where political generals were encouraged to resign or go elsewhere. Officers engaged in battle developed quickly and those who rose to the grade of general had excelled from the first. Officers who had long and excellent battle records were those who were diligent in maintaining the well-being and discipline of their troops. The author also found that battle experience, of itself, did not develop good generals. Thus the quality of the high command deteriorated during the last phases of the conflict because qualified replacements could not be found. From this he advances a tentative premise to the effect that, of the officers who can well perform the lesser duties, only a minute fraction possess, or may develop, the qualities necessary for successful general command, and therefore, maintaining a high quality of general command may depend more on the number of officers from whom selection is made than on training or battle experience. This suggests the fascinating question as to what extent this premise may be confirmed

or refuted from our experiences in the present war, when large numbers of officers are given formal instruction in staff and command.

The author's style is pleasing and adequate, and there are many excellent maps. The text is supported by abundant references to the best sources, the official records, memoirs and contemporary writings. The author's approach is exceptionally objective. There is no trace of the Lee deification cult. He ascribes to the Commanding General a proportion of the blame for failures. On numerous occasions the author pays tribute to the courage and ability of the Union forces. *Lee's Lieutenants* is the result of a great amount of exhaustive research, keen analysis and skillful compilation. It is destined to become one of our standard works on this tragic but glorious era.

HENRY O. SWINDLER,
Colonel, Infantry

Bases Overseas, An American Trusteeship in Power, by George Weller,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1944. Pp. 434.
\$3.50.)

World War II has furnished to the American people voluminous evidence of the significance of air, sea, and land bases. We willingly exchanged old destroyers for bases in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. We have paid a high price in lives and munitions for our island bases in the Pacific. We have noted the advantages gained by Germany by reason of her air and sea bases in Norway and France. In the shrunken world of today, bases far from the homeland are essential for the conduct of war.

Mr. Weller believes that because a national acquisitive instinct was nonexistent, we derived little or nothing from our sacrifices in World War I. In 1918 we were not interested in territorial gains or even in political advantages as a result of victory. His book is an urgent appeal to look to our interests during the present war and to obtain at the peace settlement the essential bases overseas that we have fought hard to win since Pearl Harbor, and to reenforce them with a suitable foreign policy.

According to Mr. Weller, American military victories have been achieved through enormous production or by superiority of weapons. In our recent wars, we have been content with military victory. We have not been concerned with strategic consolidation after victory has been won. In his opinion, there is a cheaper way to win a war, or to prevent one. The largest army plus the largest navy plus the largest factories is too costly. He would try a new method. Concerning bases

as tools of security, cheap and no threat to other nations, he has this to say: "A base is strong in peace. Costing little to uphold, it nevertheless enables the nation to economize greatly on other more expensive forms of defensive preparation. A well-located base takes the place of a task force, or ten divisions of an army, or a wing of heavy bombers. It can be armed for offensive war in quick order; defensively it is armed already by its location, the advantageous spot where it stands. A base is a kind of warning, a political reminder to an enemy against strategic aggression, and a memorandum of commitment to a nation."

In the foregoing excerpt, it is possible to note a grave danger in Mr. Weller's arguments. There is a decided risk in an excessively enthusiastic belief in the efficacy of bases overseas as a panacea for all our national defense ills. Of course, bases are essential; but they are merely a means to make the ships, planes and armies more effective where they are needed. So the diplomacy or foreign policy that would gain us bases is not enough. There must be a national military policy and a military and naval strategic sense of training, backed by a sound industrial mobilization plan, that will produce the air and sea armadas and the soldiers to use the bases. Mr. Weller understands this thoroughly, but will his reader be lulled by his eloquent plea for bases into believing them a substitute for ships and men?

The author recognizes two types of bases. "Containing bases" control the direction of political power at the source, while "barrier bases" allow the enemy freedom to gather his political strength at home and direct his military strength abroad in whichever of several lines seem most advantageous to him." Obviously the former are more powerful bases both from a political and military point of view. The Weller blueprint establishes containing bases in Greenland, Iceland, in the Scandinavian and Baltic area, Spain, the Balearic Islands, Corsica, Sardinia, North Africa, the Aegean, Adriatic, Africa, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, China, Burma and many in the Pacific. Surely this is an ambitious program, and it would be astonishing indeed if many of these bases could be obtained by peaceful diplomatic means.

What this means in actual numbers of bases is that the United States, according to Mr. Weller, requires the establishment of ten to twelve heavy naval and air bases overseas of the Pearl Harbor type, and about twenty-five lighter bases of the Corregidor dimensions. In addition, an indefinite number of subsidiary landing fields and shelters for small naval craft would be required. Therefore, he says that we should consider a minimum and a maximum program:

"This minimum gathering of overseas bases should be put into being—rather retained in being, inasmuch as most of them are already or will be war bases—with the concord of America's allies if possible, without it if necessary. This inner program of American obligation to herself should be realized first, and not allowed to wait on negotiations for the exterior or maximum program.

"The maximum program of bases, which looks to political guidance and the prevention of war, the assurance of stability and protection of friendly powers, and the winning of unfriendly powers, should be put into effect only with the harmonious consent of the powers concerned. The consent should be obtained individually, however, not by conference but through bilateral (or possibly in some cases trilateral) agreement."

The book is of uneven merit, but it is thoughtful and thought-provoking. Occasional prolixity dulls the keen edge of argument, and excessive wordiness conceals rather than clarifies the issue. Mr. Weller is a master of metaphor and of picturesque expression.

No reader of Mr. Weller's book can remain indifferent to the question of bases or to the foreign policy of this and associated nations. Mr. Weller is a crusader for a more realistic and less disinterested attitude towards our world position and responsibilities. Regardless of agreement with his thesis—and many will call him harsh names for his unabashed arguments and uninhibited stand vis-à-vis foreign nations and his neglect of the Atlantic Charter and its implications—his book will stimulate thought and discussion in a field of which the average citizen is strangely ignorant and indifferent. There may be much debate concerning international ethics involved in this thesis; the cost of acquisition and of adequate defense of these bases is certainly underestimated; the loss of Singapore, the Philippines, Guam, show how useless bases are without a sound military policy. Nevertheless the book is recommended as a stimulating and provocative lesson in some essential phases of foreign and military policy.

DONALD ARMSTRONG,
Brigadier General,
Army Industrial College

Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, by Raphaël Lemkin. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1944. Pp. 674. Columbia University Press. \$7.50.)

Military occupation and government of enemy territory are regulated by Articles 42-56, Section III of Hague Regulations (1907) re-

specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, entitled "On Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State." While the Regulations attempt to circumscribe the power of an invader in his relations with the inhabitants temporarily under his control, the signatories to the Convention, in order to diminish the evil effects of war upon civilians, evidently did not intend to leave "unforeseen cases . . . to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders." For they have specifically provided in the preamble to the Convention that "in cases not included in the Regulations . . . the inhabitants and the belligerent remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."

Despite the solemn obligations entered into by the Powers, violations of the law of belligerent occupation have been frequent. Particularly notorious were the German violations during World War I, which have been instanced by Ernst H. Feilchenfeld in his monograph dealing with "the international economic law of belligerent occupation." Never before, however, have the violations reached that utmost in ferocity which has marked the practices of the Axis powers in their occupation of the conquered nations of Europe.

The first comprehensive study, based on documentary evidence, of the rule imposed upon the occupied countries of Europe since 1939 by the Axis powers—Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania—is presented in this voluminous work by Dr. Raphaël Lemkin, a noted Polish scholar and attorney, presently associated with Duke University. The evidence which the author has collected over a period of four years consists of a selection of the texts of the more representative laws, orders and decrees, issued by the Axis powers for the government of the territories occupied by their armed forces. Dr. Lemkin presents this evidence especially for the edification of "the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with his innate respect for human rights and human personality, may be inclined to believe that the Axis regime could not possibly be as cruel and ruthless as it has been hitherto described." (Preface, p. ix.) Indeed, in these documents the skeptical reader will find indisputably recorded the actual nature of the Axis military government which has been one monstrous crime against humanity. Here he will read the evidence of their misgovernment, of their murders, thefts, enslavement of foreign nations, and how they went about methodically in exterminating whole peoples. This collection of documents, covering over 360 pages, the major part of the volume, forms the third part of the book.

The first part presents the German techniques of occupation (pp. 7-95), while the second part deals in individual chapters with the techniques of occupation followed by the Germans and the other Axis partners in the respective countries, stressing in each case local peculiarities (pp. 99-264).

In the general survey of German techniques of occupation, Dr. Lemkin analyzes in nine chapters different aspects of government. These chapters will be of immediate interest to the military government and civil affairs personnel of the United States Army trained for the administration of conquered Germany. These officials will be able to compare our own instructions embodied in the manual on military government with the practices of Germany in the occupied areas. It should give them a clearer understanding of the enemy whose country they will have to administer. Members of crime commissions concerned with punishing war criminals will have here the evidences of violations of international law and the laws of humanity.

The chapters deal successively with: the German administration of the occupied lands and the various aspects of usurpation of sovereignty contrary to the law of *occupatio bellica*; the police system, and the role and functions of the Gestapo and S. S. (Schutzstaffeln) and their crimes, which are "mainly an essential part of the program of their activities and even of their world outlook"; the introduction of German law, based upon the principle of discrimination and not of equality, into the occupied areas; the organization of the courts; the treatment of property in the occupied lands, which has deprived it of legal foundations and has made it "an object of utilitarian administrative techniques"; the administration of finance through the creation and development of a mechanism for the "taking over the whole of the financial resources of the countries in question"; the exploitation of labor through a regime of slavery, and the policy of depopulation of occupied areas; the extremely inhuman treatment of Jews; and the practice of extermination of nations and ethnic groups, for which the author has coined a new term "genocide."

Genocide, as Dr. Lemkin explains, signifies "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (p. 79). After analyzing the German techniques of genocide carried out in the political, social, cultural, economic, and other fields in the occupied countries, Dr. Lemkin concludes that the enemy "has embarked upon a gigantic scheme to change, in favor of Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and the captive

nations for many years to come. The objective of this scheme is to destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples in their development so that, even in the case of Germany's military defeat, it will be in a position to deal with other European nations from the vantage point of numerical, physical, and economic superiority. Despite the bombings of Germany, this German superiority will be fully evident after hostilities have ceased and for many years to follow, when, due to the present disastrous state of nourishment and health in the occupied countries, we shall see in such countries a stunted post-war generation, survivors of the ill-fed children of these war years" (p. xi). This conclusion, it may be urged, deserves serious consideration by all those whose task it will be to settle the German problem after the war.

The other Axis powers have behaved in the respective countries occupied by them in a manner similar to that of Germany. In the second part of the book, Dr. Lemkin has analyzed methodically their vicious rule, buttressing each case with the appropriate documentary evidence.

For all the acts committed by the German occupying forces in the occupied countries, Dr. Lemkin holds the entire German people responsible, with which this reviewer, on the basis of his own work in the field, fully agrees. As Dr. Lemkin forcefully points out, "The present destruction of Europe would not be so complete and thorough had the German people not accepted freely its plan, participated voluntarily in its execution, and up to this point profited greatly therefrom." (p. xiii). Furthermore, the author rightly emphasizes the significant fact that "The German techniques of exploitation of the subjugated nations are so numerous, thoughtful and elaborate, and are so greatly dependent upon personal skill and responsibility that this complex machinery could not have been successful without devotion to the cause of the persons in control" (p. xiv). He therefore urges "that the considerable number of Germans responsible for the carnage and looting should be punished or reduced to a condition in which they may not again be dangerous to the social order and international peace" (p. xii). However, the members of the S. S. and of the police in the occupied countries should be precluded from raising the defense that they have acted under orders of their superiors, because murder and persecution of political opponents and members of "lower" races are part of their outlook and not merely a result of a decision in a particular case (pp. 22-24).

From the analysis of Axis rule in the occupied countries, Dr. Lemkin passes on to a treatment, regrettably brief, of the problem of redress.

He limits himself chiefly to four phases. (1) He outlines a complete plan for restitution of property to dispossessed persons of occupied countries after liberation (pp. 40-49); (2) proposes a method for liquidating the financial consequences of occupation (pp. 65-66); (3) urges financial reimbursement, by any future German government, to the millions of foreign workers forced into Germany from the occupied countries to the extent of the difference between the wages paid to them and to German workers for the same kind of employment (pp. 72-74, 559-562), and (4) renews his proposal, submitted as far back as 1933 to the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Madrid, to the effect that genocide procedures in war and in peace should be made an international crime and prohibited by an international treaty, and that the Regulations of the Hague Convention should be modified so provide for international control of occupation practices, similar to that in the case for prisoners of war (pp. 90-95).

Axis Rule in Occupied Europe is of importance not only to the military government personnel of the United States Army and to officials who will be concerned with undoing the effects of German occupation, but will prove an indispensable source of information to international lawyers, political scientists, and historians.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER,¹
Foreign Economic Administration

Great Soldiers of World War II, by Major H. A. DeWeerd. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1944. Pp. 316. \$3.75.)

Major DeWeerd is by profession a historian. The facts he sets forth in this book seem to be accurate and backed up by an excellent bibliography. His comments, in the main, seem to me to be well founded, impersonal, and judicial. The study of war has attained a prominence today because this World War II is the greatest we have ever had. A study of the great leaders, which brings out their accomplishments, their qualifications for their positions, failures as well as successes, will give to the layman an understanding of the war as well as ability to understand the great leaders under consideration.

This book may also give to the professional soldier, who after the end of this war will be called upon to make recommendations as to the make-up of a Ministry of National Defense including the Army and Navy, possibly an independent Air Force, the size of the military establishment, its components and relative positions and responsibilities. About 1925, the so-called Eberle Board, the General Board of the Navy including eight admirals and the Marine Corps head, made a

¹The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official position of

pronouncement in effect as follows: The Navy is for the support of the Army, to transport it and protect it going overseas, assist in its landing, protect its communications and supply routes, and in the Army the only arm which can seize and hold, a requisite for ending most wars, the Infantry. There have been many changes in the responsibilities of the various arms and services due to improvements of armament, especially the tanks, the air service and naval airplane carriers since 1924. In reading the history of these great leaders and noting their efficient or non-efficient use of these various arms and task forces it will be seen their rise or fall in a large measure was caused by their ability to properly coordinate Army, Navy, tanks, air forces, ground forces and supply and the complicated system of proper and immediate communication in battle that all do their proper part in full coordination.

The author, in his accounts and comments on Gamelin, De Gaulle, Wavell, Rommel, Montgomery, Hitler, Churchill, Timoshenko, MacArthur, Chiang Kai-shek and Eisenhower has discussed the military thought and doctrine at the time of their command as well as the individuals. Churchill and Chiang are examples of the soldier-statesman who at times found it necessary to give orders even to their commanders in the field. This is the fairest account of Hitler, his acts and reasons for them, I have read.

Churchill is the outstanding figure; Chiang had heart-rending problems of international dissension as well as fighting the Japs. Timoshenko is at present "under a blanket." Hitler is nearing his end—Gamelin is finished. Rommel, Montgomery, MacArthur, and Eisenhower are outstanding figures not only in this book but in the war up to date.

Rommel, the desert fox, drove the British across North Africa although they had air supremacy but lacked coordination. It was only after Lord Churchill, in his Egyptian visit shortly before Gen. Montgomery's successful attack on Rommel, emphasized and directed that during combat air forces must comply with the requirements of the ground commander, that the coordinated British Army, under Montgomery, defeated Rommel. Rommel "repeated his tactics," he trapped the British tanks, but fell into the same kind of a trap laid by Montgomery.

Montgomery is a forceful and ingenious commander. The three British divisions, the newest type airplanes, the superior tanks and self-propelled artillery with which he was reinforced had much to do with Montgomery's success over an inferior enemy. From that time on the

Allied forces in Europe on the Western Front have been coordinated, the Navy, the Air Forces, and the Ground Forces each in general doing their part in the team.

MacArthur has been doing excellent work in the Pacific and has well earned the five stars given him as General of the Army. Next to Churchill, Eisenhower, who has just received the 5-star rank of General of the Army, to my mind has become the outstanding leader on the Western Front. Confronted with all the problems of a mixed command, he has established their confidence in him by his military knowledge, his tact, his "common sense," and good judgment. He has taken "considered risks" where such seemed warranted—he has the confidence of President Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and the loyal support and confidence of officers under his command who have many years' more experience. This is far beyond anything we had in World War I. I have only touched the high spots of this excellent history.

HANSON E. ELY,
Major General, USA.

Foreign Policy Begins at Home, by James P. Warburg. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1944. Pp. 308. \$2.50.)

James Warburg has written a forthright, honest survey of the history and problems of American foreign policy. The book was admittedly prepared for popular attention (for the author in working for the Overseas Branch of OWI had been impressed by the eager desire of American servicemen to understand the complexities of America's role in world affairs); but the intelligent and uncompromising stand that Mr. Warburg takes against fascism, both here and abroad, should also recommend the work to a number of experts as well.

The author's enmity toward fascism, "the ultimate perversion" of run-away capitalism, is central and fundamental to his text: We are not only fighting a military "war for survival" against our fascist enemies Germany and Japan; we are also engaged in a no less significant struggle against the very idea and aspirations of fascism everywhere, by no means restricted to areas beyond our own frontier. Undemocratic evils, Mr. Warburg shows in his opening chapters, have not only made their appearance in America; they threaten to grow apace if we fail to square the cynicism of our economic behavior with our professed ideals of political democracy. As long as this conflict between our deeds and declared principles is allowed to go on unresolved, fertile cleavages in which fascism thrives will continue to appear in our own backyard, to impede our progress against undemocratic developments at home.

With splendid clarity Mr. Warburg shows the organic connection between what we do inside America and what we do as a nation abroad. Our puzzling contradictory foreign policy, at times resembling nothing so much as a total want of policy, has been a striking reflection of our own domestic indecision, our inability to adjust our system of "economic cannibalism" to the democratic principles which we profess, and our failure to keep the twofold aspects of the war clearly distinguished, especially when the pattern of our struggle against fascism ceases to coincide exactly with the pattern of our military battles.

Mr. Warburg supports his thesis with adequate data, though perhaps at times too highly compressed for the best effect. The heart of his book comprises a concise history of America's foreign relations from 1783 through the events of the past midsummer. It may be objected that, having an ax to grind, he has in places distorted his material to fit the pattern; it appears, however, to this observer that he has succeeded honestly and validly in his avowed attempt to show "how our foreign policy has reflected and at the same time influenced our development at home." It is a significant purpose, suggesting the grave responsibilities that lie with every citizen. Nor does Mr. Warburg minimize such responsibility, or its gravity, in his final appraisal of where we now stand; we can, and we will, win our military war against the axis, he declares; but in view of the shape of our foreign policy to date, it is difficult to feel completely assured that, in the bid for enduring peace, we shall act with a vision more clear and a purpose more undivided than those who managed only an armistice after the last World War.

With no pretense at being definitive, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home* is yet, within its limits, distinctly successful, and is recommended reading for those interested in more than the purely military conduct of the war.

THURMAN S. WILKINS,
Lieutenant, Adjutant General Dept.

Story of a Secret State, by Jan Karski. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1944. Pp. 389. \$3.00.)

International relations are, according to International Law, conducted among states in certain approved forms somewhat analogous to the sociologist's folkways and institutionalized mores. But international struggle, in spite of all the limits imposed thereon by any theory of law, any concept of human decency and civilization, is really utterly ruthless. The struggle for power is as amorally efficient as may be permitted by the needs and means of the group which has recourse to

the methods involving violence. No methods are too ruthless or too cruel to employ if, in so doing, any benefit is to be gained. One of these devices is the operation of the underground and of secret societies and movements. Little has been written on this national and international weapon as a theory and discipline which would outline all the experience, strategy, and tactics worked out by numerous such movements the world over in recent years. Karski's memoirs describe the operation of the underground in Poland, showing how members of the underground meet, recognize one another and perform their difficult task. As such, it is an extremely valuable documentary survey of one country's underground struggle which will prove invaluable to a specialist who, sooner or later, is bound to prepare a systematized picture of the role that the underground has played in recent years in world politics.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK,
Hofstra College

Smith & Wesson Hand-Guns, by Roy C. McHenry and Walter F. Roper. (Huntington, West Virginia: Standard Publications, Inc. 1945. Pp. 233. \$7.50.)

This volume enables the arms collector or enthusiast to fill a long existing gap in his library on American handguns. Taking its place beside the excellent *History of the Colt Revolver* by Haven and Bel-den,¹ it will, we hope, stimulate other qualified writers to make available in print the stories of Iver Johnson and Harrington and Richardson, to name but two additional firms currently producing pistols and revolvers, not to speak of Hopkins and Allen, Forehand and Wadsworth, and a host of others whose product has long been off the market. For detailed records of the activities of prominent rifle makers, Sharps excepted,² we must still possess our souls in patience. But the ice is now definitely broken and perhaps hope will not be too long deferred.

The authors of the present publication have done a good job, for although the editing has been poor, the work gives evidence of earnest workmanship combined with excellent basic knowledge of the subject in hand. One might wish that the table of contents offered some indication of the topics discussed in the several chapters. Unfortunately it does not, neither do any of the twenty-four chapter headings. Only by reference to the subject index and index of illustrations or by actual reading of the text may we learn what particular model or models are under scrutiny as the story unfolds.

¹Morrow & Co., pub., N. Y., 1940.

²Winston O. Smith. *The Sharps Rifle*. N. Y., 1943.

Chapter I (16 pp.) offers a brief history of the evolution of the metallic cartridge case and of weapons employing it. This should serve to acquaint many with long forgotten or little known elements of that story. Subsequent chapters offer a comprehensive and for the most part a chronological record, of the activities of the Smith & Wesson firm. Supplementing the 135 pages of text are 62 plates of photographs and one of six line drawings, illustrating some 77 different specimens of Smith & Wesson's handiwork as well as of many others produced by competing (and infringing) firms both domestic and foreign. There follow forty-four pages of detailed descriptions of various models of Smith & Wesson arms, grouped by calibers, covering a time period from 1855 to date. Four pages of subject index and a three-page index of illustrations complete the volume. Unfortunately, no bibliography is included.

Despite the careless editing already noted, the job, as we have said before, is a good one. It constitutes a very real addition to our literature on small arms. A copy should be in the library of every collector of American handguns.

With respect to the negative qualities of this volume (commonly left unmentioned by the reviewer) I noted 13 wholly or partly erroneous statements of fact, 4 misspellings of proper names, one instance of the use of bad grammar, one misspelling of a simple noun, and three cases in which the wrong word was employed (e.g., "cylinder" where "chamber" was intended—p. 40). On two occasions people or things were mentioned (e.g., "Colonel Hatcher's figures"—p. 47, and "Wells-Fargo employees,"—p. 58) with no explanation as to who or what these were. The "gun bug" will recognize Colonel Hatcher as Brig. Gen. J. S. Hatcher, Ord. Dep't., USA, and his "figures" as references to tables appearing in his several volumes on small arms. Old timers will know that Wells-Fargo was an express company which did a large business in the West and purchased many Schofield model Smith & Wessons for the use of its employees. To youngsters the name will be without significance.

Among the illustrations we find one revolver depicted (Pl. 53, p. 174) in a caliber not mentioned in the text. The first model .38 double action, so rare that 99% of collectors have never seen one and hence calling definitely for an illustration, does not appear. The arm labelled as being a specimen of this model (Pl. 21, p. 151) has the conventional "U" shaped side plate, hence is plainly of the second or third model, while that captioned as the second model is evidently an example of the *fourth* series (same plate.)

One model, the .22 Straight Line single shot, while illustrated, and mentioned in the text, is omitted from the detailed model descriptions which fill pages 182-225.

On pp. 113-114, the *same* cartridge is referred to four times as the .38S&W, and five as the .38S&W*Special*. Since the two are wholly unlike and will not chamber in the same weapon, this is a bit of loose talking which one would hardly expect from authorities on Smith & Wesson products.

CALVIN GODDARD,
Lieutenant Colonel, Ordnance Department

China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, by Lawrence K. Rosinger.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1944. Pp. 133. \$2.00.)

While nothing in the way of an original contribution either of analysis or data justifies the publication of this book, the summary of Kuomintang-Communist relations is a literary convenience, and might help as a mental jumping off point for a reorientated American pressure program aimed to implement a general solution of the China problem.

The general facts are presented: a crippled central government short of supplies and immediate reform, but for international and military purposes, the only government of China; opposed with varying intensity by the Chinese Communist Party on the grounds of general inadequacy, and cruelty in intimidating reform. In continuing the civil war, the Kuomintang has to an important degree diverged from its main object of preserving the territorial integrity of China by fighting Japan. Its excuse is that the elimination of the last powerful faction outside the government is necessary for the life of the State.

Neither party has changed appreciably during the war. The Kuomintang retains its old-line conservative personnel, policies, antagonisms. The Communists, similarly, continue to exist as an embryo all-China Government, their program modified for war purposes but practically intact, awaiting perhaps the postwar denouement.

The author indicates that Chiang Kai-shek is especially sensitive to foreign criticism as he is dependent on Russia, America, and Britain for supplies. Though not given in so many words, and beyond the scope of a purely factual presentation, the material presented can be salted down for action purposes to three statements. Britain which defends an 18th century position in China and India is still discredited by her Pacific defeat, and is moreover primarily engaged in Europe. Russia, as far to the Left relative to Asia as Britain is to the Right, has learned

to distrust Chiang whatever the aid it has given him and continues to give him; on his part Chiang is fearful of Russia. To the United States alone, as to a disinterested friend and his most powerful ally, Chiang looks for guidance and aid. This is our cue for a forthright positive policy once naval and supply lines are established.

HYMAN ROUDMAN,

The Adjutant General's Office, War Department.

Island Victory, by Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall. (Washington: Infantry Journal. 1944. Pp. 213. 25 cents.)

This work is another of the growing number of pocket-sized volumes published as a "Fighting Forces-Penguin Special" by the *Infantry Journal*. Besides a foreword by the editors, there is a very useful introductory thumb-nail sketch on infantry tactics, written by the author. The text amounts to a blow-by-blow description of the conquest of the Kwajalein Atoll in the Central Pacific, particularly the attacks on the islands of Chance, Ninni, Ennylobegan, Enubuj, Ebeye, Loi, and the principal island of Kwajalein.

The book is a result of what the author and editors claim is a new method of historical writing which they term the "interview after combat" method. In essence, the author gathered his material by assembling each company separately, after its return from battle, and holding mass interviews. These interviews, the author states, are not to be confused with the well-known system of the military critique, because in the critique all information and criticism flow from the top down, whereas in this method all data flows from the bottom up. The attempt is made to reconstruct the precise actions, movements, and emotional experiences of each combatant soldier of each squad and platoon of a company. Thus "the fog of war" is lifted from the very area that usually suffers the most from haze—the actual field of battle itself.

In effect, then, the work is a highly detailed tactical study of the actual hour-by-hour fighting of the smallest units and, obviously, it has merit because such studies, whenever honestly and thoroughly done, always have merit. The reader's attention must be called, however, to the fact that the entire study is restricted solely to the front line fighting with no mention of the logistical side of the campaign that made the successful fighting possible.

The author states that his method can be employed by the average company officer, after a little coaching. But, at this distance, it still does not seem possible that so atomistic a scheme could be used on a

large scale. The method appears to require an unavailable number of laymen and professional historians skilled in interviewing. We have here a tactical monograph of the smallest of fighting units. Undoubtedly a limited number of these can be prepared on a sampling basis to illustrate various conditions and typical problems, but they could hardly be prepared for a large number of units. Such studies, however, are useful for the interpretation and integration of official reports, written field orders, and the memoranda emanating from the staffs of the larger combat organizations such as regiments, divisions, and corps. Furthermore, since logistics are an inseparable part of the existence of every unit and of every action, that vital phase of battle and campaign must be included in any study to make it definitive.

VICTOR GONDOS,
The National Archives.

NOTES

Hand Cannon to Automatic, A Pictorial Parade of Hand Arms, by Herschel C. Logan, Arms Consultant, Kansas State Historical Society, is an unusual work valuable to all those interested in the period from the 14th century to the present. (Huntington, West Virginia: Standard Publications, Incorporated. 1944. 172 plates. \$5.00.) The book's purpose is to present in cross-section the development of Hand Arms through the medium of line drawings with short descriptive text. The format of the volume (8 x 11) is especially suited to the method of presentation. It provides stimulating pictorial information for the general student as well as for the expert and an examination is necessary in order to fully realize the value of this work.

Alexander James Dallas, by Raymond Walters, Jr. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1943. Pp. 251. \$2.50) has current interest to military historians since the very able Dallas was Secretary of the Treasury, and Acting Secretary of War from March 14 to December 1, 1815, during which time the demobilization and reorganization of the army after the War of 1812 took place. Based upon manuscript sources, this well written biography is full of important information on the period 1783-1817.

Belle Boyd, Confederate Spy, by Louis A. Sigaud is an excitingly written favorable biography based on many original sources. (Richmond, Virginia: The Deitz Press. 1944. Pp. 254. \$3.00.)

Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1944. Pp. 64. Free) were presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament on November 1944. This important command paper contains a statistical summary under five general topics: Manpower, Home Production, Shipping and Foreign Trade, Civilian Consumption, and Finance, which shows for the first time in a general way how mobilization for war had been achieved from 1939 to June 1944, with the result that a tremendous amount of information has been succinctly presented.

The History of the New Deal, by Basil Rauch covers the period 1933 to 1938. Its value to those interested in military matters is in its presentation of the first overall picture of these years against which backdrop foreign and domestic military events and policies may be seen in perspective. His organization of this complicated historical period is excellent and his clear presentation makes a work worth reading as the basis of more detailed studies. (New York: Creative Age Press. 1944. Pp. 368. \$2.50.)

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Contemporary Scene

- The World of the Arabs*, by Edward J. Byng. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1944. Pp. 344. \$2.50.)
- The Ukraine*, by William H. Chamberlin. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. 91. \$1.75.)
- Modern Korea*, by Andrew J. Grajdanzer. (New York: John Day Company. 1944. Pp. 340. \$4.00.)
- Pictorial History of Russia from Rurik to Stalin*, by Alexander Howard and Earnest Newman. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 207. \$5.75.)
- The Economic Development of French Indo-China*, by Charles Robequain. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. 407. \$4.00.)
- Poland*, by Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Editor. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1945. Pp. 519. \$5.00.)

POST WAR DEVELOPMENTS

- Cartels: Challenge to a Free World*, by Wendell Berge. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1945. Pp. 266. \$3.25.)
- Demobilization of Wartime Economic Controls*, by John M. Clark. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 232. \$1.75.)
- Remobilization for Peace*, by Sir Ronald C. Davison. (Forest Hills, Transatlantic Arts. 1944. Pp. 55. \$1.50.)
- War Criminals; Their Prosecution and Punishment*, by Sheldon Gleuck. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Incorporated. 1944. Pp. 270. \$3.00.)
- Creative Demobilization*, by E. A. Gutkind. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. 2 V. Pp. 347, 288. \$6.00.)
- Providing for Unemployed Workers in the Transition*, by Richard A. Lester. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 163. \$1.50.)
- Soldier to Civilian*, by George K. Pratt. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill. 1944. Pp. 245. \$2.50.)
- An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace*, by Sumner Welles, Editor. (New York: Dryden Press. 1945. Pp. 376. \$3.75.)

NATIONAL WARFARE

- War and Its Causes*, by Luther L. Bernard. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1944. Pp. 489. \$4.25.)
- Education in Transition, A Sociological Study of the Impact of War on English Education 1939-1943*, by H. C. Dent. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 256. \$3.00.)
- Bernard Baruch*, by Carter Field. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill. 1944. Pp. 314. \$3.00.)
- I Lied to Live*, by Alexander Janta. (New York: Roy Publishers. 1944. Pp. 320. \$2.75.)
- The U.S.A. at War; U. S. Camera, 1945*, by Thomas J. Maloney, Editor. (New York: U. S. Camera Publishers. 1944. Pp. 303. \$4.50.)
- Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet*, by Rembert W. Patrack. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1944. Pp. 411. \$3.75.)
- The Leathernecks Come Through*, by Lt. Warren W. Willaird. (New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1944. Pp. 224. \$2.50.)

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

World War II

- Bulldozers Come First*, by Waldo G. Bowman. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 278. \$2.75.)
- They Called It "Purple Heart Valley,"* by Margaret Bourke White. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1944. Pp. 190. \$3.00.)
- The Fifty-Two Days*, by William W. Chaplin. (Indianapolis; the Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1944. Pp. 215. \$2.50.)
- Flight to Everywhere*, by Ivan Dmitri. (New York: Whittlesey House-McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 240. \$6.00.)
- The Secret History of the War*, by Waverly L. Root. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1945. 2 V. Pp. 645, 632. \$10.00.)
- Jim Crow Joins Up*, by Ruth D. Wilson. (New York: Press of William J. Clark. 1944. Pp. 138. \$2.50.)

SEA WARFARE

- My Life to the Destroyers*, by Captain L. A. Abercrombie and Fletcher Pratt. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 168. \$2.75.)
- Many a Watchful Night*, by Lt. John M. Brown. (New York: Whittlesey House-McGraw-Hill. 1944. Pp. 219. \$2.75.)
- The First Battle of Modern Naval History*, by Garland E. Hopkins. (Richmond, Va.: Dietz Press. 1945. Pp. 36. \$3.50.)
- Admiral Sir William Fisher*, by Admiral Sir William M. James. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. 173. \$2.00.)
- Sank Same*, by William B. Mellon, Jr. (New York: Howell, Soskin, Incorporated. 1944. Pp. 224. \$2.50.)
- Our Flying Navy*. The Macmillan Company. 1944. Pp. 114. \$3.75.)
- Death Was Our Escort*, by Lt. Comdr. Ernest G. Vetter. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1944. Pp. 330. \$3.00.)

AIR WARFARE

- The Aviation Annual of 1945*, by R. M. Cleveland and F. P. Graham. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Company. 1944. Pp. 219. \$3.75.)
- The Aircraft Annual 1945*, by David C. Cooke. (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 1944. Pp. 288. \$3.00.)
- Pilots Also Pray*, by Lt. Tom Harmon. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1944. Pp. 188. \$2.50.)
- Helldiver Squadron; the Story of Carrier Bombing Squadron 17 with Task Force 58*, by Robert Olds. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1944. Pp. 236. \$3.00.)
- Fighting Wings*, by Gilbert H. Paust and Milton Lancelot. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1944. Pp. 256. \$2.75.)
- Doomed to Glory*, by Colonel Robert L. Scott. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1944. Pp. 228. \$2.50.)
- No Tumult, No Shouting, the Story of the PBY*, by Lois and Donald B. Thorburn. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 156. \$2.50.)
- American Warplanes in Action*, by Sydney E. Veale. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1944. Pp. 47. \$1.50.)

NATIONAL FORCES

- Thomas Cresap, Maryland Frontiersman*, by Kenneth P. Bailey. (Boston: Christopher. 1944. Pp. 322. \$4.00.)

- Fighting Generals*, by Robert Lee Bullard. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: J. W. Edwards Company. 1944. Pp. 329. \$5.00.)
- Captain Cushing in the War of 1812*, by Daniel L. Cushing. (Columbia: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society. 1944. Pp. 144. \$2.00.)
- The Red Army*, by Colonel E. K. Federov. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 48. \$1.50.)
- Fighting Joe Hooker*, by Walter H. Hebert. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1944. Pp. 366. \$3.50.)
- "First with the Most" *Forrest*, by Robert S. Henry. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 558. \$4.00.)
- Suliman The Magnificent*, by Roger B. Merriman. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1944. Pp. 333. \$3.50.)
- Tennessee During the Revolutionary War*, by Samuel C. Williams. (Nashville: Tennessee Historical Commission. 1944. Pp. 273. \$4.00.)

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- The Story of the Rifle*, by Mick Bennett. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. Pp. 51. \$0.75.)
- Sea Language Comes Ashore*, by Joanna C. Colcord. (New York: Cornell Maritime Press. 1945. Pp. 22. \$2.25.)
- The Aeronautical Dictionary*, by Thomas A. Dickerson. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1945. Pp. 495. \$3.50.)
- The Military Institutions of the Romans*, by Flavius Vegetius Renatus. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1944. Pp. 114. \$1.00.)
- English-Spanish and Spanish-English Dictionary of Aviation Terms*, by Juan K. Senates. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 141. \$2.50.)
- The Language of World War II*, by A. Marjorie Taylor. (New York: H. W. Wilson Company. 1945. Pp. 94. \$1.25.)
- Burbank Among the Indians*, by Frank J. Taylor, Editor. (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers. 1945. Pp. 232. \$5.00.)

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

NATIONAL WARFARE

- "World Population in Transition," symposium, entire issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1945.
- "The End in Sight," by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1945, pp. 167-81.
- "Developments in the Iron and Steel Industry during 1944," by W. H. Burr, in *Iron and Steel Engineer*, January 1945, pp. 80-92.
- "British Imperial Policy," entire issue in *Amerasia*, January 12, 1945.
- "Mass Production in Shipbuilding," by Howard Campbell, in *Modern Machine Shop*, January 1945, pp. 124-38.
- "Critical Points," war metals survey by the editor, in *Metal Progress*, January 1945, pp. 105-8.
- "Middle Eastern Perplexities," by H. A. R. Gibb, in *International Affairs*, October 1944, pp. 458-72.
- "Oil and Air Transport," by Orville Harden, in *The Lamp*, December 1944, pp. 8-9.
- "Shuttle Run," air-run to USSR by Private Howard Katzander, in *North American Skyline*, November-December 1944, pp. 24-5, 27.

- "West Coast Refining and Natural Gasoline Construction Assumes Added Significance," by John H. Kunkel, in *The Petroleum Engineer*, December 1944, pp. 59-66.
- "The Bitter Fruits of Teheran," by Isaac Don Levine, in *American Affairs*, January 1945, pp. 37-41.
- "Sale of War Surpluses to Speculators," by John G. McLean, in *Harvard Business Review*, Winter 1945, pp. 229-45.
- "European Theatre of Operations," by Max Miller and Irwin Ross, in *Harper's*, January 1945, pp. 116-32.
- "Income, Money and Prices in Wartime," by J. L. Mosak and W. A. Salant, in *The American Economic Review*, December 1944, pp. 828-39.
- "Airway to the Philippines," by Harry E. Patterson, in *Douglas Airview*, December 1944, pp. 4-7.
- "Hazardous Journey," air transport Himalayas route, by Captain John D. Payne, in *Curtis Fly Leaf*, November-December 1944, pp. 14-15, 21.
- "Post Mortem Critique on 1944," Merchant Marine, feature article in *Marine Journal*, January 1945, pp. 24-5, 44.
- "The Vatican's Position in Europe," by Luigi Sturzo, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1945, pp. 211-21.
- "An Analysis of Our Shipping Position," by Arthur M. Tode, in *Marine Journal*, January 1945, pp. 32-2, 40-3.
- "Reconversion," copper, by H. H. Wanders, in *Engineering and Mining Journal*, January 1945, pp. 54-7.
- Round Table*, all issues.
- The War Illustrated*, Sir John Hammerton editor, all issues.

THE UNITED NATIONS

- "The Legal Nature of War Crimes and the Problem of Superior Command," by Jacob Berger, in *The American Political Science Review*, December 1944, pp. 1203-8.
- "A Chinese Munitions Plant," illustrated article in *Metals and Alloys*, December 1944, pp. 1611-3.
- "Impressions of the French Aircraft Industry," by L. Graham Davies, in *The Aeroplane*, January 12, 1945, pp. 54-6.
- "The Responsibilities of World Citizenship," by J. C. Easton, in *West Virginia History Quarterly*, January 1945, pp. 115-26.
- "Going in with LeClerc," by Emlen Etting, in *The Atlantic*, December 1944, pp. 40-3.
- "Conflict in Poland," by Sidney B. Fay, in *Current History*, December 1944, pp. 453-9.
- "The Governor as Commander-in-Chief," by Ruth Fletcher, in *Historical Studies* (Australia and New Zealand), November 1943, pp. 209-23.
- "A Military Wedding," combined operations, by Commander Thomas W. Jones, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1944, pp. 1451-9.
- "The Franco-Lebanese Dispute and the Crisis of November 1943," by Majid Khaduri, in *American Journal of International Law*, October 1944, pp. 601-20.
- "Congressional Tax Policies in 1943," by Mabel Newcomer, in *The American Economic Review*, December 1944, pp. 734-56.
- "Transition to Democracy in Germany?" by Sigmund Neumann, in *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1944, pp. 341-62.
- "The Russians Can Manage," article in *Fortune*, January 1945, pp. 159-63, 184-93.

- "Russia Rebuilds," by Anna Louise Strong, in *The Atlantic*, December 1944, pp. 92-6.
- "Panamericanism," by Alfredo Jauregui Rosquellas, in *Boletín de la Sociedad Geografica "Sucre"* (Bolivia), May 1944, pp. 38-41.
- "The Rise, Fall and Coming Revival of French Aviation," by Genevieve Tabouis, in *The Pegasus*, January 1945, pp. 1-7, 16.
- "The Chinese in Southeast Asia," by Leonard Unger, in *The Geographical Review*, April 1944, pp. 196-217.
- "Russia's Asiatic Quislings," by Albert Parry, in *Asia and the Americans*, December 1944, pp. 542-5.
- "From Grease Monkey to Air Chief," General Roberto Fierro of Mexico, by S. Wallace in *Air Pilot and Technician*, December 1944, pp. 16-7, 20.

LAND AND AIR WARFARE

The Service journals continue to be uniformly excellent sources of information on all aspects of the war. No attempt has been made to list titles separately. The following should be given thorough reading:

Command and General Staff School *Military Review*, *The Field Artillery Journal*, *The Infantry Journal*, *The Cavalry Journal*, *The Coast Artillery Journal*, *Army Ordnance*, *Firepower* (Ordnance), *Air Force*, *Aircraft Recognition*, *Recognition*, *Army Air Forces Technical Data Digest*, *Chemical Warfare Bulletin*, *The Military Engineer*, *The Quartermaster Review*, *Bulletin of the United States Medical Department*, *The (British) Army Quarterly*, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, *The Royal Air Force Quarterly*, *Journal of the Royal Medical Corps*, *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, *Intelligence Bulletin*, *Transactions of the American Society for Metals*, *Yank*, *Stars and Stripes*.

In addition, certain publications serving the paramount public interest in aeronautics are good for complete reading in all issues: *Skyways*, *Air Tech*, *Air News*, *Plane Talk* and *The Aeroplane* (British).

- "The Story of SCAT," by Captain Robert J. Allen and Lieutenant Otis Carney, in *Air Transport*, January 1945, pp. 28-32.
- "5000 Harbingers of Doom" (B-26), article in *The Martin Star*, December 1944, pp. 4-5, 21.
- "First B-29 Over Tokyo," article in *Boeing*, December 1944, pp. 3, 18.
- "Superfortress Production," article in *Aircraft Production*, December 1944, pp. 582-4.
- "CBI Thunderbolt," article in *Air Trails, Pictorial*, February 1945, pp. 32-4, 97.
- "How the B-29 Concentrates Its Fire Power," by H. T. Hokanson and T. S. Lisberger, in *Machine Design*, January 1945, pp. 113-6.
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

NAPOLEON: LEGEND AND PROPAGANDA

BY LIEUTENANT M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

Napoleon's companion during his exile, his first biographer, Las Casas, once asked the Emperor why in addition to the alarm-clock he had not also taken Frederick II's sword from his bedroom at Sans-Souci.

"Because I had mine," came the retort.

Napoleon added that the reply should be recorded.

"It will be useful as a contribution to characterize my attitude toward the 'Great Fritz,'" he commented further.

Napoleon knew that in his military career he had surpassed his master. He realized that both history and historical legend would proclaim him superior. Of this he was convinced. Nevertheless, he wanted to bequeath to history his complete consciousness of this superiority, his own opinion of himself, a glimpse of himself from a historical perspective. Understanding how unalterable are the vicissitudes of life, he realized the impossibility of influencing the course of events. Napoleon, therefore, eagerly commenced to form the legend to be passed on to posterity as complete as possible, and conforming to the pattern which this virtuoso of propaganda had designed for himself and his dynasty.

Military science and techniques have changed remarkably, but nevertheless all training of military students in schools over the world is based on the campaigns of the "Little Corporal." In an interview with Foch, Wickham Steed inquired:

"What would Napoleon have done, had he been the commander-in-chief of the allied armed forces? Would his genius have been capable of embracing complicated contemporary warfare?"

Unhesitatingly, Foch expressed the opinion that Napoleon's genius depended precisely on the exploitation of existing conditions by adjusting himself to those circumstances which are unchangeable, and by bending to his own will the flexible factors.

Having at his disposal technical facilities not much wealthier than Caesar, Napoleon's achievements were incomparably greater than Caesar's, especially when one considers that he had for opponents nations

which were on the same plane of civilization as France.

Despite the harnessing into service of infinitely greater factors, Hitler's conquests yield to Napoleon's. Bonaparte was in Cairo, Madrid, and Moscow. His thrust from Wilno to Moscow was achieved merely by help of cavalry and infantry, and took only 48 days.

Napoleon's career is spectacular. On the other hand, it is surprising upon analyzing the power of influence and the charm of his legend, to find upon taking off his mask of demi-god, a rationalist, influenced by XVIII century philosophy, of little appeal to the masses, a bibliophile and a book-worm, devotee of the theater and an admirer of poetry, reciting at any opportunity whole passages from Virgil, Racine, or Corneille. Beyond that, he was not an orator, and at any rate, he was incapable of swaying the masses. Having been for years an idol of the crowds, he had before them an almost panicky fright, especially if the crowd had not been carefully prepared with favorable propaganda or, what was worse, when it was hostile. As the events of 18 brumaire demonstrated, he did not know how to influence the masses. Even during his life, his popularity was based more on awe than on affection.

The most frequently ignored aspect of the Napoleonic legend, without which its permanence and scope are difficult to comprehend, is: The versatility of this hero.

Paul Cambon said of Paderewski that he was a genius who also played on the piano. It can be said of Napoleon that he was a genius who among other things won sixty battles.

His military and political genius does not fully determine or explain the success during his lifetime or his posthumous fame. Among the many aspects of his individuality, one is underestimated, which, when considered, illumines and clarifies many things. That is his propaganda approach to himself and to his activities. Napoleon was, without doubt, as an Englishman said, "propaganda conscious." He was a past-master of propaganda.

The secret of the success of his propaganda method lay in the adroit and concentric playing on the popular imagination with several media simultaneously, and then directing the psychological reactions toward a specific goal. Innate and acquired knowledge of mass psychology combined with a pedantic planning of every problem submitted by Fouche and Napoleon's personally organized intelligence provided him with the indispensable elements for decision. Lacking any feeling or understanding of the technical progress or new inventions of his time, he nevertheless always succeeded in utilizing the facilities at his disposal.

Asked during the campaign on 1814 what forces were available, he

answered unhesitatingly:

"Sixty thousand and I; together one hundred thousand."

That same attitude, that same understanding of his part as a propagandist caused him, despite a well-organized system of agents and command of the best pens and minds of France, to rely above all on himself. He planned, wrote, produced, and organized. Hence, every action of his has a vigorous, indelible personal stamp.

Realizing that he was not an impassioned orator, Napoleon avoided unrehearsed, impromptu addresses. On the other hand, he could write. Not only could he write well, but his words could arouse to battle.

"Soldiers!" shouted General Bonaparte, taking command of a motley group of ragamuffins and beggars, on whom he conferred immortality under the name of the army of Italy, "soldiers, you are tattered, barefoot, and hungry. I shall lead you to the most fertile valley in the world. Large cities, rich provinces will be in your power. There in Italy you will find glory, fame and wealth. Follow me . . ."

From the very first moment, the 26-year old general managed to inspire a revolutionary and rebellious army with faith in the new commander, and in themselves. The first victories transformed this faith into a fanatic idolization for the general, small and unimpressive, but performing feats beyond their most daring fancies.

The Directorate joyfully welcomed Italian gold, Austrian banners and classical sculpture. But accompanying the banners are chests full of leaflets and engravings: "General Bonaparte at Lodi," "Bonaparte arriving at Milan," "Bonaparte at Virgil's grave." Josephine and her friends undertook to spread this printed matter. Bonaparte's popularity increased, and this is one of the reasons why the Directorate, wishing to dispose of the ambitious Corsican, sent him to almost inevitable ruin in Egypt.

Egypt was a new stage in Napoleon's career. For the expedition he selected an ensemble of the finest scholars, writers, designers, and painters. The majority of these men perished, but those who returned enthusiastically aided in the preparation of the road to Consulship and later Emperorship. There, in Egypt, Napoleon probably reached the zenith of his writing artistry in the historic order: "Soldiers, forty centuries look down upon you from these pyramids . . ."

His knowledge of the East had a decisive influence on his methods of playing on the imagination of the masses by creating a suitable background for himself. As Emperor, he alone would design the uniforms of his regiments so that their splendor reflected the austerity of his own attire. From that time, he began to surround himself with Mamelukes.

He took pains to establish in the public mind a permanent picture of modesty. Then, aside from the coronation fashion, he would wear only a green frock coat of the horse-guards, a grey cloak, and a three-cornered hat.

The setting for the spectacle, in which he took part, and with which he wished to charm the masses, was a specialty of this virtuoso of mass psychology and popularity.

Nothing was left to chance. He restaged the coronation ceremony with rehearsals, using appropriately costumed dolls. "Success lies in the organization of details and in their meticulous arrangement." The meeting with Czar Alexander after the signing of the peace-pact at Tilsit was a typical example of his pageantry: the raft anchored on the Niemen with two Emperors, who only yesterday were leaders of enemy armies, exchanging embraces and assurances of friendship. Alexander offered the order of the Legion of Honor, saying: "Sir, I have been defeated!" "Yes," answered Bonaparte, "I know, but being defeated by Napoleon is almost equal to victory." On both banks of the Niemen, amphitheatrically-arranged, cheering and gazing on, were the armies, thus completing an impressive and decorative tableau of this historic occasion.

But there were days of darkness. There was the Russian campaign, the retreat from Moscow. Of the large army, only tatters remained. How to present France with the story of defeat, and at the same time prepare her for dedication to new achievements.

At his quarters in Warsaw in "English Hotel" he outlined the famous bulletin 29 which appeared in the *Monitor* on December 16, 1812, two days before the arrival of the Emperor in Paris. It is truly a masterpiece of prose. In words full of dignity and tragic pathos, the commander of a non-existing army describes its superhuman struggle, its final capitulation, not before the might of the enemy, but before "nature, untamed by man."

As in a Sophoclean tragedy, we see the uncontrollable mounting peripeties of fate. The words are selected with dexterity. The transforming scenes add to the impression and blend completely into one doleful frieze, where on the snow-covered plain of White Russia, we see heaps of corpses—both human and animal, abandoned wagons, soldiers struggling under their heavy burdens, generals commanding platoons, and colonels battling as mere privates. In these scenes, worthy of the brush of Goya, surrounded by his retinue and the remnants of his guard, stands the figure of the Emperor. The whole bulletin, de-

spite the tragic description, touches one with the tranquillity and masterfulness of the man, who during the expedition to this icy hell, did not lose control of himself even for a moment, but sought even greater glory by rising above the unconquerable. The bulletin concludes with the words, "The Emperor was never more happily blessed with good health than at present."

Then followed the battle of Lipsk, the campaign of 1814, and finally abdication.

In the farewell scene with his guards, the master of drama surpassed even himself, furnishing the artist with an ideal painting which needs only to be copied, reproduced by thousands, and finally hung on the walls of French homes. Broken physically and morally, between hysterical attacks of despair and long hours of complete inertia, Napoleon reflected how most dramatically to retire from the stage of history, how he could mark this departure as a most heroic episode.

The court-yard at Fontainebleau palace, with the veterans, "Fed on the blood of Europe, the Italian sun, scarred by battles," crying like children, the shouts piercing with sobs, the Emperor-leader touching, kissing the regimental banner.

What artist or what poet could resist such a scene?

"My comrades in battle," he called, fully conscious that he was departing to become a legend, "If I decided to outlive myself, it is only to further serve your cause. Now, I want to describe these great deeds which we have performed together."

This gesture proved premature.

The sojourn in Elba restored tranquility, gave him time to deliberate and reflect. Faith in his power and in his star returned.

"This is not an end worthy of me," he told his mother.

Letitia not only agreed, but encouraged flight.

After reviewing reports from his followers in France, Napoleon proceeded to edit and print at Porto Ferrajo pamphlets which were to be disseminated upon disembarkation. The leaflet brimmed with revolutionary demagogue, calling the populace to overthrow the Bourbon yoke and to drive out the nobility and clergy. "The Emperor's eagles will fly from tower to tower until they rest on Notre Dame."

Thiers termed Napoleon's return from Elba "An invasion performed by one man." Contemporary witnesses contend that there was something supernatural, nearly miraculous, in Napoleon's triumphant return. This miracle, however, was carefully prepared by pamphlets, agents, and what was of paramount importance in those days, whis-

pered propaganda.

Napoleon met the first signs of resistance at Laffrey where in a mountain-pass he was obstructed by the 5th regiment of infantry regulars.

"Soldiers," he shouted, "if there is one among you who would like to fire at his Emperor, here I am!"

Two officers, sent the previous day to the barracks of the regiment, prepared the terrain and brought back reports of definite anti-Bourbon and pro-Napoleon sentiments. This episode, which has gone down in history, was achieved with confidence and no danger existed.

Bloodless, and crowned with complete success, the invasion of France took Napoleon twenty of the one hundred days. He landed at Antibes on March 1. He reached Paris on the 20th. The alteration in France's attitude was reflected in *Figaro*, in which the news of the landing was headlined as "L'Antropophage débarqua à Antibes." The 5th of March, "L'usurpateur à Nice"; on the 8th, "Bonaparte à Grenoble"; on the 14th, "Napoleon à Lyon"; on the 17th, "L'Empereur à Fontainebleau"; on the 18th, "Sa Majesté Impériale est entrée à Paris hier soir."

Napoleon spent more than one-fifth of his life on the isle of St. Helena in exile. Deprived of any possible hope of further activity, unable even to dream of flight, he concentrated his complete efforts toward one goal: the greatest possible improvement in opinion toward the 20-year reign of his dynasty.

"Only by martyrdom can I replace the crown of my dynasty," he told himself on the ship carrying him to exile. Consequently, from the moment of his arrival on the isle he did everything to make this exile look like martyrdom, and above all so that tidings of this would reach the outside world, composed and inspired others to do so in the same spirit.

In the *Commentaries* this Prometheus succeeded in implanting in history his version of his achievements and words. There, too, he adopted the pose of "prophet of a new age," democrat and liberal, initiator of common reforms, builder of a new national consciousness, and in this manner acknowledged himself the father of new ideas and changes, of which he was only the obstetrician.

Thanks to these efforts, he laid the groundwork for the existence of the Second Empire. Napoleon III owed his career in a large measure to the work of his uncle on the isle of St. Helena. The birth of the Second Empire was the posthumous triumph of Napoleon I.

THE JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND

BY MAJOR BEN BRUCE BLAKENEY

PART ONE

I. The Organization

The student of the military systems of Europe will find much that is familiar in the organization of the Japanese Army—and, indeed, in its equipment, drill and tactical employment in past wars. The course of Japan's military history in modern times, rather than mere coincidence, accounts for this *mélange*, in which French, German and even, in small degree, British and Italian influences may be recognized.

When Commodore Perry "opened" Japan, in 1852-53, the country's fighting forces consisted of some hundreds of thousands—perhaps toward a million—*samurai*, professional military men still in the day of the two-handed sword and the brass muzzle-loader cannon. The society of Japan was then a pure feudalism; the *samurai* were in no sense national troops, but were serfs of the *daimyō*, the lords of clans scattered throughout the land, each the ruler of his province, great or small, and commander of his own army. Over them all was the *Shōgun*, he who, as head of the military autocracy which for centuries had usurped the authority of the Emperor in temporal matters, was the actual ruler of the country. In ordinary times the Shogunate itself retained only relatively a few troops, relying upon levies to be made by the *daimyō* as occasion might require for conducting its foreign wars or maintaining itself against domestic challenge.

The menace to Japan's existence as a nation implied by the arrival of Perry's four "Black Ships"—a menace all too apparent when Japanese eyes were turned upon events in China across the sea—led some of the more progressive feudal lords to undertake the modernization of their military forces, for which purpose they secured the services of foreign advisors of various nations. The Shogunate in its turn, feeling its existence threatened by the clans' more efficient armies, was forced to adopt for itself the foreign military system, which it did in 1862; a French military mission was imported in 1867 to reorganize its army on the model of the French, then apparently the world's finest. Shortly afterward, however, the Shogunate itself fell bloodlessly, the administrative power was restored to the Throne, and Japan as a new unified nation set about converting herself into a modern state. One of the first things to claim attention was, inevitably, the military establishment. There could then be found among the clan troops reflections

of the military systems and training of the French, the Dutch, the Germans and the English; in order to determine which was preferable, the government sent abroad a young *samurai*, Yamagata Aritomo, to make a study of the chief foreign military establishments. Yamagata, who later became Prince, Field-Marshal, twice Premier and for a generation the guiding genius of the Japanese Army, returned after a sojourn of several years in Europe to report that the French system of universal compulsory service and the French army organization were the best, and to urge their adoption. Conscription was accordingly instituted in 1873; another mission, under the Frenchman Marguerie, had meanwhile arrived the year before, to remain until 1880, by which time an army small in scale but modern and efficient had been built.

No sooner, however, had the Japanese decided that the French Army was the one to pattern after—before the French mission had yet arrived, in fact—than the event of the Franco-Prussian War revealed that they had backed a losing horse. As it gradually became clear that Prussia, or Germany, as she was now, was the great military power, the Japanese, ever avid for the first-rate, turned to the Germans for their further military tutelage. A mission came headed by Major (later Major-General) Meckel, a distinguished officer of the school of von Moltke, remaining until the eve of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Under the German *régime* the latest German doctrine and method were adopted, the General Staff and the Ministry of War were constituted in their present form, and in general the army assumed the aspect which it has retained until the present. A consequence of the obliteration of the French system originally in vogue in favor of the German was that from that time the Japanese Army has been uniformly pro-German, even—paradoxically—during the time that Japan and Germany took the field as enemies in 1914-18. Thenceforward the Japanese have stood on their own military feet; no further foreign advisors have been employed by them except for a British and a French mission which came, after World War I, to assist in reorganizing and training the Navy and Army air forces, respectively (at the same time a number of Army Air Force officers and men were sent to Italy for training).

The result of this eclecticism is that reminiscences may be found in the Japanese military establishment of many systems, along with the home-grown ingredients which have gone into the creation of the new whole, the Japanese Army of the twentieth century. For it has its own

quite native flavor, its *esprit de corps*, its tradition rooted far in the heroic past of *bushidō*, the Warrior's Way. No Western system could apply without radical modification to a nation with Japan's all-pervading Imperial tradition, the cornerstone of which is the military command—for though no Emperor in centuries has personally commanded the Army, yet the Imperial tradition is very real, is present daily and hourly, among the troops.

In today's military organization we find that the only function of the Emperor, as theoretical Commander-in-Chief, is to assent to what is done by his representatives. Since the power of command is nominally exercised by him, however, all appointments to the highest military posts are made in his name, and the appointees are responsible ostensibly to him alone. For his assistance and guidance the Emperor has at his disposal three consultative bodies. Of these the most honorific and the least functional is the *Gensui-fu*, the Board of *Gensui*—Field-M Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet—which is nothing more than the total of *gensui* living at the time; at present, the four field-m Marshals and the two admirals of the fleet. As "the highest advisory body on military and naval matters" it has nothing of importance to do.

A second standing board is the *Gunji sangiin*, the Supreme War Council, likewise a joint Army-Navy body. The membership includes the *gensui*, several of the highest functionaries as *ex officio* members, the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and a few others, with their Navy counterparts—and such other high-ranking officers as the Emperor may nominate, these usually numbering ten to fifteen. The functions of the Supreme War Council are to advise the Emperor upon the appointment of Ministers of War and Navy, to consider and advise upon matters of import, such as the ratification of treaties, affecting the services, and to correlate matters of military policy. In practice its influence as a body is very little, for its Army and Navy sections, being dominated by the high office-holders of the services, speak with their voices.

The third of the consultative bodies, and the most important, is the *Dai hon-ei*, or Grand Imperial Headquarters. This body, set up in wartime only, actually is nothing more than a joint-chiefs-of-staff establishment. Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staffs, Ministers of the services, with their retinues, the *gensui* and the other Supreme War Councillors, and such others as they may require or the Emperor may designate (the Premier is usually present), compose the membership, which determines the policy and the strategy of the war. In view of

its real importance, the Emperor himself is likely to attend at the Grand Imperial Headquarters; in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, for example, his residence and the Headquarters were established in the western city of Hiroshima, to be nearer the theater of operations.

The high command itself, the repository of control over the military system, consists of five agencies, roughly coördinate and co-equal in authority. This distribution of control, which is illustrative of the traditional separation in Japan of military administration and military command, serves also to assure that too much power over the Army shall not be concentrated into the hands of any subject. Similarly, the requirement that the heads of these five agencies, and the deputy of each, be a general or a lieutenant-general on the active list excludes the possibility of civilian intrusion into the Army high command.

First, and in late years much the most powerful, of these organs is the Ministry of War, which controls the administration, supply and mobilization of the Army. It has been mentioned that the Minister, who is a member of the cabinet, must be a general or a lieutenant-general in active service; but perhaps the bald statement does not sufficiently emphasize the power which the Army can and does thereby wield over the government. No ministry can be formed without a Minister of War; and no Minister of War can be appointed without the Army's concurrence, for any general who ignored Army disapproval to accept the post would find himself retired. Hence the Army can determine the complexion of the government by declining to detail an officer as Minister of War for any premier-designate whom it finds unacceptable, thereby preventing the formation of a ministry. It can similarly force the resignation of a government at any time by withdrawing its Minister—this has happened several times, most lately to Premier Admiral Yonai in 1940. Thus the cabinet seat of the Minister of War is primarily to enable him to dictate to Ministry and Diet in military matters, rather than by reason of any responsibility of his to them. The Japanese historian, in saying that "in Japanese constitutional practice, His Majesty's government and His Majesty's high command are independent of each other," expresses only a half-truth, for the independence is unilateral.

The Ministry, then, administers the Army, somewhat in the manner of our War Department. There are the Minister, the Vice-Minister, a Parliamentary Vice-Minister (a permanent, civilian functionary maintaining liaison with the Diet and continuity of departmental practice) and a number of bureaux and other agencies. Of these the most

important are the Bureaux of Military Affairs and Personnel and the Aviation Headquarters. The Military Affairs Bureau is the real center of military administration, with responsibility for establishment and supervision of the system and organization of the Army. The Director of the Military Affairs Bureau—a major-general, in the usual course—is, by reason of his control over assignments, one of the most powerful men in the Army, and an officer appointed to the post is almost invariably destined for the highest places.

The second of the instrumentalities of the high command is the General Staff, which has the responsibility for drawing the country's war plans and formulating strategy and, in general, for the employment of the army. The organization, under the Chief and the Vice-Chief (since February, 1944, there have been two concurrent vice-chiefs), is in sections comparable vaguely to our "G's"—Section 1 is Operations, for example, Section 2 Intelligence, and so on. The General Staff also operates the Army Staff College and has control over staff officers. It must be repeated that the General Staff is not subordinate to, but is coördinate with, the Ministry of War—and thereby has occasionally worked at cross-purposes with it.

Third is the Inspectorate-General of Military Education. Here is lodged all control over technical and tactical training of troops of the various ground arms, including operation of the military schools (except aviation schools and the Staff College), preparation and application of training regulations, and inspection of troops. In addition to the Inspector-General and the Assistant Inspector, the department includes inspectors of branches—artillery, cavalry, engineers, transport—and to an extent may be considered as analagous to our Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.

The Inspectorate of Aviation is the fourth of the branches of the high command. This relative newcomer (it was established, superseding the old Aviation Department of the Ministry, by ordinance of 7 December 1938) has as its chief function Army aviation training, over which it has full control. It controls, also, however, the present Aviation Headquarters, by virtue of the custom of appointing one man concurrently to the two offices; and thereby it has charge of the administration of the air force. The Inspectorate thus represents a partial severance of the Air Force from the Army, rendering it semi-autonomous somewhat in the same way as is our Army Air Forces. There are Inspector, Assistant Inspector and the bureau chiefs; and the numerous flying-training, technical and tactical schools.

Lastly comes the National Defense Headquarters, created in October 1941 when eventual attack upon the Japanese mainland could begin to be envisioned as more than a possibility. The Commander-in-Chief, although responsible directly to the Emperor, is nevertheless under the supervision of the "Central Control Board," to be mentioned presently, in the execution of his office. The National Defense Headquarters assumed direction of the preëxisting Army Districts of which there are now six in Japan Proper, one each in Korea, Formosa and Kwantung, in relation to which its business is to superintend conscription and mobilization and to provide liaison with the civil, prefectural, government. In addition it has the task of organizing and executing, as may be necessary, measures for the defense of the country; this function is organized in districts which differ somewhat territorially from the administrative districts. In April 1945 there were created two new "over-all Army commands" for Japan proper, which—though their organization and territorial limits are not yet clear—probably succeeded to the operational functions of the Defense Headquarters.

The coördination of these five organs is effected through two unofficial bodies which are the true rulers of the Army. The first, known as "the Big Three," consists of the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Inspector-General of Military Education. They are really "big;" not only do they determine policies for the Army as a whole and decide upon major personnel assignments, but also, acting as a group, they choose the successor of any one of the trio who quits office. Being thus self-perpetuating, they are able except in times of crisis or extreme strain to maintain a clique or party dominant within the Army, and to provide for continuity of any policy which they may desire to see carried out. It need not be pointed out that no civilian, cabinet minister or otherwise, has *entrée* to this circle. With the inclusion of the Inspector of Aviation the Big Three become the other group, the Central Control Board, which as a body has final decision concerning employment of troops—has, in fine, the exercise of the war power.

Territorially, the Japanese Empire is organized, as has been mentioned, in Army Districts, of which in time of peace there were seven. Japan Proper has Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Districts, serving much the same purpose as our Service Commands, and Korea and Formosa each constitutes a similar district. The seventh is the Kwantung Army Area, embracing the Kwantung Leased Territory in southern Manchuria, where Japan has (or claims) the treaty right to

maintain a garrison and railway guards. Each of the army areas is the command of a general or a lieutenant-general, responsible in theory directly to the Emperor—actually subject in large measure to the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of National Defense, and through him to the Central Control Board. Now, in wartime, several additional armies have of course come into existence—in China and Mongolia, all under the Commander-in-Chief of China forces; additional ones in Manchuria, under the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army; and in Burma, Malaya and the South Seas, under the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army. In early 1945 there were created also two new army districts, Northeastern and East Central, in Japan Proper.

We cannot leave the subject of the Japanese Army structure without a word about that unique institution, the Kwantung Army. Notwithstanding the designation of "army," it consisted down to the late nineteen-twenties of only one division, chosen from among the regular establishment in Japan and serving a two-year tour in Manchuria. But Japanese ambitions have historically been directed toward Manchuria, and the military detachment in Kwantung has always felt itself the obviously chosen instrument for the extension of the Imperial tradition. The Kwantung Army thus early developed an *esprit de corps* quite remarkable in an organization of such shifting composition, and became the *corps d'élite* of the Japanese Army. It has long served another purpose, equally valued by militarists: it has served as a proving-ground for officers, troops, equipment and doctrine in battle conditions. In 1931 it undertook, and in following years completed, the conquest of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, subsequently set up as the Empire of "Manchoukuo;" during the middle and late 'thirties there were other occasions for experimentation, in the form of frontier incidents with the Russians—who have been nothing loath, on their part. The Russian question, indeed, is what gives the Kwantung Army its transcendent importance to Japan. Never absent from Japanese military thought is the deep and abiding preoccupation with the problem of Russia, and what will she do? In time of peace as of war the preoccupation is there; at a time as desperate as the present it immobilizes in Manchuria hundreds of thousands of Japan's crack troops, the flower of her Army. She has had the more cause for concern over the Manchurian frontier since the last of the big border "incidents"—the battles (for such they were) of Changkufeng in 1938, of Nomonhan in 1939. The Nomonhan affair was a full-scale engagement, of several months'

duration, calling into employment mechanized forces and aviation; the Japanese admitted to 18,000 casualties to their four divisions participating. The Russian commander was Gregory Zhukov.

With this sketch of the present-day Japanese Army organization as an introduction, we turn to some of the personalities who make it go.

II. The Generals

The Japanese Army is well staffed with general officers. In mid-1942 it had a total of seven hundred and six—sixteen full generals, 190 lieutenant-generals and an even five hundred major-generals—giving it the largest number of general officers *per capita* of any of the world's first-rate armies. We may contrast the United States Army's fifteen hundred generals in April 1945, at a time when our army was two or three times as large as the Japanese—at a time, moreover, when the number of Japanese generals had almost doubled: today the full generals are twenty-six, and the other grades are proportionately more numerous. Since the establishment of the modern military system in the eighteen-seventies there has been a total of 131 full generals.

A word of caution is necessary in connection with these figures. The Japanese terms for their general grades, of which they have three only, are *Taishō*, *Chūjō* and *Shōshō*. It has now become settled custom to translate these, which literally signify "Greater General," "Middle General," "Lesser General," by the English "General," "Lieutenant-General" and "Major-General." The analogy is misleading—the Japanese "lieutenant-general," for example, commands a division, and his brigade-commanders are "major-generals"—and it would have been more satisfactory to treat the three functionally, as the equivalents of our lieutenant-, major- and brigadier-general.

There is another Japanese rank, or *quasi*-rank, that of *Gensui*. The title "*gensui*," being common to Army and Navy, represents either "Field-Marshal" or "Admiral of the Fleet." *Gensui* are sparingly created, the title being bestowed almost always (except in the case of Imperial Princes, to whom it comes effortlessly) for distinguished service in war; it is thus as much in the nature of an honor as of a rank. The field-marshals, in fact, continue to be treated as *taishō*, wearing the insignia and being so carried in the Army list—except that they do not retire at the general's age limit in grade of 65, but remain active while they live. The rarity of *gensui* may be seen from the fact that today there are but six (of whom four are Army men)—the largest number in many years living simultaneously. In modern times only

thirty *gensui* have been created, two-thirds of them field-m Marshals, the rest admirals of the fleet; and a few of these were posthumous promotions, as those for Admirals Yamamoto and Koga of recent memory.

We come now to consider the twenty-six *taishō* currently on the active list. Among them are, it will be noticed, several Imperial Princes. They need not be taken seriously; traditionally, members of the Imperial Family enter the services, there finding their paths to the highest places smooth and straight, advancing rapidly and without regard to their abilities, and are all in all more ornamental than useful.

The sketches which follow vary considerably in length. Although by and large the more important men have received the fuller treatment, yet the space accorded an individual should be considered to some extent an index to his colorfulness rather than strictly to his significance. Also it should be noted that, although most generals serve from time to time on the Supreme War Council, no mention is made here of such service; all field-m Marshals, of course, are life-time Councilors. Names are given in the Japanese style: surname first, followed by the given name.

1. Field-Marshal Prince NASHIMOTO Morimasi (born 1874). After graduation from the Japanese Military Academy Prince Nashimoto was a student in France, at St.-Cyr; following the Russo-Japanese War, in which he took part as an infantry officer, he returned to France for further study at the Staff College. He became a general in 1923, *gensui* in 1932, but he has been of no importance in military affairs.

2. Field-Marshal Count TERAUCHI Hisaichi (born 1879) is a true Japanese aristocrat. His father before him was count, and field-marshal, Minister of War from 1901 to 1911, and was Premier of Japan during World War I—the last military man on active status to serve as premier until Tōjō, for World War II. This heritage naturally was no drawback to the son's career. The Japanese Army is, however—except for the case of Imperial Princes who have to be provided for—a democratic one; and Terauchi's own abilities have brought him to his present high place. The combination of Terauchi's name, his rank (he has been a general since October 1935) and his personality—he is a large, handsome man, affable in manner, a forceful and indomitable personality—led to his selection in 1936 as the Minister of War who would force through the Diet the bills, and impose upon the government the measures, required by the Army in preparation for the planned conquest of China. In accomplishing this end he did as much as any man toward the metamorphosis from Japan's

Army to the Army's Japan—and won for himself the deep distrust of liberals and anti-militarists by his contemptuous disregard of civilian opinion in matters touching upon military business.

Terauchi has always held the Germanophile views of the later military generations, and twenty-seven years after his first visit to Germany he returned there—at the special invitation of Hitler—at the head of a military mission in time to be present at the opening of the war in 1939.

After he had left the War Ministry in 1937, his work done, he became Inspector-General of Military Education for a time, and, shortly, supreme commander in China. To him, as Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army from November 1941, is the acclaim for Japan's unprecedented successes in the early months of the war, for which his reward was elevation to the field-marshalcy in June 1943. What reward may be his, as Japanese disasters multiply in the Southern regions; remains to be seen. It may indeed be doubted but that Terauchi is too big for even the Army to chasten.

3. Field-Marshal SUGIYAMA Gen (born 1880) is the most distinguished of living Japanese soldiers, the one man living who has held each of the positions of the "Big Three." He has lately completed his second term as Minister of War, the former one being in 1937-38; he was Inspector-General in 1936-37, and again for half a week in July 1944; he was Chief of the General Staff from October 1940 to February 1944. He has served also as Vice-Minister of War, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Commander of Aviation Headquarters, of forces in North China—has pretty well run the gamut, in short, of the positions within the grasp of a Japanese soldier. All such honors have come as the reward of merit.

It is worth noting that Sugiyama is a member of the famous "Twelfth-year Class" of the Japanese Military Academy, the Class of 1900, which has produced two *gensui* and General Koiso, recently premier. His most intimate association, however, has been with Field-Marshal Terauchi, who was Class of 1899. Significantly, they two, almost alone of the latter-day high command, have never served with the Kwantung Army nor been close to its leaders. Yet they, acting as a sort of clique of their own, largely dominated the Army in the matter of assignment of top positions, down to the advent of Tōjō, from 1936. They took over the Army after the celebrated incident of 26 March of that year, when radicals among the junior officers (urged on, it was common knowledge, by some extremely senior officers) assassinated

the Inspector-General, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal—a retired admiral—and the Minister of Finance, the great and beloved Takahashi Korekiyo, and barely failed to get the Premier, the Minister of the Imperial Household and other high but moderately-inclined officials including the present premier, Admiral Suzuki. Ruthlessly Terauchi and Sugiyama cleansed the Army of radicals, high and low; but to reunify the Army itself, and to restore its popularity with the nation, they set it on the course of foreign conquest for which Japan's bill is yet to pay.

At the same time as Terauchi—June 1943 (he had been a general since 1936)—Sugiyama became a *gensui*, in recognition of his direction of the Army as Chief of the General Staff. Eight months later, in an attempt to shift the onus of the losing war, Tōjō removed Sugiyama, himself assuming the position (the Chief of the Naval General Staff Board, Admiral of the Fleet Nagano, was simultaneously displaced). It is hardly open to question that the attack thereby implied upon the senior leaders of the Army was a chief contributory cause of the collapse of what had seemed Tōjō's impregnable dictatorship, the longest-lived ministry in Japan since 1921. On 18 July 1944 Sugiyama returned from obscurity to become Inspector-General, and on the 22nd became Minister of War, once again and undoubtedly the strongest man in the Japanese Army. When the two new army commands for defense of Japan Proper were created in April 1945, one was inevitably assigned to Field-Marshal Sugiyama, ablest of their generals.

4. Field-Marshal HATA Shunroku (born 1879), commander of the other of the new homeland commands, is another member of the Twelfth-year Class. His field-marshalcy (he is the latest *gensui*) came in June 1944, in reward to the Commander-in-Chief in China for the successes at Changsha, Loyang and Hengyang. Hata rose from the poverty of his Northern farm home to become an Army officer, and fulfill his mother's ambition for him; he had wanted to be an artist. With his quick eyes, his warm smile illuminating his sensitive features, he looks the artist yet, the creator, the dreamer. He is not a dreamer; he is an artilleryman, and his creations are of tactical masterpieces, for he is the acknowledged tactician of his army.

Hata has been successively Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff, Inspector of Artillery, Commander of Aviation Headquarters, Commander of the Formosa Army; Inspector-General in 1937-38, Commander-in-Chief in Central China, Minister of War in the Abe and Yonai governments of 1939-40, and Commander-in-Chief

in China from March 1941 to November 1944. His generalcy dates from July 1937. Hata's reputation as a tactician and his appreciation of air-power made him a logical choice for the supreme command in China when the China war was to be coördinated with the Greater East Asia War, and the choice stands justified. It is true that the definitive victory has never been won; but there is much truth in the Japanese assertion that they have taken what they need of China.

On several occasions during 1939 and 1940 Hata was mentioned as a probable premier. The likeliest-appearing opportunity was when the Abe ministry fell in January 1940; but Admiral Yonai was chosen, and Hata remained as Minister of War. When Yonai resisted the Army's demand for a military alliance with Germany, the Army wrecked the ministry; the Minister of War was relieved, and none of the generals alternatively offered by the Army felt competent to undertake the position.

Hata, today concerned with defense against invasion of Japan, was reputedly nominated by Tōjō, in 1943, as commander-in-chief of the force which is, or was, to invade the United States.

5. General Prince ASAKA Sasuhiko (born 1887) is a half-brother of Prince Nashimoto. Another half-brother is Prince Higashikuni, number six on the ranking list, born two months after Prince Asaka. After the education, usual for Imperial Princes of his generation, in the French military schools, Prince Asaka held a variety of commands, being promoted general in 1939. He has also been talked to as no Imperial Prince was ever addressed before or since: as one of the commanders at Nanking, at the "rape" in 1937, he was among those present at the caustic castigation of his officers by General Matsui Iwane, commander-in-chief, for the breakdown of discipline on that occasion. Prince Asaka was reported in 1942 to have been appointed governor-general of the Philippines, before the Japanese decided to grant "independence." Since April 1943 he has been connected with the educational staff of the Army Air Force.

6. General Prince HIGASHIKUNI Naruhiko (born 1887), the third of the brother generals, has had a career parallelling that of Prince Asaka, but has by far the greater share of ability. He has been a serious student of military affairs, and proved himself a competent and successful commander in China during the 'thirties. Prince Higashikuni became a general in 1939, and has been Commander-in-Chief of National Defense Headquarters since December 1941; as such he

announced the death sentence to be visited upon Allied airmen who might be shot down over Japan.

7. General UMEZU Yoshijirō (born 1883), the present Chief of the General Staff, has sometimes been spoken of by the Japanese as "the strongest man in the Army." Much of his strength is traceable to the fact of his being quiet, cautious, a businessman- or civil-servant-type; more, to his ability to get on well with all factions of the Army. When Terauchi and Sugiyama took over the high command, in March 1936, they chose Umezu as Vice-Minister of War to clean up after the "2-26 Incident." He had already made a distinguished record in such positions as Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff and commander of the North China garrison, at Tientsin.

Until coming to his present post Umezu's most significant assignment was that which he had just quitted, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, where he had been since September 1939. Nothing could be more certain than that in such a period as the five years just past the Japanese Army would entrust the task of watching the Russians to none but the most capable of its generals—and Umezu, prudent and circumspect, cool to radicalism, able administrator and diplomat, was the man in whom reliance could be placed. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army has the concurrent offices of Ambassador Extraordinary to "Manchoukuo" and Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Umezu is one of the rare Japanese military men with the versatility to administer these varied positions more than nominally. His competence in this assignment brought him his generalcy in August 1940.

When in July last Tōjō relinquished the place as Chief of Staff, which he had held since February, Umezu was designated to it. He should work well with the senior Army commanders, and with thoughtful quiet should make the most of his new somewhat hopeless post.

8. General YAMADA Otozō (born 1881) is a cavalryman, a long-time Inspector-General and the present Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. His qualifications for this post are many: he is a Russophobe—it would be a singular Japanese officer who was not—he is a notable planner and organizer; cavalry training and tactics would take an important place, in the form of mechanized warfare, in battles fought over the vast plains of Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia.

Yamada is lacking in that flamboyance sometimes associated with his branch of the service, and is in fact very little known to the public.

Nevertheless he is one of the ablest officers in the Army. His positions have included those of Commandant of the Military Academy, command in Central China and of National Defense Headquarters; but it was as Inspector-General of Military Education from October 1939 to July 1944 that he made his mark. During this extraordinary period he bore the burden first of training the armies in preparation for the impending Greater East Asia War, then of continuing to train reservists and raw recruits by the hundreds of thousands while modifying and improving the training methods as they were applied. This task he did notably well—there can be no question that today's Japanese soldier is as well trained for his job as any soldier in Japanese history. Yamada became a general with Umezu, in August 1940.

9. General HASUNUMA Shigeru (born 1883), another cavalryman, has been relatively inconspicuous, especially since, in 1939, he became Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, which position he still holds. Little is known of him, in the West, save the formal facts of his career: he has toured Europe and America, has held cavalry commands in the Empire and in Manchuria, has served as Inspector of Cavalry and as commander of the Central Army District. He received his promotion to general in December 1940.

10. General OKAMURA Yasuji (born 1884). Okamura received most notice from the fact that it was he who, as Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, signed the celebrated Tangku Truce which put a temporary end to Sino-Japanese hostilities in North China in 1933. He moved on to become Chief of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, divisional commander, general and a few months later—on the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the "China Incident," 7 July 1941—Commander-in-Chief in North China, where he remained until he was relieved in the autumn of last year, becoming Commander-in-Chief in China in succession to Hata in November. There the experience of an old China hand and of the expert on mountain warfare which Okamura is reputed should be of value.

11. General DOIHARA Kenji (born 1883) is the most colorful of the Japanese generals. A soldier he has never been, though he has held some high offices: Commandant of the Military Academy, Inspector of Aviation, Eastern Defense commander, since April Inspector-General of Military Education. But Doihara is the Army's preëminent China expert and its wiliest power-politician. Fascinated from boyhood with China, he chose Chinese as his foreign language at Military Academy, mastered it, and has spent almost his whole life in China,

meddling in its destinies. The one time he essayed military meddling was a fiasco—when he and his 14th Division were surrounded by the Chinese and almost annihilated, at Lanfeng, in 1938.

Doihara first went to China in 1912, and was not again stationed in Japan for twenty years. Meanwhile he had been consorting with the ex-Emperor of China; had served as High Advisor to the Old Marshal, Chang Tso-lin, the tyrant of Manchuria—for whose murder he was probably responsible; had been the brain behind the "Mukden Incident" of 18 September 1931, which led to Japan's conquest of Manchuria, and behind the establishment of the Empire of "Manchoukuo," with his old friend the ex-Dragon Emperor on the throne; and had acquired the soubriquet, "the Lawrence of Manchuria." His later schemes, and especially the grandiose one for the seizure without war of the five northern provinces of China, collapsed in the face of increasing Chinese unity, and Doihara was finally recalled when the job was turned over to the fighting generals.

Since then he has filled—nominally—several positions which actually were run by others; he became a general in April 1941, and for the year before coming to his present post he held an army command in Malaya. From it he escaped in time to preserve his talents for the day when power-politics may again be of service.

12. General ITAGAKI Seishirō (born 1885) is today the outstanding figure of the radical Kwantung Army clique; he has been for years, in fact, the shining embodiment of the Kwantung Army spirit. As such he has also been, inevitably, somewhat the "roughneck" that his professor brother, a well-known officer of societies for international peace, has called him. Partly because of his words—though quiet, and a poor speaker, he has long beat the drum for "expansion"—but more still because of his life, his asceticism, his remaining the plain man of the people that he began, Itagaki has won and held the boundless loyalty of the soldiers and the officers of Japan's predominantly agrarian-class army.

In successive assignments as staff officer of the Kwantung Army, Minister of War in two cabinets and Chief of Staff of the forces in China, 1939-41, he showed himself a capable staff officer and no mean politician himself. In the field, however, he has been less than an unqualified success; he was the responsible commander at the *débâcle* of Taierhchwang in 1938, a holocaust in which some 40,000 Japanese casualties were suffered.

Itagaki has been Commander-in-Chief of the Korea Army since July

1941, which is also the date of his rank as general. With his Kwantung Army gang momentarily in disfavor, he is of no importance—until another turn of the wheel or war with Russia calls attention to him and his Korea Army, in the front lines.

13. General USHIROKU Jun (born 1884) was briefly—February to July 1944—the second most powerful man in the Japanese Army. His chief claim to this high estate was that he was a classmate of Tōjō's at Military Academy (1905) and Staff College. He served without attaining any particular note as Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, commander in South China, and Chief of Staff for a time to Field-Marshal Hata, Commander-in-Chief in China. Tōjō, upon becoming Premier, brought Ushiroku in as commander of the Central Army District and made him a general, in August 1942; and in the Army shake-up of February-March 1944 gave him three of the most important offices of the army: Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Inspector of Aviation, Commanding General of Aviation Headquarters. From these offices he was removed with Tōjō's downfall, and the Army has not even troubled to announce its disposition of him, though he is known to have command of an army in Manchuria.

14. General YAMASHITA Tomoyuki (born 1885) is well known enough as the conqueror of Malaya and the loser of the Philippines, but perhaps insufficiently so for the excellent soldier that he had been for many years. Graduating from the Military Academy in 1906 and from Staff College in the 1915 class, which included also Tōjō and Homma, he served as attaché at Warsaw and later at Vienna; was director of the Military Affairs Bureau and Chief of Staff of forces in North China, and in 1940 became Inspector of Aviation. Most of his term as Inspector was spent in a visit to Europe, in the course of which he toured the Maginot Line, had audiences with Hitler and Mussolini, bestowed on Hermann Goering the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun. More to the military point, he made a careful study of the Luftwaffe, and returned to reorganize the air force and to apply, as air commander in China, the lessons which he had learned of the employment of air power. Yamashita was no stranger to Germany; he had been sent there before World War I, at which time he became intimate with Haushofer and such future notables as Alexander Löhr, late Generaloberst of the Luftwaffe, and the late Ernst Udet.

If Yamashita, brutal and sadistic, is a sufficiently repulsive character, his abilities, as demonstrated in the Malayan campaign, cannot

be doubted. He was made a general in February 1943, after his relief from the Malayan command. Yamashita's arrival to assume supreme command in the Philippines, in November 1944, was extremely well advertised—but no *réclame* whatever attended his departure for home toward the end of the catastrophic campaign there.

15. General OKABE Naosaburō (born 1887) is a technical expert, an artilleryman, who has been little in the public eye. He has served long in the Technical Headquarters, the branch of the War Ministry charged with research in all technical developments, inspection and development of ordnance, chemical warfare and the like; he was the head of Technical Headquarters from December 1940 to September 1944, when he took over the North China command from Okamura. His generalcy came, with Yamashita's and Fujie's, in February 1943.

16. General FUJIE Keisuke (born 1885) is an ex-artilleryman and ex-military policeman, general since February 1943, who held Army District commands in Japan for four years from April 1941. Until March of last year he had the Western district, and for the following year the Eastern. His whereabouts at present is unknown.

17. General ANAMI Korechika (born 1887) is Minister of War. After a moderately distinguished and promising career—including direction of the Military Affairs (1936-37) and Personnel Bureaux of the Ministry, and nearly two years as Vice-Minister of War down to 1941—Anami came a cropper in politics. The disclosure in the Diet that as Vice-Minister he had been compelling Army reservists to join the new political party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which his superior, Minister Tōjō, had assured the civilians would be left to them, drove him from office. Trouble in China followed; as commander in Hunan he was the loser of the second and third battles of Changsha, in 1941 and 1942 (the Chinese reported that he had committed suicide in expiation). He was nevertheless made a general in May 1943, became Inspector of Aviation last December, and reached the top when he surprisingly appeared as Minister of War in the Suzuki ministry.

18. General IMAMURA Hitoshi (born 1886) has had an outstanding career. As Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at the outbreak of the present China war he was a significant figure; thereafter he was Director of the Military Affairs Bureau in 1938, then Assistant Inspector-General in 1940. Since the beginning of the Greater East Asia War he has commanded armies in the Indies—successfully—and in the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomons, less happily. The reali-

zation that he had not been supported there perhaps helped to save his reputation; at any rate, he was made a general in May 1943. Imamura had been attaché in London and New Delhi, and is an expert on the British.

19. General TANAKA Shizuichi (born 1887) likewise knows the English-speaking peoples, having served as attaché at Washington and London; at Mexico City, also. He has been a military policeman, commanding the gendarmerie of the Kwantung Army in 1937-38, and of the entire Army, 1938-39. In August 1942 he took over from Homma command in the Philippines—an obvious assignment for a man of his background—remaining there to May 1943, when he was relieved. He became a general in September 1943, served as Commandant of the Army Staff College, and is now Eastern Army District commander. Since his district and defense command include the preëminently important region of the Kantō Plain around Tōkyō, Tanaka's assignment is one already of considerable consequence.

20. General ANDŌ Rikichi (born 1884) is Commander of the Formosa Army. He has twice served as attaché to the Embassy in England, once just after World War I and again in 1932-34, and on the General Staff and as Assistant Inspector-General, in 1938. His chief notoriety came to him, however, as commander-in-chief in South China, when the trouble occurred between Japan and Vichy France, in 1940. Fearing to lose out on events, Andō moved 20,000 of his troops across the border into Indo-China, after he had been notified that a treaty had been entered into for adjustment of Franco-Japanese relations. He was relieved shortly after. In November 1941 he assumed his present command, where he may meet us sooner than he had thought for. In January 1944 he became a general.

21. General YAMAWAKI Masataka (born 1884). Yamawaki has served in a number of responsible positions: twice attaché at Warsaw, Director of the Resources Mobilization Bureau of the War Ministry, briefly Inspector-General, Vice-Minister of War in 1938-39. His chief celebrity was won, however, when he was in Warsaw as a colonel, for the conception there of the Anti-Comintern Pact is attributed to him. Yamawaki has commanded in Borneo since its conquest, becoming a general in late 1944.

22. General KAWABE Masakazu (born 1886), commander of the new over-all air command of Japan Proper, has been much less prominent than his Military Academy and Staff College classmate, Homma, perhaps because he has been almost continuously in the field. This

service has been largely in China, where among other things he gave the order commencing the China war at Lu K'ou Ch'iao on 7 July 1937. His rise from Commander-in-Chief in Burma in 1943-44 to Central Army District Commander and to his present post has been almost meteoric, and his promotion to general in March 1945 emphasizes the high esteem in which he is held by his army.

23. General KIT Seiichi (born 1886), made a general with Kawabe, has spent most of his career also in China, but in a different way: he was long Doihara's arch-rival for the title of chief power-politician. Latterly he has commanded armies in quiet areas of China and Manchuria, but he is not known to possess any ability as a soldier.

Kita was a member of the Military Academy Class of 1907, which has more generals—five—presently active than any other.

24. General SHIMOMURA Sadamu (born 1887) is a graduate of the French Staff College, and is accounted one of the Army's leading experts on things European (he was an active member of the delegation at Geneva in 1933, when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations). His most recent positions have been as Commander of the Western Army District in 1944, and Commander-in-Chief in North China since November. His generalcy came in May 1945.

25. General YOSHIMOTO Teiichi (born 1887). Unobtrusively, but efficiently, Yoshimoto has worked his way up through a number of key positions—such as chief secretary to the General Staff, Chief of Staff of Tōkyō Defense—to an army command in North China, where he remained from 1942 until this year. When the two new army districts were created, in January, Yoshimoto was given command of the North-eastern. His promotion to general simultaneously with Shimomura and Kimura is the first instance of three Military Academy and Staff College classmates attaining that grade at once.

26. General KIMURA Hyōtarō (born 1888), Commander-in-Chief in Burma, is one of the most brilliant of the younger generals. He has held such important positions as Director of the Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry (he is an artilleryman), Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and, from April 1941 to March 1943, Vice-Minister of War. In the Burma command, which he assumed in December 1944, he has apparently preserved not only his life but his reputation. In May he became the 130th *taishō* of the Japanese Army (the 131st and latest was a posthumous award).

HOW SHOULD THE MEDICAL CARE OF VETERANS BE ORGANIZED?

BY LAWRENCE S. KUBIE

A few months ago a young artillery officer was discharged from the Army because a condition had been discovered of which he had been unaware on induction, and which needed operation. Through a mutual friend the young man consulted an outstanding surgeon who for many years had been Consultant in Surgery to one of the best of the hospitals for veterans maintained by the Veterans Administration. The surgeon advised the young officer not to be operated on in a veterans' hospital. He said, "I can operate on you there; but the after care? No! You will do better on the ward at X (a teaching hospital) where you will receive better care from the house staff." Certainly one such instance is not a conclusive indictment; but where this can occur, all will agree that something is seriously wrong, about which a storm of popular indignation is already making itself felt in the daily press and in current serious and popular magazines.

No one will doubt that the medical care of veterans is a government responsibility. No one sees in this the spectre of socialized medicine. Nor does anyone protest that it sounds the doom of private practice. We are free, therefore, to dismiss these vexing problems as irrelevant, and to consider how hospitals and out-patient clinics under government auspices can be operated at the highest level of medical science, avoiding carelessness and graft on the one hand, and bureaucratic mediocrity on the other.

In approaching this issue we should not forget the scandal of the 20's, in which Colonel Forbes, a Harding appointment, went down in a stink of corruption, equalled only by the aroma of Teapot Dome in the same infamous administration, or by the scandals of the days of Ulysses S. Grant. Nor should we fail to pay tribute to the scrupulous dollar-honesty which General Hines brought into the administration of veteran affairs. For this the country as a whole, and the veterans in particular, owe him praise and gratitude.

But it also must be admitted that honesty, although essential to good medicine, cannot alone and of itself create good medicine. Many an honest doctor makes fatal yet avoidable blunders; and the same can be true of an organization which is administratively honest but medically incompetent. If an organization is set up in such a way as to fail to attract good doctors, if it fails to keep its doctors on their toes professionally and scientifically, if it fails to create an atmosphere which induces in its patients a drive to recover, then we may find that we pay too high a price for a restricted honesty which is not illuminated by an

understanding of human needs and medical problems.

What then is essential in a medical organization for veterans which will be both honest and at the same time will give the highest type of care?

The first essential is that the organization must have diagnosis and therapy as its only goal. This means that it must never serve as a compensation agency for its patients. Compensation alone has never cured a patient! The compensation doctor may get money for him from an insurance company or from a railroad or from a pension bureau; but he never makes him well. Indeed it is not his business to make the patient well, because the financial advantage of the patient depends upon his remaining sick. As a matter of fact, compensation doctors do not function as doctors in the best sense. They are medically-informed legal agents for their patients. Similarly if a hospital or clinic turns itself into the advocate for a patient's compensation claims, or if on the other hand it adjudicates adversely on such claims, if it even becomes involved to any degree with such compensation issues as deciding on the extent of disabilities, or weighing and estimating the extent to which disabilities are service-connected, then it automatically loses all therapeutic leverage with its patients. Therefore the functions of therapy and of claim adjudication must be completely disassociated, if any hospital or clinic is to have any chance to make veterans well.

From the patient's point of view as well it is essential that his stay in a hospital or his care in a clinic must mean to him getting well and not getting money. If he goes there to prove a disability he is not going there to get well. His nose will be pointed downwind toward money and not upwind toward health. Therefore when a hospital or clinic becomes involved in compensation issues, its patients come to it with wrong ideas in their heads, with purposes which block all possibility of recovery.

In some measure this is true for all kinds of sickness, including organic ailments and wounds. But it is outstandingly true in the care of all neuro-psychiatric ailments and in the so-called psychosomatic disorders.

Furthermore once an organization becomes involved in compensation issues, these gradually tend to exclude all others; whereupon it becomes impossible to attract into the organization highly trained or medically and scientifically earnest physicians. No doctor who is worth his salt wants to be dominated by or involved exclusively in administrative red tape, in the filling out of forms, in giving evidence for the

adjudication of claims. Good doctors want to be therapists and scientists, not pension officers or administrators. This is one of the reasons why in the past the calibre of physicians in the veterans service has been so poor. During the depression years numbers of able young physicians sought posts in the veterans hospitals; but as the depression eased, most of those who could get out did so. The rest were mired in the intricacies of compensation problems. It is not an accident, therefore, that no scientific contributions and no significant clinical observations have come from our veterans' hospitals.

To achieve a clear separation of these functions, it is not enough that they be separated administratively, as they are at present in the Veterans' Administration. The essential precaution is to set up panels of medical specialists to take care of the adjudication of claims, these panels to have no responsibility for the care of patients; while the doctors who treat the sick must not be called upon constantly for long and detailed reports in connection with claim adjudications. Such demands upon their time and energy, coupled with the fact that they remain in the same posts for years without rotation, gradually turns all of them into compensation doctors, both in their own minds and in the eyes of their patients. Since every compensation doctor should understand the effect of compensation policies on therapy, and since every physician in charge of treatment should understand compensation issues, all physicians should have tours of duty on the compensation panels. To make sure that therapeutic issues always come first in their deliberations, the tours of duty as therapist should precede duty on compensation panels, and should absorb the major portion of each physician's time. Only in this way can the ever-present danger of paying men to remain ill be avoided.

What further features are essential for a government medical agency if it is to attract and hold a high calibre of professional personnel, and maintain high standards of work?

First the leadership must be scientific, and not business or administrative. Administrators pick administrators: it takes a scientist to pick a scientist, and a doctor to pick a doctor. The business affairs of the organization can be managed by competent executives: but these should at every point be subordinate to the medical policy-makers. Medical leadership must be free to pick the scientific personnel.

Secondly, the ladder of advancement and responsibility must be intact from bottom to top, and must rest upon scientific and medical achievements and not primarily upon administrative efficiency. Important though the latter is, it must never become the principal basis of

promotion, if the goal of the organization is to be scientific and therapeutic.

Third, the organization must be closely integrated and coordinated with the general current of medical science. This means that it must take an active role in teaching and in research. The medical and scientific personnel must be in close and intimate contact with what is going on in medical schools and teaching hospitals throughout the country. Therefore all hospital or out-patient clinics for the medical care of veterans must be built in large communities, and if possible immediately adjacent to medical schools, so that there can be a continual interchange of faculty, of scientific experience, and of clinical opportunities.

It is impossible to overstress the fact that hospitals and out-patient clinics for the care of veterans must themselves be centers of post-graduate teaching and of research, if the scientific quality of their work is to be maintained at a high level. It is an old experience in medicine that especially teaching hospitals, and particularly the centers of medical research provide for their patients the highest quality of medical care.

Many who are unfamiliar with the subject assume that teaching and research subject patients to unjustified experimentation. Actually every such patient will tell you that it is a source of gratification and reassurance to feel that his doctors show a special interest in his case. Furthermore, the patient who is studied with special care for scientific reasons or because his illness is to be discussed with students for teaching purposes, finds that his history is taken more carefully, his physical examinations more meticulously performed, his treatment more thoroughly supervised. He soon takes pride in the fact that the study of his illness is contributing to medical knowledge; and in turn he realizes that he is benefitting by the fact that he has been a subject for thought and study on the part of more than one inquiring mind. Experience has shown that to be the subject of teaching and research is the most valuable protection which any patient can have; and patients themselves always sense this and appreciate it. No patients are better cared for, or more conscientiously treated than are the patients on the general wards of our teaching hospitals. No other patients as a group are as satisfied.

Obviously therefore the budgets of hospitals which care for veterans must include large budgets for research and for research fellowships.

This brings us to the question of personnel and management. How should the medical organization for the care of veterans be led, and who should staff it? In this connection it should be recalled that vet-

erans grow old, that their more acute ailments either kill them, or else are cured. In the course of time therefore the veterans become a group of old and chronic patients. Consequently if medical establishments for the care of veterans have no other medical responsibilities they become old people's homes, a refuge for old, chronic patients and for doctors whose interests are in administration, and not in the study and cure of disease. That is hardly the kind of organization which one should aim to set up after this war, when better alternatives can be created.

It should not be forgotten that the veteran was once a soldier or a sailor. Medical officers of the armed services presumably diagnosed and treated the onset of his disability. In medicine all knowledge grows by following ailments through from their onset either to recovery or to the autopsy table, through every stage of recovery, recurrence, chronicity, and death. This would seem to be the right of the military physician if he is to develop to his fullest stature. Yet he is deprived of this opportunity by the arbitrary, legalistic subdivision of a human being into soldier and veteran. As a consequence of this artificial schism, the medical officer of the Army or Navy or Public Health Service sees the man only *until* he becomes a veteran, whereupon he is turned over to the medical officer of the Veterans Administration. An alternative plan would seem to be sounder.

Under such a plan, the medical care of veterans would be established under a joint board, consisting of the Surgeon-General of the Army, the Surgeon-General of the Navy, and the Surgeon-General of the U. S. Public Health Service. All facilities for care of Veterans would then be staffed exclusively by medical officers of the Army, Navy, and Public Health Service. Except during a war these officers would rotate between tours of duty with veterans' hospitals and tours of duty with the active forces. The periods of service in veterans' hospitals could then become opportunities for intensive post-graduate training in various specialties. In the case of those who showed an inclination towards research and who demonstrated investigative ability, the period of duty with the veterans could provide opportunities for research in their chosen fields. In this way the Military Force could develop their own highly trained specialists and teachers. Not only would this mean a greatly improved level of medical care for veterans: but it would be highly instructive to all medical officers. It would give them an opportunity to acquire increased specialized knowledge. It would attract a higher calibre of men into the regular medical service of our armed forces, and it would help to hold them there, thus raising their scientific level.

An inevitable consequence of the present set-up is that chronic-minded doctors who deal only with chronic patients become incapable of dealing effectively with illness in its early phases, i.e. precisely when treatment can be most effective. It is an old story in medicine that organic ailments which are allowed to become chronic become so interwoven with neuroses that all therapy becomes impotent. Therefore it is early in the disorder that intensive treatment must be made available. The consequences of the failure to do this were demonstrated by our experience in the years between World War I and World War II, with the care of tuberculous and other ill veterans. Statistics published in the annual reports of the Veterans Administration and of its predecessor, the Veterans Bureau, show that the neuropsychiatric case load in veterans' hospitals increased from approximately 5,000 cases in 1920 to 33,000 in 1940. Apart from the effects of aging and of the depression, this was an inevitable consequence of the failure to provide adequate psychiatric treatment in the early phases of illness. It will occur again this time, multiplied many times, unless a sounder medical organization is created.

This, then, is an additional reason for turning the hospitals for veterans into postgraduate training institutions. Here medical officers returning from the war could receive intensive training and supervision while at the same time caring for the veterans. For it should be borne in mind that postgraduate medical training is always "on-the-job" training. Consequently the doctors who are receiving supervised training will themselves care for patients who need help, while the quality of the care which they give will improve steadily. Such a program must include the training of many psychiatrists, of clinical psychologists, of psychiatric and general medical social workers, of occupational therapists, of nurses and attendants, and of vocational advisors. The opportunity which now presents itself calls for prompt action if we hope to furnish postgraduate training to the medical men who will soon be returning to civilian life. Therefore the financing of such a program and its teaching staff, the organization of the curriculum, and the gathering of the personnel should be arranged without delay.

Let us convert the medical organization for the care of veterans into a permanent peacetime postgraduate training and research station for the military physicians of our armed forces and of the U. S. Public Health Service, thus widening the scope of military medicine to include the end results. This is administratively and scientifically sound. It will be good for the veterans, good for military medicine, and good for public health.

GUNS AND WEST FRONT STRATEGY

BY MAJOR JOHN NORTH

When Rundstedt tried his ill-fated drive into the Ardennes, its early momentum was achieved as a result of the greatest concentration of armor yet seen in Western Europe. The weight behind it was such as to render inevitable, whatever the nature of the opposition, some measure of success in its earliest stages. Nevertheless, within a fortnight, the tide of battle turned; and the German armor began to retire without having reached either of its strategic objectives—the port of Antwerp or the communications center of Liege.

Every such single-pronged drive runs the risk of failure if it cannot continue to hit hard when it meets an enemy who has had time to effect the necessary concentrations to hold an armored attack. In Belgium, these concentrations were successfully built under the direction of Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and the German armor was finally halted. The German attack failed, not through lack of armor, but through lack of adequate air and artillery bombardment to sustain that armor when armor itself could no longer hope to achieve what would be, in effect, a second break-through.

What, then, was the supreme lesson that emerged from this operation on the Western Front? It was that to break through the western gateways of Germany meant blasting a path through them by air and artillery bombardment. That form of preliminary had been seen again in the British and Canadian attack on the Reichswald Forest area. It is the chief purpose of this article to discuss the part played by the guns in pursuing this age-old and (some would say) old-fashioned strategy of "destroying the enemy" by blasting him out of existence.

Modern war is modern only at odd moments. Today's mobility is founded on the internal combustion engine; and this mobility—"the power to sweep round the enemy's supply line and to smash his command system"—is dependent on local conditions of terrain, irrespective of the fighting powers of the enemy. The oldest bugbear of war—mud—is still a bugbear and, in the autumn of last year, only as a result of herculean efforts on the part of men and machines were the Allied armies able to maintain their pressure on Germany. Mud again was encountered in Montgomery's drive in the Cleve area.

Again, under the conditions prevailing in Western Europe, where a river line, backed by high mountains with but few "gateways," formed a natural defensive barrier to the heart of Germany, mobility became possible only after heavy infantry fighting. On the German frontier

this proved to be of a character which differed from infantry fighting of the last war only in that the weapons were new, and that artillery, although no more powerful than in the last war, was more effectively used.

Modern war is essentially a medieval conception, if one thinks of it only in terms of aircraft and tanks. The tank on the modern battlefield is in precisely the same quandary as the medieval armored knight. He was helpless if compelled to dismount, and he had to rely on the foot-soldier to hold the ground he had cleared.

Aircraft, too, however effective their contribution to the modern battlefield, must always suffer under the limitations that apply to any raiding force. When they go farther afield and engage in strategic bombing of the enemy's supply centers, they conform to yet another medieval conception—that of burning the enemy's crops.

Nevertheless, in view of the defensive fire-power of modern weapons it is quite certain that if the enemy's defensive crust is to be broken, the infantry must receive assistance from the air, from the ground, or from both. This is the first clue to the modern theory that close support bombing and artillery bombardment are complementary.

Here, too, the comparative value of the two methods can be distinguished; for whereas air bombardment must always be at the mercy of the weather, artillery remains an all-weather and all-round-the-clock weapon. The artillery commander can promise a bombardment for any specified hour of the day or night. The air force commander, on the other hand, is never in a position to give an unqualified promise of air support; and the commander of the ground forces, if he is not prepared to cancel his proposed operation, must plan it on the assumption that the promised air support may not be forthcoming at the last moment. The reliability of the artillery weapon has enabled it to hold its place on the modern battlefield.

The battle for the entry into Aachen provided an example of "blasting one's enemy out of existence" and also serves to illustrate this point of reliability. It had been expected that much of the "blasting would be done, not by artillery, but by air forces; but, instead of two days' flying out of three, as had been anticipated, the actual proportion was one in four—and the artillery were called upon to expend 300,000 rounds of 105 mm. ammunition alone.

Nevertheless the decisive character of air intervention, when conditions are favorable, should not be under-rated. It may be doubted whether the British and Canadian armies could ever have broken the

vital Caen "hinge" of the German front in Normandy but for the close support given to the ground forces on two occasions by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force.

However, even on occasions such as these, when the primary role in the preliminary bombardment of an enemy position is taken over by the air forces, the artillery can contribute to the success of the operation. Methods of air and artillery liaison through the use of colored flares, have been considerably developed as a result of the experience gained in the fighting on the Western Front.

Comparisons of weight of metal dropped by air and artillery are unprofitable, artillery scores every time, whatever the figures, in terms of accuracy—in this context, only another word for effectiveness. Experience of air bombardment shows that tonnage is not a reliable measure of effectiveness; nor is it even when artillery fire alone is under consideration.

No artillery barrage in this war, on whatever front, begins to compare with that of the battle of Messines, in World War I, when five-and-a-half tons of ammunition were thrown on each yard of front, on a front of just over nine miles. The Messines artillery strength was approximately one gun to every seven yards of front, as against one gun to every twenty-three yards of front in the battle of El Alamein. The greater effectiveness of artillery fire in this war must be attributed to the new methods employed.

The old type of "curtain fire" or "creeping barrage" with its wasteful dispersion is not yet entirely outmoded; but, in the main, it has been superseded by mighty shifting concentrations which, in the British Army, are called "stonks." These take specific targets in quick succession, and obliterate them; the whole artillery of a corps may be directed on a single area.

This elasticity and flexibility in the mass use of artillery was an entirely British development; and it is a fact of history that German prisoners-of-war, from Alamein onwards, have feared it more than any other form of attack. As an answer to a call from the infantry for "defensive fire" it knows no rival in terms of speed, with the possible exception of the rocket-firing Typhoons of the Royal Air Force. The artillery regimental commander himself can call for these aircraft in an emergency, since he has direct wireless communication with a visual "forward control post" which is able to direct an aircraft on to a target in a matter of seconds.

Thus in the handling and control of massed artillery, British Army

gunners have been able to find a new use for this ancient yet perennial weapon: so perennial, indeed, that, throughout World War II artillery weight in the British Army has been constantly increased.

If, therefore, the best answer to an enemy gun is a concentration from one's own artillery, the Royal Artillery can say to the British Army: "Tell us where you want the shells—and we will see that you get them." The British infantryman is always able to go into battle with the knowledge that the guns will answer the call.

The Royal Artillery on the Western Front, when the German air force appeared in strength, had the task of protecting ground troops from air attack. It was organized to put up a belt of controlled fire which offered a powerful interdiction to medium or low-level bombing. At other times light anti-aircraft artillery is available for small-scale infantry support, and heavy anti-aircraft for artillery support in the fullest sense of the word. Nor should the work of the anti-tank gunners be overlooked, where experience has shown that successful use of the anti-tank gun is dependent less on marksmanship than on position.

Any soldier who is not a gunner, finds it difficult to realize just what "artillery support" means in terms of physical and mental strain. During a battle the gunner is rarely rested. He has to be ready for action all the twenty-four hours; if he is shooting by day he is likely to be called upon for harassing fire at night, and the cross-checking of abstruse mathematical calculations must continue through the din and stress of battle. A single miscalculation may be equivalent to a death-warrant for his comrades: "accidents" cannot be allowed to happen.

Perhaps the extent of the sheer physical strain on the gunners can be illustrated by the first day of the battle of El Alamein when they actually man-handled 2,000 tons of shells—a figure upon which they were called upon to improve in the battle of Germany.

The proud motto of the Royal Artillery in the British Army is *Ubique*—"Everywhere." It is no idle boast. This most ancient of weapons since the bow-and-arrow era is still "queen of the battlefield."

“LUCK TO THE FIGHTERS”

BY GEORGE WELLER

CONCLUSION

The invasion of Bali was to be the knot in the noose with which the Jap garroted Java. On February 20th, with Soerabaya saved by the Forties but Darwin's harbor filled with sinking ships and her streets with bodies, the great simultaneous invasion of the island chain for which this had been only a preparation got under way by night. A Japanese fleet with two cruisers, four or five destroyers and four transports slipped down through Lombok Strait on the eastern coast of Bali, swung around and prepared to attack from the southern side.

The reason the Japs landed on Bali from this side was that they knew most of the Dutch, British and American warships were operating in the Java Sea, and felt they could protect the landing operations by getting through Lombok Strait and thus closing both Bali and Lombok Straits with patrolling destroyers from the Indian Ocean side. They had already made Den Pasar Field useless.

At the same time the parachutists were cleaning up Penfoei airdrome at Koepang, where the last American fighters on their way through from Darwin had rested. The Japanese were not yet in at Waingapoe on Soemba, their next destination. But they had broken the lifeline in two places.

Just to be sure of having the first stepping stone, the Japs also landed on this day at Dilli in Portuguese Timor, forcing the Australians already there back into the mountains. The Japanese had prepared well for their coming to Dilli; since early November an air line of four motored Japanese transport flying boats, piloted by naval aviators, had been operating from the Pelew (Palau) Islands, eastern pincers of the Japanese encirclement of the Philippines, to Dilli. (Japan had gained the Pelews, formerly German, by the secret Anglo-Japanese pact of February 16, 1917, by which—after Wilson's rupture with Germany on February 3—these Pacific powers earmarked all the German possessions of the Pacific which compromised America's route to the Philippines and Asia. Wilson professed to have had no knowledge of this and other treaties of spoils until he reached the Versailles peace conference.)

The chain of islands was severed. Now no more fighter reinforcements could be flown to Java.

And the little band of P-40s already there could not be flown out. They would fight until their wings burned off.

The fleet moving upon Bali had been under observation since two days before. On the night of the 19th Bandoeng sent down orders for a bombing mission against the force on the bay by Den Pasar and its destroyers and cruisers.

The P-40s took off with Major Sprague in the lead, while the A-24 dive bombers, together with LB-30s and Fortresses lifted their wings from Malang against the convoy. These A-24s, seven of a force of 50 that had been landed at Brisbane four days before Christmas and assembled by ground crews of the fortresses, had made the same long hazardous pilgrimage to Java as the Seventeenth. Their pilots were experienced, but their gunners were nothing but pickups from the ground and air echelons of the B-17s, who never had dive bombed in their lives before. When they reached Java they were based at Soerabaya and had to fly to Malang to be bombed up, to rendezvous with Sprague's sixteen fighters over Singosari, and then to fly with the eight new fortresses (B-17Es) to attack the Japanese at their new landing anchorage.

The Japanese ships were mostly unloading landing barges and men on the eastern side of Bali in the mouth of Badoeng Strait by the little island of Nusa Besar.

The writer had gone up to Malang to see this first takeoff of an army dive bombing squadron. It was a bright blue morning. The A-24s came in and circled the green painted hangar where one or two fortresses damaged in earlier raids were being repaired. Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, who looked the image of Will Rogers, paced nervously up and down wringing his left hand with his right in that peculiar manner that he always used when worrying.

There was some difficulty fitting the big bombs to the attachments. The dive bombers were navy planes, converted for army use, and the mechanics were unfamiliar with the underpinnings. Over an hour was lost struggling with the bomb racks.

"Raid time" approached, and the adjustment of the bombs had to be interrupted to scatter the dive bombers around the hangar. One by one the pilots and observers pulled down their goggles, climbed in and took off on the first army dive bombing raid of history.

This little group of dive bombers, with an occasional loss here and there, was to go on fighting the war all the way to Papua, where a squadron of their comrades were to make a gallant, but costly and ineffectual effort in July to halt the Japanese fleet's last offensive landings at Buna and Gona.

The P-40s had the hazardous job of staying over the enemy force in southern Bali and protecting the dive bombers, the LB-30s, and the fortresses as they came over from Malang. Time after time the Zeros attacked them from above. All four flights of the 17th were fighting to protect the dive bombers and high level bombers.

When the sweaty and drawn pilots got back to Blimbing and Gnoro four faces were missing. One of them was Sprague.

How the Zeros got the Major no one knows exactly. Stauter reported by radio: "The Major didn't have a chance," and someone else was supposed to have said—they thought it was Gallienne—"I can see him going in."

On the raid previous, Sprague's mechanic, a more than usually apt staff sergeant from Seattle named Robert Jung, had complained about the redheaded commander buzzing the field too low when he came in. "You shouldn't do that; I got a weak heart," he said. He had already painted the name "Hell Diver" on Sprague's plane before. The day just preceding the Bali landing Sprague asked him to add the name of his wife, Lillian, on the ship. In a sense Red Sprague took his wife with him, off into the wild blue yonder.

Lieutenant Gallienne, the San Franciscan, was never heard from again.

Thomas I. Hayes of Brooks, Oregon, who had his elevators virtually shot away by the 20 millimeter cannon in the noses of the Zeros, was nevertheless just able to make the home field alive and walk away from his fighter's wreckage. He was saved largely by the circumstance that ordinary rubber bath sponges, which the ground men had tied onto the gunsights frame in lieu of the regular cushions, held the snap of his forehead as he fell on the runway. As soon as his tailskid caught the weeds, Colbert peeled back his canopy and dragged him out, bleeding.

Three Zeros had been shot down, and one more was destroyed on the field at Den Pasar. (This was the tucked away Zero whose red circles had accidentally given warning to a lost fortress on the way from Darwin coming in to land on the Bali field, when it was already in Japanese hands—the first the fortress pilot had heard of this. On his second pass the ignorant newcomer drew fire from the field. Immediately he grasped the idea that Bali was Japanese.)

Two of the four missing pilots, Stauter and R. S. Johnson of Mesa, Arizona made emergency landings in out of the way places on the beach.

Stauter crash-landed, pulled himself out and found that he was wounded and his plane was ruined. He walked, losing blood rapidly, until he came on a native pedaling along a path on a bicycle. He bade the native get on the handlebars and began pedaling himself. Then he passed out from loss of blood. When he came to he found himself in the hands of the Javanese police. They had taken away his gun, and for some reason he could not understand, his shoes. Perhaps it was standard practice to keep a tenderfooted white man from running away. They brought him, shoeless and disarmed, to the hospital at Malang where he, Hayes and Foy were nursed with wounded Fortress pilots and gunners, by a Celebes-Javanese nurse who refused to take shelter under the bed with the Americans during air raids because she anticipated amorous advances.

Johnson had a most peculiar experience, in that he was rescued by the baby ship of the Asiatic fleet, the little schooner *Lanakai*.

The *Lanakai* was a schooner that had been used in the movie *Hurricane* and had been sold to the navy as a patrol schooner three days before the war broke out. In an extraordinary series of escapes from Japanese bombings she had made her way south with a crew headed by Lieutenant Kemp Tolley, Lieutenant Commander Charles Adair, and Lieutenant Commander Harry H. Keith, through the Straits of Macassar to Soerabaya, and later around through Bali Strait, always just one jump ahead of the Japanese coming southward by parallel routes.

The *Lanakai* had seen Johnson hunting up and down the coves of southern Java for a landing and watched him come in on the tight little beach. They sent a boat ashore, tried to help him get the P-40 off, failed, and helped him dismantle his guns and remove his ammunition before touching off the plane. In his first flight Johnson, unused to the new belly tanks upon which the Americans depended to give them fighting time over Bali, had used the gas in his regular tank above the belly tank. When he was attacked by Zeros and had to drop his belly tank, he quickly ran dry.

How the 19-year-old Perry felt at Sprague's failure to return is somewhat how all the members of the 17th felt:

"All of us liked Major Sprague and considered him the best C.O. we ever had. He flew for the love of flying, he fought for the love of fighting and to avenge the deaths of his partners in the Philippines. He instilled his courage and fighting spirit into all the pilots and men and there was no one who did not admire him. He was a square-

shooter and hell on wings for the Japs. When he buzzed the field he came lower than anyone else, and that was low. Prop blades chopped the grass as he soared over the field at 300 miles an hour. We had to clean his coolers a couple of times a week because of the collection of leaves and grass inside. He was usually first to take off on an alert and never asked his pilots to do something he could not do himself. The 17th will long remember him."

The coverage furnished by the P-40s to the bombing attack made it possible for the Dutch mixed force of cruisers and torpedo boats together with American destroyers to creep through Bali Strait that night and attack the Japs before the convoy could get away. There ensued the battle of Bali Strait, which resulted in the probable sinking of several Japanese ships.

Two of the seven A-24 dive bombers did not come back from the raid, but it was in general successful. The fortresses did well, and when the writer talked to the returned pilots on the field at Malang, they were jubilant.

It was almost a week later, after returning to Bandoeng and coming back to Soerabaya for its last hours that the writer was able to talk with the crew of one A-24 who had dropped their 600-pounder exactly on the bow of a cruiser.

After blowing the nose off the cruiser and first skimming, then slipping into the waves, they had lived on Bali with the natives. They were Lieutenant Richard B. Launder of Los Angeles and Sergeant I. A. Lnenicha of Seattle. Lnenicha was twenty-two, his pilot twenty-one.

They said: "We started up under the umbrella of P-40s and dived straight from 14,000 feet. Our 600 pounder hit exactly on the cruiser's bow, and our two little bombs, just to make no mistake, hit on both sides showing a direct straddle.

"We came out of our dive at 15,000 feet, but then our oil line burst. Black oil covered our windshield and we could see nothing. With the motor getting hotter every minute we scooted across the Den Pasar field with that single Zero parked underneath us.

"The Japs must have thought we were finished. We skimmed over the surf aiming to try to put her down where the breakers were not too big. Finally we hit the water about 15 miles west of Den Pasar. Somehow we got through the surf.

"We climbed up into the jungle, still carrying our Colts—useless because the ammunition was wet. The Japs were out looking for us,

but suddenly a Balinese chief turned up. One beach boy had asked us a hundred guilders, or about 50 dollars to take us over to Banjoewangi on the Java side.

"This chief gave us two coolies hats to wear for camouflage and the equivalent of 35 cents for food, and told the boy he had to take us across for nothing.

"After thirteen hours paddling through the cross currents of the Strait in this little *prau* we reached Banjoewangi. I guess we were the last American tourists to leave Bali. But we had one comfort: we had never done a regular dive bombing attack in war before and we blew the bow right off a cruiser at the first try."

It is possible, however, that Launder and Lnenicha were not the last American tourists to leave Bali. Months later a Japanese radio report said that a major of the American Air Force badly enfeebled with sickness, had surrendered at Bali. Was it Sprague? Did he live after he fell?

Months later, as he sat on an Australian beach facing an Indian Ocean sunset, Lieutenant-Commander Frederick Worder, one of the most successful American submarine commanders, told the writer how, just about at the hour of the air battle, he had seen the white canopy of a parachute break out in the sky over Bali and a man come floating down on to Nusa Besar Island.

Was this Bud Sprague?

Everyone who knew the commander of the 17th hoped that it was.

Successful though the raid against Bali was, it had another costly sequel, for the Japanese struck back at Singosari within an hour afterward. It happened thus:

The eight fortresses that had bombed the Japanese in the Badoeng Strait came back and landed without a single loss. They were not dispersed to their revetments, but were fuelled by the natives and bombed up by their skimpy ground crews for another blow at Bali. While this was going on, nine fighters suddenly appeared over the field at hardly 3,000 feet, coming in as though to land.

The groundlings of the fortresses, who had seen the 16 P-40s of the Seventeenth take the dive bombers under their wings en route to Bali a bare two hours before, pointed up and said: "Look, sixteen went out and only nine are getting back. The boys must have caught it." The intruders, however, were not Kittyhawks.

The next moment the onlookers themselves caught it, for the fighters—Zeros—dove down on the field with their guns firing at the

full. There were some 400 natives and 700 Americans scattered from one end of the broad mushy green runway to the other. By luck only nine men were wounded. But five of the eight fortresses blew up and burned on the ground at Singosari.

Mistaking Zeros for the P-40s of the Seventeenth had given the striking force of fortresses a blow which made it almost powerless to deal with the greater invasion convoys—reconnaissance said they totalled over 130 cruisers, destroyers, transports, freighters and trawlers—that were then being gathered in that unhappy portion of the Straits of Macassar to which the navy's PBY pilots had given the name of "cold turkey straits."

The next day at half past nine four flights of the squadron went up again and met a force of 18 bombers at 20,000 feet directly over Soerabaya. Just as they started to come down on the bombers, waddling badly in the thin air, the Kittyhawks saw a cloud of Zeros coming down on them. The attack was broken up. Lieutenant George W. Hynes, a quiet boy from San Antonio, who always carried rosary beads in his pocket, was caught by the Zeros and killed, before Mahoney, who was leading his flight, and Hennon and Fuchs could go to his rescue.

The third and fourth flights were able to go through to the bombers and make one individual attack. Frank Adkins, a dark haired, usually unshaved pilot from Tennessee, got his first Zero as he went in with Kiser, Hague and Irvin. The talkative Jack D. Dale led in the flight of Turner, Egenes and Johnsen.

Walt Coss led in C flight with Oliver, Reynolds and Wally Hoskyn following him. This was the flight that had most success with the bombers; the air directional control, watching through their binoculars, said that they saw two redballed bombers go down and crash. But Hoskyn, even after he knew that the Zeros were on his tail kept on coming back to the bombers. There were twelve Zeros in all and they outnumbered each flight of Kittyhawks. Hoskyn got at least one of the bombers, and probably two—certainly one—of the Zeros. Hoskyn's tenacity cost him his life.

When they gave "Hosk" the posthumous Silver Star, months later, they wrote of him: "His tenacity of purpose, coolness under fire and outstanding courage were instrumental in much of the success enjoyed by the squadron and an inspiration to all of the men."

The day before "Hosk's last flight Perry and Deyo, his pals, had painted, at the pilot's direction, the name "Stub and Lou" on his plane.

Whenever he took off Hoskyn always used to give the rounded thumb and forefinger signal, the American signal of *okay*, to his line chief. On his last flight he forgot to give it. Ground crews are not ashamed to be superstitious. Without either superstition or politics, war would come to mean nothing at all.

When both Sprague and Hoskyn fell immediately after putting names on their ships, no more names were given. Christening seemed to be prelude to death. Both Jackson and Kiser, the more reserved and quiet members of the squadron, had never painted anything on their ships anyway.

Egenes, given ship No. 13, re-named it "Eight-Ball," and got behind it. Fliers like Morehead and Adkins, however, flew any plane they were given, even if it was the over-decorated shark on whose guns twang-voiced Benjamin Culpepper of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, had inscribed the names of Tom, Dick and Harry, and on the other wing vents Sally, Irene and Mary. Gilmore, who got his first Jap in the Philippines, and two in Java, had two names on opposite sides of his ship, "Drummer Boy" and "Michigan Kid."

The squadron was now leaderless and had lost two of its best-liked pilots. But it was getting recognition from the Japs, the low hissing obeisance of ever more and more Zeros, ever more Japanese pilots who had become gods.

And the surviving 17 P-40s were all flyable.

The next day a signal came down from Brereton in Bandoeng that Mahoney, thin, dark and realistic, was to succeed into Bud Sprague's empty place.

The Japs were now closing in upon Java in earnest. Things began cooking immediately. Just before ten o'clock the Soerabaya air control signified that trouble was coming over from Kendari. The Seventeenth found them up at 22,000 feet.

The battle split unequally from the beginning. The Japs had sent over nine bombers with nine Zeros as guardian angels. The two first flights to take off, McCallum, Hague, Kruzel and Adkins in one and Lund, Kiser, Hennon and Reynolds in the other, put their cannon shells into three bombers and chopped up three pursuit ships. But things were too hot and the air too full of loose things to watch everything, and none of these crashes were confirmed.

Two dead birds that were seen smoking all the way down were a Zero that Ray Thompson caught over Malang and a bomber Bill Turner brought down over Soerabaya.

Throughout the time in Java the totals of Dutch air controls system of how many ships were shot down was about twice as great as those which the Seventeenth claimed. The pilots paid scant heed to tallies when Zeros were around; they wound the eyes around, not down. A pilot who aims at longevity watches behind and high, and only ahead and down when an enemy is there.

This day Cy Blanton's gang drew one of the combinations that nobody likes: nine bombers with no less than 15 Zeros over them. Besides Cy ("Baldy" to the gang when they wanted to tease him), there was Dockstader, the boy from Long Beach, Irvin and "Jack" Jackson to help him. Cy got his bomber. Everybody else took his pass and dived away safely from this hot alley of overhead thugs. Fifteen Zeros upstairs was too many for four P-40s to tackle, especially when they knew they could not strike the bombers again. They dived off and away.

The squadron now had too many more pilots than planes, and some of them were ordered away immediately by Major Fisher to pick up more P-40s elsewhere. A number of boxed P-40s had been landed at Tjilatjap in southern Java, and the *Langley* was coming in at the same port with more. Twenty officers and twenty men left Blimbing, February 23rd, and another sixteen men the next day.

The men who left had not the slightest idea of where they were going, and little apprehension what was happening to Java. The order came suddenly; actually when Mahoney called those departing together for the last time it was for a checkup on their work. "What I called you in for was to ball you out," he said. "That's no use now. Where you boys are going, you're going to get a good deal. I'd like to be going with you. You will go into Blimbing, gather your belongings and leave for Soerabaya. You have an hour and a half to make Soerabaya before your train leaves."

Winding across the old temple-laden hills of central Java, where Buddhism once came and went, and where the beetle-browed Java man stalked strange animals before time was, they discussed in the sleepy train all night long the question of where they were going. Most of them thought it was merely a routine transfer to India. But it was Mahoney, not they, who was to go to India. They were still to cross the Indian Ocean, the great Australian desert, the coastal rim of parasitic cities; and they were to go northward to the tropics again to strike the Japanese in the humid skies of Papua.

None of them dreamed anything like this would happen to them.

The Japs kept coming at Soerabaya. The handful of P-40s rose and fell, day after day.

On the 24th the largest swarm of Japs yet seen came over. The naval PBYs of Patwing 10, who had a little more time to look up at the sky over Soerabaya than the army pursuit, having lost all their Catalinas but three, wrote down succinctly in their log: "There were 44 to 54 bombers over the navy yard today. Able damage was done."

The Americans met them this time at 21,000 feet with four flights of fighters. Mahoney led the first with R. S. Johnson, Reynolds and Oliver. Kiser followed by Dockstader, Hennon and Lund, ran the second flight.

"Kay" Kiser caused one big bomber to bend its flight over until it went searing into the ground—in flames. Dockstader shot up another badly and the sharp eyes of the Dutch air control saw it fall into the sea. All the others came back safely, but some of them were severely shot up, and others were worn out with this heavy daily use.

On an evening of this week the young armorer Perry encountered something in Soerabaya that drew him closer to the Dutch:

"It was when I was walking down the street, after having had dinner at the Cafe Royale, that I met my friend, the father of the Dutch girl. I called to him twice before he recognized me, and then came over. He said hello and the following conversation resulted in one of the deepest personal tragedies I have ever had in my life. 'How is Doreen and her mother?' I asked.

"He looked away for a moment and then straightening up he said in almost a trembling voice, 'Doreen is gone. She was taken from us a few days ago . . . when they hit the Tip Top Cafe.'

"Doreen, the fairhaired girl that I had spoken to and laughed with only a few days before! I turned away, but I kept thinking of it all day. The beautiful daughter of the first friends I had made in Java had been killed by the Japs. An innocent civilian who, only a little before, had been joking about the war. If coming close, too close, to bombs myself, and being shot at by strafers hadn't brought the full meaning of war to me, this did. I knew that I would never be satisfied until I had killed at least one of them myself."

There were only ten Kittyhawks left to defend Java, and this was the day when the Japanese invasion force was beginning to mass itself in Sumatra, at Balikpapan, and in Macassar Strait.

The navy, having at this time only three serviceable PBY Catalinas left, was to have none at all usable the day before the Japs landed. Patwing 10 lost in all 30 of 33 planes it had possessed in Cavite, and only two of them on the ground. The writer saw its commander,

Captain Frank D. Wagner, the last American naval officer at Bandoeng headquarters, leave there in a Navy 2-passenger Duck. The later famous naval doctor Lt. Comdr. Corydon M. Wassell and Comdr. William Goggins of the *Marblehead* left with the writer on the Dutch freighter *Janssens* and were the last American officers to escape.

General Brereton in Bandoeng, knowing that he would need a fighter force in Burma to save India, crooked his finger to Mahoney and once again the Seventeenth lost a commander. When Brereton took off in a fortress for Colombo, Mahoney was ordered to go with him.

The last anyone saw of Mahoney, the second commander of the Seventeenth, was in Djocjakarta, where McNeil, Caldwell's armorer, saw him across the street. The ace and the armorer had been reading, turn and turn, a western novel about a wild and untameable mustang *California Red*.

"Hey, McNeil, did they ever catch that California Red?" Mahoney asked.

"No, sir, they never did get close enough to him again," answered the sergeant.

Mahoney shook his head and walked away, never to be seen by his squadron again. They said of him afterward, *he had the darkest, tired-est eyes, with deep rings under them, you ever saw.*

A despatch from Bandoeng made Lt. Jerry McCallum, the engineering officer, their new commander.

The night after Mahoney flew with Brereton to India (where he made a reputation shooting up Japanese locomotives in Burma), the writer had dinner in a little mountain inn with three of the ground mechanics of the Seventeenth. They looked like high school kids. One of them wore an orange sweatshirt with an Indian's head on it. They seemed strange, there in the middle of Java, suspended at the far end of the thin silver thread of American retreat. One thought of summer maples, soda fountains and girls in bobbysocks; the orange sweatshirt was imagination's catalyst and the magic carpet of longing.

But there was no question of leaving Java. "You can't run a war out of your pants pockets," they said. "As long as the pilots stay with the Dutch, we stay. Until we have nothing flyable left, until we're just as hard up as the navy, we'll stay."

Now Japan, having wrecked Darwin, was throwing her full bomber force against Soerabaya. They sent over the next day a force that could only be compared with what the Luftwaffe sent across the Channel in

the days when the sun was obscured with German planes. They had everything, bombers and fighters. They had height. This strike was meant for the knockout blow, to wipe out Soerabaya's defenses and to smother the American fighters.

The bombers were stepped up from 27,000 feet to 30,000. After every nine bombers there were 6 Zeros. In other words there were 54 bombers and 36 Zeros, against 12 lone wolves of Americans. (Two more Kittyhawks had been tinkered up into operation by these greaseballs in American sweatshirts.)

Bob McCallum, the Louisianan, led his first command into action and took tall Marion J. Fuchs of Big Springs, Texas, Roger F. Williams, and Ben Irvin with him. At the same time Dale, R. S. Johnson, Paul B. Gambonini of Petaluma, California, and Bernard J. Oliver of Prescott, Arizona, tried to climb up to the lowermost level of bombers. A thousand feet below the red balled wings of the bombers the hive of Zeros opened on them.

At such a height it was foolhardy to try to outmaneuver the butterfly Japanese, and the eight went into their dive. But the other four Americans (Adkins, Hennon and Reynolds with Kiser giving them the signals) were able to dive upon the Zero's tail after the leader followed the first two flights down far enough.

Ben Irvin saw a Zero about to attack, dropped back and got him.

Hennon and Reynolds each got a Zero in their sights and burst him open from the rear; in a diving match a heavy P-40 could beat a Zero any day. But McCallum, feeling his responsibility to cover the tails of his companions in the escaping dive, was reached by one of the leading Zeros.

His plane faltered, his engine smoked. He bailed out.

When the Japanese saw his canopy open they came out of their dive and twisted away after it. The little handful of pilots lost sight of him.

The next day Bill Fisher, their defense control officer, in Soerabaya, broke to them the news that Jerry McCallum had been found, machine gunned in his parachute as he fell. He had bailed out like "Chief" Fields, and his bushido-loving and chivalrous enemy had followed him down. But death had been mercifully quick. there were thirty holes in his 'chute, and he had been hit twice each in his head and heart.

When Jerry McCallum went the only officer who had been able to run their rude little engineering shack, to hold airplanes together by gum and by God, was gone. You could feel Java creaking and cracking around you, getting ready to break up. This was the day before Wavell

and his staff turned the defense of Java over to the Dutch and followed Brereton to Colombo. That afternoon there was a report that a big Jap fleet had already been sighted north of Bawean Island, off Soerabaya.

The invasion of Java had begun.

Walt Coss, who with only three guns working had sawed off the wing of the squadron's second Tokio-built Messerschmitt, succeeded as permanent commander to McCallum, who briefly succeeded Mahoney.

Fighters had more chance to get away from the cruiser based sea-planes that were playing the role of sheep dogs of the Jap invasion, than the last limping navy Catalina that still remained in Soerabaya. Kiser and Hennon were sent off as the sun was descending to hunt for the Japanese convoy. They hunted for two hours, but never saw it.

The reason why there were now more Zeros was because the new Japanese fighter base on Den Pasar in Bali was in full operation. Java was being hit in the face with bombers and stabbed in the ribs with fighters, simultaneously.

The next day 26 bombers came over and unloaded everything they had upon the Soerabaya navy yard from 30,000 feet. Their protective cover of Zeros flew at 27,000 feet and attacked the rising handful of P-40s, which could only dive away.

Hennon, more persistent than the others, followed the bombers and fighters until they parted company, and then intercepted all by himself two Zeros that were flying low on their way home. He sent one of them down aflame into the wet rice fields and was back at his little field shortly after 11 o'clock.

The fortresses were leaving Malang, having been badly shot up by strafing Zeros. They asked for protection, but the air direction control could not give it to them. There was enough work for 120 fighters, and there were only a dozen fighters.

Around lunch time word came that six Brewster Buffaloes with Dutch pilots—apparently some of those rescued from Singapore—would arrive at Blimbing and lend a hand, as well as they could with their 16,000 foot operating ceiling and 160 mile an hour speed.

The Dutchmen landed at two in the afternoon. Next there arrived six Hurricanes piloted by Dutchmen who had had an average of two or three hours' experience in this advanced fighter. This was not so bad as it sounded; some of the American fliers had left Australia with only one or two fast fighter hours on their logbook. The Hurricanes

finally took the air to fight only the day after the Japs actually landed on Java, because at the American field the hydraulic fluid and ammunition was unsuitable for the British motors.

Little Lester Johnsen wrote in his notebook that day: "These Dutchmen were very courageous and excellent pilots. Lieutenant Anamaet was their commanding officer, a half-cast Dutch Javanese, a very smart man and well-liked."

The relations of the Americans with all tints in Java had been good, right from the pure Dutch through the halfcastes to the fullblooded Javanese. Staff Sergeant Jung, who spoke no Malay, had been teaching a class of Javanese mechanics, who spoke no English, the guns and the vitals of the 1,150 horsepower Allison engine. Although lectures consisted mostly of gestures in dumb show by the professor and grunts of comprehension by the class, the visiting pedagogue said his pupils "caught on in no time at all."

Now the Japanese convoys were on the way across the Java Sea and the invasion of Java, the last holding point in the Indies, was in full progress. By working hard on each grasping and weary engine, and repairing every bullet hole, the ground crew had managed to keep a dozen of the P-40s still in flying condition.

The Jap fleet was coming in not straight for Soerabaya but somewhat to the westward. It was only one of three fleets trisecting Java. The amphibious force to take Soerabaya, actually aimed at Rembang 70 miles to the east, was the largest. The Japs were methodical. First they had cut Indonesia's chain, from Sumatra to Timor, in segments. Now they subdivided Java, the largest segment.

The one remaining navy PBY Catalina counted 80 transports as it surveyed this enormous force. It took this last battered Cat ten minutes to fly the convoy's length, with every antiaircraft gun in the fleet sending up hot needles at them.

The three serviceable A-24 dive bombers still remaining were anxious to do their part in making invasion costly. On that afternoon, with the Japs just off Bawean, they set off to attack amphibious Nippon. They were protected by Kiser, lanky Morehead, Fuchs and Lund in the first flight, and Dale, Johnson, Johnsen, Adkins, Dockstader and Kruzel in the second flight.

This attack was made almost simultaneously with the first joining of the battle of the Java Sea, from whose final phase not one of five allied cruisers escaped. Among these five, which should have had a total of 20 reconnaissance aircraft—four per cruiser—not one plane was in condition to be catapulted.

The American dive bombers put their loads directly on the deck of a 14,000 ton transport. It burned beautifully and sunk blackly before their eyes. It was only a pinprick among the 80 transports but there was one delight in it: every plane got home.

Here's what little Lester Johnsen, the Stanford relay runner, wrote in the notebook he was saving to show his wife: "We took off at 4.30 to escort three A-24s to divebomb a Jap convoy 90 miles at sea. The A-24s made three direct hits with their bombs, probably sinking the ships. The allied fleet was intercepting enemy convoys and fierce fighting was in progress and some naval craft were burning. One of ours was burning badly. It was probably a cruiser. Jap fleet was firing anti-aircraft at us and several were coming very close. We encountered no enemy planes. The Jap fleet was composed of 45 transports and 12 warships: subs, corvettes and cruisers. One could not see from one end of the convoy to the other. . . . On this day our operations staff consisted of one clerk and one Dutch army lieutenant."

The last day of February was Java's black day. Six more of the fortresses had been sent away to the final American base at Djocjakarta to be evacuated. The remaining members of the Seventeenth were beginning to feel like the last tenants in a house that is being demolished.

By nine o'clock in the morning the first gong of enemy aircraft approaching clanged in the village, and the 12 P-40s with four Brewsters took off to find them. They missed them.

It was pretty hard that day to hold a breakfast down; one could not tell whether one would live until sunset. The next warning came at 10 past 2 and the P-40s and Brewsters went up. The P-40s led the way. The Japs had sent a dozen bombers and nine Zeros over at a five mile height. But the P-40s could not get up there in time.

Zeros, recognizing cold turkey in the Brewsters, went into their dive, but the little barrels on wings could match rates of fall with anybody, and they got away. One Brewster's motor stopped, and the Dutchmen bailed out safely. The Americans struggled to get up at the bombers, but the Japs stayed too high.

By this time interceptions were being broken off repeatedly on account of motor trouble. The engines had been fighting full throttle for over 150 hours. They could not be repaired or overhauled; there were too few for replacement. All of them had to remain on alert all the time. One flyer took a sad inventory of the P-40 that had brought him all the way from Australia and kept him alive in the face of all the Zeros, and he wrote:

"My plane has two tires that have huge blisters in them. It has no brakes and no generator and hydraulic fluid is leaking into the cockpit." Yet he took off in this "heap"—and fought.

By now the Japs had successfully landed at Rembang, about 70 miles west of Soerabaya. The second night Dutch motor torpedo boats were ordered to attack the Jap destroyers, under the leadership of Lieutenant Henry Jorissen. Jorissen, incidentally, was one of the leading young Dutch poets, a tall blond and cultivated Hollander. His force was to hit the naval force off the beach by moonlight, as soon as they could see. His two PTs hit a Japanese flotilla-leading destroyer, and it blew up.

Nevertheless the Japs used the whole of this perfect moonlight night for their unloading. Nearly everything was on the beach the next morning. The little fighter force took off, under plans laid down by Major Fisher, who had come from Soerabaya to help Coss. It was the last blow that was to be struck for Java; already the allied fleet was scattered and the Japs were picking off the cruisers one by one. The *Houston* was trapped in the Sunda Straits at the other end of Java.

There were only nine Americans left with planes that could fly. They were broken down into flights of three each. Kiser led one, with Adkins and R. S. Johnson at his wing tips. Jack Dale led the second, with Jock Caldwell and McWherter beside him. Kruzel led the third with Reagan and Fuchs on his wings.

They knew this attack was to be the last. So did the Dutchmen. Desperately they forced the engines and guns of the Hurricanes into shape, and all six took off together with the four flyable Brewsters.

As they came down over the paddy fields outside Rembang they could see the line of transports parallel to the coast. It was a peaceful sight; the landing barges were shuttling back and forth in the usual orderly and systematic fashion of the Nipponese amphibious force.

The Japs had already landed anti-aircraft guns on the shore. Both these guns and the ackack on the destroyers and cruisers opened up a terrible fire. The orange of the dawn was seared with grey smoke tracers, and scarred with gleaming incendiaries.

Kiser led the flight around in a broad curve to approach the bay out of the sun and get what protection was possible. The orders were that the P-40s should lead the way in, and then that the Dutchmen and Hurricanes flying in two strings, should follow them.

The Japanese closely criss-crossed their fire. "Jock" Caldwell went down with a crash into the water.

Reagan's plane caught on fire, and only a glimpse was seen of him as he tried to land. McWherter was flying on the Kentuckian's wing and signalled Reagan, whose motor was spitting flames, to fly with him to the beach and then bail out. Reagan understood and waved back. Possibly he was shot or his parachute was holed. Whatever the reason, he did something McWherter never forgot. He plucked himself a cigarette, rolled back the canopy, reached forward, lighted the cigarette on the burning motor, and put it in his mouth to await the end. When the plane fell McWherter followed him down, but was met with more fire from the ground and ships, and turned away before Reagan struck the ground.

"Big" Johnson received a cannon shell in his tank and oil line. Hot black oil spewed back as he fled for Blimbing. He landed in a ship black with oil from nose to empennage, covered with hot black oil himself and with an inch of oil in the cockpit.

Adkins was shot down, too, and was thought to be lost.

The anti-aircraft from the beach and ships was chewed to pieces by the strafing American fighters, making the way for the Dutch somewhat safer. The barges and small boats were shot up and sunk. They were strung seven or eight deep in long columns, an arrangement indicative of the confidence the Japanese felt that their landing was safe. Several barges burned and sank.

The Seventeenth never saw Caldwell or Reagan again, although Reagan may have lived.

For Reagan it was the first mission and the last; the Seventeenth hardly knew him, one of the late comers. But Jock Caldwell was interwoven in the fiber of the lives of all those who had been at Blimbing. It was he who had handled the uncrating in the critical first days in Australia, when they realized from the time that they began to negotiate with the stubborn Brisbane dockworkers union about unloading the ship that they stood alone. It was Little Tarzan who made the Japanese real to them, and worthy of the sacrifice of their lives, a creeping disease of the Orient that would spread far unless stitched up with American machine gun fire. "You can tell Chinese and Japs apart," he told them, "because the Chinese are lighter and fleshier than the Japs." He had been their kindergarten master in the politics of Asia, so new and so vital to their country, so neglected in their educations, so intimate with his.

Adkins had an incredible experience. He landed by the beach and bounced off the water after pulling out of his power dive. He made

two attacks in all, and finally bailed out over the beach, only about three hundred yards from the Japs.

A Javanese, frightened by the exchange of fire, was pedalling by along the beach road at high speed on a bicycle. Adkins was still very full of the will to live and commanded the Javanese to stop. When he did so Adkins jumped on the handle bars, and yelled to his chauffeur: "Come on, let's go!" The legs of the terrified Javanese soon grew too weak for him. Adkins, with the Japs of the beachhead close after him, ditched the owner of the bicycle, and pedalled away at top speed.

The remaining planes got back to the field at 20 minutes to 8, tragically shot up. Skimming after the landing barges with everything blazing, one fighter had gone so low that the concussion of the wave tops bent back the supports for his belly tank against the body of the plane. The waves also bent in the cowling of his under plane radiator. Only six of them could still fly, but none could fight.

By nine o'clock not one of them could fly. The Japs sent over two Zeros, and strafed the entire field back and forth, wiping out every one of the six. It was over. Captain Anamaet, the partly Javanese fighter commander, took over the field.

The enemy had done the earth-scorching of the Americans for them at the last moment. Just to make sure—the Dutch are great people for making *sure* of things—the Dutch native soldiers burned the perforated Forties. The Kittyhawks died like phoenixes in fire and ashes, and the army fighters, like the navy patrol bombers, left Java only when they had nothing left that was fightable.

It was the end, too, of the Seventeenth Pursuit, Provisional. Provisional they had been, indeed.

One staff car and two trucks remained, and they loaded themselves aboard, deeding what there was left to the Dutch. Kurtz, the 19th's liaison officer, said he would try to get them out on bombers. They paid their last bills, down to the groschen, as a departing Dutchman would have done. Their papers were torn up and burned.

Shaking hands for the last time with the Dutch family that had cooked and cared for them, looking around the debris and ashes-strewn quarters for the last time, the men of the Seventeenth heard a sound like weeping. It was Judy, the coolie-boy Judy. He was crying, a line chief sad, "fit to break your heart."

Judy was just a brown mite from the swarm of Java's forty millions, twelve years old, some said, while others thought he was twenty. He seemed to love to work for the Americans. So they had made him a

staff sergeant. They painted the herring bone chevrons on his skinny brown arm with whitewash, renewing them each day. They gave him metal parts of the Forties to polish, and got an artilleryman's hat for him from one of the dozen or so Texans that Sprague had shanghaied from the artillery outfit camped at Malang. (The others of this National Guard regiment, except those who served as emergency gunners on the fortresses, were taken prisoner fighting on the outskirts of Batavia.)

They had taught Judy to call the camp roll, while all hands stood gravely at attention before the slim little brown boy-man. "'E Jung, 'e Little, 'e Merriman, 'e Schott," the little brown top kick would say.

Now that he was weeping, so clearly wanting to go away with them, they did not know what to do. They filled his hands with all the guilders they had left, more than he would earn the next ten years of his life. Still he could not stop weeping. So they took him out to the shattered workshop, put the tools in his hands, and gave him an old cartridge case to clean. "Have it ready by the time we come back," they told him.

Judy nodded through his tears and began to polish earnestly.

Under the orders of Major Fisher, the whole party, pilots and men, started for Djocjakarta, now the last fortress base since Malang and Madison were abandoned. Enroute the trucks got separated from the staff car containing Coss, and ran into some Dutch troops. Their commander told Washburn, whose linguistic talents later made him a lieutenant, that the Japs were only a half mile away. They saw the Dutch blowing up their sugar mills. They helped a fleeing Dutchman fix his broken cart, and thereby missed being bombed on Djocjakarta field.

Little Johnsen wrote:

"We drove to Djocja by car and had to go very near the enemy. We could see the fires of the towns that were being burned. The Nips bombed the field, destroying the B-24s. The Zeros came down and strafed us, afterward."

They spent their last day in Java on the field at Djocjakarta, from which every coolie had fled, rolling gasoline drums out to the last fortresses that escaped the 2 p.m. raid by the Zeros. Here were destroyed the last official records of Java's fighters. The ebullient Adkins, who had barely missed his outfit at Blimbing, arrived in a carful of Dutch officers. Their roster was complete except for one staff sergeant, Bill O'Rear of South Bend, whom no one was able to find. A

rouged rumor said he had a Javanese girl, who had promised to hide him.

After supper Captain Lane, having consulted the bombers, said that 15 men under Lieutenant McCartney would have to be left behind for safety of load. Sergeant Evans offered to stay. Rickmar and other enlisted men went to the bomber crews and begged them to take all. All were taken.

The Sunday night, March 1, with the Japs 30 hours landed on the teeming island, the last of the Seventeenth took off at 11.20 p.m. in the fortresses. By the light of dawn they landed at Broome, halfway down the coast of western Australia. They had been raided at Djocjakarta the day of their departure. The day after their arrival at Broome a raid by Japanese long range fighters, the most costly in human life after that of Darwin six weeks before, left the waters of the harbor best known to the Japanese pearlers filled with the bodies of Dutch women and children, together with six members of the Seventeenth. The death toll was in the neighborhood of eighty against Darwin's approximately thousand killed.

Thirty-eight men came out by plane, thanks to the bombers; 53 men had already left on the battered but still reasonably fast-footed Dutch freighter *Abbequerque*, bombed and sunk once in the Thames, but now raised and seaworthy again. The strong-minded captain of the *Abbequerque*, after leaving Tjilatjap, Java's only port on the Indian Ocean, on the last day of February, broke convoy and ignoring naval orders, took a course of his own. Several other members of the convoy were sunk; this was two days from the time when the Japanese trapped the aircraft tender *Langley* and the navy tanker *Pecos*, with 32 more P-40s and pilots aboard, in these same waters.

Armorers and crew chiefs, pilots and men, slept on the cold decks in the rain, one blanket to a man. The ship was full of British and Australian troops who had evacuated both Malaya and Java, bearded and dirty. Water was rationed on the crowded decks to one canteen a man. There were two identical meals daily: canned willy, hardtack, and a sour coffee.

Two days out one of the cruiser-based Japanese seaplanes, the same that found and sank the *Langley* and *Pecos* next day, circled over the *Abbequerque* and prepared to attack. With the Dutchman cursing robustly at the helm, the Americans prepared to hold off the Jap. "I saw work to do and hurried to help," Perry remembers.

"We brought up machine guns salvaged from our planes, and stuck

them on a piece of pipe tied to the rail with rope. We fixed up four that way. The Jap was going around for another pass. I saw a rifle lying on a hatch, grabbed it and joined the other riflemen at the rail. From stem to stern, on both sides of the ship, it was lined with soldiers and sailors. A sailor came along distributing clips of ammunition as if he were selling popcorn at a circus. I took a handful of the clips, jammed one into the Springfield, turned around and waited for the Jap.

"The Jap came in again. 'He'll bomb for sure this time,' somebody muttered. I raised my rifle simultaneously with 150 others and waited to get a bead in front of him.

"The hastily put up .50s from our planes chattered. Guns went off all over the ship. One fellow was holding on to the receiver of a rapidly heating machine gun, steadying it with one hand and pressing the trigger without letup.

"The Jap came close alongside and I felt the kick of the rifle five times. He had gone on. Tracers had been seen going into him; he had been hit, we knew. He dipped toward the sea, came up again and disappeared. He had dropped two objects astern which could have been bombs but were reported to be belly-tanks. 'Well, if he doesn't tell his damned navy about us we'll be okay for awhile,' somebody observed dryly.

"That night we had two submarine attacks. Although we didn't learn of it until we reached port, we found out that in the night a submarine had fired two torpedoes at us, but missed with both of them. We did not have any more action."

The *Abbequerque* reached Fremantle on March 6, one week ahead of the *Janssens*, an even smaller Dutch freighter of 6 knot speed, the last vessel to escape from Java of more than trawler size, aboard which the writer arrived after being strafed by Zeros off the coast of Java near Patjitan. The argosy of this vessel was romantically chronicled by Cecil B. deMille in a movie named after the naval physician, Lt. Com. Corydon M. Wassell, USNR, entitled "The Life of Dr. Wassell."

Meantime Major Legg, energetic commander of the unformed group, had flown to Broome to take over the air defense of north-western Australia. When the Fortresses came in one by one from Djocjakarta, groaning with their extra load and riddled with the holes of eight weeks of fighting off Zeros, there were no facilities to fuel them rapidly. Moreover, the harbor was full of Dutch flying boats filled with women and children.

A big B-24 Liberator flew to Java the night of March 2 to take off the remaining air force personnel, who were to have given a pre-arranged signal from the field at Djocjakarta. The B-24 circled in the darkness, saw no signal, and returned to Broome the morning of March 3. The wounded from Java were loaded into it, and from the Seventeenth, as passengers, Beatty, Donoho, Foster, Rex, Sheets, Steinmetz and Taylor. The B-24 took off at 9.50 and seven minutes later began Broome's agony, the second worst air raid in Australian history.

Broome had neither radar, anti-aircraft guns, nor fighter planes. It was a defenseless bay and airfield, both crammed with aircraft, both completely helpless.

Nine Zeros came in from the sea. Six began strafing the harbor, making one leisurely pass after another until flying boats and bombers, the former loaded with the wives and children of Dutch officers wanted by the Japs, puffed into flame and exploded. Three Zeros went after the B-24, which was carrying 30 passengers beside its crew, and had attained about 600 feet height.

Donoho, a stockily built armorer who in Java had taken care of Blanton's plane, was lying at the bottom of the bomb bay. "I looked up and saw what looked like an arc of electricity come into the plane. It came once, then it came again."

The gastanks caught fire. The passengers on top of Donoho crawled out of the bomb bay and back into the rear of the plane in a squirming mass, trying to escape the flames. As the flames found more gasoline, the fire pursued them. The plane was falling.

"I figured it was all over anyway, so I lay down on the catwalk and just waited."

The next thing that Donoho knew he was below the surface of the water, where the plane has landed with a crack that broke it in two, and was looking up through the greenish light toward the surface. He swam up to the surface. The two parts of the plane were will separated, the tail sticking up vertically, the nose still afloat with men jumping out of it. There was no one discernible alive where the flames had been, in the tail, but there were 15 or 16 men, doctors pulling out their already wounded patients, around the nose.

Donoho swam close to Beatty, who seemed to be the only one alive from the Seventeenth. They could see smoke on the horizon, but were not sure it was land. Actually it was the planes burning at Broome. They began to swim. In twelve hours they were a quarter mile from shore. Then came night. The heavy tide of Broome, which

falls over 30 feet and leaves freighters stranded on the mud at their piers, took them out to sea.

They swam all night, keeping together in the darkness by Beatty, the weaker, swimming between Donoho's legs. They swam on their backs as much as they could. Beatty kept urging Donoho to leave him, go ashore and bring help. He complained of being cold, too. Finally, about noon next day they saw a lighthouse, with docks and fishing vessels. "Go on in, leave me," Beatty said.

Donoho, who was 29 and husky from working in the oilfields, still had more reserve than Beatty, though the latter at 26 had spent seven years in the army. He struck on ahead and got within 200 yards of shore. But the outrushing tide carried him away again. "Hell, I thought I'd quit." Then he changed his mind and decided to go down the coast from the lighthouse.

The next thing he heard was a slapping noise. It was waves striking rocks. He reached them, climbed up, and collapsed. Shore was fifty yards away across a channel. He made it and started walking back up the beach toward the lighthouse. It was five miles away. When he got there it was deserted and there were no docks or boats. They had been a mirage. He found a little water in a cistern, staggered through the reeds for hours, and finally walked into Legg's arms on the airfield he had left 36 hours before, a naked, sunburned and exhausted man.

By daylight Beatty was found on the beach, unconscious and delirious. Flown at top speed to Perth, the nearest city, some 1,400 miles away he died there in the hospital without returning to his senses.

Lieutenant Howard Petschel, one of those communications pilots who under Hampton of the troop-carrying transports had brought the Seventeenth to Java, disappeared with the lost Liberator.

Sergeant Goltry, Kruzel's armorer, had his own difficulties in the wilderness of the dry northwest. His plane cracked up taking off from Broome with 19 aboard, but none was injured. With eight others he set off by broken down truck for Port Hedland, the next wharf down the coast. The caravan ran out of food quickly and lived on wild turkey. Mosquitoes hunted them in clouds as they hauled their trucks from one morass of sand and mud after another. It was 250 miles to Port Hedland. It took them 14 days to get there.

The evacuees from Java, though hardly a trickle of its millions of Javanese and thousands of Dutch trapped there, were an overwhelming torrent when they touched the northwest coast of Australia, isolated by the wet season among its meager stores of foodstuffs shipped from Perth. They remained only a day or two; yet it was enough to eat

the one or two aboriginal missions and the scattering of settlers out of the little food they had left. It was impossible, even after the evacuees meandered south to Perth, to send food by ship to northwestern Australia because the Japs sank the ships. Some of the little stations were calling desperately for food with their pedal wirelasses long after the planesful from Java departed.

An Arkansas sergeant by the name of Ewart managed to hold on, all the way to Perth, to a Javanese monkey. He seemed to be trying, in this way, to express the very strong attachment for Java, the Javanese and the Dutch, that almost everyone of the Seventeenth felt, the most extraordinary six weeks in the lives of any of them.

The Seventeenth had much to remember.

They remembered the day when Morehead came burning in over the field, did a victory roll straight down the middle of the runway, and then did another. They remembered how he landed—he had run into nine bombers over Malang and shot down *two*—how he threw back his canopy before his wheels stopped rolling, stood up with two fingers in the air and shook them grinning, and how he yelled: "Hell, you guys are crazy! Those Japs can't shoot. . . ." That day a Zero had been on his tail as he pursued the bombers, but he just seesawed his plane up and down like a bucking horse to spoil the Jap's aim, and kept on boring in. All he got was a bullet hole in his stabilizer.

They remembered the day Egenes and Parker mistook tall cane for young rice, landed in the high green stalks, were surrounded by natives with spears who took them for Japs, saved themselves with the Javanese words Lt. Gertz had taught them, and finally took off on a curved tar highway, with everybody happy and waving.

They remembered the day when Coss, their last commander, got his first Jap, how he could not speak but just kept smiling and smiling to himself.

They remembered combing the jungle, after the Seventeenth itself had lost a plane, trying to get enough parts out of the wreckage to keep some other pilot's ship flying.

They remembered Sprague, who still might be alive, on their first payday in Java, when he said, "We haven't any records or finance officer yet, so you just tell me what the government owes you, and I'll pay you, only remember to be honest because I'm responsible for this," and how he did pay them, more or less out of the pockets of his flying suit.

The remembered the day on Perak Field in an air raid, when a

Dutch sergeant mistook the ackack's white puffs for the opening canopies of airborne invaders, took them to the hut where fliers were fed and issued them rifles to hunt and kill what he called "parashite trups," and how they obediently hunted all the marshland, but found none.

They remembered the silver loving cup that the Dutch couple who took care of them had bought, inscribing with care the name of every pilot who brought down a Japanese. There had been five names on the cup, when things began to happen too fast to keep up with inscriptions. Whatever happened to the loving cup, anyway?

They remembered Kiser, one of the cunningest of the pilots in battle, whose strongest cussword was "by damn," and they remembered "Stonewall" Jackson, his armorer, an old regular army hand who tinkered constantly through his waking hours and chewed cigarettes because Java had no cutplug.

They remembered the Dutch pilot of a B-10, seeing his bomber as vulnerable as the early B-17 fortress because it had no tail gunner, who painted the point of his tail black, put in a flashlight attached by switch to his cockpit, and used to wink the light at any Jap diving on his tail to simulate machine gun fire.

They remembered the day when the three little sergeants, Austin, Killian and Merriman, who looked as alike as Javanese and always went around together, found themselves on the runway at Soerabaya in the middle of a raid. A burning Dutchman came down with his landing wheels retracted and bellywhumped along the strip, a doctor ran out to help him, the pursuing Jap strafed him, the doctor ran back, the Dutchman tried to climb out, the doctor ran to help him and brought him in, the Jap came down with his machine guns going again, another Dutchman came in and crashed with his wheels down, Austin saw an unused P-40, started to run for it, angry for revenge. Killian and Merriman held him down as the Japs came in, and Austin cast them aside long enough to get his helmet off and throw it passionately after the Jap as he went by.

They remembered "Toughey" Hague who said, "The first time I saw a Nip I was so excited to get at him I wobbled my fire all over the sky."

They remembered the rare nights of Soerabaya, at the Shanghai and the Tiptop—the officers went to the Oranje—and they remembered the look, in the wet red dawn of Blimbing, of the palms and the red, yellow, blue and green sharks and dragons of the impatient planes.

Perry, with a young man's sense of what he will remember, said: "With forty millions of natives alone populating Java, one could not

walk more than two hundred yards through the jungle without seeing at least five native huts, or a whole village. This was in the vicinity of Soerabaya, but it didn't vary much anywhere you went. You saw the Javanese everywhere, washing clothes on the stones in the river, dressed in their 'Sunday best,' on a day off in town, squatting along the streets and crowding around to sell you something. From a tourist's viewpoint Java was all it ever claimed to be—and more. From a soldier's viewpoint it was a place where you did not have time enough really to take in everything. From a soldier's viewpoint, with the idea of returning sometime with lots of time and money, it was a place where the best drunk, the most fun and the best chance of having the time of a lifetime were to be had. We loved it. We liked being able to see half-primitive modes of living, of hearing strange words spoken and guessing at their meaning, at being able to visit exclusive bars and cafes and being able to exert a certain amount of influence where it meant most. The tropics, the romantic South Sea isles, the strange cities and tangled jungles filled with strange people, were, as we look back on them now, not a disappointment. We were thoroughly impressed."

Such was the close of the work of the Seventeenth Pursuit. Only seventeen planes were lost of those that actually reached Java. For these seventeen battle weary Kittyhawks the Americans exacted a price of at least 50 Japanese planes, nearly half of them heavy bombers and most of the rest Zeros. The Dutch said they were certain of at least 65, positively seen to crash. And this destruction, amounting to the loss to Japan of at least two hundred trained airmen, was caused by a squadron which had only 31 planes, flyable and faulty included, at a zenith which lasted two days, but which yet lost only eleven men in all, and only nine of them in combat with the Japanese in Java, in a period of five weeks single-handed fighting.

And all this was accomplished without a radio warning system. Had there been an adequate air warning system at Soerabaya and four times as many P-40s, Java might have held as long as Corregidor, affording a nuisance to the Japs until May.

As the Seventeenth was disbanded and scattered, their fortunes became different. Andy Reynolds and Jim Morehead became two of the finest fighter pilots in Darwin, where the pickings were poor because the Zeros didn't like to fight after the long fuel-exhausting run from Koepang. R. S. "Big" Johnson crashed in Moresby and "Toughey" Hague was lost in August on a raid in northern Papua. Many, like little Les Johnsen, went hotfoot after the records of those

like "Kay" Kiser, who had come back from Java laden with scalps. Kay's homecoming was reported in *Life* magazine; such is a modern immortality. Dutton, who had only one bomber out of Java, went to the Solomons and collected two Zeros and three medals, filling with pride a father who was an adjutant in Moresby's bomber command. Adkins and his irrepressible sidekick, the bushybearded Wahl, did well out of Moresby, and Turner topped all other Java veterans for honors in New Guinea. McWherter and Egenes held their own, too, in the skies of Papua, while waiting for the then novel P-38 Lightnings to take their place.

In far off Washington Princess Juliana called Willard Reed's widow and thanked her for what "Jess" Reed had offered Java.

Many of the enlisted men who fought in Java, too, were still carrying the battle a year later in New Guinea. Sergeant Jack Evans, the one who offered to stay behind in Java, became a fortress bomber, won his Silver Star and Purple Heart, and joined the daredevil middleaged bellwether of the Beechcraft in low level strafing jobs in A-20s and super-gunned B-25s. After the Philippines fell this latter was revealed to have been Major Paul "Pappy" Gunn.

Sergeant Ollie Hale, the World War I veteran who could make a radio talk any language, was handling the earphones in General MacArthur's private plane.

Langjajhr, a private in the rear rank in Java, became a fortress bombardier, peeped down on the Buin-Faisi retreat in the Solomons, and put two 500 pounders on the decks, two next the flanks of a Japanese monitor battleship, one of those new high speed, heavy firepower creatures that made hideous the nights of marines by their unopposed bombardments of Guadalcanal's foxholes.

When the enlisted men crossed Australia they found newly arrived officers from the States who said they had never heard of any American fighters in Java. At first the Seventeenth was bitter. When they got over that, they did what the army calls "a snow job." They told the Australian girls they were all "tail gunners in P-40s." This mischievous description in a way came close to the truth.

The lesson of the Seventeenth teaches the necessity of permanent American air and naval bases throughout the world, like those in the Atlantic, in order that the unpreparedness the Seventeenth fought to remedy may never be ours or that of our allies again.

For a while the American wings over Java were folded. But some day they would be spread again.

For that day, as the Dutch used to say: "Luck to the fighters!"

CRACKING THE CRIMEA

BY JOHN MASON POTTER

After the westward surge of the Red Army had isolated the Nazi garrison on the peninsula in 1943, the Germans were sure that their defenses were adequate to hold the Crimea. They had the same sureness that the French high command had possessed four springs before that the Ardennes Mountains could not be passed through by effective forces of the German Army. It was a state of mind that invited disaster.

There are only two land bridges to the Crimea—the Perekop isthmus connecting with the mainland to the north, and the Kerch peninsula jutting eastward from the Crimea to within a short distance of the Kuban.

During their two years the Germans strongly fortified their lines across the two land bridges and apparently believed them impenetrable. They built three separate lines west of the Soviet beachhead which the Russians had managed to cling to during the winter of 1943-44, on the very tip of the Kerch peninsula. The entire Perekop isthmus from the town of that name southward was fortified, and in addition lesser defenses were built about key positions in the interior of the Crimea, presumably at Dzhankoi and along the highways running south to Sevastopol and other cities on the southern shore of the peninsula.

The Germans had little fear of an amphibious attack on the shores of the Crimea, for Nazi planes from airfields on the peninsula had kept the remnants of the Russian Black Sea fleet well bottled up in the eastern end of that sea. It was therefore unable to give the same kind of support to the Third Ukrainian Army of General Rodion Y. Malinovsky as it pushed along the coast west of the Crimea that the British Eighth Army had received from the Mediterranean fleet when it was chasing Rommel and his Afrika Corps across north Africa, or to attempt to wrest the Crimea from the enemy with the help of a land drive.

Nor did the Germans fear very much an attack from across the Sivash sea—a vast mudflat covered with a foot or so of extremely salty water—which separated the northern shore of the Crimea from the Russian mainland. The Sivash lies between the Perekop peninsula on the west and the Sea of Azov on the east. Known locally as “the putrid sea,” the Sivash was passable only to men on foot, sloshing and slogging their way through the slime and muck. Horses refused to enter the

water because the brine cut their legs, and the mudflats were utterly unpassable to the lightest kind of motor vehicle.

The Germans reasoned that obviously only foot patrols could cross the Sivash, and therefore their lines facing it, like the French lines facing the Ardennes, were lightly fortified and lightly held.

Late in March the Red Army was ready for an all-out assault against the Crimea. Facing the Perekop defenses was the Fourth Ukrainian Army of General Fedor I. Tolbukhin, while the eastern beachhead facing the fortified town of Kerch was manned by units of the Independent Maritime Army of General Andrei I. Yeremenko.

The Germans brought in some reserves by plane and probably by boat as well, and although outnumbered, the Nazis were confident they could hold their naturally strong positions.

But while the Germans were holding back the Red tide at Perekop and Kerch, units of the Fourth Ukrainian Army, in an operation reminiscent of our Revolutionary victory over the British garrison at Vincennes, pushed across the icy mudflats of the Sivash, broke through German lines and advanced on the communications core of the entire peninsula.

The surprise thrust across the seemingly impassable "putrid sea" was made possible by Red Army engineers, veterans of the historic battle of Stalingrad. They solved the problem of how to crack the Crimea.

After infantry troops of Lieutenant General Kreiser had waded from a peninsula running far south into the Sivash, to the northern Crimean shore to establish a beachhead, the sappers (engineers) of Major General Bazhenov began their near impossible task of bringing across the two and a half kilometers of ice cold water and mud such heavy weapons as mortars and field pieces, in addition to ammunition and other supplies for the infantrymen who for two days held on with only rifle fire.

During the two days the sappers pulled the guns and supplies across on specially constructed sleds and in pontoons. They pulled them, wading in water up to their knees and subjected at times to enemy plane attacks.

But the Red Army flyers were able to keep the sky clear of the enemy most of the time and the sappers continued to tug their loads across. The passage of field pieces was followed by that of horses, whose legs had been tied together before being placed on the sleds.

The skins of the men's legs cracked and split open from the cold

wind and the icy water. Open sores were further irritated by the bitter salt brine. There was no time to wait until special wind-and-water-repellent clothes arrived because the beachhead had to be developed before the Germans became aware that the main push against them was to come across the Sivash.

Reinforcements for the handful of infantrymen holding the beachhead positions were not required to wade across, as had the original group. The Stalingrad sappers pulled them across in their sleds, leaving the new men untired by the passage and ready and fit for action when they stepped ashore. The original holding on the northern shore of the Crimea was apparently very small, for the men referred to it as "the little land."

But while the sappers had been able, by pulling and tugging, to bring men, ammunition, light field pieces, mortars, supplies and even horses across in pontoons and the special sleds, such methods obviously were not adequate for heavier guns and tanks, nor would such methods permit a steady flow of supplies and men across the mudflats in sufficient volume for anything larger than a diversionary attack.

The sappers, already cold and weary from their task, then began to construct a bridge across "the putrid sea," an undertaking which even in peacetime would have been hailed as a feat.

The Russians rushed the work, despite the attempts to break it up by Nazi airmen who sometimes managed to break through the Soviet aerial umbrella. The Germans turned some of their guns on the bridge-makers, too, but apparently Red Army flyers were able to silence them, or at least force them to maintain no more than a desultory fire.

Finally when the bridge was nearly finished, a late winter storm broke out over the Sivash, whipping its shallow waters into waves which pounded the structure until it was shattered. What the German planes and artillery had not been able to accomplish, nature did in one stroke.

The sappers began again, working long hours in the icy waters, toiling night and day to get the bridge done and the tanks and big guns across as soon as possible. There were no arrangements for the men to dry their clothes or to get warm after they were relieved at their tasks, so in the day-time they built bonfires.

The bridge was finally finished and the flow of traffic across it began. In their hurry to get the drive started, the sappers continued to

drag light field pieces, and even light tanks, across the Sivash on the sleds and pontoons, leaving the bridge to the heavier weapons.

Just as the attack was to be opened, another storm swept the area—this time it was snow. An ice-cold wind swept the flakes into the trenches of the infantry force holding the beachhead, and the Red Army men were forced to dig themselves out frequently.

The storm over, the Soviets at last were able to launch their attack. The guns which had been brought across on the bridge opened up a barrage and tanks pushed forward through lanes which had been cleared in the German mine fields by the sappers.

Striking a weak spot in the Crimean defenses at the same time that other units of the Fourth Ukrainian Army were knocking at the main Perekop fortifications and the Independent Maritime Army was hitting out from its beachhead outside Kerch, the Sivash attack smashed through in two days. More than 1000 Germans were killed in the two days of fighting.

Instead of turning westward toward the rear of the Perekop lines, the Sivash force plunged southeast and took Dzhankoi, railway hub of the peninsula, in a quick capture that denied most of the Crimean rail lines to German use.

The northwest-southeast rail line running from Perekop to Feodosiya, and the northeast-southwest line running from Melitopol on the mainland to Sevastopol cross each other at Dzhankoi. Loss of the junction town deprived the Nazis of rail connections between the Perekop and Kerch fronts and cut both fronts off from rail communication with Sevastopol and other cities on the southern and western shores of the Crimea.

Moreover the Russian capture of the rail crossing threatened both eastern and northern fronts from the rear. The Germans hastily began to pull out of their prepared positions and race southward and westward toward the famous Black Sea port and naval base, hoping to stabilize a line in the mountains just north of Sevastopol.

But the Fourth Ukrainian Army, sweeping over the Perekop defenses, destroyed most of the units which had faced it and were then engaged in the hazardous military operation of suddenly abandoning strong positions and attempting a retreat with almost no prior notice.

The Kerch defenders began a retreat from their intrenchments, too, and like the Germans at Perekop, they were undoubtedly forced to this action by the threat to the rear as well as by the strong frontal attacks being made by the Maritime Army.

The Maritime Army, consisting in part, at least, of marines from the immobilized Black Sea fleet, struck at them savagely, as they made their way to Feodosiya, and thence onward to the west.

The Sivash column, after taking Dzhankoi, raced straight down the rail line toward Sevastopol, in an attempt to get there before the bulk of the Germans and Romanians from the two shattered fronts reached there and were able to set up defense lines about the port.

Meeting only slight resistance, the Sivash units swept over defenses which the Germans had prepared before the opening of the campaign, but which had not had time to man after the breakthrough. The Soviet forces plunged 46 miles in a single day, the sixth of the offensive, and on the seventh day they gained an additional 21 miles to reach a position only 26 miles from Sevastopol.

Meanwhile the Kerch drive had swept past Feodosiya, while to the west the Red Army forces which had swept over the Perekop fortifications captured Yevpatoriya in a pre-dawn attack. In the seven days of fighting, the Soviets had taken 20,000 prisoners.

It was only the eighth day of the offensive when the two sections of the Fourth Ukrainian Army and the Maritime Army joined forces at Bakhchisarai, 18 miles from Sevastopol, where less than a fourth of the Crimea's Axis defenders were withstanding their first day of siege.

Three weeks later the two Russian armies began a three-day all-out assault that carried them into the city to complete the reconquest of the 10,000 square miles of the Crimean peninsula.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

An important conference relating to the future of military studies in the United States took place at the Hotel Carlton, Washington, May 25, 1945. The conference was held under the auspices of the War Studies Committee of the Social Service Research Council and Professor Roy Nichols, of the University of Pennsylvania, acted as Chairman. Among the speakers were Major H. A. De Weerd, Associate Editor, *Infantry Journal*; Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, Commandant, Army Industrial College; Professor R. G. Albion, Princeton University; Professor Edward Mead Earle, Institute for Advanced Studies; Professor Troyer S. Anderson, G-2 Historical Branch; Professor Pendleton Herring, Harvard University.

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The scope of the Historical Records Section, originally established in the War Department Records Branch of The Adjutant General's Office for the concentration of ASF historical materials only, has now been extended. The enlarged mission, directed by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at the request of the Historical Branch, G-2, will provide for the eventual central custody of all historical materials prepared under the War Department historical program for World War II. Accordingly, ASF, AAF, and AGF historical representatives, including Lieutenant Colonel John D. Millett, Lieutenant Colonel Clanton W. Williams, and Major Bell I. Wiley, all members of the Institute, have met with Colonel Allen F. Clark, Jr., Chief of Historical Branch, G-2, for discussion of retirement policies, which are to be announced in a forthcoming War Department directive. Proposed examples of the type of papers to be preserved in this section (in addition to copies of every study or monograph prepared) include files assembled for research purposes, certain of the notes made in the course of historical investigation, preliminary drafts of historical studies, and criticisms or comments on such studies. The section, which has to date received a number of accessions, operate under the general direction of Major Hugh M. Flick, Chief of the War Department Records Branch, and the immediate supervision of Captain Thurman Wilkins.

To provide for the collecting, control, and preservation of combat paintings, photographs, and other trophies of historical interest acquired by the War Department during the present war, a Historical Properties Section has recently been established in the Office of the Army Headquarters Commandant in the Pentagon. The unit is directly supervised by Captain Herman W. Williams, Jr., CE, formerly Assistant Curator of Paintings at the Metropolitan Museum of Art; and its staff includes Lieutenants Rothermel, Taggart, Glefke, and Smith. To date the section has assembled a collection of some 1,800 drawings and paintings in which men on the spot have recorded first-hand impressions of the war. A Soviet decoration which General Zhadov, Commanding General of the Fifth Russian Guards Army, presented to General Hodges in Commemoration of the meeting of the Soviet and American forces at the Elbe River can be mentioned as an example of the type of trophy which the section has on display. All this material is available to publishers for reproduction, and to other government agencies or public institutions for loan exhibitions. For the duration of the war the collection will be exhibited in Washington unless it should be included in loan or travelling exhibitions in various other prominent cities throughout the country.

* * *

Dr. Luther H. Evans, Institute trustee, was appointed Librarian of Congress on June 29, 1945. Dr. Evans has played a leading part in the affairs of the Institute for the past five years and his appointment places in this key position in the world of scholarship an understanding and sympathetic student of military history and international affairs.

* * *

The Secretary announces that four new life members have been added to the rolls of the Institute. They are Colonel James B. Kaine of Chicago, Ill.; Lieutenant Charles J. West, Jr., now overseas; F. E. Burgess of Geneva, Ill., and Dr. Thew Wright of Tuscon, Ariz. Dr. Wright remarked in his application that in spite of good health he did not expect life membership to be of financial advantage to him in view of his 68 years of age. We trust that Dr. Wright has missed his guess by a wide margin.

Lieutenant Colonel Jesse S. Douglas of the Historical Branch, G-2, discussed the historical program in the Pacific at a meeting of the Institute in the Conference Room of the National Archives on Thursday evening, July 26. Colonel Douglas, a trustee of the Institute and formerly managing editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, recently returned from a five-month tour in the Pacific area.

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At a meeting of the Institute held in Washington on June 15, 1945, Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, Institute member and prominent political geographer, spoke on "Some Aspects of Geopolitics."

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On May 31, 1945, the Institute presented an evening of films relating to the war in the Pacific. Films shown were: "Action on Angaur," "Why We Are Here" (CBI Theater), and "C.O.D. Saipan."

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AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Major Ben Bruce Blakeney, AAF, is a specialist on the history of the Japanese military institutions.

Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D., is the author of the several articles on the selection of troops that have appeared in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

Major John North of the British Army is a frequent contributor to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

George Weller, war correspondent on the staff of Chicago *Daily News*, is once again in the Far East, on assignment to the China-Burma theater headquarters.

John Mason Potter is military analyst for the Boston *Globe*.

Brigadier General John Charteris is an engineer officer in the British Army.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Battle Report, Prepared from Official Sources by Commander Walter Karig, USNR, and Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Incorporated. 1944. Pp. 499. \$3.50.)

Battle Report is exactly what the title indicates. It is a blow by blow account of the naval engagements of the United States and Allied fleets against the Japanese Navy and its bases in the Pacific. It covers the approximate six months period from Pearl Harbor up to the battle of the Coral Sea. The authors specifically state that they have "avoided any discussion of strategy and tactics, any analysis or evaluation of battle plans, logistics or international diplomacy." Therefore, they would be the first to deny that they intended writing a definitive naval history of this portion of the war. Moreover, security requires continued silence on some of the factual data, although many details hitherto unknown are here made public.

A vivid description of the attack on the United States fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor is the opening chapter. The action that lasted one hour and fifty minutes crippled our Pacific fleet. And yet three battleships, that, according to the Japanese radio, had been "destroyed to pieces," sailed out of the harbor less than three weeks later. Shortly thereafter other battleships were afloat. This great naval tragedy is well told with eyewitness accounts of many participants. But it was only the beginning of the bad news. Disaster continued with the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse by Japanese planes three days after Pearl Harbor. The details of this report were made available from previously confidential Admiralty files.

The Japanese, during the period covered by this book, never relinquished the initiative which they employed with considerable skill. Their superior sea-air forces advanced along a number of lines towards the southeast and southwest. Their obvious intention was to strike at our line of communications to Australia, and to counteract this necessitated as early an offensive as possible.

During this period a number of minor engagements occurred, all of which are described graphically and with adequate maps to show the course of the action. On February 1, 1942 occurred the first offensive action of the United States Navy. It employed combined aerial and surface combat power against the Marshall and Gilbert Islands bases.

It paved the way for future naval activities destined to diminish Japanese naval forces to the vanishing point.

Among the other highlights of this book are details of the part played by the United States Navy in the Doolittle raid, and at least some fragmentary reports on the activities of our submarines.

This book is certainly not naval history for the professional student nor is it intended to be. It is, however, probably the closest approximation to naval history that the general public will care to get. Since it is highly readable, clearly presented, illustrated with unusually fine photographs and maps and well written, it tells the layman what the Navy has accomplished in this war. It records the slow arduous progress from the tragic initial defeats to the painfully slow regaining by the American Navy of the mastery of the Pacific.

Students of naval warfare will note that it is not a critical analysis nor does it concern itself with the relationship between national policy and naval policy. It is too early to reveal the strategic concepts that have covered the major moves in this area or to reveal all the facts of these naval engagements. It is too soon to estimate the consequences of a particular course of action. Nevertheless, for the general reader the book contributes to an understanding of the Pacific war.

DONALD ARMSTRONG,
Brigadier General, USA

When the French Were Here, by Stephen Bonsal. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1945. Pp. 263. \$2.75.)

Mr. Bonsal has been a distinguished newspaper correspondent and writer for many years and needs no introduction. This, his latest book, is a distinct contribution to the history of the War of the American Revolution describing a phase that has never before been adequately treated. M. Clemenceau gave the author complete access to the French archives and a diligent research of manuscripts in the Library of Congress was made by Mr. Bonsal. The author has produced a volume abounding in color as he made full use of contemporary correspondence, diaries and journals particularly those of French officers.

The French division was an elite body. William Channing said: "The French troops are a fine body of men and they appear well officered. Neither officers nor men are the effeminate beings we were hitherto taught to believe them. They are as large and as likely men as can be produced by any Nation." A similar remark was made by

Gen. Wayne in a letter from Williamsburg to Robert Morris: "The French troops are the finest and best made body of troops I ever beheld. The officers are gentlemen and I will be answerable for their discipline and cannot doubt their prowess."

The French infantry regiments were ancient and distinguished. The Royal Auvergne was organized by Henry IV; Boubonnais dated from 1600; Soissonais from 1598; Saintonge, 1684; Touraine, 1636. They wore white coats and long waistcoats, each regiment distinguished by the color of the coat lapel and collar bands—crimson, pink, sky blue, green and yellow. Grenadiers wore high hats with red plumes and chasseurs wore green. The artillery had long grey coats faced with red velvet. An American, astonished at this splendor, wrote in his diary that the French king was extravagant and reckless in exposing such rich garments to the hazard of the field. Lauzun's Legion composed of both horse and foot excited many comments especially the hussars. It was observed that every hussar wore a long moustache. This facial adornment was at the time required of all hussars. Baron de Marbot says in his well known memoirs that when as a youth in the French Revolution he joined the First Hussars, too young to have a moustache, a sergeant conducted him to a pot of blacking and painted a moustache on his upper lip.

Rochambeau arrived in Rhode Island with definite and explicit orders that were both wise and necessary. He was to serve directly under Washington. This eliminated Congress as France recognized that the soul of the revolution rested in the Commander in Chief. Likewise the King directed that his troops should not be disseminated but serve as one united body. Another wise provision was found in the direction that the French troops were to be classed as "auxiliaries" and as such would "yield the right" to the Americans. This settled for once and all matters of precedence considered so important in the 18th century. The right of the line was the first post of honor. Therefore when Rochambeau first joined Washington on the banks of the Hudson the French formed on the left as they also did at Yorktown.

When the French landed at New Port they called upon Washington for his plans; but Washington had no plans. The truth was, which he did not confess to Rochambeau, Washington had practically no troops, supplies or funds; the colonies had fallen into indolence and Congress was without authority. During this phase of waiting the author calls upon local historians and gives many interesting sidelights into the social activities of the French officers.

Then the question of attacking New York was carefully discussed but finally abandoned. Here sea power was as important an element as the British garrison of the city. The author always gives full weight to the influence of fleets on the land operation. Finally the united armies marched south, first threatening New York, then taking up their long march to Yorktown. The French contingent was about five thousand men and during their march they made forty-five camps. This march is well described. Accompanying the French was their field artillery, the modern guns developed by the French artillerist General Gribeauval — their field trial. The author gives a good account of the French operations in the Siege of Yorktown where much of the success was due to the French siege artillery.

The many quotations given from letters, journals and the like written by French officers describing Washington are illuminating. These educated professional soldiers saw the American general, talked with him and observed him in action. Their remarks were not for publication and had no other motive than the truth. Reading them we shall all agree that the Washington Monument, high though it be, is not high enough.

Mr. Bonsal gives attractive sketches of many of the French officers showing them not only as efficient soldiers but also as men possessed of a diversity of talent and much wordly experience; many were to assume important roles in great events, but, unfortunately, many also were to perish on the guillotine. There was Berthier, later Napoleon's Chief of Staff, Marshal and Prince; Montesquieu, grandson of the author; the three Counts Dillon; the Duke of Lauzun; Duportail, later Minister of War; Chastellux, world traveller and Academician; Dumas, distinguished soldier and writer under Napoleon; Abouville, famous soldier under Napoleon. In the French fleet was Bougainville, raconteur, traveller and discoverer whose name was given to the Pacific Island famous in the present war and also to the treeplant of the Tropics with its gorgeous flowers. He wrote on mathematics, served as a diplomat and was a member of the Royal Society. Saint Simon after the war became an apostle of a new form of society looking towards the betterment of man. Today in Moscow his name is cut upon a granite obelisk together with those of Marx, Engels, and Lasalle; yet this man was descended from the Duke of Saint Simon whose memoirs of the court of Louis XIV are so celebrated. Apparently French officers of this period developed a great variety of interests in many fields of thought and action which in no wise interfered with

their professional efficiency. Probably no other army of the time other than the French could make a similar showing.

On page 13 the author deviates somewhat from the main theme. Referring to Rochambeau's orders from the King of France he suggests that if Clemenceau had possessed a copy of these orders it would have been more difficult for General Pershing to sustain his controversy on the use of American troops. This statement of the author is not altogether clear. Both Rochambeau and Pershing had orders to preserve their own armies intact. The former was directed not to parcel out his command under any circumstances. Pershing in v. 2 of his *Memoirs* discusses this subject and even quotes a portion of the King's instructions to Rochambeau.

Mr. Bonsal's book is a splendid production.

JOHN W. WRIGHT,
Colonel, USA

Military Occupation and the Rule of Law, by Ernst Fraenkel. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. 267. \$3.50.)

Dr. Ernst Fraenkel, author of *The Dual State*, has presented a careful study of the occupational government of the Rhineland between 1918 and 1923. In his introduction to this excellent book, Dr. Fraenkel has wisely stated that "A study of the Rhineland occupation cannot provide answers directly applicable to the . . . occupation of Germany, for the problems that . . . arise are unique in character. The absence of a responsible government, the necessity to purge both German bureaucracy and the leading economic and social groups, the fact that Germany is . . . to be occupied, and not merely a small part of the country—these circumstances, and many others as well, are basically at variance with those that prevailed at the end of the last war." Dr. Fraenkel has raised the question of whether the rule of law controls, or should control, a government of military occupation. He defines the "rule of law" as the recognition of the fact that the custodians of military, political, and administrative power are bound by "those formal principles that are indispensable for the protection of the individual from arbitrary interference with his personal integrity." This does not mean that firmness nor even severity need be absent, but rather that there should be no "discrepancy between the proclaimed principles and their application."

The main concern of this book is whether a principle, which is primarily one of constitutional law, is applicable to foreign governments

of occupation exercising their power by virtue of international law. Does a democratic power, whose rule of law is derived from the consent of the governed, insisting upon nothing less than unconditional surrender, and fighting for the preservation of democratic principles, find itself obliged to observe the rule of law in its relations with a vanquished nation that has so enthusiastically repudiated such a notion? There can be no precise answer to this difficult question. Nevertheless, the author maintains that occupying powers, although enjoying the privileges of extraterritoriality, have the duty to observe the rule of law during the period of military occupation and the period during which the organization and structure of total war is being painfully liquidated.

The author has treated a great mass of conflicting evidence with rare skill and objectivity. His method has been analytical and descriptive in the discussions of both the armistice and the peace periods of the occupation of the Rhineland. The decisions of the military, civil, criminal, and administrative courts of the several occupying powers are discussed with equal frankness and candor. Excellent expositions have been made of the institutions of the occupying powers and of the relations of these powers with the governmental institutions of the occupied country. Much light is thrown upon such matters as the prosecution of war criminals, the administration of justice, the administration of public utilities, and the handling of labor problems within the Rhineland between 1918 and 1923.

The conclusions of the writer will be of interest to many readers. The Rhineland Agreement was the product of the democratic optimism of the last war, and the belief that political and economic *laissez-faire* was not only the best but the only guarantee of both internal and international peace. The occupying powers neglected to construct or to set in motion machinery for the liquidation of "total war." Dr. Fraenkel asserts that, occupation "under the rule of law must be based upon a philosophy that is reconcilable with the political tradition of the occupied country." Since Germany has been continuously in a state of seige (*Ausnahmezustand*) since February 28, 1933, allied martial law will not constitute a break with the past. The martial law of the occupying powers is merely substituted for the martial law of the Third Reich. The way in which Germany has gone down to defeat has brought about a condition of affairs that has no historical precedent; there is and for a time there can be no government in Germany that can be judged by normal standards. Nevertheless, every effort should

be made to expand the operation of the rule of law and the development of free institutions. An apparatus must be established that can deal effectively with the bureaucratic machinery of a totalitarian state in the process of dissolution. Clearly defined rules of jurisdiction, procedure, and substantive law must be applied. Such institutions as the Gestapo, concentration camps, and the stormtroops must be abolished. The activities of party and state agencies which existed outside the law or were exclusively dependent upon the existence of German martial law must be terminated. Within the vacuum thus created, the forces of Germany must be given an opportunity to work for the reconstruction of democracy. This presupposes the granting of civil liberties and the honoring of guarantees "that the bearers of public power will not interfere arbitrarily with the rebuilding of religious, local, and professional bodies" in the occupied country. The establishment of civil liberties and the protection of all those attempting to overcome the ghastly heritage of Nazi dictatorship may prove to be a benefaction for both the victors and the vanquished.

This book can be recommended to those interested in civil liberties, in international law, and in public administration. Although the author has attempted to provide no practical solutions for the urgent political problems confronting the occupying powers, he has done much to assist us in grasping the significance of their task.

ELLIOTT CASSIDY,
War Department.

The Real Soviet Russia, by David J. Dallin; translated by Joseph Shaplen. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 260 pages. \$3.50.)

This volume is the third in a series of recent volumes on Soviet Russia by the same author. The first work¹ appeared in 1942, and was an objective, informative and well documented contribution to current thought in the field of international relations. The second book,² published the following year, projected Soviet diplomacy into the post-war years.

The present volume is not concerned directly with foreign relations but with the socio-political foundations of the Soviet regime, out of which grow the complex tentacles of foreign policy. The author sagely states this relationship in the Preface:

"In Russia, foreign and internal policies are more closely allied than in any other country. Only by studying the general concepts dominat-

¹*Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-42.*

²*Russia and Post-War Europe.*

ing Soviet activity at home, the established social relations, the direction of internal political development, is it possible to comprehend and to foresee the evolution of Soviet foreign policy and to avoid the naive and dangerous mistakes so frequent during the past decade."

Very early in the book, therefore, the author presents analyses of several of the more important theoretical concepts of the Soviet regime, pointing out where these concepts were modified or reversed as the nation grew in size and power. The discussion is undeniably of historic interest, but it is hardly necessary these days to prove that Stalin has not always agreed with Lenin (or even with himself). And certainly such inconsistencies should not be made the basis of an attack on the moral principles of the nation, which attack Dallin makes.

As a matter of fact, the book itself possesses many inconsistencies. For example, on page 42 and again on page 182, the author states emphatically that the invading Germans did not destroy the collective farms in the occupied regions, while a footnote on page 181 informs us that a number of such farms were divided into private holdings. The "inconsistency" in this case, however, is aggravated when the author declares it was more productive and easier to administer in large units (page 182) and yet spends an entire chapter (Chapter X) "proving" that the collective farm system is inherently unwieldy, top-heavy with administrators, and so unpopular with the peasants that many of them refuse to work at all.

There is also a strange use of the case of General Vlasov, who became a German prisoner in 1941 and two years later established the "Russian Army of Liberation" which fought side by side with the Wehrmacht. Mr. Dallin quotes other authors who had been impressed with Vlasov's "former devotion to Stalin," and then attempts to prove that the Soviet system has failed to prevent the existence of traitors. What Government ever has? Among all the general officers of the Red Army, Vlasov's case is almost unique in this war; when one considers the number of German generals in the German Officers Committee (Moscow), the Red Army record for devotion is high indeed.

Mr. Dallin frequently omits one set of salient facts in order to throw the spotlight on another set. For example, on page 246, Dallin declares that the Soviet Union in 1939 could have chosen France, Britain, and the United States as allies instead of concluding a pact with Germany. He does not add, however, that between 1934 and 1939 Russia offered to conclude neutrality and non-aggression pacts

with *all* nations, that she did conclude a mutual assistance pact with France in May 1935 which the Laval Government failed to renew in 1937, and that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was not signed in 1939 until it appeared that all hope had been abandoned for a similar pact with Great Britain.

A second example of the author's concentration on one aspect of a large question is provided in Chapter XIII—The Red Army and the N.K.V.D. In a book purporting to give "the essential facts concerning the character of the Soviet regime" (Preface), one could surely expect to find material relating to the organization, training, general strategy, and chief victories of the Red Army. Instead, Dallin describes *only* the tie-up between the Red Army and the N.K.V.D., devoting a mere *two pages* to the organization which liberated half of Europe from the Germans.

There is much which is worthwhile in the volume but the book's contributions do not balance against its drawbacks. The chapter on Forced Labor and the chapter on the Communist Party are fairly good, although other books have given better descriptions of both subjects. There is also interesting material on the various social and economic classes in Russia, although here again the author tries so hard to prove his point that his conclusions cannot always be trusted. In short, that is the fault of the entire work: the author's failure to provide specific references for his statements and his general unreliability make his book a considerable travesty on scholarship.

D. COOPER GRANT,
Washington, D. C.

Betio Beachhead: U. S. Marines' Own Story of the Battle for Tarawa, by Captain Earl J. Wilson, Master Technical Sergeants Jim G. Lucas and Samuel Schaffer and Staff Sergeant C. Peter Zurlinden. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. Pp. 160. \$2.50.)

In order that the American public might have a popularly written account of the Tarawa operation, General Holcomb asked four Marines who took part in the engagement to write the present volume. He did so because in his opinion the Tarawa operation was one of the most spectacular in the history of the Marine Corps and provided many important lessons for future amphibious operations in the Pacific.

We have already had one notable book on Tarawa by the correspondent Robert Sherrod. *Betio Beachhead* presents a panoramic

view of the operation from the fighter's point of view and accompanies the text with a superb collection of photographs. In fact the photographs present a more convincing story of the battle than the text. Perhaps this is because Tarawa was essentially a soldier's battle of confusion. Only here and there does the reader gain any impression that the operation was a controlled one. Individual Marines stand out as the heroes of the costly fighting. Their tenacity and valor made the conquest of Tarawa possible.

General Vandegrift states in a summary at the end of the book that subsequent amphibious operations in the Pacific have differed from Tarawa only in a "quantitative" sense. Yet the reviewer could not resist comparing the outlines of the Tarawa operation as here presented with accounts of other operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific. Rightly or wrongly one feels that they have also differed in a "qualitative" sense. The reader is strongly impressed by the crowding together of Marines in nearly all the pictures shown in the book. While admiring their courage and *sang froid* even a civilian could barely resist shouting to these troops to disperse—if there was room for them to do so. One can almost hear the old Marine gripe: "There must be a harder way to do this" arising from the lips of the tired and gallant men who fought on Tarawa.

In reading about the brilliant if costly exploits of the Marines one is torn between admiration for their courage and concern as to whether or not the same ends might have been attained at less cost by other method or means.

Certainly the Marines have been called upon to carry out some of the toughest assignments in the Pacific war. At Tarawa, time was of the essence, and the more leisurely methods and ample artillery preparations favored by Army leaders could not be employed. The marines will tell you that their kind of savage, relentless, close-in battle is less costly in the long run and has a far greater effect on Japanese morale. It is a question of whether or not the full use in being made of America's overall superiority in technical advances and industrial output in fighting the Japanese on a man-to-man basis.

We need more information than is available at present to answer this question. Until we get it—books like *Berio Beachhead* will have to be our guides.

BERTRAND DU GUESCLIN
Washington, D. C.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1943-44, edited by Francis E. McMurtie. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1945. Pp. 582. \$19.00.)

The most recent of the series (corrected to July 1944) and probably more quickly obsolete than any previous issue. Wartime censorship, incomplete distribution of the Italian Navy, and subsequent events—the elimination of the German and near total destruction of the Japanese Fleets—have severely dated this edition. Allowance must also be made for the frequent alteration, repairs and reconstruction of ships which thus took on altered characteristics in silhouette, speed, etc. These, however, are unavoidable variations; the display of naval power and the secrets of war, however late, remain an invaluable index to the strength and intentions of nations as reflected in *Jane's* illustrations of their naval craft.

Points of especial interest in all navies are:

1. US. The five ships of the *Montana* class, projected and building, apparently the last BB installment. Dimensions given as 58,000 tons (65,000 fully loaded), 903x120 ft.; no disclosures on armament or designed speed. Width to length ratio indicates a very slim, fast ship.
2. US. The five ships of the *Iowa* class, 45,000 tons (52,000 fully loaded), 860x108 ft., nine 16" guns and heavy AA.
3. US. *Alabama* (*Indiana* class) built in the record time of 23¼ years from date of laying keel. This contrasts with the four years and better usually required for BB construction.
4. US. The *North Carolina* (*Washington* class) reported 35% welded, bulb-nose cutwater, and new type 16" guns. These new features undoubtedly carried over into the *Indians*, *Iowas*, and *Montanas*.
5. US. Bulb-nose incorporated in all new naval craft of fleet importance (BB, CA, CL, CV, depot ships, etc.). Edge in speed is felt in the *Washington* class at 28 knots and over, and in CA and CL at 29 knots and over.
6. US. Reported construction of six battle cruisers, as of 1943, named after territories; dimensions ca. 27,000 tons; armament of six 14" guns.
7. US. Three CV of special design (*FDR* and *Midway* mentioned). Dimensions: 45,000 tons, high degree of subdivided compartments, and capacity load of exceptionally heavy bombers.
8. GrBr. *Duke of York* turret arrangement: four 14" guns in each of lower turrets on which are superimposed turrets of two 14" guns.

9. GrBr. Over 40,000 tons displacement in the *Lion* class of four battleships.

10. GrBr. especially. Removal of catapults and aircraft from the majority of capital ships and cruisers.

11. Resurrection of French and disappearance of Italian naval power. The heavily armored French battleships and cruisers, as well as lighter craft, are all of original design, exhibiting lines of power and extreme grace; beautifully balanced masses.

12. The addition of the *Yamato* and *Musashi*, 45,000 tonners to the Japanese Navy, the *Yamato* sunk since.

13. A US Navy official photo of the Japanese aircraft carrier *Syokaku*, with bombs bursting fore and aft.

14. The addition of certain British and US units to the Soviet Navy, probably compensation in the division of the Italian Fleet. Also the round of old battleships of the USSR.

15. The Scandinavian ships, few and small, but mounting extraordinarily heavy guns for their tonnage. Obviously coast-defense only.

16. The Argentine Fleet: two battleships of 31,000 tons, 12" guns, vintage of 1911 with refits 1924-5; three cruisers mounting 6" and 7.5" guns; three small submarines. Small and old as this aggregation is, it is still the most powerful Latin American navy.

17. The Brazilian Fleet: two small battleships of 19,200 tons, 12" guns; three small and one medium sized submarines.

18. The Chilean Fleet: One battleship of 28,000 tons (32,000 fully loaded), 14" guns, completed 1915; two 8" and one 6" gunned cruisers (1897 and 1902); and 9 old, small submarines.

A summation of naval power cannot be made until some subsequent issue when the postwar naval policies of the Powers will be announced. At the moment of writing, naval trends show the US with naval supremacy, not merely superiority; Britain a good second, France third and the USSR fourth.

HYMAN ROUDMAN,
War Department

Brassey's Naval Annual, 1944, edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 416. \$5.00.)

In the fifty-fifth year of its publication, there is surely no need to praise anew the outstanding merits of *Brassey's Naval Annual*. For the record it may be said that the issue of 1944, edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield, is of outstanding quality. The *Annual* contains

a survey and chronicle of naval events in 1943, a technical reference section about navies and warships, and a number of topical articles dealing with technical naval questions. The reliable and detailed Naval Chronicle will be read with great interest and will be profitably consulted as source material. The Reference Section is as complete as it "is possible in the conditions obtaining in time of war," hence it contains a number of unavoidable inaccuracies. For example, two German 40,000-ton battleships, one 25,000-ton carrier and four cruisers are listed as building, while the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* and the heavy cruiser *Seydlitz* are listed as completed. The tabulated number of Japanese battleships also seems to be rather on the high side. The perusal of the statistical section reveals, however, the great progress which has been made in the war against our enemies, as an astonishing number of enemy warships, still in commission some 18 months ago, have in the meantime been destroyed.

A considerable part of the topical section is devoted to problems of naval air power. Major Oliver Stewart contributes an illuminating chapter on "The Air War at Sea" in which he exposes some of the popular fallacies about the alleged weaknesses of carrier-based aviation, as contrasted to land-based planes. His conclusion is that "the facts of the sea-air war point to the need for the use of both the land-based machines and the ship-based machines working in concert. . . . The land-based landplane is not self-sufficient. It must be supported by the ship-based aircraft." This argument is continued by Owen Rutter in a skilful description of "The Fleet Air Arm."

The future of sea and air transport and the interdependence of both means of transportation are discussed by Sir Archibald Hurd. Sir Archibald explains in some detail the position of the British shipping industry and its plea "that the ship and the aeroplane be regarded as complementary agents for the transports of passengers and goods" and that, therefore, British shipping companies should actively participate in the development of British air transport. A similar plea was later entered by British railroad companies. Recently these ideas have been incorporated by the British Ministry for Civil Aviation in a White Paper about the reorganization of British commercial flying. They are subject to a very heated discussion in Britain. This paper is one of the earliest formulations of these ideas, which may sound strange to American readers.

Among the chapters dealing with the more strictly naval aspects of modern war, there is a very useful contribution by Mr. A. J. Mc-

Whinnie on "The Development of Landing Craft." His chapter begins with the following words: "While landing craft are as old as marine history—the Romans used galleys to run aground on the beaches of Southern England and the Vikings beached their long-ships when they came harrying the coasts of England and Scotland—the creation of modern landing craft started in the 1914-18 war. Britain was the pioneer. Among the various landing craft designed for that war there was the famous *River Clyde*, specially adapted for landing on the beaches of Gallipoli." The author also suggests that "one of America's greatest contributions to the Allied war effort has been the big-scale production of 'ducks'—the last word in amphibious warfare."

Special attention is invited to Commander Pursey's review of the U-boat war in 1943. In retrospect, 1943 was the decisive period in the crucial battle of the Atlantic. In another chapter, Admiral Sir William James discusses the human factor in the modern mechanized war at sea, and rightly emphasizes that "it is still the man who counts for everything."

Dr. Herbert Rosinski writes an analysis of the role of sea power in the present war. The author, an expert in the history of naval strategy, shows that "the stature of sea power has been enhanced through the expansion of the war to global dimensions. . . . Indeed, sea power has only now truly come into its own," because "it is only on such a global scale that sea power can reap the full benefit of its peculiar assets—its ability to isolate its opponents and support its allies; to impose disproportionate and often disastrous effort upon its enemies by the mere threat of its ubiquitous striking power; and in its turn concentrate overwhelmingly superior forces against the isolated fraction of its opponents."

The well-known book by Bernard Brodie *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* is generously and favorably reviewed in a special chapter by Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. In the preface, the Editor himself comments that Brodie's volume "has done much to present a balanced view of some of the new theories of which there has been such a plentiful crop in the last few years." In view of the fact that *Brassey's* rarely printed book reviews, especially as full-length chapters, Captain Grenfell's is a handsome tribute to American naval writing in general, and to Dr. Brodie in particular.

People interested in the public relations side of naval warfare will enjoy Gordon Holman's "The Press and the Navy." The *Annual* also contains an excellent Pictorial Section with profiles and plans of

warships. All in all, the American reader who is naturally more familiar with naval developments in the Pacific will find much valuable material about experiences gained from the war in European waters. This last issue of *Brassey's*, as all the previous ones, is warmly recommended to all those who are interested in the facts, and not in the fancies, of naval warfare.

STEFAN T. POSSONY,
Washington, D. C.

Written in Sand, by Josephine Young Case. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1945. Pp. 161. \$2.00.)

This gripping little novelette of adventure is part of the belated glory due an heroic American, William Eaton, the measure of whose greatness was tested in an amazing prodigy of bravery and balanced wisdom in the Tripolitan war. Eaton's plan was to cooperate with the lawful Pashaw of Tripoli in unseating the usurper Yusuf; thereby gaining, for the United States, peace, repayment of expenses of the expedition, return of 300 Americans imprisoned from the destroyed naval vessel *Philadelphia*.

The story gives a close-up of Eaton's experiences with his eight marines and his motley army of left-overs from Napoleon's troops, Greek mercenaries, and almost hostile Arabs. This historical novelette tells how near the Americans came to death by battle, by treachery, and by starvation; and how, in spite of ridiculously inadequate supplies, they would have won—except for lack of vision of higher officials.

Not the least of the merit of the book is the weaving into the North African glare the hero's thoughts of contrasted America.

LUCILE H. PENDELL,
National Archives

NOTES

The American edition of the thirty-third *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, edited by Leonard Bridgeman (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 337. \$19.00), contains its usual sections on Civil and Service Aviation, Aeroplanes and Aero-engines to August 1944. A short article by J. M. Spaight on the "Waning of German Air Power," and the resume of the war in the air under Great Britain and the United States are of particular interest in this volume, which maintains its usual high standard of excellence.

Fighters Up, by Eric Friedheim and Samuel W. Taylor (Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith Company. 1945. Pp. 275. \$2.50) is the well edited story of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces Fighter Commands operating in the European theater, beginning with the establishment of bases in England through January 1945.

Osmar White, New Zealand war correspondent, has written an unusual narrative and analysis of operations in the South East Pacific Area as seen "from the inside looking out" in *Green Armor*. (New York: W. W. Norton Company. 1945. Pp. 288. \$3.00.)

The Generals and The Admirals containing thirty portraits by T. H. Chamberlain, with short biographical sketches by the editors of *Newsweek*, is a volume of considerable artistic interest and has permanent value as a ready reference work of noted leaders of this war. (New York: The Devin-Adair Company. 1945. Pp. 64. \$4.50.)

Two volumes of particular interest to veterans are, first, *Psychology for the Returning Serviceman*. (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 243. \$0.25.) A Penguin Book prepared by a committee of the National Research Council which emphasizes the best ways to become adjusted to the social life of the community; *The Serviceman's Guide to the Future*, by Bern Williams (New York: D and M Book Company. 1945. Pp. 64. \$0.25) which presents a survey of the economic opportunities, privileges and benefits available to the returning veterans.

Frank Kingdon has written a thought provoking account of *An Uncommon Man, Henry Wallace and 60 Million Jobs* (New York: The Readers Press. 1945. Pp. 200. \$2.00) and Wallace's position on permanent full employment for all Americans.

Two Hundred Thousand Flyers, by Williard Weiner (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 196. \$2.75), tells the story of the civilian-AAF Pilot Training Program from its humble beginnings in 1939 through its extraordinary achievements in providing the trained flyers for the Army. The military history of the present war would have been far different without this unusually effective program.

The Tiger Kills tells the story of the 4th, 5th and 10th Indian Divisions with the Eighth Army in North Africa from June 1941 until the victory in Tunisia. Written by two officers of the Indian Army from war diaries, official records and personal experiences of participants, a stimulating narrative has resulted. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1945. Pp. 195. 2 shillings, 60c.) Another excellent history is that of *The Air Battle of Malta* containing the official account of the R.A.F. in Malta, June 1940 to November 1942. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1944. Pp. 95. 1 shilling, 30c.)

Tell Sparta by A. C. Sedgewick is a novel about American war correspondents in the period from 1939 through 1942. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1945. Pp. 342. \$2.50.)

The World at War 1939-1944, prepared by the War Department (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 416. \$0.25.), is an excellent brief history of the origins, military operations and related events of World War II.

Two further publications of interest are *The Royal Netherlands Navy* (New York: The Netherlands Information Bureau. 1945. Pp. 31. Free) and *Atlantic Bridge*, the official account of R.A.F. Transport Command's Ocean Ferry. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1945. Pp. 75. Free.)

RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Post War Developments

Take Your Place at the Peace Table, by Edward L. Bernays (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1945. Pp. 68. \$1.00.)

Full Employment in a Free Society, by Sir William H. Beveridge. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1945. Pp. 429. \$3.75.)

The Economics of Peace, by Kenneth E. Boulding. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1945. Pp. 300. \$3.75.)

What to Do with Japan?, by Williard Fleisher. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 178. \$2.00.)

Legal Claims Against Germany, by Siegfried Goldschmidt. (New York: The Dryden Press. 1945. Pp. 221. \$3.00.)

Crossroads of Two Continents; A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe, by Feliks Gross. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1945. Pp. 170. \$2.00.)

Europe Free and United, by Albert L. Guerard. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1945. Pp. 217. \$2.50.)

International Tribunals; Past and Future, by Manley O. Hudson. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute. 1945. Pp. 287. \$2.50.)

Plan for Reconstruction, by William H. Hutt. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 336. \$4.50.)

Asia on the Move, by Bruno Lasker. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)

Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1945. Pp. 214. \$2.00.)

Problems of the Post War World, by Thomas C. T. McCormick, Editor. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 534. \$3.75.)

- Germany, Russia and the Future*, by John T. MacCurdy. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 148. \$1.25.)
- The Future of Europe*, by Johannes Steel. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 256. \$3.00.)
- Postwar Jobs for Veterans*, by Paul Webbink, Editor. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1945. Pp. 239. \$2.50.)

Contemporary Scene

- Report from Red China*, by Harrison Forman. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 254. \$3.00.)
- America's Role in the World Economy*, by Alvin H. Hansen. (New York: W. W. Norton Company. 1945. Pp. 197. \$2.50.)
- Tourist Under Fire*, by Thomas E. Healy. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 311. \$3.00.)
- Europe Now*, by H. V. Kaltenborn. (New York: Didier. 1945. Pp. 199. \$2.50.)
- Germany: Economic and Labour Conditions Under Facism*, by Jurgen Kuezynski. (New York: International Publishers. 1945. Pp. 234. \$2.50.)
- China Among the Powers*, by David N. Rowe. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. 1945. Pp. 215. \$2.00.)
- Civil Life in Wartime Germany*, by Max Seydewitz. (New York: The Viking Press. 1945. Pp. 456. \$3.50.)
- No Traveller Returns*, by Henry Shoskes. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 280. \$2.50.)
- Russia Is No Riddle*, by Edmund Stevens. (New York: Greenberg Publisher. 1945. Pp. 317. \$3.00.)
- Through Japanese Eyes*, by Otto D. Tolischus. (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 182. \$2.00.)
- China, After Seven Years of War*, by Hollington K. Tong, Editor. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 246. \$2.00.)
- Japan; A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography*, by Glenn T. Trewartha. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1945. Pp. 607. \$5.00.)
- A Rising Wind*, by Walter F. White. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 155. \$2.00.)
- Collection of International War Damage Claims*, by Rine A. Wormser. (New York: Alexander Publishing Company, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 426. \$7.50.)

NATIONAL WARFARE

- One America*, by Frances J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1945. Pp. 733. \$5.00.)
- Belgium*, by Johannes A. Goris. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1945. Pp. 498. \$5.00.)
- At His Side*, by George G. Korson. (New York: Coward-McCann. 1945. Pp. 336. \$2.75.)
- Double Ten; Captain O'Bannon's Story of the Chinese Revolution*, by Carl Glick. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 281. \$2.50.)

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

World War II

- Guadalcanal Round Trip*, by Alfred S. Campbell. (Lambertville, New Jersey: Author, Sevenoaks Farm. 1945. Pp. 112. \$2.00.)
- Robinson Crusoe, USN*, by Thomas B. Clark. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 275. \$2.75.)
- Guns for Tito*, by Mapor L. Huot. (New York: L. B. Fischer Company. 1945. Pp. 273. \$2.75.)

- The Far Shore*, by Lieut. Commander Max Miller. (New York: Whittlesley House-McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 173. \$2.50.)
- I Dream of the Day*, by Caleb Milne. (Woodstock, New York: Stonecrop Shop. 1945. Pp. 122. \$1.50.)
- Mob Three*, by Captain Robert P. Parsons. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 248. \$3.50.)
- The Shaping of Psychiatry by War*, by John R. Rees. (New York: W. W. Norton Company. 1945. Pp. 158. \$2.50.)
- Wingate's Raiders*, by Charles J. Rolo. (New York: The Viking Press. 1945. Pp. 278. \$2.50.)
- Jewish Youth at War*, by Isaac E. Ronteh. (New York: Marstin Press. 1945. Pp. 304. \$3.00.)
- Leyte Calling*, by Lt. Joseph F. St. John. (New York: The Vanguard Press. 1945. Pp. 220. \$2.00.)
- American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, by Ira Wolfert. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1945. Pp. 311. \$2.75.)
- The Best from Yank*. (New York: E. P. Dutton Company. 1945. Pp. 319. \$3.50.)

SEA WARFARE

- Carrier War*, by Lt. Oliver Jensen. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1945. Pp. 172. \$2.50.)
- Secret Mission Submarine*, by Lt. N. L. A. Jewell. (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 1945. Pp. 159. \$2.00.)

AIR WARFARE

- Air News Yearbook V2*, by Philip Andrews, Editor. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1945. Pp. 296. \$4.75.)
- Aircraft Armament*, by Louis Bruchiss. (New York: Aerosphere, Incorporated. Pp. 224. \$6.00.)

NATIONAL FORCES

- Famous American Naval Officers*, by Charles L. Lewis. (Boston: L. C. Page Company. 1945. Pp. 425. \$2.75.)
- Rochester in the Civil War*, by Blake McKelvey, Editor. (Rochester: Rochester Historical Society. 1945. Pp. 280. \$4.00.)
- The Diary of a Public Man*. (Chicago: Abraham Lincoln Book Shop. 1945. Pp. 128. \$10.00.)
- Allenby in Egypt*, by General Archibald Wavell. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 174. \$2.50.)
- British Battlefields*, by C. V. Wedgewood. (New York: Hastings House. 1945. Pp. 48. \$1.25.)

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- George Biddle's War Drawings*, by George Biddle. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1945. Pp. 78. \$3.00.)
- Arab Archery*, by Nahib A. Faris and Robert P. Elmer, Editors. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. Pp. 193. \$3.00.)
- Principio to Wheeling, 1715-1945*, by Earl C. May. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1945. Pp. 349. \$3.00.)
- The Pacific Islands Handbook 1944*, by Robert W. Robson. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 383. \$4.00.)
- Fighting Words*, by Lewis Warfield. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company. 1945. Pp. 330. \$3.00.)

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- "Puissance et Diplomatie," by Jules Roy, in *La France Libre*, March 15, 1945, pp. 315-8.
- "Some Lessons of the European Warfare," by B. H. Liddell Hart, in *Yale Review*, Spring 1945, pp. 405-26.
- "American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East 1850-1914," by Seward W. Livermore, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, March 1945, pp. 113-35.
- "The Poles and Eastern Germany," by Felix E. Hirsch, in *Current History*, April 1945, pp. 294-8.
- "Krushenie Nemetskikh Planov na Krainem Severye," by E. Ermashev, in *Krasnii Flot*, December 7, 1944, p. 3.
- "Krai Zemli Povest," by A. Piesmenii, in *Novii Mir*, November-December 1942, pp. 114-48.
- "Russia and the West," by J. Middleton Murry, in *Fortnightly*, April 1945, pp. 213-8.
- "Anglo-Russian-American Cooperation—Key to World Peace," by G. A. Stolychoff, in *World Affairs*, March 1945, pp. 19-23.
- "What the American People Think of Russia," by Warren B. Walsh, in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1944-45, pp. 513-22.
- "The Liberation of Yugoslavia," by F. A. Voight, in *The Nineteenth Century*, April 1945, pp. 145-51.
- "Last Time" [World War I], by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1945, pp. 349-77.
- "The Junkers," by Dr. R. Pascal, in *The Contemporary Review*, April 1945, pp. 197-201.
- "The Punishing of Germany After the War of 1914-18," by Dr. C. J. Cadoux, in *The American Mercury*, May 1945, pp. 536-47.
- "The Army Reports on Prisoners of War," by Major General Archer L. Lerch, in *The Hibbert Journal*, January 1945, pp. 107-13.
- "German Prisoners of War," by Sidney B. Fay, in *Current History*, March 1945, pp. 193-9.
- "Corridors into Germany," by Griffith Taylor, in *The Scientific Monthly*, May 1945, pp. 353-7.
- "Increase of Zaibatsu Predominance in Wartime Japan," by T. A. Bisson, in *Pacific Affairs*, March 1945, pp. 55-61.
- "The Lesson of the Italian Purge," by Count Carlo Sforza, in *Free World*, May 1945, pp. 74-6.
- "Italy Pleads to be an Ally," by Benedette Croce, in *Free World*, April 1945, pp. 57-61.
- "The Aluminum Monopoly and the War," by Charlotte Muller, in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1945, pp. 14-43.
- "Small Farmers and Peasants of Europe before and after the War," by Sir E. John Russell, in *Geographical Review*, January 1945, pp. 1-11.
- Round Table* (Br.) all issues.
- The War Illustrated*, Sir John Hammerton, editor, all issues.

THE UNITED NATIONS

- "Towards a Democratic Theory," by Herman Finer, in *The American Political Science Review*, April 1945, pp. 249-68.
- "The Human Side of Demobilization," by Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1945, pp. 1-8.

- "The First Reconstruction Measures in Liberated Belgium," by Raoul Miry, in *International Labour Review*, April 1945, pp. 419-32.
- "Political Impasse in China," entire issue, *Amerasia*, April 1945.
- "Beginnings of an Australian Pacific Policy," by Donald C. Gordon, in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1945, pp. 791-89.
- "Reconciliation in India," by Chakpavarti Rajagopalacharia, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1945, pp. 422-34.
- "Stalinskaia Konstitutsia—samia demokratičeskaia konstitutsia v Mirye," by N. Richkov, in *Voennoe Obuchenie*, December 7, 1944, p. 2.
- "Mobilizatsia sil profsoyuzov na Skoraishii razгром Gitlerovskoi Germanii," by V. Kuznetsov, in *Voina i Rabochii Klass*, January 15, 1945, pp. 1-4.
- "Britain's Immense Shipbuilding Program," Admiralty Report, in *Marine News*, April 1945, pp. 90-106.
- "Shipping in the Immediate Postwar Years," by William Diebold, Jr., in *The Journal of Political Economy*, March 1945, pp. 15-36.
- "World Agricultural Policies and the Expansion of Trade," by Robert B. Schwenger, in *Journal of Farm Economics*, February 1945, pp. 67-87.
- "High Finance for the People," editorial in *American Affairs*, Spring 1945, pp. 62-3.
- "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," by Ray Allen Billington, in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1945, pp. 44-64.
- "The Agreements of Bretton Woods," by Ernest H. Stern, in *Economica*, November 1944, pp. 165-79.
- "The Foreign Relations Committee," by the editors of *Fortune*, May 1945, pp. 152-6, 206-21.
- "American Prosperity and the British Balance-of-Payments Problem," by Randall Hinshaw, in *The Review of Economic Statistics*, February 1945, pp. 1-9.
- "Expenditure Controls in the United States Government," by E. L. Kohler, in *The Accounting Review*, January 1945, pp. 31-44.
- "An Analysis of Absenteeism in One War Plant," by Neal G. Schenet, in *Journal of Applied Psychology*, February 1945, pp. 27-39.
- "The Army Takes Over," by John Fischer, in *Harper's*, May 1945, pp. 481-91.
- "Wartime Lessons in Wage Administration," by C. Canby Balderston, in *Advanced Management*, January-March 1945, pp. 23-30.
- "What Management Should Know About Teamwork," by Stuart Chase, in *Factory Management and Maintenance*, April 1945, pp. 101-3.
- "Steel: Report on the War Years," feature in *Fortune*, May 1945, pp. 120-5, 241-52.
- "Kaiser Builds at Fontana," by T. J. Ess, in *Iron and Steel Engineer*, April 1945, pp. 22-42.
- "Perspectivas de la Evolucion de la America Latina," feature in *Guia de Importadores de Industrias Americanas*, January 1945, pp. 62-3, 132, 140.

LAND AND AIR WARFARE

The Service journals continue to be uniformly excellent sources of information on all aspects of the war. No attempt has been made to list titles separately. The following should be given thorough reading:

Command and General Staff Military Review, Field Artillery Journal, Infantry Journal, Cavalry Journal, Coast Artillery Journal, Army Ordnance, Firepower (Ordnance), Air Force, Aircraft Recognition, Chemical Warfare Bulletin, Military Engineer, Quartermaster Review, (British) Army Quarterly, Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, Royal Air Force Quarterly, Journal of the Royal Artillery, Intelligence Bulletin, Yank, Stars and Stripes, The Royal Engineers Journal, The Fighting Forces (British).

In addition, certain publications serving the paramount public interest in aviation are good for complete reading in all issues: *Skyways*, *Air Tech*, *Air News*, *Plane Talk*, and *The Aeroplane* (Br.).

"Second Report of the Commanding General, AAF, to the Secretary of War," February 27, 1945.

"D-Day in Casablanca," by Philip H. Bagby, in *The American Foreign Service Journal*, March 1945, pp. 16-9, 41-8.

"V Italii," by K. Semenov, in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 12, 1944, p. 3.

"Heavy's Army," by Robert Shaplan, in *Yale Review*, Spring 1945, pp. 429-43.

"Analysis of V-2 Performance," by Captain Aldo Viera da Rosa, in *Aero Digest*, May 1, 1945, pp. 98-100, 145-50.

"Iwo Jima Before H-Hour," by John P. Marquand, in *Harper's*, May 1945, pp. 492-9.

"Iwo Jima and the Bombing of Japan," by Jim Douglas, in *Boeing Magazine*, March 1945, pp. 3, 16.

"Istoricheskaia Bietva nov Moskvoi," by Lieutenant General E. Shilovskii, in *Krasnii Flot*, December 7, 1944, p. 3.

Army Day Review, April 6, 1945, issue complete.

SEA WARFARE

"United States Navy at War," 2nd Official Report by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, for the year March 1, 1944-March 1, 1945, in *U. S. News*, 2nd Quarter 1945 Supplement.

"Our Ships Strike Back," by Bernard Brodie, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Spring 1945, pp. 186-206.

"Carrier Midway Launched," feature in *Marine Age*, April 1945, pp. 22-3, 37.

"The Naval Station at Alameda, 1916-40: A Case Study in the Aptitude of Democracy for Defense," by Frederick L. Paxson, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, March 1945, pp. 235-50.

"The Navy and Colonial Government," by Earl S. Pomeroy, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1945, pp. 290-7.

"The Naval Academy in Five Wars," by Louis H. Balonder, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1945, pp. 278-89.

"The Future of Nazi Submarines," by Lieutenant Commander Colin Mayers, in *Marine Journal*, March 1945, pp. 32-3.

"Nastupatel'nyi boi v Mor'e," by Kontr-Admiral N. Pavlovich, in *Krasnii Flot*, December 8, 1944, p. 3.

TECHNICAL

"The Training of Military Geographers," by Colonel Sidney P. Poole, in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, December 1944, pp. 202-6.

"Water Supply on the Battlefield," by William S. Smith, in *Civil Engineering*, April 1945, pp. 163-16.

"Guayule Development in the United States," by Ernest E. Scholl, in *The Rubber Age*, February 1945, pp. 507-10.

"Substituted Diphenylarsinic Acids and Their Reduction Products," by Hugo Bauer, in *Journal of the American Chemical Society*, April 1945, pp. 591-3.

"Zur Kenntnis der Nitrierung höher-molekullärer Paraffinköhlenwasserstoffe," by Christoph Grundmann, in *Berichte der Deutschen Chemischen Gesellschaft*, 15 March 1944, pp. 82-4.

"Curved Quartz Crystals as Supersonic Generators," by L. W. Labaw, in *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America*, April 1945, pp. 237-45.

"Development of Electronic Tubes," by I. E. Mourontseff, in *Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers*, April 1945, pp. 223-23.

- "Boroba s artilleriae proivnika," editorial in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 12, 1944, p. 2.
- "Changes in Design Speed Ordnance Production," by Max Salkin, in *Product Engineering*, May 1945, pp. 294-6.
- "Critical Points," by the editor, in *Metal Progress*, April 1945, pp. 704-6.
- "Continuous Heat Treatment of Shells," by D. E. Wyman, in *Metals and Alloys*, April 1945, pp. 1009-12.
- "Automatic Carbon Arc Welding Found Advantageous for Aluminum," by W. J. Conley, in *American Machinist*, April 26, 1945, pp. 118-20.
- "Spot Welding of Aluminized Steel," by Harry W. Brown, in *Iron Age*, April 26, 1945, pp. 56-62.
- "Light Alloy Foundry Technique," feature article in *Aircraft Production*, February 1945, pp. 55-8.
- "Greases for Military Vehicles," by Major N. W. Faust, in *S.A.E. Journal*, May 1945, pp. 287-91.
- "Recommendations for Using Steel Piping in Salt Water Systems," by Paul Ffield, in *Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers*, February 1945, pp. 1-20.
- "Construction of Auxiliary Transports," by G. G. Landis, in *Marine Engineering and Shipping Review*, April 1945, pp. 152-4.
- "The Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing Industry," by H. Gerriřh Smith, in *Marine News*, April 1945, pp. 58-61, 163-76.
- "Some Aspects of Shipbuilding during World War II," by J. R. Moore, in *Mechanical Engineering*, May 1945, pp. 319-23.
- "Normandy's Made-in-England Harbors," in *The National Geographic Magazine*, May 1945, pp. 565-80.
- "The Structural Efficiency of Wing Covers," by A. F. Donovan, Martin Goland, and J. N. Goodier, in *Journal of Applied Mechanics*, March 1945, pp. A8-12.
- The American Review of Soviet Medicine*, all issues.
- The Journal of Aviation Medicine*, all issues.
- Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences*, all issues.
- Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society*, all issues.
- Journal of Aeronautical Meteorology*, all issues.
- Bulletin of the United States Medical Department*, all issues.
- Army Air Forces Technical Data Digest*, all issues.
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- Transactions of the American Society for Metals*, all issues.

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- "Kreuser Avrora," by E. Yunga, in *Novii Mir*, November-December 1942, pp. 15-25.
- "Spanish Warfare Against the Chichimecas in the 1570s," by Philip Wayne Powell, in *The Hispanic-American Historical Review*, November 1944, pp. 580-604.
- "The Armada Campaign of 1588," by Lawrence Stone, in *History*, September 1944, pp. 120-43.
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

ROADBUILDING IN THE BRITISH ARMY

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN CHARTERIS

The role of the military engineer in war is to apply engineering knowledge and resources to the furtherance of the Commander's plan. In the British Army the problem has certain difficulties which are not found with most other armies. It has no one specific campaign or type of campaign, for which its peacetime training can be designed and adapted.

The units may be required to undertake their task in almost any part of the globe. The country they may have to fight in may be highly developed or may be barren desert; the enemy they may have to meet may be a highly trained civilized army or hordes of untrained warriors; the whole resources of the nation may be involved in which case the skill of the military engineer will be reinforced by the addition of innumerable highly trained civilian engineers or on the other hand they may have to rely solely on their own military establishments.

In civil life engineering is becoming increasingly specialized, and an engineer may frequently devote his whole life to one of its compartments. No such specialization is possible for the military engineers with the limited establishments and the great variety of tasks of the British Army; but all the developments have to be followed, studied, and adapted to or adopted in military engineering.

Engineering practice in civil life is characterized by deliberate perfection of specialized organization, resulting eventually in rapid and efficient execution. Cost and durability are of more relative importance than speed in execution or weight of material used. In military engineering the relative importance is exactly the reverse.

To fulfill his role the regular engineer officer requires a broad engineering education with much practical experience, for theory alone never suffices to solve the engineering problems of even the smallest unit. He requires as well a thorough knowledge of all military field organization and a general knowledge of the military science.

In all its varied campaigns of the present war the British Army has been well served by its engineer services. That part of its work which

has attracted most attention has been its struggle against the mines laid in such profusion by both the German and the Italian armies in their attempts to stem the Allied attacks. But though less spectacular, no less important has been—as it almost must be—the maintenance of adequate communications from seaport or from railhead to the fighting troops.

In the British organization, railway and river communications fall into the charge of the transportation services—as distinct from the engineer services, but it is the engineer services which has the undivided responsibility of maintenance and where necessary construction of new, and adaptation of old roads, from the very front line of fighting troops back to railhead. These road requirements vary with the types of transport plying on them. In the front area the military engineer will find himself faced with the problems of concealment from observation from the ground in enemy possession and wherever possible from the air.

He will have to take into account the time required to construct new roads or to reconstruct old ones. The fighting arms will generally have first line transport with cross-country capacity and in this area, therefore, good roads are more a great convenience than a necessity. Speed is all-important, and hasty expedients of great service. Second line transport will normally have only limited cross-country capacity, but a low type of road construction may be sufficient. Behind the re-filling points comes the third line transport with heavy motor vehicles with no cross-country capacity and requiring ample and good road communication.

Back on the main lines of communication there will normally be railways or water borne transport which no road system however good would wish to supplant. But the war has thrown the British Army so far mostly into countries where little or no rail communications are available and it is in these that the skill of the engineer services has overcome difficulties in an amazing manner.

The East African campaign of 1941 affords perhaps the most striking example. At its commencement the British force consisted of two divisions dependent for all its supplies on two very indifferent railheads at Thika and Nanyuiki in Kenya. No alternative source of supply was to be hoped for until the advance should secure a port on the East Coast.

The force fought its way to Kisumu, a distance of 500 miles dependent entirely on road transport. Fortunately the enemy at that time

made no extensive use of mines. Weather conditions were favorable and the ground was hard.

From Kismayu a light railroad carried the communications on to the next port at Mogadiscio. From there again everything had to be carried by road. On the attack on the Marda Pass the road supply line of the divisions employed extended to 700 miles.

Relief was then obtained by the capture of the port of Berbera in Somaliland. But though Berbera provided a shorter line, it increased rather than diminished the difficulties which the road engineer had to overcome. For the first 100 miles after leaving the coast the road runs through a tangle of rocky hills and dry wadis until it reaches Hargeisa; from there onward there is grassland in gently undulating country as far as Gigiga, then it climbs to Marda and 60 miles onward to Harar.

The Italian army had had ample time—of which fortunately full advantage had not been taken, to prepare demolitions. Even without these much work was required to enable the roads to carry the transport required to sustain the operations. Some 3,000 tons of freight was discharged from shipping each week at Berbera and the minimum requirements of the force was 500 tons of supplies and 1,000 tons of petrol. Strangely, the Italians who had constructed a magnificent road crossing the 100 miles of wild and beautiful mountain country running through narrow defiles and crossing tree choked gorges where a handful of men could have held up an army, made little attempt either to fight in its defence or to deny its use to the British by extensive demolitions. There was indeed a formidable roadblock on the crest of the Marda Pass which delayed the advance for a few hours, but apart from this no serious obstacles were encountered in this stretch.

Between Marda and Harar were two formidable obstacles, the Babilli Gap, a deep natural cutting (like a railway cutting) in precipitous weathered granite cliffs and the Bisidimo river. Neither were seriously defended and the Gap had not been obstructed by demolition. By the time Harar was taken the column had advanced 1,050 miles in 30 days, the last 65 miles in most difficult country, and the road communication had been kept open throughout. From Harar to Diredawa is wild country where the motor road passes between two great twin peaks, then over the edge of a 7,000 feet high plateau to Diredawa. It is an ideal road for demolitions and the Italian engineer had made much of the opportunity. Several bridges had been blown up and the mountain side itself had been blasted leaving the road ending on a precipice at five of the steepest points. One of the craters was 70 yards

long and the first reconnaissance reported that it would take 8 days to fill them all.

It is noteworthy that the Italians made no attempt to cover these demolitions by fire or to impede the task of their repair and in actual fact the road was reopened for traffic in 36 hours by two Field Companies and a native regiment. Had the obstacles been kept under observation and fire the original estimate might well have been exceeded.

The channel of the Awash river was the last great natural obstacle of this campaign. The river runs swiftly through a deep gorge with precipitous cliffs and was crossed by a railway and by a road bridge. Both were destroyed. The railway bridge had fallen 200 feet into the river where it lay with its back broken. The road bridge was not only destroyed but the further side of the gorge was dotted with machine gun posts.

For once, it looked as if the Italians were going to keep the obstacle under fire. Fortunately they were soon thrown out of their defences and the bridge, destroyed at sunset, was actually replaced by dawn—a remarkable feat under the circumstances.

In the desert war, roadmaking had small place. At Halfaya and at Sollum the enemy made some endeavor to arrest the pursuit by Britain's 8th Army and the road up to the escarpment was blocked and mined but the obstacles rapidly and efficiently made good and the eight days of thunderous pursuit that cleared him out of Egypt involved no roadmaking. Indeed the speed of the advance from El Alamein to El Agheila in three weeks, was a tribute to the state of the roads left by the enemy in his retreat and to the poverty of his opposition. The desert, when not rendered impassable by rain—afforded alternative routes to the lighter transport, the great coastal highway which had served the armies of the Axis in their advance on Egypt, was now of equal use to their pursuers when driven back.

In Tunisia where the operations that were to end in the great victory of the Anglo-American Army in the Northern area and the 8th British Army acting in one Army Group and giving the record number of 340,000 prisoners captured, matters were very different. The forces employed were at first not large but eventually comprise 3 American infantry Divisions with one armored and one Airborne Division, while the 1st British northern component included three British Infantry and two armored divisions. But the area in which they had to operate entailed much roadmaking and road maintenance.

From an engineering point of view the operations from the first

landing of the Anglo-American force to the final victory can be divided into three phases.

The first phase from the 8th November to the 27th December, 1942 was the race for Tunis and Bizerta in the hope of taking these strongholds by a coup de main. In this the existing communications alone could be relied on—the railway system was sparse, and rather inferior, roads deteriorated very rapidly under the wheels and tracks of heavy army vehicles. This was particularly the case in the roads leading from Phillipville and from Bone which had to carry most of the traffic.

The second phase was from the 28th December 1942 to the 28th March, 1943, when the attempt to rush Tunis and Bizerta had been abandoned and the assault was postponed until greater strength could be accumulated and until weather conditions should improve. During this phase Sherman and Churchill tanks arrived in large numbers and all roads, culverts and bridges had to be brought up to the required strength to take the extra load. In the main this involved bridging operations but all roads were surveyed for alteration where necessary.

The third and final phase was that of the assault and victory from 28th March to 18th May. Bridge repairs which were the chief task of the engineers engaged on the maintenance of communications, are beyond the scope of this article, but it is to be noted that in addition to the actual erection or repair of the bridge roadway the approaches invariably required a considerable amount of work.

In the actual road repairs the most general obstruction was in the nature of craters or blown culverts. It is not possible to generalize as to the best method of dealing with the craters or to indicate what time should be allowed for the reduction of the obstacle.

Some examples may be cited. In one large crater—some 60 feet in diameter, 800 tons of stone and 100 barrels were used. The personnel employed was one section of Royal Engineers and 30 infantry and the road was opened in $2\frac{1}{2}$ days. No bulldozer was available. Two other smaller craters, each of 30 feet radius, were filled and the road reopened in 3 hours and 2 hours respectively. A fourth crater of 50 feet diameter required 15 working hours without a bulldozer for a diversion to be made while a fifth which like the first example spanned 60 feet was filled in 8 hours with a bulldozer.

In crossing a marsh, timber baulks were three abreast and touching one another and spiked together at their ends. Planking formed the roadway and 750 yards of causeway was completed in $3\frac{1}{2}$ days.

Perhaps the most important, as it is also the most difficult, of the

duties of the road engineer is the rapid decision as to the means to be adopted to overcome the obstacle. He must take note of the nature of the soil, of the resources at his disposal and whether the work is under enemy observation.

Generally rapidity is the first essential. The road must be reopened, improvements to make the repair durable can be effected later. Thus in soft ground a diversion that will stand traffic for a short time may be very rapidly made for use while the crater itself is dealt with.

Generally in North Africa no attempt was made by the advanced engineers to replace demolished culverts. They were simply filled in with any material available and the risk of a wash-out accepted.

In the whole of the campaigns in North Africa the most formidable demolitions were probably encountered in the advance from Agheila to Tripoli by the 8th Army. In all 137 separate demolitions were dealt with in the 250 miles.

But these, though numerous, did not impose upon the engineer services the strain that they had to face in the subsequent crossing of Zigzau and the Akarit wadis. The task was to make crossings by causeways for the attack on a front of some 2,000 yards immediately under a strongly held and steep wadi bank. Three sites were selected and to each a field company was allotted.

Only in the center did the engineers under fire succeed in constructing a causeway over which in due course the attacking tanks passed. It was an instance of great courage and determination in circumstances of extreme difficulty and danger for which the commanding officer received as was his due an immediate reward given only for exceptional service.

MILITARY STUDIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

BY MAJOR H. A. DEWEERD

Until recently there has been no organized program of military studies in the United States. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries we had no civilian specialists comparable to Hans Delbrück in Germany or Spenser Wilkinson in England. The United States Army had no organ similar to the historical section of the old German General Staff or to the historical section of the Committee of Imperial Defence in Britain. We have never published an "official history" of any of our military campaigns. There has been no definite study of the War Department as a part of the government. Very little attention has been paid by political scientists or historians to the relation of our military and foreign policies. In the pre-atomic era military affairs apparently were not associated in the minds of taxpayers or scholars with the practice of statecraft or the character of society.

Considering the practical nature of the American people these facts are a little astonishing. The War Department is one of the largest departments of the Federal Government and our military expenditures have greatly overshadowed those for all other purposes. Military expenditures in the present war up to VE-day exceed by more than 100 billion dollars total government expenditures for all other purposes from the formation of the state to Pearl Harbor. We study other things that cost us money and endanger our welfare, but we have not seen fit to study the nature of war or of military institutions.

There are many reasons for this. Captain A. T. Mahan once described the American people as being "aggressive, combative, even warlike, but the reverse of military." We have shown a tendency to wage war at intervals but take no interest in war as a subject for study, possibly for fear of inciting war or indirectly fostering a large military establishment. Military affairs do not fall into any compartment of the highly departmentalized academic system in this country. Peace societies were interested in abolishing war but not in learning anything about its nature or conduct. The historians, who might normally be expected to pay some consideration to war, neglected the military field because of the popular trend toward the "new history" with its emphasis

on the social, economic, and cultural aspects of American life. A revolution against the "battle historians" and "battle histories" made itself apparent.

Despite the fact that the War Department archives offered an untapped field for numberless important historical dissertations, these resources have not been systematically utilized by American scholars. No regular courses in military studies were taught in American graduate schools. This was largely because graduate students must specialize in subjects in which teaching positions are available, and there were no such positions in the field of military studies. Individual American scholars who carried on single-handed struggles against public apathy or academic opposition and managed to teach occasional courses in military history found themselves limited to instruction on the undergraduate level. They were unable to train successive generations of scholars to carry on research and teaching in this field.

Because the average American historian slighted the military field, he could not fully prepare the minds of his students for the tragic events of 1939-45. The "standard" European history texts which served a complacent generation of American instructors and students from 1919 to 1939 now seem as obsolete as the kerosene lamp. To judge by these textbooks American historians did not present an adequate picture of European developments and trends during the prewar years. Their preoccupation with social, economic and cultural history prevented them from preparing their students to judge the essentially warlike nature and the sinister purposes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. A student might finish studying any of the popular American college textbooks in recent European history on August 31, 1939, and be completely surprised at the outbreak of the most terrible war in history on the following day. If he had no other basis on which to shape his judgment, such a student would be completely surprised by every phase of the Second World War after that date.

The first organized effort to foster military studies in the United States in recent times was the formation of the American Military Institute in the early thirties. This organization grew out of lectures and conferences held at the Army War College by Professor C. J. H. Hayes, Professor J. B. Scott, Colonel E. T. Lull, and Colonel A. L. Conger. In 1933 an organization called the American Military History Foundation (now the American Military Institute) was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. Its purpose was to foster

the study of war with emphasis on American military history and institutions.

One noteworthy accomplishment of the American Military Institute during the years 1935-1941 was to establish a strong cell of specialists in the War Department Division of the National Archives, then under the direction of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine. The latter trained and inspired a considerable number of young men who rendered valuable work in the Army of the United States and in related war agencies.

Another notable advance in this field has been the development of a school of military studies at Princeton centered around the seminar led by Professor E. M. Earle at the Institute for Advanced Study. Conducted on the post-doctoral level and participated in by a small number of American and foreign scholars, Professor Earle's seminar has produced an unusually qualified group of men who served effectively in various phases of the national war effort. A number of publications, including the important collaborative volume *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, 1943), were written or projected in the Princeton group. The success of Professor Earle's pioneer effort demonstrates what can be accomplished by an outstanding scholar in the military field when placed in a position to carry out a planned program over a number of years.

There is unanimous agreement that the physical scientists, who have contributed so much toward the effectiveness of our war effort, should, in the interests of national defense, continue to make their specialized knowledge available to the defense agencies in time of peace. Less well known, but almost equally important, has been the contribution of the social scientists.

The present war has called scholars from all branches of the social sciences into the national war effort. The Army, the Navy, and the Federal Government have utilized academic men in all phases of their work. Both the Army and the Navy have organized historical sections on a much more extensive scale than existed during the last war. Several hundred men are now engaged in compiling the histories of the armed forces. We thus have a considerable body of social scientists trained in various specialties and acquainted with the ways and needs of the armed services.

The close collaboration between military and naval men and civilian scholars during this war has resulted in an increased appreciation of the capacity and usefulness of the civilian expert on the part of the

military. In most cases this has been paralleled by an increased appreciation on the part of the civilians of the difficulties and needs of the military. The old isolation between civilians and military men has been broken down on a broad front. The possibilities for future collaboration on matters of national defense are almost unlimited: With the atomic bomb war becomes the life and death concern of all.

The success of American war making is based in a large measure on our capacity to produce military equipment and supplies of high quality in overwhelming masses, and upon our capacity to deliver this concentrated power in an explosive manner on battlefields of our own choosing.

The United States Army has for some years maintained the only industrial college in the world devoted to the study of war production and distribution problems on a high level. The commandant of that college recently declared that modern war is 75 per cent production and 25 per cent execution. He emphatically asserted that social scientists of all disciplines have been of vital service to the War Department in the present war and that their talents and specialized knowledge must be used in the future—if we are to draw the full lessons from our costly experience. He sees the need for a close and continuous interchange of ideas and services between the Army Industrial College and civilian specialists in the academic world. This exchange might take the form of joint seminars in which military and civilian personnel would take part, joint research projects, civilian consultants attached to the War Department, and freer use of civilian lecturers by military organizations.

In the opinion of the Commandant of the Army Industrial College social scientists can render important aid by studying the following subjects: the history of industrial mobilization in both World Wars, military and industrial manpower, transportation, public utilities, public health in wartime, and other kindred topics.

The historical branches of the Army and the Navy have made considerable progress toward completing their narratives of the war, but they will require support and assistance if these vitally important projects are to be made available for study. It would be a great tragedy if the historical programs of our armed forces should be allowed to languish after the war through lack of public support or service opposition. The record of our armed forces in the present war is of deep interest to the American people. It is more than the record of two services; it

is the record of America at war. As such it belongs to the people. For the first time in our history we stand to gain the fullest lessons from our dearly bought military experience. But to do so the historical programs must be pushed to their conclusions and the histories published.

Service personnel must be able to see in the historical branches an opportunity to render conspicuous service. Tours of duty in that section should not be allowed to prejudice an officer's opportunities for promotion, and he should be encouraged to serve with the unit long enough to develop and perfect special skills. No country in the world will have at its disposal so rich a body of historical material from which to draw lessons of this conflict. Since a great deal of German documentary material will be in our hands, our efforts might well extend to the history of the German military effort insofar as it is possible to reconstruct it.

It is obvious that the historical branches of the services will need the backing of Congress and the people and will doubtless require the assistance of civilian scholars to complete their functions. Academic institutions should encourage professional historians to spend a sabbatical year or two working in the historical section. Graduate schools willing to cooperate might find in the historical branches a unique opportunity to "farm out" advanced degree students who might wish to write a doctoral thesis in military or naval history under the direction of branch specialists. Here the documents and the trained assistants would be readily available. Three purposes would be served by such an arrangement. The student could write his dissertation under more competent direction than he would enjoy at most graduate schools. His study would become a part of the overall historical program. After completion of his dissertation, the successful candidate would normally return to the academic profession where he would be in a position to train and inspire other students.

The city of Washington may well become a center of postwar military studies. The facilities of the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Army War College Library, the Navy Department Library, and other special collections offer many advantages to the student of military affairs. The trained personnel of these agencies are uniquely fitted to participate in any such program. Separate or joint seminars in military topics might be conducted by the staffs of these institutions. To these seminars the specialists of the Army Industrial College, the historical branches of the services, and other government agencies could contribute a great deal.

The Library of Congress has demonstrated a praiseworthy willingness to cooperate with other libraries in an orderly program of book buying in the military field. Only by cooperative purchases and allocation of special fields to individual libraries will it be possible in the United States to build up relatively complete collections in the military field.

A recent conference held under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on War Studies showed a wide area of agreement between civilian scholars and military men of the need for expanding the work offered by academic institutions in the military field. It emphasized the desirability of introducing military courses in our colleges and universities cutting across disciplinary lines. Geographers, economists, political scientists and historians all have a role to play. The probable extension of Army and Navy ROTC units in a number of academic institutions offers one field in which qualified civilian instructors might aid in the military program.

On July 28, 1945, the Social Science Research Council approved the formation of a standing committee on Military Problems and Social Research. The objective of this committee is to foster closer collaboration between the social scientists, academic institutions, and defense agencies. This is a promising first step. It should be followed by others.

LOGISTICS AND MODERN WAR

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. MILLETT

I

Military commanders of whatever rank—the company's captain, the regiment's colonel, the division's major general, the theater's commanding general, the chief of staff under the commander-in-chief—have never been free from supply worries. Preparations for battle have always been the greatest task of the military leader, have always demanded his most sustained attention. If campaigns have not always been won by the best prepared, wars have seldom been lost by the nation with the greatest resources in men and equipment.

Yet surprisingly enough, only passing attention is usually given to supply problems in the memoirs of the great military figures of history. Military analysts have written at length about marches, the deployment of forces, and the reduction of fortified places. Yet only a few words are given to logistics.

Von Clausewitz remarks:

An army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws its nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size. A small body of troops has also its channels, from which it draws the sustenance of life but it strikes root easily where it happens to be; not so a large army. When, therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an army, the dimensions of the army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence.¹

Von Clausewitz also remarks that "the system of subsistence will control the war, as far as the other conditions on which it depends permit; but when the latter are encroached upon the war will react upon the subsistence system and in such case determine the same."²

Vegetius remarked that an army unsupplied with corn and other necessary provisions will be vanquished without striking a blow.³ He pointed out:

Famine makes greater Havoc in an Army than the Enemy, and is more terrible than the Sword. Time and Opportunity may help to retrieve other Misfortunes; but where Forage and Provisions have not been carefully provided, the Evil is without Remedy. The main and principal Point in War is to secure Plenty of Provisions, and to destroy

¹Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Col. J. J. Braham, Vol. II, p. 113.

²*Ibid.*, p. 101.

³John Clark, *Military Institutions of Vegetius*, p. 161.

the Enemy by Famine. An exact Calculation must therefore be made, before the Commencement of the War, of the Number of Troops, and the expenses incident thereto, that the Provinces may timely furnish the Forage, Corn, and all other Kinds of Provisions demanded of them, to be transported, in more than sufficient Quantity, into the strongest and most convenient Cities, before the Opening of the Campaign. If the Provinces cannot raise their Quotas in Kind, they must compound for them in Money, to be employed in procuring all Things requisite for the Service: for the Possessions of the Subject can not otherwise be secured than by the Defence of Arms.

Napoleon is said to have had as one of his maxims "according to the laws of war, every general who loses his line of communication deserves to be shot. I understand by a line of communication that in which are the hospitals, succor for the sick, ammunition, provisions, where an army reorganizes recruits and regains in a few days' rest its morale lost by some unforeseen accident."⁴ Napoleon may not have always paid attention to his own maxims, but there is at least an indication that he appreciated in part the importance of supply operations.

The leading advocate within the German General Staff of army control over the national economy, Major General Georg Thomas, wrote before 1939 that "the military-political estimate of a country's strength will in the future depend upon the estimate of its economic defense power."

No military authority has suggested that the problems of supply are necessarily the final decisive factor in war. On the other hand, it is amply evident, particularly today, that no army can wage war successfully without unlimited resources for its support in the field.

Behind all combat organization and all modern strategy lies a nation's capacity to produce and provide the weapons of war. The present war has provided many examples of brave troops whose courage and determination were inadequate against an army with superior equipment and complete control of supply lines.

II.

The problems of supply have always affected the course of military campaigns. Caesar was as famous for his road building as for his military campaigns. In fact, the two were synonymous. The Romans were only able to bring those areas north of the Po under their permanent domination as they built roads and provided permanent garrisons which could be supported in hostile territory. The inability of the Germanic

⁴L. E. Henry, *Napoleon War Maxims*, p. 137.

tribes to organize and support large forces against the Romans explained in considerable part their failure to resist Roman conquest for four centuries.

The military efforts to rescue the Holy Land from the Mohammedans were unsuccessful because individual military victories were not followed up by systematic provisions of supplies. Lodged on a hostile shore, the Crusaders were dependent upon provisions and equipment brought from Italian ports. Since there was no organization to assure this supply, the Crusades ended in complete failure.

Gustavus Adolphus was successful in his campaigns upon the European Continent during the Thirty Years' War largely because of the care which he provided for the supply of his troops on foreign soil. Indeed, it is suggested that one of the most important contributions of Gustavus Adolphus to military science was his practice of organizing depots behind his advancing troops. He saw to it that these depots were kept full from Sweden or by systematic contribution from the countries traversed. There was a regular staff of commissaries who distributed provisions to regiments in bulk. The Swedish king was himself an expert engineer and he organized a superb corps of engineers to accompany his troops and provide the necessary facilities for their support. It is said that German princes and their military captains were amazed to find "men of science" accompanying an army.⁵

The great French Marshal, Turenne, was noted for his ceaseless activity in obtaining rations for his troops. The Duke of Marlborough had a similar reputation. The long lines of wagons following his forces were a remarkable sight in his day. Such great victories as that at Blenheim could be traced in part to his enemy's conviction that he could never move a force of men to such distances from his bases in the Lowlands. This certainty was to cost the French and Austrians dearly on several occasions.

During the American Revolution General Washington was able to muster a large force for only a few days at any one time because of the lack of any means for systematic supply of his troops. One historian has noted that Washington was "forced to be a collector of supplies when he hoped to be a leader of men."⁶ The equipment of the individ-

⁵Theodore Dodge, *Great Captains, Gustavus Adolphus*.

⁶W. A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army*, p. 20.

ual soldier was almost entirely what he was able to bring with him. An enlistment blank of the day enjoined the soldier to "furnish a good firearm, cartouch box, blanket, and knapsack." In place of a firearm the recruit was directed to bring a good sword or a tomahawk and later a shovel, spade, pickaxe, or scythe. Powder was always short and lead was obtained from various sources, including statues. The individual soldier molded his own bullets and manufactured cartridges. These reasons had much to do with the ineffective size and operation of the Revolutionary Army. On the other hand, British support of its forces was negligible. In order to provide food and quarters, the British were compelled to divide their forces, particularly in winter, among many different communities. In consequence, it was possible for the Americans to strike at isolated garrisons at Princeton and Trenton and thus obtain tactical victories. The only large British expedition of the whole Revolutionary War which moved any extended distance from its major base ended in complete disaster with Burgoyne's Surrender at Saratoga. The American forces under Gates at that time numbered 22,000 men but this force could have been kept together for no more than three weeks because of the supply situation.

French assistance to the American cause meant even more in terms of material than it did in terms of men. Even so, there are those who say the American fight for independence was primarily successful because of the political situation in Europe rather than because of any military victory by the American Confederation of States.

Two of Napoleon's greatest defeats resulted from a complete underestimate of supply difficulties. Wellington was able to maintain his forces in the Peninsula because of his sea communications with England and his steadfast insistence upon adequate supply from the homeland. The French armies in Spain were compelled to disperse in order to forage, while Wellington, with his communications line, was able to concentrate his forces and defeat the French in piecemeal fashion. The disaster at Moscow in 1812 was almost entirely a supply defeat. If Napoleon had examined with care the success of Charles the XII in Russia he might not have made such a mistake. On each field of battle the French armies were successful against the Russians but inability to obtain supplies compelled Napoleon to retreat from Moscow and eventually to lose most of his force to the climate and Russian guerrilla tactics.

Even in British colonial wars supply organization played a major

part. Kitchener's famous advance to Khartum was an advance of supply bases. He built a railroad in order to keep his force intact and supplied. The eventual defeat of the Fuzzywuzzies was a foregone conclusion.

In other words, warfare has always been affected by considerations of space and locale. These are considerations which are synonymous with supply, since the purpose of all logistical operations is to free military tactics as far as possible from the limitations of space and locale.

III.

At the end of the 18th Century two great changes occurred which were to have far-reaching effect upon the conduct of war. The French Revolution introduced the practice of large armies based upon a draft of civilians. Until this time armies traditionally had been made up of small professional groups of men. Commanders were necessarily economical in their battles since their ability to raise forces depended upon their reputation for conserving the lives of their men. It was not uncommon for the small professional armies of a European principality to be hired by some other king or noble to fight his battles. The French Revolution changed all this. The citizen army became a fundamental characteristic of modern war.

At the time of Napoleon the first steps had already been taken which were to be hailed as the industrial revolution. The growth in the use of power to operate machines brought entirely new practices in the manufacture of weapons as in the manufacture of civilian goods. Economic resources in the form of raw materials, machines, labor and transportation became more and more important to the conduct of war.

The citizen army and the industrial revolution together wrought fundamental changes in the logistical factor in warfare. Previously the accepted military maxim had been "to live off the country." This was feasible when the most important item of supply was subsistence and forage. It was equally possible as long as armies were small bodies of men. Henceforth to live off the land was no longer an acceptable military practice although this development was not entirely appreciated until well into the 19th Century.

The American Civil War demonstrated to the whole world the emerging importance of industrial power in military conflict. The Confederate states represented an agrarian economy. The North, in the long run, won the conflict because of its superior economical resources

and its successful blockade of the southern states. General Lee might win battles but he could not win a war. General McClellan may have been slow and even reluctant to risk battle, but he was thorough in his organization of supply facilities. Each time he invaded the North General Lee was compelled to retire not only because of a temporary repulse at Antietam and Gettysburg but even more because he was unable to move and supply his forces.

Sherman's campaign into the South was to demonstrate clearly the place that supply now played in war. The advance from Chattanooga upon Atlanta was a series of flanking attacks against Johnston. But each new advance was followed by a careful system of depots and supply lines supporting the Union forces. Only when Atlanta had been outflanked and captured did the Confederates suddenly move to sever Sherman's line of communications. Sherman decided upon a bold move. A part of his force was sent back to Chattanooga. With some 60,000 remaining, he marched across Georgia to Savannah where he was to be supplied from the North by sea. Before he could turn to make a junction with Grant's forces in the east he had to establish a base for his support. Savannah was a supply objective. Much has been said about how Sherman lived off the country from Atlanta to Savannah. This was an incidental phase of the campaign. General Sherman himself later related that upon the approach to Savannah he explained to General Hagen that the success of the whole campaign and the safety of the army depended upon an immediate assault upon the city and an establishment of contact with the fleet awaiting in the sound.⁷

The collapse of the southern cause in the early spring of 1865 was induced as much by supply exhaustion as by military operations. The South had been active in its efforts to organize sufficient support for its armies in the field. The interruption of trade with Europe and the virtual absence of any industrial power of its own brought about the defeat of the South.

The lessons of the American Civil War were only slowly appreciated. Such rapid campaigns as those of the Prussian Army against Denmark, Austria, and France from 1866 to 1870 overshadowed the superior preparations which had preceded the actual military operations.

The Spanish-American War was too short to do more than demonstrate the inadequacies of American military organization and our com-

⁷*Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, Vol. II, p. 183.

plete lack of preparedness. The even weaker position of the enemy made the outcome swift and sure.

The Russo-Japanese War was again a lesson in the importance of supply. Afterwards the Russian commander had many observations to make about the importance of supply. The following are only a few:

We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled.

* * *

The War showed that our army organization gave us too small a percentage of actual combatants as compared with the total numbers whom we rationed. . . . Even so the number of non-combatants laid down in the establishments for each unit was not sufficient to perform the duties that fell to them, and it became necessary . . . to detail combatants for domestic duties. . . . The fighting number was never more than 75 per cent of the number of men on the strength.

* * *

The reason why the lines of communication in the field took so large a number away from our fighting line was that we had no proper communication units, and the large working parties necessary for the light railway, road and bridge work had to be drawn from the fighting troops. It was entirely owing to the care with which the commanding officers on the line of communications—especially those in the engineers—had been selected that we were able to fight, and at the same time to make roads of some hundreds of miles' length for inter-communication between corps.

* * *

The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will be made in a struggle between two European powers. . . . The speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways (especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads, the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day, while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wires, mines, hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage.

* * *

The security of our communications was literally vital, for even their temporary disorganization meant catastrophe. Not only the flow of reinforcements to the front, but the collection and distribution of local supplies would have ceased. As we were over 5,300 miles away from our base (Russia), we had been forced to form a local supply base and the loss of this would have threatened the army with starvation.⁸

⁸General A. N. Kuropatkin, *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, translated by Capt. A. D. Lindsay and edited by Maj. E. D. Swinton, Vol. II, pp. 33, 44-5, 50-1, 141, and 322.

IV

The First World War in one sense demonstrated the logical consequence of civilian armies and industrial power—total mobilization. *The War Memoirs* of David Lloyd George vividly portrayed the steps necessary to mobilize all the economic resources for war—industry, agriculture, labor, and transportation.

When the United States entered the war against Germany in April 1917, our industrial preparation was negligible. The American forces eventually sent to France received almost all of their heavy equipment from the British and the French governments. On a tonnage basis the report of the Services of Supply at the end of the war showed that 51 per cent of all supplies for the AEF were provided by our Allies. The most important items received from the United States were foodstuffs and miscellaneous quartermaster supplies. All heavy artillery pieces and all combat airplanes were provided by the British and French. At the end of the war American munitions were just beginning to flow on a large scale from American factories. It was America's manpower, however, and not American supplies which turned the tide in World War I. British mobilization of industrial resources outran her manpower resources.

The Assistant Secretary of War in 1917-1919, Benedict Crowell, observed:

The really amazing thing which America did was to place in France in 19 months an army of the size and the ability of the American Expeditionary Force. The war taught us that America can organize, train, and transport troops of a superior sort at a rate which leaves far behind any program for the manufacture of munitions. It upset the previous opinion that adequate military preparedness is largely a question of trained man power. . . . The experience of 1917 and 1918 was a lesson in the time it takes to determine types, create designs, provide facilities, and establish manufacture.⁹

The nations of the world learned the importance of industrial preparedness as a result of the experience in World War I. In the United States this demonstration led Congress to confer upon the War Department responsibility for planning for the industrial mobilization of the nation's resources for the eventuality of another war. Far-reaching steps to put America's military forces and industrial resources in a state of preparedness were taken between June 1940 and December 1941.

World War II has demonstrated the interlocking considerations of strategy and logistics. The great objectives of German military operations were the economic resources of the European continent to support

⁹*America's Munitions, 1917-1918*, pp. 17-18.

her own military production. The determination to attack Russia in the summer of 1941, often hailed as Hitler's greatest mistake, was to a great degree dictated by logistical considerations. It is altogether probable that the Japanese decision to attack the United States was prompted by the measures taken to curtail essential raw materials for the support of Japan's war in China.

After the entry of the United States into the war against the Axis, joint British-American strategy was determined by logistical factors. Japan's rapid advance throughout the Pacific area and Malaysia went unchecked except temporarily on Bataan because of Allied inability to move men and supplies into the area. Eventually it was decided to launch the major blows upon the Axis directly against Germany for the simple reason that England was available as a base for the attack. Here were large sources of supplies which did not have to be transported for the British Army. The distance of British ports from the United States was only half the distance of Australian ports. The capacity to unload and handle supplies in England was far superior to that available in Australia. These considerations made deployment of a major striking force in Europe possible far sooner than in the Pacific. There a holding action with individual tactical offensives was the only alternative because of the logistical situation.

World War II was a struggle of economic forces as well as military forces. The sinews of war were not the muscles of a soldier but the labor of a nation.

The first essential in the logistics of modern war is the adequate procurement of supplies. The production of military equipment requires industrial facilities, raw materials, and labor. The provision of all of these takes time. It is impossible when a nation does not have the resources with which to begin in the first place.

Although the United States had begun to convert her industrial resources to the output of munitions before December 7, 1941, the progress made was inadequate to meet the immediate needs when this country was attacked. General Marshall summarized the situation in these words:

On all the fighting fronts the Allies were in a desperate situation due to lack of adequate materiel while facing an enemy who possessed an abundance of the most modern equipment conceived at that time. The trying problem of the War Department was to meet the urgent necessities of critical fronts without jeopardy to the security of continental United States. Money in large appropriations had been made available but not available was the time in which to convert this money into munitions ready for issue.

The broad problems of procurement in war time may be divided into three major categories—the division of a nation's output, the role of the military in procurement operations, and the distribution system.

The first great problem is the division of the nation's economic resources between the armed forces, the immediate production for maintaining direct war output, and the production necessary to sustain the civilian population producing war goods. The calculation of war requirements is an indispensable feature to the planning which results in a division of national resources. Industrial facilities, raw materials, and manpower must all be divided. Under conditions of total war there cannot be war competition between the armed forces and the civilian population. All are a part of the war effort. Adjustments are nonetheless possible which affect the type of war to be waged, the strategy for its successful completion, and its duration.

When the requirements for the U. S. Army were first calculated on a complete basis after Pearl Harbor, it was evident that the American economy would be unable to provide the necessary supplies and equipment. Considerable adjustments then followed which reduced the number of armored divisions and later the entire size of the Army.

The second great problem in procurement was to determine the role of the War Department in managing the resources made available for war production. Because of the close interrelationship between strategy and logistics, even to the point of modification of weapons to meet particular tactical needs, the War Department had its own organization for the purchase and manufacture of supplies. The War Department asked the right to control the utilization made of its share of national resources. This problem revealed itself in the machinery established for the control of raw materials, the scheduling of production, and the utilization of labor. Eventually satisfactory lines of mutual cooperation were worked out between the great civilian agencies controlling the mobilization of economic resources as a whole and the War Department controlling the procurement of specific military supplies.

In the third place, the distribution system for the supplies of the Army had a vital relationship to procurement. Inventories maintained within the United States to insure the continuous flow of supplies to troops affected military requirements. Moreover, the prompt location of supplies wherever they might be was essential in order to meet troop

¹⁰*Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1941-June 30, 1943*, pp. 6-7.

demands. In other words, the efficient utilization of the production made possible by the resources available for war production required an adequate system of distribution. The two could not be divorced.

There were incidental aspects to procurement which proved troublesome during the war effort—price control, renegotiation of contracts, disposal of surplus properties, and the termination of contracts.

Constant research and development were essential to the improvement of war materiel. This continued throughout the war effort. Within three years after Pearl Harbor there was scarcely a single weapon that remained unchanged. Nonetheless, research and development was the qualitative aspect of what remained throughout the war essentially a quantitative problem.

VII.

The protection of the United States on battlefields thousands of miles from our continental limits focused particular attention upon transportation. From the beginning of the war the merchant marine available for the movement of troops and supplies became the key factor in military operations. This situation is evident from the determined onslaught by the Axis upon shipping lines and port facilities. Not until effective countermethods had been devised for submarine and aerial attack could the Allies support a sustained military offensive.

Many devices were used to conquer transportation defects. The United States shipped many of its supplies unassembled in order to preserve shipping space. Constant pressure was exerted to provide full loads. Deck spaces were utilized to the fullest extent.

Landing ships were built and used to haul supplies over short distances in combat readiness. This helped avoid the tie-up of transport vessels in large-scale military movement until they could be efficiently used. Strict limits were required to reduce the haul of unnecessary items. Balance was necessary between lifting capacity for supplies and lifting capacity for troops. In some instances pre-shipment was resorted to build up overseas supply areas in anticipation of future large-scale military operations. A close integration was essential between the distribution machinery and transportation machinery. This was achieved in the supply system of the War Department during the war.

All the great conferences of military leaders throughout the war determined military strategy in the light of transportation possibilities. In his 1943 report to the Secretary of War the Chief of Staff of the

American Army reported that the Casablanca Conference "covered strategic plans throughout the world, a careful breakdown of ship tonnage allotments, convoy movements, naval dispositions, etc."¹¹

Time was essential to transportation. Military operations had to be scheduled as transportation conditions permitted. The attack upon Sicily, for example, was originally planned before the final completion of the North African campaign. An inability to provide the necessary transportation compelled a postponement of D-Day. Later the Commander-in-Chief of the North Africa Theater of Operations estimated that if one additional division could have been transported to Sicily, the escape of the Germans after their defeat there could have been prevented.

Transportation limitations affected strategic decisions in other ways. The military planners for the North African operation had to choose between a large assault force without its trucks and other wheeled vehicles or a smaller force fully equipped with all of its vehicles for inland movement. The decision was made in favor of a large assault force. The initial success in taking all objectives was followed by a period of inactivity until means of inland movement could be transported to North Africa.

Finally, no surer evidence of the importance of transportation to modern war can be assembled than the continuing attention given by both sides to interruption of transportation facilities.

VIII.

In the last place, supply is a problem of movement overseas wherever troops operate against the enemy. Amphibious warfare has emphasized the problem of bases, ports, and supply lines immediately behind combat troops. Supplies must be unloaded and strengthened in preparation for an assault upon the enemy. No military operation is possible until adequate buildup has taken place close to the expected scene of conflict. Much has been said about the new elements of warfare introduced by the airplane. This is true. Yet, the success of the airplane in use against the enemy is dependent upon ground transportation. This has been amply demonstrated in the difficulties in supporting active aerial operations against the Japanese in China.

In commenting about the shift of aerial operations from the Philippines to Australia early in 1942, the Chief of Staff pointed out:

While this sudden reversal of a movement half way around the earth demonstrated

¹¹Biennial Report, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

the mobility of the airplane, it also demonstrated the lack of mobility of air forces until a lengthy process of building up ground service forces and supplies (mechanics, ordnance and radio technicians, signal personnel, radar warning detachments, antiaircraft, medical, and quartermaster units, as well as the troops to capture airfields and defend them against land attack, and the accumulation of repair machinery, gasoline, bombs, and ammunition) had been laboriously completed by transport plane, passenger and cargo ship—the last two largely being slow-moving means of transportation. The planes flew to Australia in 10 days. The ground units and materiel to service the planes and keep them flying required approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ months or longer for the transfer.¹²

Bases are as essential to the movement of supplies as they are to aerial operations. As troops advance, supply lines must continue to follow. As already mentioned above, the forces originally landing in North Africa on November 8, 1942 were unable after the seizure of Oran and Algiers to advance into Tunisia. The occupation of that area by the Germans could not be prevented because the forces necessary could not be moved and kept supplied. Advancing patrols came within 60 miles of Tunis by November 16 and were within 30 miles by November 25. The nearest ports to supply this force were Bone and Phillippeville. The eventual defeat of the Germans in Tunisia was made possible only by the construction of rail and road facilities which moved men and supplies in sufficient force against the enemy. Ten gasoline pipelines were constructed before the attack began. This was a single illustration of the essentials for modern war.

In the Pacific, where ports have been unavailable, amphibious trucks had to be used to unload supplies. Landing craft likewise provided a means for direct support of military operations. One by one new points of operations were found and kept supplied by a constant stream of vessels. Thus coastwise traffic in the Southwest Pacific took the place of inland traffic characteristic of military campaigns in North Africa and Europe. In both cases continuing flow of supplies was indispensable to successful operation against the enemy. Sustained pressure was only possible when a sustained flow of supplies was assured.

The delivery of supplies to troops in combat presented far-reaching difficulties. Yet any slow-up was immediately evident on the fighting lines themselves.

IX.

The experience of the Second World War has demonstrated certain lessons which must be borne in mind by future generations if military defeat for this country is to be avoided.

¹²Biennial Report, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

The first of these lessons is the importance of industrial preparedness. Military training and an adequate military force are of little avail without industrial facilities and organization capable of supporting the forces to be put in the field. War is an insatiable consumer of supplies. Heavy equipment such as military airplanes, mobile weapons, communications equipment, and ammunition have few civilian counterparts. We have learned that 18 months is only time to plan the conversion of an economy from peacetime output to defense output when we must begin from zero. American industrial potential has swung the balance in World War II against Germany because, thanks first to Britain and then to Russia, we had the time to make our great industrial might effective. Will that time always be available? May not a future aggressor aim his initial blows at destroying the industrial potential of the United States before those resources can be marshalled against him?

In the second place, supply and strategic considerations have today become so intertwined that no line of demarkation is possible. Total war knows no differentiation between military economy and civilian economy. Unless victory is to be jeopardized, all resources must be used for war. This is not to say that all resources are to be used for the output of immediate war goods. The nation's transportation system must be maintained, its health guarded, adequate housing assured, some recreation provided. These are indispensable to the continued sustained output of military supplies. Nonetheless, military organization must assume a large responsibility for the control of economic resources if military needs are to be translated at once into procurement performance.

World War II has demonstrated a practical line of division of authority. Just as the Commander-in-Chief is a civilian under the American democratic system, so the war direction of a nation's economic resources is entrusted to civilian agencies. But within that area of total resources allotted to military use, military authorities themselves should maintain complete control. That there should be constant check on how these resources are used is desirable. Criticism can serve a helpful purpose. Responsibility, however, should remain with the same individuals who must achieve military success.

In the third place, procurement without a completely adequate distribution system is of little avail. Supplies must be moved and moved promptly. Waste in the accumulation of large inventories means ineffective military operations. Waste in accumulated supplies that can-

not be properly identified and moved when desired means ineffective military operations. Distribution and procurement are so interlocked that it has not been uncommon for certain supplies to move directly from production lines to ports of embarkation. One organization must direct procurement and distribution and insure that both function efficiently. It has been evident in World War II that distribution experience reflecting the demands of troops is an important element in the determination of military requirements. No advance planning can fully take the place of distribution experience.

In the fourth place, American defense is dependent upon its overseas transportation facilities. If once an enemy is permitted to occupy American soil and sustain an attack upon our continental territory, the prospects of successful resistance are meager. America depends upon her foreign outposts and those foreign outposts can only be maintained with adequate control of the sea. This means not only naval power but also the vessels to move troops and supplies. This lesson was amply demonstrated by the attack by Japan upon the Philippines in 1941. The use of England as a base for the defeat of Germany on the soil of France, the Lowlands, and Germany was made possible by our transportation system. The American attack upon Pacific bases gathered momentum as increased transportation facilities became available. Supplies must be moved overseas and until the day when the airplane can take over the whole burden, the United States is dependent upon its merchant marine for successful defense.

In the fifth place, military operations overseas are dependent upon their own supply machinery. Supplies unloaded from the United States must be stored until needed and then promptly moved in support of military attack. No Army can afford to ignore the machinery available to it for its constant support. Depots, railroads, roads, trucks, pipelines—all these come increasingly indispensable as troops move away from coastal bases. When water rather than land is the means of communications, one base serves as the supply point for the next area of operation. The job of logistics is to make possible the free movement of troops and free them from the limitations of time and space.

If these lessons are fully appreciated not only by our military leaders of tomorrow but also by an alert citizenry, the United States may look forward to its future security with reasonable assurance.

THE JAPANESE HIGH COMMAND

BY MAJOR BEN BRUCE BLAKENEY

CONCLUDED

III. Some Lesser Figures

As in any army, many of the responsible places in the Japanese high command are filled by men other than the senior generals—by lieutenant- and major-generals and colonels. At the end of the war such places included the Inspectorate of Aviation, as well as those of Vice-Chiefs of Staff, Vice-Minister of War and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. In the field armies, as a matter of course, we find many junior generals in positions of high importance.

One phenomenon conspicuously absent from the Japanese Army is the "boy colonels" and general officers in their thirties which most war-time armies produce in some numbers. The Oriental reverence for age is such that the Japanese do not consider promotion to high rank a suitable method of rewarding distinguished service by young officers; instead they confer awards and give choice assignments. The average age of the twenty-six full generals active in August 1945 was, at the time they reached general rank, nearly 49; and the younger men, even with the accelerated promotion of wartime, averaged only about a year earlier. The Japanese officer, be he never so brilliant, just doesn't (unless, of course, he is an Imperial Prince) attain general rank before his middle forties. Prince Kan-in, for fifteen years until his death in May the *doyen* of the Japanese Army, did make major-general at 36; but that was forty-four years ago, and the younger Imperial Princes, even, have had to await the fortieth birthday or later. There are, it is true, the posthumous promotions often given to officers of any grade. As an example, there was the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Katō Tateo, one of the leading Japanese aces of the early days of the war even if we discount the official claim for him of "more than two hundred victories." When he was killed in aerial combat in Burma at the age of 39, in 1942, and was made posthumously a major-general, he was one of the youngest on record.

Very rarely, also, if ever, was a Japanese officer promoted in grade

over his seniors. Promotions are governed by such slavish attention to the ranking list that even the most able officer can't be brought to the top until his seniors have been promoted or retired. Of the active *taishō* at the war's end, General Umezu is the solitary example (neglecting the Imperial Princes and a couple of officers once retired and recalled to active service) of an officer promoted out of turn—he, a fifteenth-year Academy-class man, was made a general while there were active lieutenant-generals of the fourteenth-year class.

The biographical sketches which follow introduce a number of the junior general officers—limitations of space confine us to the lieutenant-generals—of present importance, men without whose acquaintance we can scarcely consider ourselves to appreciate the full flavor of the high command. These include men in the “desk jobs” of the Ministry of War, the General Staff office and other branches of the high command, as well as some in field commands or of unknown whereabouts, who remain of interest by reason of their offices, their personalities or the parts they played on the stage of Japanese militarism. A few retired generals, chosen by like criteria, are added. All positions mentioned are as of the cessation of hostilities in August.

Lieutenant-General TERAMOTO Kumaichi (born 1889), as the Inspector of Aviation, at the end was officially the biggest figure in the Army after Generals Anami, Umezu and Doihara, the “Big Three.” He is little known outside professional circles, although he was an attaché at Washington in the late 'twenties. Teramoto's background is typical of that of the high-ranking officers of the Army Air Force: originally a ground-force officer, he was one of the group of carefully-selected colonels transferred to the Air Force in 1937 with orders to “familiarize themselves with aviation matters” and to equip themselves to direct the aviation arm, which was growing increasingly autonomous. Teramoto served as commandant of aviation schools; became a lieutenant-general by late 1940; and since the beginning of the war has commanded flying divisions and air armies in various theaters of war. In April 1945 he was appointed Inspector of Aviation to succeed General Anami, becoming concurrently Commander of Aviation Headquarters as has lately been customary.

Lieutenant-General KAWABE Torashirō (born 1890) is one of the two Vice-Chiefs of the General Staff (unless the joint vice-chiefs system has been abandoned; no other incumbent has been announced recently). He is a converted artilleryman who (like his elder brother

General Kawabe Masakazu) has held many important high-echelon air commands and staff positions. His breadth of outlook and adaptability are best shown by the singular fact of his having been attaché to the U.S.S.R. and Germany successively—singular, because in the Japanese Army one is *either* a Russophile or of the great German-admiring majority. Kawabe was in Berlin, newly a lieutenant-general, when World War II began; recalled, he was named Chief of Staff of National Defense Headquarters, then Commandant of the Aviation Academy, Assistant Inspector of Aviation, and finally Vice-Chief of the General Staff in March 1945. To the distinction with which he served in these varied posts he can add whatever measure of glory can be found in the efficient conduct of the most humiliating task ever to fall to a Japanese soldier, leading the surrender mission to Manila. Whether his wide experience, his official position or his personality predominated in dictating his selection for this job, his business-like approach to the affair justified the choice.

Lieutenant-General WAKAMATSU Tadakazu (born 1893) is, like so many of the younger officers raised to prominence by war and now filling positions of great responsibility, an unknown quantity; he became Vice-Minister of War in July, coming in with Minister Anami, whom he survived. Prior to that he was once attaché at Budapest and was Director of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff Office when the war began; later he moved to the 3d (Transport and Communications) Section, where he remained (receiving his lieutenant-generalcy) until coming to his present office.

Lieutenant-General YOSHIZUMI Masao (born 1893) is the incumbent of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War—the office, normally the charge of a major-general, has been filled by lieutenant-generals during the war years. Yoshizumi, an infantryman, is another unknown. Since April 1942 he had served as Director of the Ministry's Mobilization Plans Bureau, which office he retained when he was appointed to the Military Affairs Bureau in March.

Lieutenant-General SUGAWARA Michiō (born 1888), one of the outstanding men in the Army Air Force, was last commander of the Training Air Force. When he became the sixth Inspector of Aviation, in July 1944, he was the first who brought aviation experience to the office: after service with the British Army in World War I, he embarked upon a career in aviation which has been long and distinguished. The chief positions which he has held include section chief in the old

Aviation Headquarters, back in 1937 (he had been on the staffs of several flying schools, even before that), command of air brigades, divisions and armies, and Commandant of the Aviation Academy, before becoming Inspector of Aviation. As a lieutenant-general (since 1939) Sugawara made a brilliant record in the Southern regions, being responsible among other things for the successful paratroop attack on Palembang in early 1942. His term as Inspector, coming at a time of ubiquitous misfortune to Japanese aviation, was brief; he was removed to the relatively inferior place of commander of the training air force in December 1944.

Lieutenant-General Prince KAYA Tsunenori (born 1900), a cavalryman turned mechanized, lieutenant-general since 1943, is Commandant of the Army Staff College. In the recent past he has held a number of high offices: commander of the Guards and Nagoya divisions, Vice-Chief of the General Staff from July 1944 to March 1945. There is nothing in his background to explain his fitness for such a responsible post as that of vice-chief of the general staff in wartime, and his appointment must be supposed to have been on the usual principle which brings Imperial Princes to high office. July 1944, with the fall of a government and a thorough-going shake-up of the high command, was a time when the Army badly needed to raise its stock with the nation. By the installation of an Imperial personage in the military high command any censure, doubt or debate would of course be forestalled, by his mere presence and blood. This time-honored maneuver not sufficing for long, Kaya was relegated to his present limbo in March.

Lieutenant-General IIMURA Jō (born 1888), as commander of the Tōkyō Defense Army, had what appeared to be perhaps the chief defense responsibilities in Japan Proper. This is a new command, created in July 1945, and Iimura was its first and last commander. Curiously, he has been better known for his service in administrative posts (such as Commandant of the Staff College and first director of the Total War Research Institute, from 1940) than in field commands. He is accounted a brilliant staff officer (he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in 1939) and administrator, but is known above all as the Army's leading expert on Far Eastern economics, and was reported in charge of the planning for exploitation of the territories conquered by the Southern Army. His foreign service was in Turkey.

Lieutenant-General UCHIYAMA Eitarō (born 1887), Central Army Commander since April, is an artilleryman and ordnance expert. He is

little known except that he is said to have distinguished himself as commander of armies in Manchuria and China since the beginning of the war, particularly in the campaign to open the railroad south to Hankow in 1944. He has been a lieutenant-general since October 1939.

Lieutenant-General YOKOYAMA Isamu (born 1889), an infantryman, has commanded the Western Army (Kyūshū) since November 1944. Before that he had had armies in Manchuria and central China, being best known for participation in the successful drives on Hengyang and Kweilin last year. He is considered an authority on Chinese economics.

Lieutenant-General HATA Hikosaburō (born 1890) is the officer who, as its chief of staff, was called upon to surrender the Kwangtung Army to Marshal Vasilevsky. He knew the Russians of old; he was once, seven or eight years ago, military attaché at Moscow. Upon his return to his army his knowledge was naturally put to use, Hata being made Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army in July 1941 (and lieutenant-general soon after). When he returned to it, as Chief of Staff, a few months ago, it was with the prestige of over two years as Vice-Chief of the General Staff under three chiefs, during which time he was concurrently Inspector of Transportation, and for a time Commandant of the Staff College. Hata had made a notable record as planner, administrator and staff officer, and better might have been expected of him than the Kwantung Army displayed during its fortnight's war. Hata has kept close to his profession, not straying into politics, and little is known of his personality.

Lieutenant-General NAKAMURA Aketo (born 1889). Nakamura, after a career which included as many of the big positions in the Japanese Army as any of his contemporaries has held, has been shelved during much of the war as commander of Thailand forces. After returning from Germany, where he had spent several years study in the early 'twenties, he worked up to the directorship of the Military Affairs and Personnel bureaux of the Ministry and, just before the outbreak of the war, commander of the Military Police. This is a place of much power; the Japanese Army's Kempeitai is a very different thing from our Military Police (it combines the functions also of secret police, Gestapo and, to an extent, of civilian police, being charged with supervision of "thought-control" and other anti-subversive activities as well as the policing chores which we associate with the conception of military police). For some reason Nakamura didn't succeed—perhaps danger-

ous thoughts got out of control—and he was transferred to Thailand in January 1943.

Lieutenant-General IKEDA Sumihisa (born 1894). High-ranking Army officers, active as well as retired, have come more and more, during the past decade, to monopolize the key positions in the civilian government. Such a one is that of Director of the General Planning Board, which Ikeda has held since July. This post is one involving staff work (the Board's functions were to draft necessary measures "for the more effective prosecution of the war on the home front," including all internal affairs—education, agriculture, transportation, food-supply), for which Ikeda is well suited. He came to it from the position of Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, where he had been since 1941. In his new job, Ikeda remains on active services.

Lieutenant-General IIDA Shōjirō (born 1888) is at present in an undisclosed position. He is one of the senior lieutenant-generals of the Army (his date of rank is August 1939) and was probably next in line for promotion to general. An infantryman, Iida made an excellent record in a number of responsible assignments; he was also said to be a favorite of both Sugiyama and Tōjō, which hasn't done him any harm. He has been director of the Personnel and Military Affairs bureaux; just before the war he was in command in Indo-China, and thereafter moved into Thailand and Burma—where he was responsible for giving General Stilwell "a hell of a beating." Iida got out of Burma, in time to save his reputation, in early 1943, served through most of 1944 as Central Army District commander, but has not been heard of in recent months.

Lieutenant-General SATŌ Kenryō (born 1895) must be looked upon as one of the ablest of the young officers of the past few years, though probably he has been a little too closely associated with the Kwantung Army clique for his own good. Satō is a firebrand, impetuous and impulsive, qualities which he has had ample opportunities to demonstrate. One occasion was when he was a member of the military mission which wrung from defenseless Indo-China the right to move troops through, to attack China from the rear, in 1940. Earlier, at home, he had attacked the Army's hated enemies the plutocrats for thinking only of profit, "while the soldiers advance in China in 100° heat." By virtue of his position as Director of the Military Affairs Bureau from April 1942 to December 1944 he did much of the sounding off for the Army during the war.

In the nineteen-thirties, Satō served a term as assistant attaché to the Embassy to the United States (he was stationed for a time at Fort Sam Houston), and the Army considers him one of its leading authorities on international affairs. He was remarkably early in reaching his present rank, in 1943, at the age of 48. He achieved another feat by surviving for six months in office the downfall of Tōjō, whose protégé and confidant he was. Satō's present whereabouts are unknown.

Lieutenant-General KURODA Shigenori (born 1887) is another formerly highly-placed officer now in eclipse. Kuroda, an infantryman, went from the position of Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, in May 1943, to become commander-in-chief in the Philippines, succeeding General Tanaka. He was superseded there upon the appointment of Yamashita to resist the reinvasion, in November 1944. Like so many of the leading Japanese commanders in this war, he has served terms as attaché at London and New Delhi, but little is known of him personally. His date of rank is August 1939.

Lieutenant-General MACHIJIRI Kazumoto (born 1888) has had a curiously uneven career. Of noble family, after his graduation from Staff College he was detailed ADC to Field-Marshal Oku, one of the Russo-Japanese War heroes, and subsequently an Imperial aide-de-camp. Machijiri is violent in disposition, indifferent to fame, courageous—and careless; he was dismissed, in 1938, as Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, over the loss of some secret documents. He was reinstated (he held the position for three terms, serving on and off from 1936 to 1939), but he never fulfilled the prophecies of observers who considered him one of the promising men of the Army. He was afterwards Vice-Chief of Staff of the China forces, Inspector of Artillery, and for a time from November 1942 commander in Indo-China, after which he was lost sight of.

Lieutenant-General SHIBAYAMA Kenshirō (born 1889), a Transport Corps officer, is considered one of the Army's great China experts, having passed a large part of his active career on the continent—he was "advisor" to the attaché's office in China for some years, and in 1943-44 was Vice-Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army. Otherwise, he has served in the Ministry, as Inspector of Transport, and as Vice-Minister of War for the life of the Koiso government, July 1944-April 1945. Shibayama's plebian appearance and manners belie his profound knowledge of international affairs; these, and his forthright manner and lack of finesse, have probably held him back.

General Koiso Kuniaki (born 1880). Koiso suddenly attained celebrity in 1944 as Premier of Japan; but he had long been known within Japan as one of the strong men of the Army. As a member of the Twelfth-year Class of the Military Academy he was a classmate of Field-Marshal Sugiyama and Hata, and with them he left the Army Staff College with the Class of 1910. His career ran for a time as brilliantly as theirs; he was promoted from the Directorship of the Military Affairs Bureau, in 1931, to the Vice-Ministership of War, which in turn he quitted at his own request in favor of the lesser position of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, in 1932, after the "Manchuria Incident" had got well under way. There he remained for two years, then after a term as divisional commander (his postponed required service upon promotion to lieutenant-general) became Commander-in-Chief of the Korea Army, where he remained from December 1935 to July 1938. He had meanwhile become a general in November 1937—being signally honored, so it was considered, by fortuitously being the hundredth general to be created.

Unhappily for Koiso, he had become embroiled in the factionalism which was rife in the Army during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties—and, as it proved, had chosen the wrong side. The relatively liberal party of General Ugaki was finally routed by the radical followers of General Araki, "the Loud Trombone of Destiny," and Koiso was (in common with many other liberally-inclined officers) retired, the immediate occasion being the beating which his Korea Army took from the Red Army at Changkufeng in July 1938. He has not, however, wanted for occupation since; he was Minister for Overseas Affairs in 1939 and 1940, and was Governor-General of Korea from June 1942 until his call to the Premiership came in July 1944.

Koiso won for himself, by his ruthlessness with the never-too-submissive Koreans, the soubriquet "the Tiger of Korea." Aside from his qualities as a subjugator, he is clear-headed, cautious, a powerful intellect and a driving force. An advocate of Japanese designs for expansion, he was none the less noted while he was in the service for his abstention from politics. He was one of the foremost leaders in developing the Army's "new economy" for Manchuria.

General NISHIO Toshizō (born 1881) is perhaps, so fast does the world move, hardly remembered now; but until the spring of 1941 he had been very much in the forefront of war in the Orient. For just two and a half years from September 1939 Nishio was Commander-in-

Chief of the armies in China, and one of the powerful men of the Army. But the war in China failed to come to an end, and Nishio was relieved in March 1941; and some time after the autumn of 1942 he was unobtrusively retired.

Nishio as a captain went as attaché to the Embassy in Berlin; was then Director of a bureau of the War Ministry, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, 1934-36, Vice-Chief of the General Staff at the beginning of the China war, divisional commander in China, Inspector-General of Military Education, general in 1939. During these years he seemed marked to dominate the Army; he was a brilliant strategist (second to Hata in the Staff College Class of 1910) and a successful commander; he holds the rarely-bestowed Order of the Golden Kite, First Class. For the drudgery of staff-work he had no stomach; but with his long-time chief of staff, Itagaki, poor commander but masterly planner, he made a perfect team. "Let Itagaki do the deskwork," he used to say; "I'll attend to the fighting." Saying so much was a concession for Nishio, known from his dislike for discussing military business and from his dourness as "the Silent General." Not only was Itagaki his man—he made him Minister of War, in 1938, over the heads of several irate seniors—but Tōjō also was largely the creation of this manipulator of the Kwantung Army. Nishio's aversions are better known than his preferences; he is a noted hater of Communism, and of Japan's great monopoly of plutocrats.

When Nishio's fellow-Kwantung Army graduate, Koiso, became Premier, Nishio again entered upon the scene as Governor of Tōkyō Metropolis—a war-time novelty erecting a sort of "city-and-county" government for the capital of Japan, the world's third city. Nishio resigned that office in August, and is momentarily a private citizen again.

General Tōjō Hideki (born 1884). Tōjō will doubtless be remembered as a man who nearly scaled the heights. Taciturn, hard-headed, ruthless and keen—he is called "*Kamisori*," "the Razor"—off to a good start in life as the son of a lieutenant-general of the Russo-Japanese War, Tōjō lacked the intellect of a Nishio, the color of an Itagaki. His *forte* was organizing, planning; whenever during the crucial decade or so just past a big planning job has been needed, Tōjō has been on hand. Nishio brought him in as commander of the *kempei*—the military police—of the Kwantung Army, and he stayed on as its chief of staff in 1937-38, when the China war was starting. Thence

he moved to Tōkyō as Vice-Minister of War, and in December 1938 became the first Inspector of Aviation when that office was created. In July 1940 he succeeded Hata as Minister of War, which position he retained upon becoming Premier on 18 October 1941 for the management of the Greater East Asia War.

To the Occidental the selection as Premier of a man notable for neither personality nor intellect may seem remarkable; but it was characteristic of the Japanese, who esteem individualism less and regimentation more than we. When the Army arrived at the point of taking over the government, it delegated the task to a man who would be a willing and, so to say, an anonymous tool, who would act on no personal ambition. In the end, it worked out otherwise; Tōjō, serving finally as Premier, Minister of War, Minister of Munitions—in control of all heavy industry, fuel production, armament manufacture—President of the authoritarian party, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and, at the last, Chief of the General Staff, was all but a dictator in the Western sense. The fall of his government, in July 1944, can be traced to many different causes, but primarily of course to the war disasters, which he, with the Japanese sense of personal responsibility, felt compelled to expiate personally.

Tōjō's fall was complete; not only was he stripped of all his positions in the government, but the Army retired him. This will have been done with sardonic solemnity by the new Minister of War, Field-Marshal Sugiyama, whom Tōjō had ejected from his place as Chief of Staff in February 1944.

Lieutenant-General ŌSHIMA Hiroshi (born 1886) was Japan's recent ambassador to Germany and is now a prisoner of the United States. Ōshima was a natural choice for liaison with Germany; his father, Lieutenant-General Ōshima Ken-ichi, was long connected with Germany as student and attaché, and apparently took a German wife (the son is big, blond and Prussian in appearance). From 1921 on Ōshima has been almost continuously in a German atmosphere: he was a student there with Yamashita, later attaché and twice—in 1938-39 and again after his retirement—ambassador (from February 1941). His associations in the Army are interesting: he was a classmate at Military Academy not only of Yamashita but also of Okabe, Fujie and Anami, and at Staff College of Tōjō, Homma and Yamashita. By personality—he is courteous, urbane, gregarious and discreet—no less than by his

perfect command of German he was well-equipped to deal with Japan's European ally.

Lieutenant-General HOMMA Masaharu (born 1888) is the outstanding example of a celebrated general of this war who has dropped completely from sight. After his relief from the Philippines command by General Tanaka, in August 1942, no announcement of his reassignment was made—though rumors multiplied; actually he was quietly retired at that time. His retirement may perhaps seem remarkable, in view of his being the conqueror of the Philippines for Japan, and a young man yet, as generals go. It must, however, be remembered that his casualties in the Philippines campaign were extremely high; and despite the cheapness with which life is held in the Orient, the Japanese commander whose casualties are great has never received the rewards which would otherwise have come his way.

His retirement notwithstanding, Homma was a successful military man. He is a big man, polished and intelligent, with an outstanding personality. He may be considered the Army's chief English expert—and its chief Anglophobe, this the requital for a cordial reception during his terms as attaché in London, during World War I (at which time he studied at Cambridge) and in 1930-32; as attaché in New Delhi in 1920; and as visitor to England (Aide-de-Camp to Prince Chichibu, the Emperor's brother) for the 1937 Coronation. Homma's chance to vent his spleen on the British came when he was in command of the garrison at the Japanese Concession at Tientsin. The British also had a concession at Tientsin, and Homma conceived the notion that he would force England to settle all impending controversies with Japan—such as the use of the Burma Road to supply China—by pressure on the concession. He accordingly declared a blockade; forced British men and women to undress in the streets for search, upon entering or leaving; had to open every bottle of milk, lest it conceal a bomb; and in general improved the occasion by much suave but minatory talk. Homma is a noted talker-out-of-turn, which may have affected his career. Four of his Military Academy classmates—Imamura, Tanaka, Kawabe and Kita—have reached full general grade; Homma, perhaps ablest of the lot, was a lieutenant-general from 1939. His occupation since his retirement has consisted of more talking: he has held forth, by radio, to the people of the Philippines, whom he "liberated."

CONCLUDED

A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT UNITED STATES ARMY

BY GEORGE JAMES STANSFIELD

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD, 1775-1789

The Judge Advocate General's Department has had a long and varied career in more than a century and a half of effectively administering an equitable system of military jurisprudence and rendering legal aid to the Secretary of War. Its origins can be traced to the very first years of the Republic—even prior to the creation of the War Department.

On June 30, 1775, the first "Articles of War" were enacted by the Continental Congress.¹ This legislation provided for a system of military law based upon a British model.² Shortly thereafter, on July 29, 1775, William Tudor, a prominent Boston lawyer, was appointed to the position of Judge Advocate of the Army, created that day.³ On August 10, 1776, Judge Advocate General Tudor was given the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Army of the United States.⁴

Colonel Tudor resigned and was succeeded by John Lawrence, the eminent jurist, on April 10, 1777.⁵ Before his appointment as Judge Advocate General, Colonel Lawrence had active service in the field with the revolutionary army, serving as both regimental and staff officer at various times. He acted as judge advocate of the board of officers investigating the Major André case, and served for five years as head of the administration of military law for the army.⁶ After the war Colonel Lawrence had a notable career as a federal judge, member of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

At various times during the war Congress appointed judge advocates or deputy judge advocates and from time to time it empowered commanding generals to appoint these officers. On November 20, 1777, orders issued from General Headquarters, Whitemarsh, stated

¹*Journals of the Continental Congress* (Worthington C. Ford, editor), Volume II, p. 111; Major General Myron C. Cramer, "Justice in a Wartime Army," in *Military Review*, Volume XXII (October 1942), p. 31. The 69 Articles of War of 1775 are to be found in the *American Archives* (Fourth Series), 1775, Volume II, pp. 1856-63.

²*A Manual for Courts-Martial*, 1921, p. xiii.

³Brigadier General William M. Dunn, *A Sketch of the History and Duties of the Judge Advocate General's Department*, p. 1.

⁴Raphael P. Thian, *Legislative History of General Staff of the Army of the United States*, p. 123.

⁵Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁶Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

"Lieutenant John Marshall is, by the Judge-Advocate-General, appointed deputy judge-advocate in the Army of the United States."⁷ Thus began the career of the great Chief Justice. On February 17, 1778, Congress confirmed the appointment of Henry Purcell as deputy judge advocate general for the states of South Carolina and Georgia.⁸ On April 9, 1780, orders from General Headquarters, Morristown, stated that "Lieutenant Edwards, of Colonel Jackson's regiment, is appointed deputy judge-advocate in the Army of the United States."⁹

An indication of the relative position of the Judge Advocate General during the incumbency of Tudor and Lawrence is to be found in the pay received by them. In 1777 the pay was sixty dollars per month and in 1778 it was raised to seventy-five dollars per month, rations, and forage for two horses; and in 1779 Congress ordered that "the subsistence of a judge-advocate be the same as the present subsistence of a colonel; and that the subsistence of a deputy judge-advocate be the same as the present subsistence of a lieutenant-colonel."¹⁰

In May 1782, Colonel Lawrence resigned his post.¹¹ Then began an almost futile effort to find a successor as the position went begging for lack of takers. On July 9, 1782, Congress proceeded to the election of a judge advocate for the Army, and having been duly nominated by Bland of Virginia, James Innis was elected to the office. Two days later, Congress passed a resolution fixing the pay at seventy-five dollars per month, but adding twelve and two-thirds dollars per month for subsistence, and an additional six and two-thirds dollars per month for a servant to whom would also be allowed rations and clothing equivalent to that of a private in the Army. Besides all this a two-horse wagon and forage for two saddle horses were permitted. Nevertheless Innis failed to communicate his acceptance of the offer and instead verbally intimated to friends that he would definitely decline if pressed too hard. Under the circumstances Congress proceeded to elect Major Howell in place of Innis. The Major's election took place on September 18, but by October 1, Congress received his refusal. Thus it came about that the choice finally fell on Lieutenant Thomas Edwards of the Ninth Massachusetts Regiment. Congress, not to be thwarted from the purpose of furnishing the Army with a judge advocate, elected Lieutenant Edwards on October 2, 1782, and the fact was

⁷Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹¹L. D. Ingersoll, *A History of the War Department of the United States*, p. 137.

duly published in orders from General Headquarters, Verplank's Point.¹² Colonel Edwards was the last incumbent of the office of Judge Advocate, or Judge Advocate General of the Army, as it was variously designated, prior to the adoption of the Constitution and the commencement of the Federal Government.¹³

During this period the original Articles of War establishing our military system were revised. Modifications were made on September 20, 1776 as the result of John Adams' Committee of Congress and by the resolutions of Congress of April 14, 1777 and May 31, 1786. These amendments were mainly concerned with redress of wrongs, general courts-martial, the power of pardon, and mitigation of sentences. The 1776 revision of the Articles of 1775 were suggested by General Washington, who submitted his amendments to the Committee through Colonel Tudor, the Judge-Advocate of the Army. Davis states that Adams, "to whose endeavors the adoption of the Articles of 1776 is in great part due," says that he was in favor of adopting the British Articles *totidem verbis*. In his diary under date of September 20, 1776, he refers to the revision as "the system which he persuaded Jefferson to agree with him in reporting to Congress."¹⁴

The Constitution in 1789 gave Congress specific powers of military regulation. In Article 1, Section 8, several clauses empower Congress (1) to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land or water; (2) to raise and support armies; and (3) to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

The act of September 29, 1789, recognized the existing military establishment, and contained a provision to the effect that the troops should "be governed by the Rules and Articles of War which have been established by the United States in Congress assembled, or by such Rules and Articles of War as may hereafter by law be established."¹⁵

THE EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

In 1784 the Army of the United States was reduced to less than one hundred officers and men and it was not until after the adoption of the Constitution that any great interest was taken in military matters.¹⁶

¹²Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹³Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁴Brigadier General George B. Davis, *A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States*, p. 342; *American Archives* (Fifth Series) 1776, Volume I, p. 1179.

¹⁵Stat. 95.

¹⁶Brevet Major General Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States*, pp. 68-69.

Judge advocates were merely detailed from the line of the army.¹⁷ The Army was organized into the Legion of the United States in 1792¹⁸ and on July 16, 1794 Lieutenant Campbell Smith was appointed "Judge Marshall and Advocate General to the Legion of the United States" by order of Brigadier General James Wilkinson.¹⁹

Lieutenant Smith served more than two years as Judge Marshall and relinquished his position July 13, 1796.²⁰ It appears that he was on an extended sick leave induced by a severe wound received in the service since he had to apply for congressional redress in 1800 for services rendered from 1794 to 1796.²¹

On June 2, 1797 Captain Campbell Smith became Judge Advocate of the Army.²² According to the Act of March 3 of that year provision was made for a Judge Advocate of the Army who was to be selected from the line "and shall receive two rations extra per day, and twenty-five dollars per month, in addition to his pay in the line; and whenever forage shall not be furnished by the public, to ten dollars per month in lieu thereof."²³ Captain Smith served as Judge Advocate of the Army until June 1, 1802 when he was honorably discharged,²⁴ his office having been abolished by the Act of March 16 of that year.²⁵

In 1806, the Articles of War of 1775 were thoroughly revised to correspond to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the arrangement by sections was replaced by a numerical arrangement of Articles from 1 to 101. These remained in force until 1874.

These Articles provided for certain procedures in conducting courts martial (Article 69) and continuity in the preservation of records of general courts-martial was assured in Article 90. This provides that: "Every judge-advocate, or person officiating as such, at any general court-martial, shall transmit, with as much expedition as the opportunity of time and distance of place can admit, the original proceedings and sentence of such court-martial to the Secretary of War; said original proceedings and sentence shall be carefully kept and preserved in the office of said Secretary, to the end that the persons entitled thereto

¹⁷Ingersoll, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

¹⁸Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 82-83.

¹⁹Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, Volume I, p. 1037.

²⁰Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 1037.

²¹American State Papers, *Military Affairs*, Volume I, pp. 144-46.

²²Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 1037.

²³1 Stat. 507.

²⁴Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 1037; Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

²⁵2 Stat. 132.

may be enabled, upon application to the said office, to obtain copies thereof."²⁶

The earliest known copy of a General Court-Martial is that of May 25, 1808 which gives the members of the court, Judge advocate, the charges and specifications, the questions to the answers of witnesses, the opinion of the court and the action of the reviewing authority and final sentence.²⁷ The earliest General Courts-Martial Case found in file is dated December 9, 1809.²⁸ The act of January 11, 1812 followed providing for the increase of the Army, including the appointment to each division of a Judge Advocate, who was to have the same pay and emoluments as a major of infantry; or, if the Judge Advocate was appointed from the line of the Army, he was to be entitled to thirty dollars per month in addition to his pay, and the same forage allowance as a major of infantry.²⁹

As a result of the act of 1812, a judge advocate was created for each division, with the rank and pay of major. Thomas Gales was the first appointee, September 26, 1812.³⁰ More than a year after the act was passed, in 1813, a half a dozen judge advocates received appointment including Evart A. Bancker, Philip S. Parker who subsequently became Recorder of Albany, New York, Robert Tillotson, John S. Willis, James T. Dent, and Stephen Lush. In 1814, five additional judge advocates entered upon their duties. One of them became the great publicist, Henry Wheaton, whose distinguished career embraced the posts of Reporter to the United States Supreme Court, Professor of Law at Harvard, author of the *Elements of International Law*, and American Minister to Denmark and Prussia. Another judge advocate was Major Auguste Davezac who served in that capacity with Andrew Jackson's army at the defense of New Orleans, and later became *chargé d'affaires* to the Netherlands. The list of 1814 appointees was completed by the names of Rider H. Winder, Leonard M. Parker, and Samuel Wilcox.³¹

Besides the Rules and Articles of War, Congress, in the act of March 3, 1813, authorized the "Secretary of the war department" to prepare "General Regulations" for the governance of the Army. It was provided that these regulations, when approved by the President of

²⁶2 Stat. 359; Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

²⁷Proceedings of General Courts-Martial, Book Two, pp. 1-10, from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

²⁸Proceedings of General Courts-Martial, Case X156, from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

²⁹2 Stat. 671.

³⁰Thian, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Dunn, p. 14.

³¹Dunn, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

the United States, were to be respected and obeyed until altered or revoked by the same authority.³² Two years later, when the second war with Britain was concluded, an act of April 24, 1816 provided "that the regulations in force before the reduction of the army" (which had been effected by an Act approved March 3, 1815), "be recognized . . . subject, however, to such alterations as the Secretary of War may adopt with the approbation of the President."³³ The General Regulations of the Army thus had all the binding force of military law, provided always, of course, that they were consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The Act of April 24, 1816 also increased the number of Judge Advocates to three per division, with the same rank, pay and perquisites as before.³⁴ These additional judge advocates ranked in the order named by date of appointment were: William O. Winston, Thomas Hanson, Samuel A. Storrow and John L. Lieb.³⁵ Even though the number of judge advocates per division was reduced to one with the pay and emoluments of a topographical engineer in 1818,³⁶ another Judge Advocate was appointed: Stockley D. Hays.³⁷ He was the last to be appointed prior to 1821 when the Act of March 2³⁸ caused the discontinuance of the office as of June 1.³⁹

THE YEARS OF OBLIVION 1821-1849

Between the years 1821 and 1849 there were no statutory enactments relating to the judge advocates of the Army. It was a period characterized by details from the line, as a matter of expediency rather than a settled policy. Military law, procedure, and administration were therefore dependent for development on Army Regulations and orders, which are next in point of authority to Congressional acts and court decisions.⁴⁰ Of course a regulation, which is merely an executive or administrative rule, cannot contravene statute law, otherwise it has no legal effect.⁴¹

³²² Stat. 819.

³³² Stat. 297.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 1, 15.

³⁶³ Stat. 426.

³⁷ William A. Gordon, *A Compilation of the Registers of the Army from 1815 to 1837*, p. 150.

³⁸³ Stat. 615.

³⁹ Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁰ Brigadier General G. Norman Lieber, *Remarks on Army Regulations and Executive Regulations in General*, Chapter I, "Classification and Source of Authority of Army Regulations," pp. 5-20.

⁴¹ "The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the legality and force of Army Regulations; 'The Army Regulations, when sanctioned by the President, have the force of law, because it is done by him by the authority of law.' (U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How., 567); . . . The Army Regulations derive their force from the power of the President as commander-in-chief, and are binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority. (Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 503)." Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 7.

General orders issued, through subordinate commanders, from the authority of the President as constitutional commander-in-chief, are the means of regulating the conduct of military personnel, and controlling the operations of individuals, or organizations under their several commands. Orders issued by subordinate commanders in the lower levels of organization operate only within their sphere of authority, but they receive their sanction from the Articles of War, which are a part of statutory law, and make disobedience punishable at the discretion of a court-martial.⁴²

In this period from 1821 to 1849, rather curiously, the military legal structure and administration of the Army was given no recognition on the War Department General Staff, although that body included the generous number of ten staff-departments and staff-corps.⁴³ Yet the Army Regulations of 1835 state: "The discipline and reputation of the army, are deeply involved in the manner in which military courts are conducted, and justice administered." Furthermore, the regulations emphasize that officers appointed to sit as members of courts-martial are charged with duties of the gravest and most important character, and that it is therefore "incumbent on all officers to apply themselves diligently to the acquirement of a complete knowledge of military law; to make themselves perfectly acquainted with all orders and regulations, and with the practice of military courts."⁴⁴

Again, the Army Regulations for 1841 lay down the rule that "The General Staff may be considered the central point of military administration. It is the source whence proceed all general orders for the army, the orders of detail, of instruction, of movement; and when issue the general regulations for the service."⁴⁵ Nevertheless the Army had no Judge Advocate General, and there was no recognition of military jurisprudence by its governing staff.

During this period of Congressional inactivity relating to military jurisprudence, the Army Regulations show comparatively little change, from decade to decade, in their prescriptions of procedure, duties, and jurisdictions of courts-martial.

Of the three types of courts-martial used with progressively lower jurisdictions, the court of highest jurisdiction was the general courts-martial. The Army Regulations of 1820, based on the Articles of

⁴²Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴³Gordon, *A Compilation of Registers of the Army of the United States from 1815 to 1837; Official Army Register*, 1837-59.

⁴⁴*General Regulations for the Army of the United States*, 1835, p. 91.

⁴⁵*General Regulations*, 1841, p. 133.

War of 1806, prescribed that a general court-martial could be composed of any number of commissioned officers from five members to thirteen members, although the higher number was preferred whenever possible. In interpreting the meaning of "commissioned officers," the custom of the service was to exclude from that class all surgeons, paymasters, and other persons who did not have the inherent right of command. Although in urgent circumstances there was an unavoidable temptation to use non-combat staff officers for court duty, the question was settled by the opinion of Attorney General J. McP. Berrien who, in his statement of November 6, 1829, said that courts-martial were borrowed from England, and that in England these courts were successors to the ancient courts of chivalry which were composed only of military men; since the questions at issue were those of military discipline and usage, non-combatants "could not be deemed competent to sit on courts-martial."⁴⁶

The question also arose whether cadets who had graduated and held the brevet rank of second lieutenant, but were attached to the Army only as supernumerary officers, could be considered commissioned officers within the meaning of the Articles of War. Attorney General Berrien, in his opinion of August 17, 1829, ruled that they were not commissioned officers in the fullest sense of the term, and therefore not eligible to sit on general courts-martial.⁴⁷ But this opinion of the Attorney General was never popular, and subsequently the question received a different settlement by the War Department, in a General Order of 1845, which stated that cadet graduates, attached to organizations but holding only brevet commissions of the lowest rank were nevertheless to be "entitled to all consideration as a commissioned officer."⁴⁸ In July 1855, Attorney General Cushing, constrained to re-interpret the question, upheld the views "that a brevet second lieutenant is a commissioned officer; that he can be tried as a commissioned officer; and that he is legally capable as a commissioned officer to try (cases)."⁴⁹

With reference to the number of officers composing a general court martial, the question arose from time to time as to whether less than thirteen officers constituted a legal court when it would have been possible to convene that many "without manifest injury to the service."

⁴⁶Benét, *op. cit.*, p. 20; see also *General Regulations*, 1820, p. 18.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴⁸War Department, General Orders, No. 11, April 15, 1845.

⁴⁹Benét, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 22.

Benét quotes Justice Story to the effect that the Supreme Court, in the case of *Martin V. Mott*, decided that "the direction contained in the act of 1806, that a general court-martial 'shall not consist of less than thirteen, when that number can be convened without manifest injury to the service,' is merely directory of the office appointing the court; and his decision as to whether that number can be convened without manifest injury to the service, being in a matter subjected to his sound discretion, must be conclusive."⁵⁰

The Army Regulations of 1835, confirmed by those of 1841 and 1847, further add that while member officers of the court could meet and adjourn when all members were not present, the whole court had to be present in order to render an act legal. Both prosecutor and prisoner were granted the right of challenge.⁵¹

Since the general court-martial is the highest tribunal known to military law, it has the most comprehensive jurisdiction over persons and cases, and therefore such a court can be convened only by officers exercising high command, such as a general officer commanding any army, or a colonel commanding a separate department.⁵² The general courts-martial may try any persons subject to military law for any offense over which such tribunals are given statutory jurisdiction. The warrant for the assembling of a court-martial was thus issued in the form of an order, by the officer legally empowered to do so. The sentence pronounced by a court martial could not, however, become operative until reviewed and approved by the general or other appointing officer.⁵³

Only a general court-martial has jurisdiction on cases involving officers, and on cases involving capital punishment.⁵⁴ In time of peace a sentence of death, or of dismissal from the service could not be executed until the whole proceedings had been transmitted through the Secretary of War to the President of the United States for his decision and orders in the case.⁵⁵

Regimental courts-martial were given jurisdiction over all non-capital offenses which did not require a punishment in excess of one month's imprisonment. An officer commanding a regiment, or what was in those days loosely termed a "corps," could appoint a court of three members from officers of his own organization. An officer com-

⁵⁰12 Wheaton, 34, 35, cited in Benét, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 24.

⁵¹*General Regulations*, 1835, pp. 93, 94.

⁵²*General Regulations*, 1820, p. 18.

⁵³*General Regulations*, 1835, p. 103.

⁵⁴67th Article of War of 1806, *General Regulations*, 1841, p. 14.

⁵⁵65th Article of War of 1806, *ibid.*, p. 14.

manding a garrison, post, or barracks where more than one organization was represented could appoint a garrison court-martial composed of three officers of the post.⁵⁶ A regimental or garrison court-martial could not inflict a fine exceeding one month's pay, nor try commissioned officers. All fines were to be reported to the Adjutant General, and were to be indicated on the muster rolls so that stoppages could be made accordingly.⁵⁷

There was also provision for a statute of limitations on trial and punishment by a general courts-martial, the accused being liable for trial only within two years of the commitment of the alleged offense. But if the accused had impeded justice, by flight or otherwise, within the stipulated period, the limitation could be waived by an officer empowered to convene a court.⁵⁸ The officer ordering a court martial also had the power of pardon or of mitigation of sentence, except where the punishment involved death or cashiering, in which case he could suspend sentence until the President of the United States had received the proceedings and rendered a decision.⁵⁹

A court of inquiry could be ordered by a general or commanding officer to examine "into the nature of any transaction, accusation or imputation, against any officer or soldier," but, to prevent the abuse of such courts, it was expressly provided that they could be called only when requested by the accused, or directed by the President of the United States. The court of inquiry was to consist of from one to three officers, a judge advocate or a recorder, and all were to be duly sworn. The court had the same power as a court martial to summon witnesses, and to examine under oath. Cross-examination by the accused was also permitted. The proceedings of the court of inquiry had to be authenticated by the signature of the recorder and the president of the court, and then delivered to the commanding officer. The proceedings could thereafter be admitted as evidence at a court-martial.⁶⁰

The Act of March 16, 1806, which remained unaltered, stated "that whenever a general court-martial shall be ordered, the President of the United States may appoint some fit person to act as judge advocate who shall be allowed, in addition to his other pay, one dollar and twenty-five cents, for every day he shall be necessarily employed in the duties of the said court; and in places where the President shall not

⁵⁶66th Article of War of 1806, *ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵⁷*General Regulations*, 1835, pp. 103, 104.

⁵⁸88th Article of War of 1806.

⁵⁹89th Article of War of 1806.

⁶⁰91st and 92nd Articles of War of 1806.

have made such appointment, the brigadier general, or the president of the court, may make the same.”⁶¹ To any officer travelling and sitting on a court martial a “reasonable compensation” was allowed, in addition to his pay, but such compensation could not exceed one dollar and twenty-five cents per day.

Members of a court-martial were reminded that they had two distinct duties to perform: that of jurors, and that of judges.⁶² The judge advocate, or some person deputed by him, or by the commanding officer, prosecuted in the name of the United States, but he was also to consider the prisoner’s interests “and guard him in the exercise and privileges of his legal rights” such as objecting to leading questions to witnesses or any questioning of the prisoner which might cause him to incriminate himself. The judge advocate also advised courts-martial procedure, and the nature and limits of the court’s authority. He collected, and arranged the testimony required, and presented the evidence. This work also included the preparation, care and disposition of the records, and the safe-keeping of all papers used in trials. To properly fulfill such an office the Judge Advocate was enjoined to become thoroughly acquainted with the principles of judicial procedure, the military laws and regulations governing the service, and the established customs of the Army.⁶³

By practice it was established that the officer preferring charges was permitted to act jointly with the judge advocate. The prosecutor could call witnesses, produce his written evidence, and be examined as a witness in support of the charges he himself had preferred. But the prosecutor could not aggravate the guilt of the prisoner by citing facts not directly connected with the specific offense alleged, and he had to present all his evidence before the defence of the prisoner commenced, as no further evidence would be permitted afterwards, in proof of the specific facts alleged in the charge. To answer such requirements it was therefore necessary to draw up charges with the utmost precision, and to describe the time and place where a fact occurred. Facts of a “distinct nature” could not be included in one and the same charge or specification of a charge, but had to be the subject of a separate charge or specification. After a prisoner had been arraigned on specific charges it was irregular for a court martial to admit any additional charge against him. The trial on the first charges had to be regularly con-

⁶¹*General Regulations*, 1820, p. 44.

⁶²*General Regulations*, 1835, p. 100.

⁶³*General Regulations*, 1841, p. 84.

cluded, after which another trial could be held on any further charges. Proceedings or trials had to be limited, as the law required, to meetings held between the hours of eight o'clock in the morning to three o'clock in the afternoon. Upon completion of the trial, the verdict and any subsequent sentence had to conform to the punishment prescribed in the Article of War for the transgression of which the prisoner was convicted. However, where the punishment was left to the discretion of the court it was to be in accordance with the "custom of war in like cases." In the findings and sentences of courts-martial the utmost precision was enjoined in specifying the degree of guilt and the exact nature of the punishment.⁶⁴

The character and disposal of the records were expressly stipulated. The proceedings of all general courts-martial were to be made on letter paper to preserve a uniformity in the records. A prisoner was to be furnished a correct copy of the charges, and the omission to do this could cause postponement of the trial. In making up the record of the proceedings of courts-martial, a copy of the order appointing the court, and a list of the members were to be included. A margin of one inch was to be left on the inner edge of each sheet. "The pages in each case will be correctly numbered, and the documents which are to accompany the proceedings, will be noted and marked in such manner as to afford an easy reference."⁶⁵

The Army Regulations of 1820 following the Act of Congress of 1806, required that the Judge Advocate at any general court-martial should transmit, as expeditiously as possible, "the original proceedings and sentence of such court-martial to the Secretary of War," and he was to see to it that the records were "carefully kept and preserved" so that persons entitled thereto, upon application to the Secretary's Office, could obtain copies thereof.⁶⁶ However, the Army Regulations of 1835, 1841, and 1847, changed this final repository of the records with the direction that "the original proceedings of all general courts-martial will, after receiving the final action of the approving officer, be sent to the office of the Adjutant General for safekeeping."⁶⁷ The proceedings of regimental and garrison courts-martial remained at the headquarters of the regiment or post, unless specially directed to be deposited in the Adjutant General's office.⁶⁸

⁶⁴*General Regulations*, 1835, pp. 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 102.

⁶⁵*General Regulations*, 1835, p. 103.

⁶⁶*General Regulations*, 1820, p. 22.

⁶⁷*General Regulations*, 1835, p. 103; 1841, p. 42; 1847, p. 62.

⁶⁸*General Regulations*, 1841, p. 42.

An order from the Commanding General of the Army, on September 29, 1830, notified the Army that an act of Congress of May 29, 1830, provided that thereafter no officer or soldier of the United States should be subject to the death penalty for desertion in time of peace. The same act also amended the 65th Article of War of 1806, to the effect that "whenever a General Officer commanding an army, or a Colonel commanding a separate department, shall be the accuser or prosecutor of any Officer in the Army of the United States, under his command, the General Court-Martial, for the trial of such Officer, shall be appointed by the President of the United States." Furthermore, the act went on to state, "that the proceedings and sentence of said court, shall be sent directly to the Secretary of War, to be by him laid before the President for his confirmation, or approval, or orders in the case."⁶⁹

During the following decade, the only other significant addition to the general regulations governing the courts-martial was made in November 1841, when a general order from the Headquarters of the Army stated that vacancies in a courts-martial could only be filled by the officer appointing the court, and that in no case could this authority be delegated to any other officer.⁷⁰

Various cases of courts martial are published in the orders of the decades of the '30's and '40's. Quite a number of them seem to be due to instances of spite or personal difficulties between superior and subordinate officers. At a general court martial convened at Fort Leavenworth on May 8, 1835, a First Lieutenant of the Dragoons was tried for issuing a challenge to a duel to his superior officer.⁷¹ There are a considerable number of charges of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," some of which seem trivial, but that of one Captain is symptomatic of the fiscal difficulties and temptations of the frontier. This officer was tried on the above charge, supported by four specifications; (1) that he had made a false assertion to the Acting Secretary of War A. M. Lea, with reference to the disposition of a \$31,000 annuity of the Creek Indian Tribe, (2) that he also falsely asserted that he was unaware of charges made against him that he had embezzled eight thousand dollars of the money, (3) that he had tried to influence the President of the United States against calling a court of inquiry in the matter, by writing the President a letter containing

⁶⁹Adjutant General's Office, Order No. 45, Sept. 25, 1830.

⁷⁰Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 71, November 18, 1841.

⁷¹Proceedings of General Courts-Martial, Case CC88, from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

false assertions, (4) that he had accosted Major General Winfield Scott, and attempted to influence him by stating that he had not solicited several Congressmen to write to the President in his favor. The general court-martial met in New York, November 10, 1841. To both the charge and the specifications the accused pleaded "Not Guilty." After trial and mature deliberation the court found him "Not Guilty" of any one of the four specifications, and forthwith acquitted him. With the approval of the President, he was ordered to immediately proceed to his company in Florida.⁷¹ Needless to say the exoneration did not repay the unfortunate accused for his expenses out-of-pocket, and other sufferings necessarily endured.

The majority of charges against officers were preferred for such reasons as "Neglect of duty and disobedience of orders," "Drunkenness," "Absence without leave," "Disrespectful and insubordinate conduct," "Un-officer like conduct," and "Gambling."⁷²

In the early part of the century, the country was divided into two military divisions, and officers of the staff departments including judge advocates were assigned to each. However, in the channels of military communications, from the lower echelons to headquarters in Washington, correspondence was delayed by the necessity of going from the field organization to the department headquarters, from there to the division headquarters, and then to Washington. On July 11, 1842, the War Department issued an order that "the President directs that the two military geographical Divisions be discontinued." This was done because "The great improvement which has been made in the facility of intercourse between the seat of government and the most remote parts of the Union . . . renders correspondence so rapid, that Divisions are deemed no longer necessary." The departments were, therefore, to report directly to Washington, and the major general commanding the Army was instructed to redistrict the United States into Military Departments, not to exceed ten in number.⁷³

From 1842 until the creation of the statutory office of the Judge Advocate of the Army in 1849, the office of the Adjutant General was concerned with military justice.⁷⁴

The Adjutant General, Colonel Rodger Jones wrote several opinions between December 21, 1842 and August 28, 1843 regarding ir-

⁷¹War Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 80, December 13, 1841.

⁷²Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Orders, 1830-1842, *passim*.

⁷³Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 40, July 12, 1842.

⁷⁴Record Book Number One, pp. 1-43 from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

regularities in courts-martial procedure.⁷⁵ During this period, however, Acting Judge Advocates prepared reports on cases and wrote opinions. The first Acting Judge Advocate from February 8, 1843 to March 11, 1847 was First Lieutenant Samuel Chase Ridgley, 4th Artillery of Maryland (U.S.M.A. Class of 1831).⁷⁶ He was followed by Captain Leslie Chase, 2nd Artillery of New York (U.S.M.A. Class of 1838).⁷⁷ Captain John Fitzgerald Lee, Ordnance Department, of Virginia (U.S.M.A. Class of 1834) performed these duties in 1848 and 1849.⁷⁸

In general the procedure was for the Acting Judge Advocate to prepare a report for the Adjutant General who in turn forwarded it by endorsement to the General-in-Chief, General Scott. The latter's opinion on the case was thereafter written by the Judge Advocate to the officer concerned.⁷⁹ On one occasion, Lieutenant Ridgley wrote the Secretary of War directly from the Adjutant General's office August 1, 1846.⁸⁰ Several opinions were written by the Adjutant General as late as 1849, and his last correspondence is dated March 7, 1849 overlapping in time the statutory creation of the Judge Advocate of the Army.⁸¹

By the Act of March 2, 1849, the Congress authorized the appointment of a Judge Advocate of the Army, enacting in Section 4 of that act, "that the President be, and he is hereby authorized by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint a suitable person as Judge Advocate for the Army, to be taken from the captains in the Army, who shall have the brevet rank, pay and emoluments of a major of cavalry."⁸² As a result of this enactment, the long hiatus of two-thirds of a generation without an official head for military jurisprudence was ended, and Captain John F. Lee of the Ordnance Department was appointed the new Judge Advocate continuing in that office until he resigned September 4, 1862.⁸³

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE OF THE ARMY 1849-1862

Apparently there was little work to be done in the office of the Judge Advocate since the first opinion signed by Captain Lee as Judge Advocate.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 1-7.

⁷⁶Brevet Major General George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy*, p. 474; Record Book One, pp. 8-17.

⁷⁷Cullum, *op. cit.*, Volume I, pp. 709-710; Record Book One, pp. 18-21.

⁷⁸Cullum, *op. cit.*, Volume I, pp. 570-571; Record Book One, pp. 21-43.

⁷⁹Record Book One, pp. 1-43, *passim*.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸²Stat. 351.

⁸³Cullum, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

cate of the Army was dated June 17, 1850,⁸⁴ and the first recorded incoming correspondence was dated August 19, 1854.⁸⁵ This late date for the beginning of the filing of letters received may be explained by the fact that correspondence regarding courts-martial cases is usually filed with the case and that the Judge Advocate had little other business during these quiet years before the War.

During the subsequent decade there were some modifications of regulations, and interpretations of the Articles of War, but no substantial procedural change in convening and conducting courts martial, and attesting and recording them.

On examination of several cases spaced at intervals in the years of 1852, 1854, and 1858, and comparing their records with those of 1815 to 1827, it is apparent that except for the better quality of the paper of the mid-century, there is no difference of substance in the proceedings or the manner of recording.⁸⁶

In each case we have a complete record of the composition, organization, and proceedings of the court in that case. At the beginning the convening order is given which gives the court the necessary jurisdiction. One General Court-Martial was convened by command of Major General Wool, by virtue of Orders No. 40, Headquarters, Eastern Division, Troy, N. Y., August 2, 1852.⁸⁷ The order specifies that the court is to consist of seven members and a Judge Advocate. Then follows the specific naming of the detail for the court, the names of all seven officers and the Judge Advocate being listed. The insertion of the order upon the record thus shows that it was issued by an officer competent to convene such a court martial, and that it contained members eligible to sit upon the court for the trial of that case.⁸⁸

Next follows the organization of the court. This includes the date and place of meeting, with the names and rank of the members present and that of the Judge Advocate, and any absent members are noted, with the cause of absence stated if known.⁸⁹

⁸⁴Record Book One, p. 43.

⁸⁵Letters Received Book Number One, Entry "B"; Document File Number One from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

⁸⁶Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fort Hamilton, N. Y., November 19, 1858, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fort Columbus, N. Y., May 30, 1854, H. H. 396, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fort Columbus, N. Y., August 10, 1852, H. H. 198, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fortress Monroe, Va., December 15, 1827, I 51, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fort Nelson, March 11, 1817, L 23, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, New Orleans, La., February 14, 1815, H 1, from the records of the Judge Advocate General in the National Archives.

⁸⁷Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Fort Columbus, N. Y., August 10, 1852, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸Edgar S. Dudley, *Military Law and the Procedure of Courts-Martial*, p. 179.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 179.

Then the accused is introduced to the court, and given an opportunity to challenge any of the members present. After the challenges, if any, are decided and a quorum of at least five members remains, the Judge Advocate swears in the court, and in turn he is sworn in by the presiding officer of the new court. This completes the organization of the court, and leads up to the arraignment of the accused.⁹⁰

The arraignment consists of the charges and their accompanying specifications. The accused makes a separate plea for each charge and specification, saying either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty." Thus he can plead guilty to part, and not guilty to other parts of the specifications and charges. The arraignment is always made immediately after the court and the Judge Advocate have been sworn, for if it were taken before the oath it would be invalid and without effect.⁹¹

In all the trials the next item on the agenda is the testimony, or the evidence in the case. The witnesses of the prosecution are sworn and testify, one by one, and the questions and answers are recorded in order. The accused here not infrequently exercises the right of cross-examination, and the questions asked are recorded as "questions by the accused," or "questions by the prisoner." The defense witnesses follow. At the conclusion the accused can and sometimes does make either a verbal or written statement, which is signed but not sworn to, and is appended to the proceedings and marked "A," "B," "C," or so on. The Judge Advocate may make a reply which is also appended and marked "C," "D," and so on as the case may be.⁹²

When both parties have submitted all their evidence, the records show that the Judge Advocate, the accused, and any counsel then withdrew, and the court was closed for deliberations.⁹³ The findings of the court name the accused and his rank exactly as stated in the charges and specifications, finding "Guilty" or "Not Guilty" for each charge and specification separately. Thereafter the court proceeds to sentence or acquit the accused. The sentence must accord with whatever is prescribed by law or by orders and regulations, unless the punishment happens to be discretionary.⁹⁴

The complete record of the case, when written out, is then read to and approved by the court⁹⁵ and thereafter authenticated by the signa-

⁹⁰Dudley, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-81.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 181-82.

⁹²*Ibid.*, pp. 182-84.

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 187.

tures of the president of the court and the Judge Advocate, and a couple of blank pages left for the action of the reviewing authority, although this latter point is not strictly adhered to in the case of privates convicted of minor offenses. After the record is completed and approved by the court, it states that, at such and such an hour the court proceeded to other business, or adjourned to meet at a certain date and hour, or if it has no more business to transact, the court adjourned *sine die*.⁹⁶ The entire record is then promptly forwarded by the Judge Advocate to the convening authority.⁹⁷

In connection with court procedure, it may be mentioned that cases occurred where the court may have found the accused guilty of one or more specifications in two or more charges, yet found the accused not guilty of the charges, but nevertheless proceeded, irregularly, to pass sentence upon him. Such proceedings were strongly disapproved in a General Order in 1843.⁹⁸ Of course the convening authority is competent to alter and amend the original charges, at any time, prior to the arraignment, and also to prefer additional charges and specifications against the accused. The latter must be acquainted with, in due time, of such changes, and before being called to plead. After the arraignment no additional charges or alterations can be made.⁹⁹ Another General Order in 1856 lays down the rule that the accused cannot be convicted under any other Article of War except that under which he was charged.¹⁰⁰

An opinion of Attorney General Cushing, in 1855, stated that whenever the higher reviewing authority desires a revision and the court has lawfully reassembled for a revision, but some of its members are absent, so long as there is a legal quorum the court may proceed to reconsider or modify the sentence of the original record.¹⁰¹ In a further opinion given in 1857, the Attorney General stated that "in those numerous incidents of their constitution and mode of action, concerning which the statute rules are silent, courts-martial are to be governed by the general principles of military law, recurring to adjudged cases, precedents ruled, authoritative legal opinions, and approved books of legal exposition."¹⁰²

⁹⁶Dudley, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁹⁸Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 69, December 30, 1843.

⁹⁹Headquarters, Department of Texas, Orders, No. 20, June 5, 1855.

¹⁰⁰War Department, General Orders, No. 7, June 18, 1856. War Department, General Orders No. 8, July 23, 1856.

¹⁰¹Benét, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 88.

The outbreak of the Civil War caused the issuance of new regulations made necessary by the changed conditions of the service, and the influx of militia and volunteers. An Act of Congress of February 28, 1795 was called to the attention of the military forces, in which it was provided that "the militia . . . called into the service of the United States shall be subject to the same rules and articles of war as the troops of the United States," and that "every officer, non-commissioned officer, or private of the militia, who shall not obey the orders of the President of the United States . . . shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one year's pay, and not less than one month's pay, to be determined and adjudged by a court-martial; and such officer shall be liable to be cashiered by a sentence of court-martial."¹⁰³

The Act of Congress of December 24, 1861, provided that in time of war a commander of a division or separate brigade may appoint a General Court-Martial, "and confirm, execute, pardon, and mitigate their sentences." But sentences of death, or dismissal from service of a commissioned officer, required the confirmation of the commanding general of the army in the field.¹⁰⁴

The Act of March 13, 1862 added an additional Article of War that all officers, or persons in the military or naval service of the United States, are prohibited from using any forces under their commands for returning escaped fugitives from labor, i.e., negro slaves, to their masters. The penalty for the violation of this article was dismissal from service of any officer found guilty by a court-martial.¹⁰⁵ Another Act of Congress of June 2, 1862 dealt with the prevention and punishment of fraud on the part of officers concerned with making contracts.¹⁰⁶

The most important event of this period, relating to the military jurisprudence system, was the Act of Congress of July 17, 1862 (Public No. 166), which states in Section 5, "that the President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Judge Advocate General, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry."

(To be Concluded)

¹⁰³War Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 54, August 10, 1861. The order then goes on to state that militia officers convicted may also be held incapable of holding a commission, and non-commissioned officers and privates are liable to imprisonment for failure to pay a fine.

¹⁰⁴Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 111, December 30, 1861.

¹⁰⁵War Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 27, March 21, 1862.

¹⁰⁶War Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders, No. 58, June 4, 1862.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

As the first event on its winter calendar, the American Military Institute, jointly with the Army Industrial College, scheduled "A Panel Discussion on the Atomic Bomb and Its Implications," which was held on Tuesday evening, 11 December 1945, at 5:00 p.m., at Georgetown University, Gaston Hall, 37th and O Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C. The program was as follows:

BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG, *Presiding*

SPEAKERS

- 5:00 PM Major General Leslie R. Groves, War Department General Staff
 Dr. Bernard Brodie, Institute of International Studies, Yale University
- 6:30 PM Dinner
- 7:45 PM Commodore W. S. Parsons, Special Assistant to Deputy Chief of Naval
 Operations (Special Weapons)
 Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania
 Dr. Troyer S. Anderson, Office of the Secretary of War

* * *

Before final preparations were completed on this number of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, we watched President Truman, before a crowd of thousands in the Pentagon courtyard, present an oak leaf cluster for distinguished service to the retiring Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. In accepting the President's tribute the words of General Marshall seemed a satisfying conclusion to the remarkable series of speeches which he had made during his term as Chief of Staff. Forty-eight of these public statements, made between 1938 and 1945, have recently appeared in *The Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall*, edited by Major H. A. DeWeerd, formerly editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, now historian of the Office, Chief of Staff, OPD.

Included among Major DeWeerd's selections is the significant address which General Marshall made before a joint meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association on December 28, 1939. Therein General Marshall outlined overall requirements for the defense of the United States. He stressed the fact that lack of planning and the necessity for too-hasty recruiting and training of our armies for conflicts prior to and including World War I had resulted in a tragic loss of human lives as the price of victory. He

listed amendments to the National Defense Act of 1920 which, in his opinion, if properly administered and developed, would "provide a democratic basis for the National Defense suitable to our form of government and to our particular international situation." If the "deadly disease" of war is ever to be understood and cured, General Marshall maintained that it must be through a knowledge of "the true fact, the causes and consequences that make our military history." And he stated his faith in an informed public opinion thus: "In our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed regarding the factors that bear on the subject."

* * *

Plans for the Institute to participate in the customary annual meeting of the American Historical Association, to have been held in Washington this December, have been cancelled in accordance with a decision reached by the Executive Committee of the Council, AHA, to forego the event this year. According to Dr. Guy Stanton Ford, Executive Secretary, AHA, the decision was prompted by transportation and housing difficulties in and around Washington, which seem not to have been alleviated by the ending of the war. The American Historical Association will follow a precedent set three years ago, which, according to Dr. Ford, will require merely "a meeting of the Council, a token business meeting, and an annual dinner for the President's address," all presumably to take place on December 28, 1945.

* * *

A suggestion from Mr. George H. Hoffman led a number of members and officers of this institute to consider the efforts of the Social Science Research Council to secure an extension of the wording of the Kilgore Bill (S. 1297) to cover the social as well as the physical sciences under its program of public support. On October 2, 1945, the following statement was sent to Dr. Donald Young, chairman of the Social Science Research Council:

The American Military Institute is concerned with the furtherance of all that relates to the study of war, particularly as it affects the United States. The executive committee, acting for the officers and members of the American Military Institute, heartily endorses the general purposes of the Kilgore Bill (S. 1297) soon to come before the Congress of the United States for debate.

By its present language, however, the Kilgore Bill limits the program of Federal aid to "Science and the useful arts."

Mindful of the very important role played by the social scientists of all academic disciplines in the recent war effort of the United States and foreseeing the still greater role which the social scientists may be called upon to play in any further war emergency, the American Military Institute, through its executive committee, strongly recommends that the language and scope of the proposed legislation include all relevant scientific research, in both the natural and the social sciences.

s/ Donald Armstrong
DONALD ARMSTRONG
Brigadier General
President, AMI

The Executive Committee

Donald Armstrong, Brig. Gen.
Commandant, Army Industrial College
Joseph I. Greene, Col., Inf.
Editor, *Infantry Journal*

Robert O. Albion, Ass't Dean
Princeton University
H. A. DeWeerd, Maj., GSC
Operations Division
War Department General Staff

* * *

The War Department has announced the establishment of a Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, to which is transferred all functions, records, and personnel previously assigned to Historical Branch, G-2. Major General E. F. Harding, President of the Infantry Association and long a member of the Institute, has been designated Director of the Division. His Deputy Director is Colonel Allen F. Clark, Jr., formerly Chief of Historical Branch, G-2. Also joining the Division is Colonel John M. Kemper, who preceded Colonel Clark at the head of Historical Branch, G-2. A trustee of the Institute, Colonel Kemper has just returned from service in the Mediterranean Theater.

* * *

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Major H. A. DeWeerd, formerly editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, is now doing historical work for the Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Millett, on leave from the faculty of Columbia University, is in charge of the historical activity of the Army Service Forces.

Major Ben Bruce Blakeney, Specialist on the Far East, is an instructor at the Army Air Forces school at Orlando, Florida.

George James Stansfield is an Associate Editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* and Librarian of the American Military Institute.

Major John North of the War Office is a frequent contributor to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

Captain Victor Gondos is an Associate Editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

Arthur J. Alexander of Long Island, New York, is making a study of military service in the period of the Revolutionary War. The article in this issue will serve as part of a general analysis of the field to be issued in the near future.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Asia for Asiatics? The Techniques of Japanese Occupation, by Robert S. Ward. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1945. Pp. 205. \$3.00.)

Robert S. Ward's book, it should be noted at once, is not a systematic analysis of "the techniques of Japanese occupation," as the subtitle would seem to suggest, comparable to that presented in Raphael Lemkin's, "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe." The book is limited specifically to a factual description of Japanese methods of occupation of the "Captured Territory of Hong Kong" during 1942. Mr. Ward, an American consul stationed in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong prior to Pearl Harbor, witnessed the surrender of the city on Christmas Day of 1941 to the invading Japanese after eighteen days of resistance. During his six months internment by the Japanese, Mr. Ward had opportunity to observe the techniques by which the Japanese conquerors brought about the submission of Hong Kong. On the basis of his recollection of the things that he saw and the study of the special acts and related developments recorded in the files of the Japanese controlled English language newspaper which he was able to bring away with him, Mr. Ward has written the story of Japanese rule of Hong Kong as "*a captured fortress under military bureaus.*"

One may question the author's claim, as well as that of Mr. Lawrence Salisbury, in his introduction to the volume, of the universality of the methods of control which the Japanese had employed in Hong Kong. Japanese techniques of occupation have been more numerous and varied than those described by the author in the case of Hong Kong. Like the Germans in former occupied Europe, the Japanese have employed different techniques of control in the different conquered territories so as to meet in each case local peculiarities. But dearth of reliable Japanese material and inaccessibility to available information have precluded a scientific analysis of the Japanese occupation techniques, at least for the present.

Research on Japanese methods of control of occupied countries is being carried on in several governmental agencies, but the full results of those studies will probably not become available to the public till long after the war, if at all. In these circumstances Mr. Ward's book—

well written, in a pleasant and sometimes poetic style—is a most welcome introduction to the subject of the techniques of Japanese occupation. An excellent complementary study to Mr. Ward's book, it may be suggested, is Paul Einzig's regrettably little known volume on "The Japanese 'New Order' in Asia," in which the editor of the London *Financial News* acutely analyzes the effects of the different Japanese occupation techniques on the so-called "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Against the background of the pathetic defense and capitulation of Hong Kong (chapters 2 and 3), Mr. Ward shows how Japanese techniques were applied to each phase of civilian life and economy in the conquered city. This discussion, fully documented, covers the bulk of the volume (chapters 4 to 13). It is clear from Mr. Ward's account that the Japanese methods of controlling occupied territory have not differed from the practices of the predatory German hordes that overran the European lands invaded by Hitler. Their methods have been just as vicious, and have been in every respect in violation of the laws of belligerent occupation and contrary to "the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." Stern justice will have to be meted out to Japanese war criminals for their violations of the Hague Convention to which their country is a signatory.

Mr. Ward details: how through Japanese created anarchy, and through pillaging and rape inaugurated by the military authorities themselves the "subject people was bound hand and foot" to their conquerors; how through the skilled manipulation of existing economic and social organizations the administrative machinery of Hong Kong was brought completely under Japanese control; how the police were made the shadow of the notorious Imperial Gendarmerie whose "task was to stamp out all activities hostile to the Japanese Army or that would in any way hamper its operations"; how through repatriation the flow of population was governed in the interests of the occupied, however disastrous the results may have been for almost a million of the city's people! how all food was managed, the authorities using "the issuance of ration cards as only another rope around the neck of the local residents"; how the trade of Hong Kong became a form of controlled exchange, "its industry owned or supervised by Japanese and the flow of its commerce regulated from Tokyo to fit the designs of a 'Greater East Asia' under the Mikado's sway." Only in the realm of public health were any of the acts of the conqueror actually for the benefit of the conquered, for "in this instance the Japanese themselves

perceived that the best interests of their subject peoples were in fact identical with their own best interests."

Through these methods the Japanese tried "(1) to defend the colony, a primary essential to which everything else had to be subordinated; (2) to exploit to the limit Hong Kong's potential contribution to the prosecution of the war; (3) to assimilate the colony politically into the Japanese Empire and economically into a Pan-Asian system controlled by Japan; and (4) to employ it as a base from which to activate other areas of Asia, in the hope of hastening the time when they, too, would be assimilated." Mr. Ward observes that to prosecute their empire's aims "There is nothing that they (the Japanese) would not do, however savage it might be, and no sacrifice that they would not make, however costly it might prove in the lives and treasures of their subject peoples, if they believed that it would serve the ends that they have so clearly in mind."

In the last two chapters of the book, Mr. Ward elucidates the implications of the techniques of Japanese occupation. Japan, he claims, is projecting "the political struggle in Asia beyond the issue of the present war."

Japan is not content with subduing and exploiting the civilian population in the conquered territories, but is concentrating in building up a hatred for the white man by capitalizing on his mistakes in the Far East, and thus laying the foundations for another war with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In planning for final victory, that is, the conquest of Asia and "placing herself in the most favorable position possible for that coming struggle for ultimate hegemony among the world's great states," Japan is taking into consideration a probable defeat, in this war. But she is making sure that her defeat—which would be only a temporary setback for her—shall not be a victory for the Western powers. The author, therefore, warns the Western powers against complacency and against the continuation of their unsound policies in Asia after the war, lest they fall into the trap which Japan has already laid for them.

Mr. Ward points out that reoccupation of their former possessions will not automatically restore the *status quo ante* to the Western powers in Asia. For through a subtle but very effective propaganda designed to discredit completely the white man in Asia and to alienate the Chinese and other Asiatics from the Western world, the peoples of Asia are having incessantly dinned into their ears "the crimes of the white man," while "Japan is the Yamato warrior come on a mission of

mercy, and the lightning of his sword is dawn in Asia." Mr. Ward believes that in spite of the ruthless exploitation of the conquered peoples Japanese propaganda is succeeding because "the Japanese were able to weave across the hemp of conquest the silver thread of the dream of Asia that would henceforth be free. They came with all the murderous trappings of war, but the words they spoke were of peace and brotherhood. They manacled the outstretched arms of Asia while they denounced her ancient chains; they led her away to bondage to the rhythm of a song of liberation." While we may differ from the author's argumentations, we can disregard only at the peril of our own risk his warning that "if the political course which we follow at the close of the war is such as to bring the peoples of Asia to believe that the Japanese were not deceiving them, . . . we will have lost a battle of incalculable proportions, even though we have utterly defeated the armies and navies of Japan."

Fortunately, Mr. Ward sees hope for the white man in Asia after the war in the application to that continent of the international economic and political policies that are presently being hammered out by the United Nations.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER,¹

Foreign Economic Administration

Human Nature and Enduring Peace. Edited by Gardner Murphy, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1945, Pp. 475. \$3.50.)

Many well-meaning organizations and earnest individuals have diligently sought the causes of war in order to provide a cure. We cannot admit so far that their efforts have been noticeably effective. Nevertheless, as Dr. Gardner Murphy points out, we ought not to be defeatists in this matter. The constructive work of Dr. Murphy and his several scores of collaborators make a sound and scientific contribution to the problem. The approach of this book is an examination of war as a problem in human relationships and in what way the study of human nature can offer suggestions for avoiding war.

Now a psychological approach to this problem has been long needed. The prevention of war has been a fertile field for the quack and the demagogue. Their appeal has been to ignorance, to passion and prejudice. We have had to listen to those who gained votes by castigating bankers and munitions makers—or even generals and admirals—as the primary and sole authors of war. Of course, such nonsense not only

¹The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the FEA.

did not prevent wars. It merely weakened our ability to defend ourselves.

Therefore, we whose business it is to defend our nation welcome a book on the psychological causes and cure of war. How far this book is removed from the asininity of the days of the Oxford Oath on our own campuses is evident from the following comment by Dr. Murphy in summarizing the kind of mental outlook that can speed us into World War III:

"If once again people achieve the mood of 1919-1920, the 'never-again' mood, declaring that they will never again fight for any cause, and, with a sense of personal righteousness, take oaths that they will never support their governments in any war which these governments may undertake, the soil will again be adequately prepared and fertilized for a counter-movement in other lands, in the form of renewed aggression, a nationalistic break-through which, snowballing and juggernauting along, will give us a new Nazi movement in a new suit of clothes. If only the never-again ideology can get a grip on us or upon any large state which finds peace more precious than the other values which at times compete with it, peace will again be hugged to death, so that in fact we shall find that it is war that we embrace."

The excellence of the book is further evidenced by the multitude of passages that might be quoted in this review. Dr. Murphy has enlisted the aid of experts in the social sciences as well as in psychology to study the thesis that war is largely caused by a sense of frustration that leads to aggression. Certainly it is naive to ascribe war exclusively to economic origins, and the psychology of peoples is a powerful element, if not the most potent among the causes of conflict. This book is, therefore, recommended without reservation as a most useful effort to understand the mass mind and its relation to war. Possibly in the distant future, if honest effort is made by *all* nations for similar comprehension of psychological cause and effect, we may expect a better world. Certainly more effort must be expended in investigations like this. But war is not a unilateral affair, as Dr. Murphy readily admits. We shall have peace only when every nation ardently prefers peace to war. Until that consummation devoutly to be wished is attained, our best prophylactic against war is a strong and powerful nation—strong enough to discourag aggression from any frustrated people. Read the book by all means and study the causes of aggression. You'll know what to look for.

DONALD ARMSTRONG,

Brigadier General, USA

Unconditional Surrender, by Everett Holles. (New York: Howell, Soskin, Publishers. 1945. Pp. 366. \$2.50.)

In the treatment of war there is a time for propaganda and journalism, and there is a time for historiography, with perhaps a cooling-off period in between the two. Historiography, probably in its own best interest, submitted to a rather far-going moratorium as regards its own treatment of the Second World War while it lasted, which is another way of saying that historians did not disgrace themselves as even some great ones among them like Bryce did during the First World War. Now, while they are still assembling the materials necessary for a future treatment, the claim for "the first book to survey the entire European War" is being staked out on behalf of Mr. Holles by his publishers' blurb. Written even before the cooling-off, his book actually treats only the downhill phase in the German war machine's course. Published on May 25, it does that with unmatched promptitude, dealing with events that came to a close 17 days earlier, the promptitude of the radio broadcaster's who is, or is supposed to be, the man readiest with the reporting word and the clichés of judgment, sticky like pre-war flypaper. In writing this first history, in following the heel of events as closely as a dog does his master's footsteps—always a dangerous procedure for the history-writer, according to Bacon—does Mr. Holles, "an expert news commentator and a news broadcast director of the CBS," give proof of something like a calling—personal or professional—for the writing of history? Let us see.

What we find in his writing is a sort of underlying belief in the easiness of history, in Dr. Johnson's half-ridiculous dictum that "no writer has a more easy task than the historian," the want of a general, distinctive perspective as well as of specific, verified and verifiable knowledge, including that of the various techniques of war, the ability of raising doubts, particularly when confronted with official statements or the clichés which the hearing public is still more ready to suffer than the reading one. His sources are those provided by the daily correspondents, reports which, largely untransmuted, give the book a quality of breathless pedestrianism.

To mingle the small and the great in our remonstrances on behalf of "academic" history: The name of Admiral Friedeburg is spelled three ways within less than half a page. To say that "throughout history Germany has always been a center of warlike aggression" may pass uncontradicted as war time propaganda; in historical terms it is sheer falsehood. Why make Rommel out once more as an S.A. hood-

lum when it is well authenticated that his career was a fairly regular one and included the position of a very respectable teacher of infantry tactics? Why repeat at this hour Allied propaganda about the misuse of Monte Cassino monastery by the Germans which the Vatican has so largely discounted? Why drag in the seemingly so authentic and so proudly displayed detail when it is *not* correct? Why let journalistic omniscience insist that the decoration of a Knight of the Iron Cross is worn on the breast instead of at the throat? Why call Jodl a "stiff-necked Prussian" when he is no Prussian? This list could be prolonged *ad lib*.

The author is particularly stuck on "unconditional surrender," somewhat as an unimaginative musician is on a *leitmotiv* given him by someone else. In the reviewer's mind there is small doubt that "unconditional surrender" will stick out like a sore thumb on every hand that will attempt to write about the war in its diplomatic and propagandistic aspect, and so the soreness might as well be kept under observation from the outset. In the opening of his book H. gives his story of the origin of the phrase, as one that Roosevelt at Casablanca on Jan. 24, 1943, "sprung on the waiting newspaper correspondents" (pp. 18-19), having nothing much else to say to these gentlemen, as well as on Winston Churchill, who was actually a good deal slower in embracing this war aim than is indicated here. Towards the end of his book (p. 325), however, it appears that the two statesmen had "drafted" this demand together at Casablanca, which is something quite different again. In playing his *leitmotiv* here and there H. insists that already Darlan's coming over to the Allied side on Nov. 11, 1942, had been on terms of "unconditional surrender" (p. 96), while actually the military-diplomatic situation was far from allowing the Allies and their generals and diplomats to insist upon it. Again, it is more than doubtful whether, as he insists, the Italians were ever presented with the demand for unconditional surrender, once negotiations for an armistice—its conditions still unpublished—were under way, which would seem a good deal earlier than the date given by H. Examined open-mindedly, the whole phrase would seem less felicitously chosen than it might appear in a hasty paean of victory, for military men and OWI propagandists—who for a time did not even know how they should translate it into German: as "bedingungslose Uebergabe" or "unbedingte Ergebung"—found it occasionally rather trying because ineffective in its influence on the Germans. It might well turn out in the last analysis to have been the most effective war-prolonger. What is no problem

to a broadcaster in the minute of victory might well promise to be a plaguing one in the historical account-taking of the war.

ALFRED VAGTS,
Sherman, Conn.

John Dooley: Confederate Soldier—His War Journal, edited by Joseph T. Durkin, S.J., Georgetown University. (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press. 1945. Pp. 244. \$3.00.)

Of the myriad or more books written about the War of Secession, there are not many that treat of the "web-foot," or are written by one of them. The few of the latter we have are made of the same stuff of which those gallant sons of the South who wore the Confederate uniform were constituted. *John Dooley's War Journal* will easily take its place in the front rank, among the very best of those chronicles. He has done for the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia what Sam R. Watkins, of Columbia, Tennessee, did for his comrades in the Western Confederate Army, in his classic little book: "*Co. Aytch*," *Maurry Grays, First Tennessee Regiment*, a book wholly unknown to the modern historian. Captain Watkins dubbed his book, in the sub-title, "A Side Show of the Big Show." Which, probably, explains what all these war diaries of the private soldier were.

John Dooley was the son of Irish immigrants. His parents were cousins; they came to America on the same boat, and were married after they got here. Settling in Richmond, Virginia, they quickly made a place for themselves, the husband establishing a business and prospering until he became one of the first citizens of that aristocratic old community. Although Roman Catholics and immigrants, they were taken into the best social circles of the city, and their children never knew that they were not descended from the First Families of Virginia. Is not the so-called snobbishness of well-bred Virginians a myth, a fiction? The elder Dooley joined one of the historic military companies of the city, and when the dreadful war came on he was a Major in the First Virginia Regiment of Infantry, in which his sons later joined him as privates.

The social historian of the South, when he comes to study the currents and cross-currents that make up the complex thing called Southern culture, will have to take into account the Dooley family and all the other Dooleys who came from Ireland and France and Germany and Switzerland and other European countries, and explain *how* they arrived at the top of the social crust and *why*, like the Richmond Doo-

leys, they became the most intense of Southerners and by and large one of the greatest forces in the life of the Southern community. In doing this, he will have to revise the opinion he has reached from reading certain American writers who have not given us a lovely picture of Southern manners and customs during the slavery period.

I have long entertained the notion that the chief book yet to be written about the South will concern itself with the influence of the Northern and New England thought on the South and of Northern men who settled in the South, prior to 1861. To this I would add the study of what the South got from the Irish Catholics and the French Huguenots, and from all the later immigrant stock. This diary of John Dooley's will not be neglected, when such a study is undertaken.

John Dooley would have been an unusual person had there been no war for him to chronicle and in which he was an heroic participant. If he had continued his studies at Georgetown and entered the priesthood, as he later did, I feel certain that he would have made his mark as one of the saintliest men in the Jesuit Order—the prototype of Francis Xavier, the apostle of salvation who yearned for the souls of men. Why did he and all his classmates turn their backs on their scholastic studies and take up the weary and heart-breaking task of the common soldier in an ill-fed, ill-trained, ill-controlled army of citizen soldiers? To answer that question you must tell the story of the South, of what Professor Edward Channing of Harvard calls "The War for Southern Independence." It was the spirit of freedom that animated them, the spirit that drove all the Dooleys to America—not any desire or hope of preserving an institution the South had inherited and could not turn loose.

From this diary we get many glimpses of the stirring of this patriot impulse. We also get the simple story of who and what the private soldier in the Virginia army was; how he acted, what he thought, and how he fought. There never were any better soldiers; there were few ever so good. Of course they were no better than the soldiers of the Western Army; they were only better led. After the death of the South's greatest soldier, Albert Sydney Johnston, the Western Army was led by second and even tenth-rate commanders. If Johnston had lived, the South might and probably would have gained her independence. Neither was the First Virginia Regiment any better than the First Tennessee; and I am sure that historians will not soon settle the controversy as to which regiment achieved the most glory on the field of battle—in the Mexican War and in that which followed. The nick-

name of the latter, earned in the Mexican War, was "The Bloody First"; and well earned it was.

One of the most amazing things about this diary is its simplicity and the excellence of the English in which it is written. One can hardly think that a boy of nineteen years of age wrote it. But Dooley was an Irishman, he was a Catholic, he was a son of Georgetown, and he was a poet—all of which may account for it. The temptation is strong to make numerous quotations from the book; but space limitations forbid. Let one suffice, this vignette of General Lee. As Dooley and his comrades were fording the Potomac, after the indecisive battle of Antietam, he notices "Gen. Lee close by the river bank, mounted and motionless as the night itself." What starving poet would not have given his supper to have coined such a phrase?

Dooley was in Pickett's Division and participated in the celebrated charge at Gettysburg, in which he was shot through both legs and his military career ended. His description of that charge is as graphic as the imagination of the loftiest genius could have made it—as vivid as Victor Hugo's description of the charge of the Old Guard at Hugue-mont. "Every officer is in front," says he, "Pickett with his long curls streaming in the fiery breath from the cannons' mouth." *That is what he saw*; so the story current for eighty years, that Pickett was in the rear, picking his teeth and pulling a cork ever and anon, is not true. But I have always thought he was out in front, his sabre flashing and his shouts urging his men on. That is where the Confederate officers always were. That is how Albert Sydney Johnston was killed, and how the gallant Pat Cleburne fell, leading a charge at the Battle of Franklin, in which Sam Watkins and "Co. Aytch" participated.

Dooley was captured and imprisoned, and the story of his imprisonment, relieved by mother wit and the grace of God that ruled his heart, is a picture from which we turn with moist eyes. All the horrors of the prison camps of that unnecessary war did not center at Andersonville. A celebrated New England scientist, Dr. Charles Wardell Stiles, of the U. S. Public Health Service, demonstrated that the horrors of Andersonville were due, not to cruelty of the jailors, nor to lack of nourishing diet, but to a disease the slaves brought from Africa and planted in Southern soil, known as the hookworm. What Dooley and his comrades suffered was worse than that; and it sprang from cruelty largely.

Father Durkin has, as the Irish would say, covered himself with glory in the manner of editing this diary, which he found in the archives of the university of which he is an ornament. He does not show

any passion for or against the South, and he did his task as a true scholar should. He even moderates some of the fervid opinions of his hero, in a footnote here and there.

The diary should be taken up by some of the book-of-the-month clubs and given wide distribution. What is *Gone With the Wind*, *A Tree Grows in Brooklyn*, *Forever Amber*, or any of those "best sellers," in comparison with this truly moving, distinguished personal narrative?

I would like to have known John Dooley in the flesh, after reading his diary. He was not unlike Tennessee's greatest Confederate hero, Sam Davis, mercilessly hung for being an honest man. And in his spiritual life he reminds me of three men I loved dearly—the late Edward Cummings, S.J., Provincial of the Southern District; the missionary priest, T. J. S. McGrath, S.J., also of Irish immigrant stock; and my own father, who was part Irish and part French, and all Methodist, the first chaplain commissioned in the Confederate army, and who, like John Dooley, gave up the cassock for the bloody sword.

DAVID RANKIN BARBEE,
Washington, D. C.

Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, by Jay Monaghan. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 505. \$4.00.)

This account of Civil War diplomacy is a significant contribution to the Lincoln story. It is the more so because, at a moment of public interest in the bases of national security, it elucidates a period in the nation's history in which diplomacy had to substitute for, rather than be supported by, armed might. The Federal Union faced the greatest crisis of its early career disunited politically, almost hopelessly lacking in trained and experienced military personnel, devoid of prestige in international politics, and subject to the intervention of aggressively self-interested neutrals. This readable volume reveals the techniques by which Lincoln tacked successfully among the shoals of adverse circumstance to prevent the intervention of England and France and the disaffection of needed support in the "border states" at home until, at long last, federal arms could overcome those of the seceded states.

Mr. Monaghan's Lincoln moves forward slowly and with caution, learning from everything and everybody, enduring insult and ridicule from persons who could get results, manipulating people who appeared to be manipulating him, balancing England against France and both against Russia just as he countered the conflicting personalities within

his own cabinet, and holding in check the domestic extremists whose eagerness to fight England, free the slaves, or make a war between capital and labor would have crystallized the situation to the nation's harm.

The author never commits himself unequivocally as to whether Lincoln created all the situations which worked to his advantage or simply had the good sense or good luck to make the moves that in the long run proved most effective. Although he stresses the obstructionism of Seward and Weed, the facts as presented show their activities to have complemented those of the President and certainly to have served the nation's good. At the same time he develops in convincing detail the major attributes of Lincoln's accomplishment as a diplomat. One was his facility of expression: the quotableness and nobility of his utterance and its appeal to effective groups, as well as his capacity to turn a phrase for political or diplomatic effect. Another was his ability to sense popular opinion and to control it through the use of effective propaganda. Added to these was the wide range of his activities and the selfishness with which he approached his task.

The reader may quarrel with the author's strictly chronological arrangement of events, a practice which on occasion slows the narrative and impedes interpretation. He may regret the lack of special attention to such controversies as Lincoln's part in the Fort Sumter episode. But he will admire the evidence of literary skill, the aptness of characterization, and above all the wealth of well-balanced detail on the many-sided activities of this firm but flexible President whose diplomatic maneuvers were an essential supplement to the military activity by which the Union was preserved.

BAYRD STILL,
Major, AUS

Generals in the White House, by Dorothy Burne Goebel and Julius Goebel, Jr. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 276. \$2.75.)

As this book shows, Americans have a tradition of suspicion against "militarism," and against large standing armies. Yet we have fought many wars, and have much admired achievements on the battlefield. More than a third of our presidents have had military records; nine have reached or passed the rank of brigadier general. The authors of this interesting, well-written volume examine the careers of these nine, hoping, perhaps, to find a key to the future. (Will "the remembrance of valor . . . be with us once more?")

As they cover a great deal in less than three hundred pages, the authors add little to our knowledge of political or military history. There is a brief sketch of the military career of each general who became a president, then a few words on the man as presidential candidate and chief executive. Often the second part is not related closely to the first; frequently the authors lose sight of their main theme, the interrelationship of politics and military effort.

Even so, the regrouping of familiar facts does bring out some things to be remembered. One point, especially—the fact that the voters have usually preferred citizens soldiers to professionals, political generals to regular army men. Of the nine presidents here considered, only Zachary Taylor and U. S. Grant could be considered professional soldiers. Franklin Pierce, an obscure politician with a weak military record, was elected over Winfield Scott, one of the ablest military figures of the nineteenth century. The Civil War, with its many fighting politicians, provided four of the generals who became presidents. World War I, which saw an accent on professional training in the higher ranks, gave not a general to the White House. It would seem, therefore, that politicians with military records (Stassen, for example) may fare better in post-war politics than military men of higher rank.

Nor need one grieve at that. Politicians now rarely try to enter military office at the top. For their own happiness as well as for the public good, generals should also stick to the work for which they were trained. They are needed there. Besides, Grant, the only West Pointer to reach the White House, was far less happy in his later days than Sherman, who refused to leave his own profession.

Generals in the White House is intended for popular sale. Footnotes, bibliography and index are missing; and the book is not improved by a curious end-sheet chart ("How They Rate"). Furthermore, the publishers carefully refrain from mentioning the fact that the authors have scholarly training. It is pleasing to observe that there are academic people who can write well enough to be disguised as something else.

FRED HARVEY HARRINGTON,

University of Wisconsin

McNair: Educator of an Army, by Chief Warrant Officer E. J. Kahn, Jr. (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945.)

"The truth is sought regardless of whether pleasant or unpleasant or whether it upholds or condemns existing tactics and doctrine."—"Building overhead is the best little thing we do."—"Victories are won

in the forward areas by men with brains and fighting hearts, not by machines." These are the words of a man who was at one time commander of nearly 2,000,000 men, and who organized and trained more than 3,000,000 soldiers and their officers for combat. The pungency and directness of the words are characteristic of the man.

Mr. Kahn had the advantage of being on the headquarters staff of the Army Ground Forces for a time before General McNair was sent to Europe. He shows that General McNair had personal qualities that could have made him a popular figure, and this sketch will help outsiders to understand the extraordinary loyalty and admiration he inspired in those who worked for him. If he kept himself out of public view, it was not only because he was modest, but because he brushed everything aside that did not contribute to the accomplishment of his mission.

His mission was to beat the enemy as he foresaw the enemy could only be beaten finally—by ground forces that could strike him on his own soil through barbed wire, mines, gunfire, exploding grenades and bombs, mud and darkness. Though an artilleryman he saw that it was the doughboy who would "utter the final cry of victory." With time and study the wisdom he brought to his great task will be more apparent. Mr. Kahn says of his influence that every ground soldier bears General McNair's imprint; it can also be said that every ground unit bears his imprint. He was not only trainer but organizer of the U. S. ground forces that liberated Italy and France and invaded the Pacific Islands and Germany, and his emphasis was always on the team. With one exception, every great issue that affected the fighting army from 1940 to July 1944 was submitted to his judgment. He threw fresh light on all of them and it was not reflected light. He was a military statesman to whom the American public owes more than all but a few are aware. Mr. Kahn's readable little book is the best informed series of statements about General McNair's personality and achievement that has yet appeared.

KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD,
Lieutenant Colonel, AUS

Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers, by Keith Ayling. (Indianapolis. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1945. Pp. 174. \$2.50.)

Coming into prominence during that period between world wars when the importance of air power was not fully comprehended, and when American military aviation was placing most emphasis on bombardment aircraft and tactics, Claire L. Chennault was a prophet with-

out honor in his own country. He learned to fly at an age when many pilots were considered "washed up" and soon gained wide publicity as the leader of the "three men on a flying trapeze" which thrilled thousands with their aerial acrobatics at national air races. Few people knew then, or know today, of his thoroughness as an instructor, his writings on the role of pursuit aviation, or his advanced ideas regarding the vast potentialities and proper use of air power. His advocacy of formation flying, concentration of fire power, air warning systems, air to air bombing, and use of aircraft to drop troops behind enemy lines, marked him as a radical among conservative American military leaders but brought him attractive offers from Soviet Russia and China as well as from several large aircraft manufacturing firms. His acceptance of the offer from China upon his retirement from the United States Army gave him an opportunity to apply many of his tactical theories and eventually led to his recall to command American flyers in China.

In the future there will be written a biography of General Chennault which will give him a proper place in the development of military aviation; until the official documents of the present war are available to the researcher, however, any such work is certain to be incomplete. Mr. Ayling has attempted to produce a biography at a time when much necessary material is not at his disposal. The result is a readable yet superficial book which characterizes Chennault with only a fair degree of accuracy. The entire biography suffers from lack of balance and exactness of detail. Almost a third of the book pertains to the seven months period during which the American Volunteer Group was operating in Burma and China. The three years during which General Chennault has commanded other larger air units in China are treated in far less space.

Numerous errors which have already appeared in print are repeated, suggesting uncritical use of materials available. Other errors of omission and commission imply an undue haste to get into print. To cite but a few examples, the map inside the cover places Ledo in Burma instead of in Assam, and has Toungoo east of the Salween River rather than west of the Sittang. Furthermore, it is stated that the board which dealt with the induction of the American Volunteer Group was made up of "Washington officers," when in reality Chennault himself was chairman of the board which included at least one other member of his old command (p. 201).

There is no record of RAF squadrons operating under command of Chennault as stated on page 141, and headquarters of the Fourteenth

Air Force was never located in India (pp. 211, 232). In treating the relationship between Chennault and Bissell, whom he erroneously refers to as lieutenant general, it is never made clear that Bissell as commanding general of the Tenth Air Force had direct command of Chennault's China Air Task Force (p. 220ff). Vagueness in chronology and as to locale frequently leave wrong impressions. For instance, the description of the aerial defense of Rangoon seems to give Chennault credit for directing personally the various defensive maneuvers, yet he was not near Rangoon during the action (p. 138ff).

It is obvious that *Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers* is a hasty and unscholarly rehash of materials already published, presenting nothing new, but unfortunately tending to perpetuate many popular misconceptions.

HERBERT WEAVER,
Captain, AUS

American Handbook, prepared by the Office of War Information.
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1945. Pp. 508. \$3.75.)

The *American Handbook*, a reference volume prepared by OWI for use by its officials overseas, has now been made available to the American public by the American Council on Public Affairs. Edited and expanded for domestic publication, it is a valuable compendium of facts which will be very useful to writers and researchers. It covers every facet of American life, with special stress on America's war activities.

Certain chapters will be especially useful to readers of MILITARY AFFAIRS. They include those on the various war agencies, lend-lease, the basic documents of our foreign policy in this war, and the chronology of our history from the discovery of America down to July 1943, when the book was published by OWI.

The chapters on the Army and Navy will seem rudimentary to the military expert, but even here some valuable material will be found. The sections of the selective service act and its operation, the organizational structure of the armed services, and the summary of naval actions fought in the first two years of the war will be good to have on tap for reference purposes.

In short, here is a valuable summary of our war activity on the home front, and a revealing picture of what we mean by the American way of life. It has undoubtedly been extremely useful to those engaged in psychological warfare overseas, and it will have permanent value here at home as a record of American achievements in this war.

SELDEN MENEFFEE,
Washington, D. C.

Pistol and Revolver Shooting, by Walter F. Roper. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. Pp. 256. \$2.49.)

This reviewer has read, religiously, well, fairly religiously, every book on pistol and revolver shooting printed in English, from Gould's interesting work of the 1880's, to Roper's of 1945. All of them have embodied considerable good red meat. One alone, that by the late Walter Winans, was so heavily embellished with references to his own prowess as a marksman as to be difficult to wade through. Yet each of the authors has had just cause for pride in his accomplishments at the targets, for all of them have been experts in their own right.

In the case of the present volume, however, we meet a new situation. For Walter Roper is not only an expert pistol shot but, by reason of contributions he has made to the art, has rendered it possible for thousands more, to pass from mediocrity to mastery. His fertile brain has imagined, and his skilled hands have contrived, improvements in sighting equipment which are so exact and errorless that there is no longer any excuse for the pistol shooter to "guess" at the proper sight setting for a given range. And his custom made stocks, designed to meet the specific requirements of the individual marksman, have reduced by half the strain of holding the weapon steady while we add that last half-ounce of squeeze to the trigger pressure.

In short, if any author of a book on pistol shooting has half as much right to speak with authority on this subject as has Roper, let him come forth. I'd like to have a look at him.

Needless to say, this new work is good, very good. It is modestly priced, a rare phenomenon in these war days when hacks are throwing together anything that comes to hand and producing volumes whose worth appears to vary inversely with their cost. No pistol devotee should miss it.

CALVIN GODDARD,
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Tanks and Armored Vehicles, by Lt. Col. Robert J. Icks, edited by Philip Andrews. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Incorporated, 1945. Pp. 264. \$4.75.)

One of the finest concise histories to appear on any weapon, certainly the best on tanks and armored vehicles. Coverage of fact and an amazing flow of illustrations indicate a life work.

After consideration of the mechanical and human elements entering into the use of the machine, the subject becomes a subdivision of national policy and evaluation. Tanks and self-propelled artillery were

the chief weapons of the new armored divisions on which the fate of battles and perhaps wars depended. The salient characteristics of armored vehicles are *armor*, *gunpower*, and *speed*, important in that order for tanks. Self-propelled artillery emphasize gunpower first, armor second; armored cars are distinguished by superior speed.

The U. S. best appears to have been the Sherman M4 of 31-4 tons, 25-8 mph, armed with a 75, 76, or in the late stages of the war, 105 mm gun. The Pershing is too recent for inclusion, though mention is made of the M6 heavy, 62 tons, "thickly armored," 25 mph, mounting a 3" high velocity gun, and additionally, a 37 mm, two 50 and a 30 cal. machine gun.

Like the British, the U. S. found itself behind in the race for armor and gunpower. In an effort at equality, counterparts of the German Ferdinand were produced in motor carriages mounting high velocity guns. The Addenda lists the M18 with a 76 mm gun, and the M36, 31 tons, 30 mph, mounting a 90 mm. The British made over the American M7 Howitzer Motor Carriage into the "Priest" with which they searched out German artillery concentrations, thus besting the Germans in the highly important sphere of artillery skirmishing.

The outstanding British tank appears to have been the Churchill, 39 tons, "extremely thick armor," 20 mph, with Besa machine guns and a 2, later 6, pound cannon.

The facts on France bear out the history of the battlefield; the French never committed themselves to the use of tanks en masse.

The Japanese made no contribution, their materiel being inferior in every respect; effective enough against the underarmed Chinese, but no match for Western armament.

The two great tank protagonists were the Germans and Russians. The Germans favored the 88 mm high velocity gun on their heavily armored Tiger and Panther tanks—the Ferdinand was a less enclosed 88 mm on a Tiger chassis. The Panther was the newer development, a take-off on the Russian T34, mounting several machine guns in addition to the main armament, capable of 17 mph, with armor 4" thick in front, 3¼" side and 1" top; further characterized by wide tracks to cross snow, mud and marsh, and rippled armor on which incendiary missiles could not adhere.

The Russian T34 standard medium of 26 tons, 30 mph, mounting a 76 mm and several machine guns, was one of a magnificent set of weapons with which the Soviets won the race for tank superiority. The narrative indicates that the Germans in 1941 considered it the best in

Europe. It was succeeded by the KV heavy, same as the T34, but weighing 52 tons, running at 20 mph, with the usual wide steel tracks. Gunpower is similar, apparently, except for an additional machine-gun. The Stalin super-heavy with which the Russians surprised and over-matched the German Tigers and Panthers, is not included, being too recent for the book. Mention should also be made of the "forests of artillery" accompanying the Red Armies, consisting in their more mobile divisions, of self-propelled, heavily armored guns mounted on T34 chassis.

Tank development appears to have developed in the direction of very heavy armor, protection being the first requirement, heavier guns, and little or no gain in speed. One wonders what to say about the future development of this weapon which thus seems to have set overquickly in its characteristics. Present tendencies, moving toward a juncture of self-propelled artillery and the heavily armored tank, indicate a tank of over 50 tons, low in silhouette, wide-tracked, with rounded surfaces and frontal armor in excess of 4".

HYMAN ROUDMAN,
War Department.

The Plot Against the Peace, by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn.
(New York: Dial Press, 1945. Pp. 258. \$2.75.)

The thesis of this book is that familiar to nursery inmates, "if you don't watch out the goblins will gitcha!" In this case the goblins are the assorted German survivors of the Second World War who, according to the authors, are already preparing the soil for World War Three. At this moment when, with a mess of B-29's clutched in one hand and a brace of atomic bombs in the other, Uncle Sam sits on top of the world heap recognized by all as the most tremendous power in all history, at this moment it must be reiterated that it is rather difficult to visualize a third challenge from the same sources. The subtitle states that the work is "A Warning to the Nation!", but since the nation at large cannot do much about purported conspiracies abroad, it might seem that the warning should have been directed towards the FBI and General Donovan's OSS, except for the fact that both highly capable organizations no doubt know all the authors claim to know and a little more by way of good measure. A considerable portion of the volume is devoted to a detailed review of German atrocities which are cruel enough to make the one-time Inquisition look to its ill-famed laurels. For the strong-stomached brethren who may like to refresh

their memories on these sad chapters of recent history this work may be interesting reading.

VICTOR GONDOS, JR.,
Washington, D. C.

Action Tonight, The Story of the Destroyer *O'Bannon* in the Pacific, by James D. Horan. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. Pp. 171. \$2.50.)

A 2,100 ton destroyer built at Bath, Maine, the *O'Bannon* sailed in April 1942 for a shakedown cruise with a green crew that would return a little over a year later with an enviable record for accomplishment and devotion to duty behind them. The *O'Bannon* finished her shakedown cruise and was rushed to protect a convoy in the Atlantic under submarine attack. In October she joined the thin line of valiant ships protecting operations in the Solomon Islands, and began one of the most unusual and exciting careers of any American naval vessel of her type. She fought a Jap battleship, cruisers, destroyers, on equal terms and greatly outnumbered on occasion, rescued survivors from the sunken strong within easy range of shore batteries and yet lived without the loss of a single man.

From official reports and from conversation with the crew the author has put together a blow by blow account of the engagements fought by the *O'Bannon*. This book provides an interesting portrayal of life aboard the vessel, including the fears and feelings of the crew, as night after night she sailed out into the dark looking for trouble.

LEO L. GERALD,
Washington, D. C.

NOTES

Two publications tell the story of Scandinavia's fight for freedom: *Arctic War* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, on behalf of the Royal Norwegian Government Information Office, 1945, Pp. 64, \$0.30) describes life on Iceland, Greenland, Jan Mayen and in Norway itself during this war. *Triumph Through Disaster*, does the same in outlining the Danish underground's activities. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office on behalf of the Danish Council in London, 1945. Pp. 64. \$0.30.)

Commodore Hornblower, by C. S. Forester (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1945, Pp. 384, \$2.50) narrates the successful naval, land, and political warfare executed by the well known fictional embodiment of British sea power in the Baltic in 1812, prior to the French invasion of Russia.

Hilary St. George Saunders has written a brilliant account of the rise of British Air Power between 1911 and 1939 in *Per Ardua* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, Pp. 356, \$3.75). The predecessors of the RAF are included in this work concerned primarily with an authoritative description of World War I Air Force History.

A Short History of Germany, by S. H. Steinberg (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945, Pp. 304, \$3.00) presents a brief readable account of the "struggle of the continental Teutons for a working compromise between uniformity and disruption." Its panorama from the year 911 to the advent of Hitler gives a needed perspective for those interested in the future of Germany.

The War Poets, An Anthology of the War Poetry of the Twentieth Century, edited by Oscar

Williams (New York: The John Day Company, 1945, Pp. 485, \$5.00), presents selections from leading military and civilian writers of World War I and the present. Photographs of these poets and bibliographic data are included. The importance of such an anthology is the "our war poetry as a whole is perhaps the document of our time that will outline all the rest."

A current novel, *The Wine of San Lorenzo*, by Herbert Gorman (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Incorporated, 1945, Pp. 472, \$3.00), is of more than usual interest in its re-creation of the War with Mexico. The Alamo and the battle for Mexico City are described, but the description of Buena Vista as seen from the alternate points of view of a Mexican officer and an American lieutenant is exceptional in its portrayal of the panorama of the battle. Few works have given such a feeling of reality. Sketches of principal actors are well drawn against a sound historical background.

The *Ordnance Field Guide*, edited by Lt. Colonel William C. Farmer (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1944, Volume I, Pp. 956, Volume II, Pp. 779, \$6.25 the set), is worth its weight, but being restricted it can be obtained only through the Book Store, the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Battlefields in Britain, by C. V. Wedgwood (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1945, Pp. 48, \$1.25), is one of the Britain in Pictures series containing well written accounts, by the English Authority, of selected battles from Hastings (1066) to Culloden (1746) illustrating briefly the developments in the art of warfare during that period. Her general survey is well worth reading by military historians.

Ocean Front (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1945, Pp. 68, \$0.25) is a British official survey of the war in the Pacific 1941-1944 which maintains the same high standard of excellence in its unusually large combat photographs and diagrams of strategy.

Russo-Polish Relations, edited by S. Kononov (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, Pp. 102, \$1.50), presents a complete summary of relationships from the occupation of Lvov in 1340 to the Yalta conference of 1944. This able and temperate presentation by an English professor provides readable information upon a subject of current interest.

Coasts, Waves and Weather for Navigators, by John Q. Stewart (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1945, Pp. 348, \$3.75), is a splendid compilation dealing with the entire physical background of marine and air navigation. Its well presented text and unusually chosen photographs provide stimulus for the historian who can thus obtain a new perspective on the physical difficulties of the military operations of this war.

Dr. Ernest Hooten has written a popular description of the Grant study made by the Department of Hygiene of Harvard University in "Young Man, You Are Normal" (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945, Pp. 210, \$2.50). This study has been interested with determining the qualities of a "normal" man. Such an account is of interest to those concerned with the present problems of demobilization.

The Fighting Jew, by Ralph Nunberg, repudiates any legend of Jewish cowardice in his accounts of the Jew at war from the first century AD to the present. (New York: Creative Age Press, 1945, Pp. 295. \$2.50.)

His Majesty's Submarines (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1945, Pp. 64, \$0.25), narrates a brief official account of British submarines in this war. Vivid photographs illustrate the text which describes the operation of a submarine as well as a few outstanding actions.

The armed forces edition of *Solution in Asia*, by Owen Lattimore (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945, Pp. 138, \$0.25), makes available a valuable discussion of our relations with China and Japan particularly emphasizing our interest in Asia's future.

Two new contributions to military art are *Cartoons for Fighters*, edited by Sgt. Frank Brandt (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945, \$0.25), containing samples of comic strips and cartoons from official manuals; and *Soldier Art* (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945, Pp. 200, \$0.25.), a complete record of the exhibition held at the National Gallery of Art, July through September 1945 of works representing the nine Service Commands, the Military District of Washington and the United States Military Academy.

Index to the Maryland Line in the Confederate Army, 1861-1865 (Annapolis, Maryland: Hall of Records, 1945, Pp. 74, \$1.00) is an excellent index compiled by Mrs. Charles L. Lewis to W. W. Goldsborough's work, first published in 1859 un-indexed, providing a key to information not otherwise available.

The American Revolution and Its Influence on World Civilization, by Robert R. McCormick (Chicago: Chicago Tribune, 1945, Pp. 56, \$1.00), presents a brief resume of the development of the

American ideals of freedom and self government in different parts of the world since 1776, with a plea for American independence from alliances as part of our future policy.

The Story of the Rifle, by Mick Bennett (London: Cobbett Publishing Company, Ltd., Long Island, New York: Transatlantic Arts, 1945, Pp. 41, \$0.75), is a very informative brief account of its subject. Line drawings illustrate its development and a short critical bibliography completes this popular presentation.

The Negro in the Armed Forces, His Value and Status—Past, Present and Potential, by Lt. Comdr. Seymour J. Schoenfeld (Washington, D. C.: The Associated Publishers, 1945, Pp. 84, \$1.10), is a discussion of the military history of the Negro in past wars and his background and status in the present conflict valued in terms of complete integration into the armed forces.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Contemporary Scene

The Basis of Soviet Strength, by George B. Cressy. (New York: Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill. 1945. Pp. 298. \$3.00.)

In Darkest Hungary, by György P. Horvath. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 158. \$2.00.)

These Are the Russians, by Richard E. Lauterbach. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1945. Pp. 368. \$3.00.)

Backgrounds of Conflict, Ideas and Forms in World Politics, by Kurt London. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 503. \$5.00.)

The Junker Menace, by Frederick Martin. (New York: Richard R. Smith. 1945. Pp. 155. \$2.00.)

Czechoslovakia, by Jan Paparek. (New York: International University Press. 1945. Pp. 144. \$2.00.)

Canada: New World Power, by Louisa W. Peat. (New York: Robert M. McBride. 1945. Pp. 293. \$3.00.)

China's Crisis, by Lawrence K. Rosinger. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1945. Pp. 284. \$3.00.)

The Pattern of Soviet Power, by Edgar Snow. (New York: Random House. 1945. Pp. 231. \$2.75.)

The South African Union, by Lewis Sowden. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 220. \$4.50.)

Bones of Contention, by Baron Robert G. Vansittart. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1945. Pp. 171. \$2.75.)

Germany's Three Reichs; Their History and Culture, by Edmond Vermeil. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 420. \$6.30.)

Evolution of the Dutch Nation, by Bernard H. M. Vlekke. (New York: Roy Publishers. 1945. Pp. 380. \$3.50.)

Post War Developments

America, Partner in World Rule, by William H. Chamberlain. (New York: Vanguard Press. 1945. Pp. 318. \$3.00.)

The Disabled Veteran, by Wilma T. Donahue and Clark Tibbetts Edelars. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1945. Pp. 242, \$2.50.)

The Forces That Shape Our Future, by Clyde Eagleton. (New York: New York University Press. 1945. Pp. 200. \$3.25.)

The Sinews of Peace, by Herbert Feis. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1945. Pp. 270. \$2.50.)

La France Derant La Reconstruction Economique. (New York: Brentanos. 1945. Pp. 113. \$1.00.)

The Basis of Lasting Peace, by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson. (New York: Van Nostrand Company. 1945. Pp. 44. \$1.00.)

The Future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 170. \$2.00.)

Boundary Making, by Stephen B. Jones. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1945. Pp. 283. \$3.00.)

Economic Stability in Post War World, by League of Nations Delegation on Economic Depression. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1945. Pp. 319. \$3.00.)

The Moral Conquest of Germany, by Emil Ludwig. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 183. \$2.00.)

The American Road to Peace; A Constitution for the World, by Mario A. Pei. (New York: S. F. Vanni. 1945. Pp. 168. \$2.00.)

Mainstreet's New Neighbors, by Melven K. Whitfather. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lipincott Company. 1945. Pp. 252. \$3.00.)

National Warfare

The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties; A Report, by H. W. Arndt (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 300. \$3.75.)

Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, by Thomas A. Bailey. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 441. \$3.50.)

Armies and the Art of Revolution, by Mrs. Katherine C. H. Chorley. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 273. \$3.75.)

Color and Democracy, by W. E. B. Du Bois. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company. 1945. Pp. 143. \$2.00.)

Pacifism and Conscientious Objectors, by Gray C. Field. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 130. \$1.25.)

The Governing of Men, by Lt. Comdr. Alexander H. Leighton. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. Pp. 400. \$3.75.)

China Fights On, by Stephen C. Y. Pan. (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1945. Pp. 188. \$2.50.)

The Coming Age of Rocket Power, by Gwain E. Pendry. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1945. Pp. 244. \$3.50.)

Time Bomb, by E. A. Piller. (New York: Arco Publishing Company. 1945. Pp. 104. \$2.00.)

Justice in Transportation, by Arne C. Wiprud. (Chicago: Zipf-Davis Publishing Company. 1945. Pp. 219. \$2.50.)

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

World War II

G I Nightingale, by Captain Theresa Archard. (New York: W. W. Norton, Company. 1945. Pp. 187. \$2.50.)

War on Japan, by Gilbert Cant. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1945. Pp. 64. \$0.25.)

History in the Writing, by Gordon Carroll. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 413. \$3.00.)

- This Is Where I Came In*, by Robert J. Casey. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 307. \$3.00.)
- From D-Day Through Victory in Europe*. (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System. 1945. Pp. 314. Free.)
- Doctors at War*, by Morris Fishbein, editor. (New York: E. P. Dutton Company. 1945. Pp. 431. \$5.00.)
- Ten Years to Alamein*, by Mathew Hatton. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 220. \$3.75.)
- Iwo Jima, Springboard to Final Victory*, by Captain Raymond Henri. (New York: U. S. Camera. 1945. Pp. 95. \$1.75.)
- Marshal Tito*, by Michael Padeo. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 126. \$2.00.)
- Spies and Traitors of World War II*, by Kurt D. Sliger. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1945. Pp. 301. \$2.76.)
- Power in the Pacific*, by Captain Edward Steichen, compiler. (New York: U. S. Camera. 1945. Pp. 144. \$2.00.)
- Psychiatry in Modern Warfare*, by Edward A. Streker and Kenneth E. Appil. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 96. \$1.50.)
- The Merchant Marine and World Frontiers*, by Robert E. Anderson. (New York: Cornell Maritime Press. 1945. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)
- Mission Beyond Darkness*, by Lt. Comdr. Joseph Bryan and Philip Reed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 133. \$2.00.)
- Battle Below*, by Robert J. Casey. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 380. \$3.50.)
- The Story of H.M.S. Victory*, by Frederick W. Engholm. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 55. \$3.00.)
- This Is the Navy*, by Critchell Rimington. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1945. \$2.75.)

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- Air Transport and Civil Aviation*. 1944-45. (London: Todd Publishing Co., Ltd., and New York: Frances Sharp. 1945. Pp. 311. \$4.50.)
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LAND AND AIR WARFARE

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SERVICE AIR JOURNALS. *Air Force*, *Air Facts*, *Aircraft Recognition*, *Air Force General Information Bulletin*, *Air Force Training Aids Division Bulletin*, *US AAF Informational Intelligence Summaries*, *US AAF Information Bulletins*, *Report of the CG AAF to the Secretary of War*, *Impact*, *Tactical and Training Trends* series, *MIS Campaign Studies*, *Naval Aviation News*.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

TWO ARMIES . . .

BY MAJOR JOHN NORTH

"No," said General Mark Clark in the map room at his headquarters outside Florence. "I did not know Italy before the war." The General's clear-eyed incisive features momentarily relaxed in a rather wan smile, and he added, "But I know it well enough now!"

At the time the General was speaking, troops of the American Fifth Army and of the British Eighth Army were on the point of entering Bologna, after executing "a double-handed punch" on that vital sector of the German front which lay between the Etruscan Apennines and the Adriatic. I do not know whether General Clark—the "Command-General" of this 15th Army Group—was already contemplating the imminent collapse of the two German armies facing him in northern Italy; but emissaries from the German Command had made contact with Field-Marshal Sir Harold Alexander at Allied Force Headquarters during the previous month, and Russian troops were about to break into the suburbs of Berlin.

However, I do not believe that General Clark was counting on an immediate and spectacular conclusion to one of the most arduous and heart-breaking campaigns in military history when he said: "The Fifth Army has had the longest and toughest assignment of any American Army in this war; but, together with your British Eighth Army, which has had a still longer assignment, we will go on to the end."

That end—which was to crown the work—was very near. For a few hours the brilliant news from Italy hit the world's headlines; but, as happened after the capture of Rome, still bigger news from the west pushed the Italian campaign into the background. Moreover, in the vast canvas of the European war, it must inevitably figure as of secondary interest to the decisive campaigns in the west. Let us therefore put on record some contemporary impressions of a visitor who could possibly view the campaign the more dispassionately because, for a long time past, he had come to associate the Italian front with what the communiques described as "only patrol activity."

"We will go on to the end," said General Clark. These are conventional words on the lips of a commander; but, in relation to the campaign in Italy, they have a special poignancy. In every other campaign fought out in the west it was always possible to hope for success within a foreseeable period of time—whether that end was Tripoli seen from the Western Desert; Tunis seen from Algeria; or the Rhine seen from the beaches of Normandy. From the autumn of 1942, when the Allies moved to the attack, German power in the Mediterranean and in Europe suffered a continuous decline.

In Italy, on the other hand, from the time of the first landings, in the September of 1943, until April of 1945, the Allied armies were faced with a seemingly unending succession of difficulties of terrain; they were called upon to fight with resources always inadequate to their tasks; and they experienced a "savage versatility" of climate without parallel in any campaign in this war—Russian not excepted. Victory never lay even remotely ahead of the inching advance of the Allied troops. Even the Valley of the Po, an alleged "tank paradise," was known to be criss-crossed with a multitude of waterways. In the words of the British Prime Minister, there was "always something else."

I have caught glimpses of this war in Africa and in Western Europe; but I did not know how much may be read into that old phrase "the resolution of the commander," until I motored almost the entire length of Italy in order to see something of what was to be the last battle. The axis of any road northward invariably lay across natural obstacles of river or mountain; and German demolitions had been so efficient and so effective that a small rearguard could easily put up a fierce battle while the main body went back at its leisure. Whatever the valor of the fighting troops, it is as certain as anything can be in war that without "the Bailey" to bridge these rivers and ravines, the campaign in Italy would have been abortive from the outset.

Nevertheless it is not only the number but the—possibly superficial—sameness of these natural obstacles that appals, and one's awareness that almost all these river crossings had to be fought for, almost every highway through the mountains forced under direct enemy observation; and forced by troops whose knowledge of mountain fighting had to be built up from zero. Every pause in the slow advance to victory by General Mark Clark's two armies is today marked by the military cemeteries one passes on the seven-hundred mile drive to the north.

The mere resolution to persevere with this campaign is the more

remarkable in that it is inconceivable that there were not occasions when afflicting doubts must have arisen about the correctness of the war strategy that demanded these apparently unrewarding sacrifices. One may well ask: "If the chief object of the original landings was possession of the airfields in southern Italy, why not stop at Rome?"

One specific answer would appear to be that the safety of the Mediterranean route—the first priority of the whole Allied strategy of the war—could not be guaranteed while German naval and air forces continued to base themselves on Italy. A second answer would appear to be that the correct Allied strategy was to attack the German war machine wherever possible, without too much regard for striking a balance between the respective drain on Allied and Axis resources.

Nor is there any evidence to suggest that any economy achieved by cutting down the Allied effort in Italy would have directly assisted other fronts. In any event, no hesitation was shown in switching Allied divisions to the decisive theater of war at whatever cost to the campaign in Italy itself. Seven were removed before D-Day; another seven for the Allied landings in southern France—with the result that Bologna, which must otherwise have fallen to the Allies in the late summer of 1944, remained a German bastion until the following April.

A third answer—though entirely speculative—is that, had the Allies decided to stop at Rome, the Germans, contrary to their practice in other theaters, would have withdrawn a considerable proportion of those twenty-seven divisions which the Allies were able to tie down in Italy during the critical battles in the west.

In any attempt to resolve this as yet unresolved question of grand strategy it should be useful to consider why the Germans themselves were prepared to devote so much to this "non-decisive front." Field-Marshal Alexander himself has supplied six reasons why. The Germans could not leave their southern frontier undefended; and, as always, they chose to fight on someone else's soil. Again, the German armies in Italy could live on the country—with always a surplus of food for export to Germany. Again, Italian industrial resources—particularly the factories of Turin and Milan—were valuable to the German war effort as a whole. Again, targets in northern Italy for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces were to be preferred to others in southern Germany. Again, by holding their positions in the Apennines, just below the knee of the Italian boot, the Germans could still control the Ligurian and Adriatic seas and continue to harass Allied shipping.

Finally, Italy was Germany's last remaining ally in Europe. The loss of Italy would at least serve to demonstrate to the German people that the tide of German conquest had at last receded to Germany's own shores; and the promising legend of "one invincible German army" would be extinguished forever.

However today, after victory, these are but arid topics; and anyway, all queries have been stilled by the dazzling success in which the campaign concluded. But there is one thing more that needs to be said, and said now, while memory is fresh.

The title of this article is "Two Armies," and it was my intention to dwell on that happy chance of fate whereby these two armies each with the longest record, American and British respectively, of service in this war—the one from Salerno, the other from El Alamein—should have fought side by side from southern Italy to the Alps. I was delighted when General Clark remarked that he was proud to have had the Eighth Army "Desert Rats" and other famous British divisions under his command at different stages of the campaign, and added: "Two-thirds of my staff are British, and at times three-quarters of my troops have been British."

But I was speedily to find any form of comparison distasteful in assessing the relative contribution of the two armies; nor should it be forgotten that these armies have numbered in their ranks Canadian, New Zealanders, South Africans, Indians, French, Poles, Brazilians—truly an international assembly of arms, welded into one Allied army by the extreme of tact and understanding on the part of the Allied commanders.

Yes, one Allied army: that is the dominant impression I brought with me from this front. If I must make a distinction I will add that, when I left the forward areas, I found that the troops of the Fifth Army who were bitterly fighting through the mountains on their way to Bologna were more than envious of those British troops who were confronted with the waterways of the Adriatic sector; and that these same Eighth Army troops were not less envious of their American comrades with their mountain cover!

In General Mark Clark's map room I saw a numerical summary of the Allied resources vis-a-vis the enemy in terms of men, tanks, guns. More than significantly, in the air there was no comparison to make. The number of Allied combat troops committed to the battle numbered hardly more than 70,000. Facing them, at that time, were twenty-six

German and six Italian Fascist divisions. Small wonder that the British Prime Minister should have remarked, after the final battle, that the Allied chiefs had no compunction about cutting down the Allied armies in Italy to the absolute minimum since it had to be assumed that no final attack could be successfully mounted on this front.

However, at Allied Force Headquarters there happened to sit a British Field-Marshal, with that faith in the military art which can remove mountains—or at least surmount them. And, commanding the 15th Army Group, of splendid memory, an American Commanding General who, not for the first time in Italy, implemented with a supreme assurance the touch of the Field-Marshal's favorite tactical doctrine of the "double-handed punch."

FIRST WORLD WAR DIVISIONAL HISTORIES

BY CAPTAIN VICTOR GONDOS, JR.

One year ago the first of a series of 28 monographs was published by the American Battle Monuments Commission. Each monograph deals with an operations summary of one of the American Army divisions that fought on the Western Front in the First World War. Today the entire series is available in print and many thousands of copies have been sold. Under the chairmanship of General John J. Pershing, and the able editorship of Colonel Henry O. Swindler, the Commission has thus completed the third of its three principal objectives relating to the publication of reliable historical information with reference to the battle activities of American armed forces in Europe in 1917-1918. The Commission's thorough study of the historical facts of our battle operations in France was motivated, however, by the need of completely performing its other two basic functions: firstly, the establishment of memorials in conjunction with the construction, administration, and maintenance of American national cemeteries in Europe; and, secondly, the exercising of control over the erection of memorials in Europe by American citizens and public bodies.¹

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Commission had established seven American cemeteries on the continent and one in

¹The American Battle Monuments Commission was established by act of Congress, approved 4 March 1923, and its authority enlarged by subsequent acts and executive orders (Cf. 48 Stat. 284, and Executive Orders No. 6614 and No. 6690).

England, containing the graves of 30,902 American dead. At each of these cemeteries a beautiful memorial chapel, designed by leading American architects, was erected. The inscriptions on the monuments in these hallowed plots of foreign soil had to be as exact, as accurate, as painstaking research could make them. Thus, early in its career, the Commission discovered the necessity for professional historical study. The initial result of these studies was a finely edited volume entitled *A Guide to the American Battlefields in Europe*, which was published in 1927 by the American Battle Monuments Commission. Its 547 pages are not only a guide to American First World War battlefields, but also a concise history and reference work containing over half a thousand official photographs and scores of maps and sketches. In 1938 the Commission issued a revised and enlarged edition of the earlier work entitled *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*.²

In 1944 came to fruition the third and last of the Commission's publication projects. Unlike its predecessors the twenty-eight booklets of divisional historical summaries contain no illustrations, although amply supplied with maps. These are not literary histories but straight factual summarizations of events in the operating lives of the divisions. The structural outline of each volume is the same: the first chapter deals with details of organization, the division's landing in France, unit strengths, and the training period behind the lines. Each succeeding chapter is devoted to a single operation performed by the division; and, at the beginning of each chapter, a section is devoted to a description of the general situation bearing upon the pertinent operation, a device so familiar in field orders. The order of battle, the lines of departure, the fluctuating battle lines are exactly detailed, day-by-day.

It must be emphasized that this is not the usual type of organization history, heavily freighted with the names and doings of the individual officers and men. There is a complete absence of personnel names. The work is wholly devoted to precision in chronology and geography, and the daily objectives, plans of operations, movements, and order of battle of each division and its component brigades, regiments, and battalions.

The divisional histories were the outcome of original studies of troop unit records in the General Headquarters records of the American Expeditionary Forces, which had been shipped back from France and

²These books were sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at \$2.75 per copy. They were also placed on sale at certain bookstores.

placed in the custody of The Adjutant General's Office.³ In prosecuting the work the Commission was assisted by Regular Officers of the Army and the Marine Corps, detailed for the purpose. In editing the division histories it was necessary to lift from the context of each operation, in which it had a part, the division's own activities; then by adding together the resulting segments a total picture was evoked of the division's battle service.

This method, for example, is reflected in the volume on the 1st Division. After the foreword, preface, and the initial chapter on organization and training service, the remaining four chapters are each devoted to one of the four operations in which the division took part, namely those of the Cantigny Sector and the Montdidier-Noyon Defensive, the Aisne-Marne Offensive, the St. Mihiel Offensive, and, finally, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The booklet ends with an appendix containing a Divisional Table of Organization; a table giving the strength of each component of the 1st Division, at monthly intervals during its active service; and a list of reference sources mentioned in the text. In addition, at the end of each chapter a table of casualties is given, related to the pertinent operation.

The usual practice of using footnotes for citations of specific passages in sources was modified in favor of a special method. At the end of each paragraph are one or more numbers enclosed in brackets. These numbers refer to pertinent documents in the list of sources in the appendix. The sources consist of field orders, field messages, operations reports, war diaries, correspondence with individual officers, and British, French, and German documents. Most paragraphs were the result of the interweaving of several field orders, messages, or memoranda, and to cite each fraction of a source separately would have required so many footnotes as to render the method inadvisable. In any event, the list in the appendix shows all source materials at a glance, and anyone desiring to pursue a point further can, as a rule, obtain photostatic copies of the particular documents desired.⁴

Since this was a group historical project the *modus operandi* is not without interest. Here again, the structural outline of each volume is an outcome of the work method. After the delimitation of the boundaries of a divisional operation, an officer was detailed to perform the

³The records of the American Expeditionary Forces are presently in the custody of the War Records Office of the National Archives.

⁴For information concerning cost of photostat copies consult the General Reference Division of the National Archives, Washington.

research and historical reconstruction of that operation. When the preliminary draft of the operational study, and the attendant maps, was completed, it was circulated amongst the officers of the historical staff engaged on related studies, and then amongst officers of the division who had actually taken part in the operations described. The study was thus carefully checked, discrepancies adjusted, and facts verified. After the process of re-valuation of the documentary sources the final draft was completed. Thereafter this draft was edited with a view toward placing it in its proper relation with the front as a whole and the general situation. When the necessary statistical tables on casualties were completed and added to the chapter, the chapter relating to the particular operations was ready for the printer. It should be noted, however, that the casualty tables required a great deal of additional work because of the policy of including therein not only the division's own casualties for an operation, but also casualties resulting to other American divisional elements which had been attached to the division for the particular action. This policy involved the re-figuring of The Adjutant General's data so that the desired result of casualties per divisional operation could be obtained.

In a pocket in the inside of the front cover of each volume are to be found the folded maps which are reproductions of those actually used in action. The whole series contains a total of 85 maps of which each of six maps are in two sheets, making a total of 91 sheets. The smallest sheet contains 329 square inches, while the largest has nearly 2000 square inches. The number of sheets per volume varies from one to seven. With one exception the maps scale 1 to 20,000. However, the 93d Division's operational map for the Oise-Aisne Offensive, September 15 to November 11, 1918, scales 1 to 80,000. Each map carries three scales in miles, yards, and kilometers respectively; and nearly all of them have the contour intervals, except a few that are of the hachure type. All place names are in French, but in the British sectors English names were superimposed, occasionally, on the French base map. The lines on the maps are based on a careful interpretation of the text, showing divisional front lines, boundary lines, and flanking divisions. All battle lines are marked with dates as of midnight of the day of action.

In addition to the actual operations, significant elements in the training and movement of the American forces are indicated, such as Pershing's famous break with Allied stationary war doctrines, also referred

to as "positional warfare." The American commander insisted that his troops were in Europe for the purpose of offense not defense and, therefore, he made it mandatory that open warfare training be given as well as the prevalent trench warfare training in vogue in the French and British armies. In the war of movement that ensued in October and early November of 1918, events bore out the correctness of Pershing's stand. Unfortunately, enough time had not been available to indoctrinate and train many of the troops for that type of campaign, and the Americans as well as the Allies were caught flat-footed when the time came. Although the campaign culminated victoriously, many avoidable errors were committed in both battle tactics and movements. The troops were relatively unaccustomed to caring for themselves in the open field and on the march.

The Commission has had numerous and excellent battle terrain photographs taken which would be of value to historians; but, for one reason or another, these have never been published in any form. Colonel Swindler, under whose editorship the long job has been completed, is now engaged on a master index for all twenty-eight booklets which, it is hoped, will be ready for publication in the near future.⁵

SERVICE BY SUBSTITUTE IN THE MILITIA OF NORTHAMPTON AND LANCASTER COUNTIES (PENNSYLVANIA) DURING THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

BY ARTHUR J. ALEXANDER

While engaged in research in connection with the Revolutionary militia of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania the writer was impressed with the large number of militiamen who rendered their required service by substitute. Anxious to gain more information upon this point he made a careful study of the published muster rolls of Lancaster and Northampton counties as contained in Series Five of the Pennsylvania Archives.¹

For the purposes of this study recourse was had to the muster rolls of such militia units only as contained data both as to the militiamen

⁵The twenty-eight volumes, issued in 1944, are available at the office of the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, at the following prices: \$1.50—1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 28th, 42nd, and 77th Divisions; \$1.25—5th, 26th, 32nd, 33rd, and 80th Divisions; \$1.00—27th, 30th, 82nd, 89th, 90th, 91st, and 93rd Divisions; \$.75—7th, 29th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 78th, 79th, 81st, and 92nd Divisions.

¹*Pennsylvania Archives*, Series Five, VII, Lancaster County and VIII, Northampton County.

who were required to turn out as well as the substitutes who served in their stead. Before proceeding further mention should be made of the fact that no attempt was made to eliminate any duplicate names which might appear upon the various muster rolls examined. Duplication of names arises not only because one militiaman may have been represented by one or more substitutes but also because substitutes may have represented two, three or even more different employers on as many different tours of duty.² Again allowance must be made for a substitute who was obliged to serve his own tour as it should be made for a substitute who appeared in person at one tour and was represented by proxy at another.

In all eighty-seven individual militia units are accounted for, forty-four in Northampton County and forty-three in Lancaster County. Together these units represent a grand total of 3,960 officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, of which number Lancaster County supplied 123 officers and 2,012 non-commissioned officers and privates as against 98 and 1,727 furnished by Northampton County.

As long as Pennsylvania's first Militia Law remained in force (March 1777-March 1780) commissioned officers could respond to a call to duty by sending an approved substitute of equal rank in their stead.³ It would seem however as though Northampton County officers continued to enjoy this privilege even after it was dropped in 1780.⁴ According to the publisher muster rolls no less than thirteen of Northampton County's 98 officers availed themselves of this privilege, some as late as the summer of 1782.⁵ On the other hand all of Lancaster County's officers appear to have responded in person when ordered to turn out.

Substitution was more common in Northampton County than in Lancaster County with the result that 856 or .543 per cent of all Northampton's private soldiers were represented by proxy as against 706 or .382

²Philip Witmon was represented by seven substitutes who served for varying periods of time during the course of his required tour of duty, August-September, 1782. Similarly four substitutes appeared for Harman Dildine, *ibid.*, VIII, 404-405. Henry Snyder, a professional substitute represented four different principals on as many tours of duty, in *ibid.*, 470, 491, 496, 597.

³*The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1809*, Chapter DCCL, Sect. XII.

⁴The Militia Act of 1780 made it "lawful for any person called to do a tour of militia duty to find a sufficient substitute, having been previously classed at least six months in the company or battalion to which the person belongs who hires such substitute." Although it might be contended that "any person" could be construed to include an officer as well as a private soldier still this construction is precluded by the qualification that such person had been previously classed. Only privates and non-commissioned officers were classed for purposes of determining the order in which they would be required to respond to tour of duty.

⁵The Ensign of Captain Daniel Good's Company, Third Class, First Battalion, Northampton County Militia appeared by substitute on June 13, 1782. *Pennsylvania Archives*, Series Five, VIII, 70. Captain Adam Stahler appeared by substitute May 25, 1782. Captain Stahler was to have commanded the 3d Class, Sixth Battalion, Northampton County Militia, *ibid.*, 495.

per cent from Lancaster County. But even though proportionately fewer Northampton County militiamen responded in person, still the number of non-commissioned officers living in that county who furnished substitutes was equal percentagewise to the number furnished by the other county, .386 per cent.⁶

Knowing as we do the number of militiamen who did not appear in person a study was then made to ascertain who the substitutes were. In the case of Lancaster County .065 per cent (forty-six) of all substitutes were members of the militiaman's immediate family or next of kin as against the same percentage .066 (fifty-seven men) furnished by Northampton County.⁷ In this connection it should be borne in mind that it is entirely possible that both percentages may be sharply increased if more data as to family relationship had been available. In the absence of specific data on this subject it was assumed that individuals having the same surnames were members of the same family or relatives. On the other hand although John Spruce substituted for Joseph Fisler it is entirely possible that the relationship between the two may have been as close or even closer than that of Alexander Snodgrass who substituted for his kinsman William.

When the writer first began his study he was under the impression that some of the militiamen might have exchanged tours of duty with complacent friends and neighbors but the more he studied the problem the more he became convinced of the error of this assumption. If friends and neighbors arranged mutual exchanges of tours of duty such exchanges were most rare and infrequent. When more than one hundred cases of substitution were subjected to careful scrutiny not one case of a mutual exchange was uncovered. Instead it would seem as if there had existed a group of men who were all too ready to step into the shoes of those who were called into actual service, for a consideration of course.

Time and again one encounters the same names, now substituting for this militiaman and then again for another. Jacob Frederick, for instance, served not less than four times, each time for a different individual. Similarly, Corporal Peter Stein served six times for as many militiamen either unable or unwilling to appear in person. Among the

⁶Northampton County furnished 150 non-commissioned officers, 58 of whom were substitutes while Lancaster County furnished 163 non-commissioned officers, 64 of whom were substitutes.

⁷Three sons are definitely known to have appeared for their fathers in Lancaster, four in Northampton County. It is quite possible that James Goete, Jr. also appeared for his father. *Pennsylvania Archives*, Fifth Series, VII, 36, 128, 242, 921; *ibid.*, VIII, 70, 73, 77, 332.

other names encountered more or less frequently are those of Sergeant Joseph Gabell, John Santee, Peter Kachlin, Jr., and Henry Snyder.⁸

It may also be of interest to ascertain who the professional substitutes were and what they received for their services. A Pennsylvanian unable to appear for militia service in person was duty bound either to find an approved substitute or pay a fine.⁹ For a time the burden of finding substitutes rested upon the County Lieutenant of the county nearest to where the delinquent resided.¹⁰ Be that as it may, data is available as to the terms of eighty-eight contracts entered into in the summer of 1777 between the Sub-Lieutenant of Lancaster County and that many professional substitutes.¹¹ Some startling conclusions present themselves when the assembled data is collated on the basis of age, country of origin, occupation and remuneration of the various substitutes.

Male white Pennsylvanians between the ages of eighteen and fifty-three capable of bearing arms and not otherwise exempt were subject to compulsory militia duty.¹² A father could however send his underage son otherwise exempt in lieu of himself.¹³ The minimum age limit, however, meant nothing to the County Lieutenant who did not hesitate to hire youths of seventeen as substitutes for his delinquent neighbors even though he had no statutory authority so to do. Similarly that official had no compunction about hiring substitutes above the statutory maximum with the result that three striplings of seventeen were found marching alongside greybeards of fifty-four and six.¹⁴ As for the others, exactly one-half, forty-four, were in their twenties with teen age youths and men in their thirties well represented.¹⁵ Field

⁸Jacob Frederick, in *ibid.*, VII, 169, 185, 189, 323. Peter Stein, in *ibid.*, 467, 471, 479, 481, 490, 497. Sergeant Joseph Gabell, in *ibid.*, 490, 497, 519. John Santee, 153, 170. Peter Kachlin, Jr., in *ibid.*, 135, 153, 188.

⁹Fines varied from time to time fluctuating particularly with the value of the currency. *Statutes at Large*, Chapter DCCL, Sect. XI. "Persons who cannot find substitutes shall pay such sum or sums of money as each of the substitutes included in the said drafts will amount unto upon an average within each respective battalion." Although modified by subsequent legislation this principal was retained throughout the war period.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Section XIII.

¹¹*Pennsylvania Archives*, Fifth Series, Vol. VII, 658-682, 1079-1089.

¹²*Statutes at Large*, Chapter DCCL, Sect. II; Chapter CMII, Sect. III.

¹³*Ibid.*, Chapter DCLXXXI, Sect. III. The same privilege extended to the master of an apprentice or an indentured servant over the age of eighteen. The statute specifically provided that "sons, apprentices or servants who are not subject to the militia law may be admitted as substitutes for their fathers or masters if of sufficient ability of body . . ." After 1780 this privilege was restricted solely to fathers of underage sons.

¹⁴As to underage youths enlisted. *Pennsylvania Archives*, Series Five, VII, 659, 673, 680. Over-age men enlisted, *ibid.*, 667, 671.

¹⁵Thirteen substitutes were in their teens, forty-four in their twenties six in their thirties and five in their forties.

service does not seem to have held any attraction for men in their forties and fifties so that only seven men are found in these age groups.

For some unknown reason natives of Ireland, whether from north or south does not appear, were more prone to accept the proffered £40 for a two-month tour of duty than were native born Americans or for that matter Germans or Scots. Thus where a lone Scot and three Germans volunteered their services forty-eight Irish turned out. Only seventeen substitutes were able to claim American birth, four of whom are known to have been born in Pennsylvania and another in neighboring Maryland.¹⁶

Although practically all professional substitutes for whom data is available, seventy-three, received £40, this sum should not be accepted as a criterion as to what a substitute might actually receive for his services. The matter was one for negotiation between the parties attendant not only upon time and circumstances but the value of a fluctuating currency as well. Thus even though the majority received £40, one received as little as £32-2, another £32-5 and three £32-10, while still another actually received all of £45.¹⁷

Very little data is available as to the occupations of the professional substitutes but such data as is available describes fourteen of them as yeomen.¹⁸

It will thus be seen that in excess of .435 per cent of all militiamen called to the colors from Lancaster and Northampton County during the War of the Revolution failed to appear in person and had recourse to the employment of substitutes. Although commissioned militia officers at one time did possess the same privilege they seem to have availed themselves of it in Northampton but not in Lancaster County even after they had been deprived of it by statutory enactment.

Some substitutes .067 per cent of all substitutes who served during the war are definitely known to have been members of the family of militiamen called out on tour of duty. The greater number were professionals who turned out for a consideration rather than good natured friends or even complacent neighbors ever ready to lend a helping hand to some other neighbor called at a time when it was difficult for him to respond.

¹⁶*Pennsylvania Archives*, Series Five, VII, 659, 673, 680, 682.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 662, 669, 673-4, 672, 1080.

¹⁸Peter Stein was a corporal in the Militia, Joseph Gabell, a sergeant, Garret Rittenhouse a drummer and Michael Gortner a fifer.

THE TRIUMPH THAT WAS BURMA

BY SQUADRON LEADER CHARLES GARDNER

One of the least known of the theaters of operations in World War II was that of the South-East Asia Command. The story of the conflict in that theater has yet to be told, but when it is the struggle and eventual victory in Burma will be given an appraisal it well merits. Here was fierce and rugged campaigning that tested the strategical genius of the Allied command and the valor of our fighting men.

Three years of fighting over the devil's own country was finished on May 5, 1945, when the British captured Rangoon and hoisted the Union Jack over Burma's capital. For three and a quarter years the city had been in Japanese hands and had been a focal point in the "Greater South-East Asia."

When Admiral Mountbatten came to his newly-created South-East Asia Command in the late autumn of 1943, the problems facing him seemed well nigh insurmountable. Our forces were meager, our responsibilities great.

The Japanese were firmly "in" all over Burma, with great jungles and sprawling mountain ranges forming a buffer against any major Allied attack. A 200-mile belt of the world's thickest natural barrier and two great rivers protected them in the Central Burma plain. Through these ragged mountains and steaming, overgrown valleys, there ran, from our side, but two roads and no railways. The Japanese, it seemed, could stay contentedly on their side of the Chindwin, nourished by good internal lines of communication which stretched back to the major port of Rangoon.

On the other side of the jungle barrier—our side—the picture was different. We had no nourishing net-work of roads and railways, no kindly port close at hand.

Where was *our* supply base?

At Calcutta, 900 miles back! Linked to our fighting front by but one railway, the Bengal-Assam line, already heavily laden with supplies to be flown to China; charged, too, with supporting General Stilwell's drive to re-open a land route to Chungking. What was more, there could be no relief from this state of affairs until we held Rangoon. For the whole of the next 1,300 miles of advance it seemed as if we were doomed to be tied to Calcutta.

Mountbatten took one look at the position and summed it up in a sentence: "the biggest logistical nightmare of the war."

How the Japanese must have smiled when they heard that! How safe they must have felt.

What could the British do? We had the weakest lines of communication that any army had ever had to fight from. We had no roads or space by which to deploy our superior equipment—when we got it. We were sealed off from Central Burma by trackless mountain and jungle. We were vulnerable to sudden attack from across the Chindwin.

On the face of it, then, all that the Japanese had to do was to sit tight, build up supplies on the Chindwin banks and then strike at India through the jungle of which they believed themselves to be all-time kings.

Yet, by May 1945, their dream was shattered. So were three Japanese armies and a Japanese Air Force! Over 120,000 of the Emperor's best troops were dead and Burma was British again.

How did it happen?

The story which follows is an uncolored, simplified account of one of the greatest military campaigns in the history of war. This campaign was planned audaciously, and carried through with courage and resolution by three British Imperial Corps of troops, one Anglo-American Air Force and a few divisions of Chinese, all supported by the big and little (but mainly the little) ships of the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Navy.

The first hurdle Mountbatten had to clear was that of the supply line. The solution of the problem of distance and lack of roads and railways was apparent to all the senior officers—to the "Supreme," to General Slim, GOC of the 14th Army, to Wingate. It was air supply.

"Bring your goods down the chimney," said Wingate, "there's no future on the jungle floor."

And so, painfully (for there were many urgent and competing demands on Allied production) a fleet of Dakota transports was gathered together. Squadron by squadron, British and American, they were assembled behind the lines, in India.

Said the Air Force Chiefs: "Before we can run this fleet of unarmed 'merchant ship' aircraft we must sweep the skies clear of Japanese fighters. The transports can't operate in the face of fighter opposition. First things first: we must gain complete air supremacy, or, further than that, we must have air monopoly."

So, gradually, the combat as well as the transport side of the Air

Forces was built up. Spitfires, Mustangs, Beaufighters and Lightnings began to trickle through. Few enough they were, the bare minimum, but enough.

More detailed planning was not possible. The main airfields for the air-lift which was to beat the jungle were chosen. Bases in India and near the railway were earmarked for the first phase, and it was decided to supply from the Arakan ports and over the Somra mountains for the second phase or the "Central Burma" advance. The complicated organizations for the building of airfields and for the sorting and loading of stores were worked out.

For the purposes of this account, I will set on one side the North-East Burma campaign of 1944 to 1945: the Stilwell-Wingate offensive which cleared the ground through Myitkyina and Bhamo to China. This important task was S.E.A.C.'s first charge on its charter, and it was a task triumphantly carried out. The first convoy went through to China in January 1945. This North-East Burma fighting, however, was not concerned directly with the liberation of Central Burma, although our forces there naturally tied down Japanese troops and resources. What must be remembered, however, is that from March 1944, until the monsoon, Wingate's men were "in," and were a major standing charge on our air supply—a charge which had to be fulfilled, for the Chindits had no other resources save those which came by air. They were 200 miles behind the enemy lines.

Let us return then to the central theme: our planned offensive over the Chindwin.

As the air supply for phase two of the liberation depended on the Arakan ports of Chittagong and Akyab, those ports had to be freed from enemy menace. That was why, in early 1944, the 15th Indian Corps was pushing down Arakan towards Akyab. About the same time, the Air Forces began their long-term program of clearing the air to prepare for the Dakota "merchant shipping."

But, just as this preamble to our plans was under way, the uncooperative Japanese altered the shape of our commitments. They launched two major attacks towards India: first in Arakan, where we were getting dangerously close to Akyab, and later, in the Central sector, at Imphal.

These two attacks had both been foreseen, and provided against, but they had the immediate effect of making us follow an enemy lead. In the long run, they speeded the whole business of the recapture of Burma but, for the time being, we lost the initiative.

In Arakan, the Japanese were decisively beaten, but only after they had completely surrounded the 7th Indian Division. The enemy's protecting air force was shot down and so mauled that it withdrew from the struggle early, and the Dakotas kept the isolated 7th going until they were relieved from the north, and a great slaughter of Japanese was made.

Result: on the whole beneficial to us and our plan. Many Japanese fighter aircraft were put out of the way, which saved us the trouble of seeking them out to destroy them and the road to Akyab was made easier by the weakening of the enemy forces.

But right on the heels of this defensive victory of ours, the Japanese plunged into their Imphal-Kohima show. This was their big push—and a pretty stroke it would have been had it come off. It aimed at bursting into India, and cutting the Bengal-Assam railway line above Kohima, leaving Stilwell and his China road project on the end of a sawn off limb. En route it would have destroyed the 4th Corps of the 14th Army and might have found the road to Calcutta more or less open.

The Japanese were convinced that success would be theirs. "On to Delhi," cried their radio, and there was no doubt that the shot was, as they say at billiards, "on."

General Slim, however, had seen the Jap chalking his cue for this "winning hazard" for some time. As the enemy surged round Imphal and isolated Kohima, he saw that, if we could hold those two places, this Japanese offensive would be the turning point of the Burma war. What appeared to be a serious reverse to our plans was, in fact, a golden opportunity that would speed up the whole process of liberation—providing Imphal and Kohima were held.

And they were!

The story of that struggle is yet to be told. The air supply machine took over and maintained a daily commitment of over 500 tons at Imphal. The fighters progressed yet further in their long range task of destroying the Japanese air force, which again came out for a short time and then retired. The Dakotas had a full scale try-out for air supply and troop movement. During the struggle they moved the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions complete from Arakan to the Chindwin battle. This removal of two of its divisions weakened 15th Corps which was not then in a position to follow up the defensive victory of February with the capture of Akyab before May and the monsoon.

Thus their Imphal offensive kept Akyab in Jap hands for a further ten months, but this was now academic as enemy offensive power in Arakan was broken and Chittagong, the main Dakota port for phase two, was no longer in danger.

By mid-June, the Imphal battle was over. The Japanese had lost heavily and had taken crippling casualties without gaining a thing. We, on the other hand, had done more than merely deny the enemy. We had proved the possibilities of air supply. We had killed the Japanese air force (pre-requisite number one for the coming Dakota operations in Central Burma) and, on the west coast, we had secured an un-menaced Chittagong. All these benefits had accrued to us as by-products of two defensive actions.

Air Marshal Joubert, in March 1944, when the Japanese were at Kohima, said, "This is the enemy's big mistake. He has come to us and so saved us the difficult and costly business of going into the jungle to find him." He was now proved to be right.

As the monsoon started, the enemy, broken, starving and disorganized, fled back into the jungle belt.

It was an opportunity not to be missed—one of the great opportunities of war. Rain or no rain, the pursuit was on. Spear-headed by the 5th Indian Division, our men pushed through the jungle, down the mudbath called the Tiddim road, and also down the Tamu road, a monument to our engineering skill. Once again, Dakotas brought the supplies and took out the wounded. The Japanese fled, fighting rearguard actions but still bewildered and defeated.

It was our troops now who were "King of the Jungle." The results of Slim's far-sighted training plans, and the inspiring feats of Wingate in North-East Burma were proving to the world that Japanese invincibility was a myth.

By the end of the monsoon, we were virtually through that jungle belt which the enemy had regarded as an impregnable safety zone in which he only could mount an attack. By November of 1944, we were across the Chindwin and, before us, was the "promised land"—the Central Plain, with the Chindwin and then Irrawaddy valleys flowing flat and invitingly southward to Mandalay and Rangoon.

This was the kick-off for phase two.

Six months of good weather lay ahead, there was room to deploy, and the base port of the air life-line in Arakan secure. The Japanese

air force was already "out," and, in the north-east, Stilwell was practically through to China.

There was one danger—there could be no drawing back. Once the 14th was on its way south, it had "burned its boats." Every yard gained was a yard further away from the port of Calcutta. There could be no relief from that dismal fact until Rangoon.

In other words, if and when the 14th reached the gates of Rangoon, it would be 2,000 impossible miles from its base port. *It would be entirely dependent upon the Dakotas. If their organization failed or if the safety of Rangoon was not reached before the monsoon of 1945, the whole 14th would be out in the blue.* Air supply might not be able to maintain the Army in South Burma in monsoon conditions, and a "bogging down" short of the objective could easily be the prelude to major disaster.

Mountbatten, Leese and Slim knew the risk, but it was one which had to be taken sooner or later, and now was the time to take it. So, in December, the 14th came over the Chindwin. The die was cast!

General Monty Stopford's 33rd Corps crossed at two places, with the 2nd British and the 19th and 20th Indian Divisions working together at the start of the plan which was to bring us to Mandalay. The 19th Division, after crossing the river, kept on due east to the Irrawaddy. The 2nd Division and 20th Division turned south into the Burma plain. They, too, were headed for the Irrawaddy, but at the point where it bends westward from Mandalay and runs due east and west for 60 miles before turning back again on to its southerly course for Rangoon. On their way they captured the Kabo weir intact—a vital achievement this, as the weir is the basis of irrigation for that great rice-growing plain.

It was now that the 14th Army changed from a jungle to a desert army—not because Central Burma is a desert, but because militarily many of the problems are the same. The open spacious plain lent itself to Libya-like tactics.

Here, able to see 20 miles at a glance instead of 20 yards, they switched all their tactics to the new conditions. Great battles were fought. But by now, our superior equipment could have a real chance: the tanks, the carriers, the armored cars and our aircraft.

The Japanese tried the old stuff—foxholes, trenches and fanatical resistance—but Slim's men cut and thrust round them, forced the Irrawaddy, two to four times as wide as the Rhine, and swept on. And

with them, however fast they moved, went that other half of Mountbatten's Burma forces, Eastern Air Command and the all-important Dakotas of Combat Cargo Task Force.

By the middle of January, 33rd Corps was crossing the Irrawaddy, the largest of the river barriers. Nineteenth Division, after bloody battles, reached the east side of the river, north of Mandalay, while 2nd and 20th Divisions crossed west of Mandalay, over that section of the river which runs east and west. All these crossings were heavily opposed and our bridgeheads heavily counter-attacked.

This was a "touch and go" period. On the 2nd and 20th Divisions' side of the battle, our flank was wide open to crippling counter-attack. That counter-attack was never launched. General Stopford in his tactical appreciation had forecast that the Japanese would not realize the weak position of the British flank, and he was right.

With the bridgeheads consolidated, two strong forces moved on Mandalay from the north and west. Nineteenth Division, under Major General Rees, got there first and took the city. Fort Dufferin fell on March 30. The time for the big drive south to Rangoon had arrived.

There was less than two months to go before the monsoon and 350 miles of enemy-held country to cross. The 14th Army had to average over six miles a day to set the seal on the victories of the previous twelve months.

It was now that General Slim made his surprise stroke. As the three divisions of 33rd Corps re-grouped in the Mandalay area, he threw in against the bewildered Japanese another corps of the 14th Army.

The 4th Corps under Lieutenant General Frank Messervy had for some time been assembling secretly near the Irrawaddy at Pakokku. From there it made a brilliant dash across the river and flung an armored column 90 miles to the south-east to seize Meiktila. An air-borne column was at once flown in, in support. The Japanese south of Mandalay now had their escape road to Rangoon cut and, after a bitter battle for Meiktila, 4th Corps plunged southwards towards the Burma Capital. Meanwhile 33rd Corps having re-grouped moved across to the western flank and also began a drive towards Rangoon down the axis of the Irrawaddy river. It is doubtful if, for some time, the Japanese realized that they were facing twin drives on the capital, each drive being of a corps strength.

Fourth Corps, specially geared for speed, with air-borne and motorized brigades, leaped down the railway towards Rangoon at an average

speed of over 15 miles a day, and by the beginning of May was only 20 miles from the port. Then, on May 2, 1945, Mountbatten sealed the fate of Rangoon. With the monsoon rains already threatening, he launched an air-borne and amphibious assault to which the Japanese had no answer.

Troops of the 26th Indian Division captured Rangoon on May 4 and a few days later linked up with Messervy's 4th Corps drive.

The great plan had worked. We had brought our forces 1,300 miles from Imphal on a main basis of air supply. To do it, something like 200 Dakota strips had to be built by British and Indian engineers. The army routine had been to consolidate, build an air strip, receive supplies, and move on. Towards the last days of the campaign, Combat Cargo Task Force was carrying nearly 3,000 tons a day to the 14th Army, and in addition was moving something like 12,000 troops a week.

At the war's end, South-East Asia Command stood on the threshold of new achievements. Mountbatten was master of the seas and skies. On his right flank, MacArthur reached Borneo. And the strangulation of Japan and of the troops in the territories she had stolen took shape.

TOLSTOY ON MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

BY ELIAS HUZAR AND DONALD MORRISON

I

Among the materials for instruction which teachers of administration—and administrators—may have neglected unduly are works of fiction. What such writing may lack in concentration on administrative problems it may more than make up through insights into human nature, vividness, and literary qualities which add up to an attraction that most available literature on administration does not have. In any list of such narratives, Tolstoy's *War and Peace* would occupy an outstanding position. This many-sided novel contains numerous observations on military administration—the planning and execution of campaigns and battles, most of which are relevant also to civilian administration,¹ as Tolstoy himself suggests when he writes: "For common action, men always unite in certain combinations, in which, in spite of the difference of the objects aimed at by common action, the relation between the men taking a part in the action always remains the same."²

Tolstoy's military narrative is based on researches into the Napoleonic campaigns and on direct observation of the Crimean War, which he described in *Sevastopol*. In writing about the Russian campaigns against Napoleon in 1805 and 1812, he depicts operations both in the overhead military organization and on the field of battle. *War and Peace* takes sharp issue with the theory that history is the work of great men in general, and of Napoleon in particular. In a major sense, the book is an essay on limitations of the power of those who occupy positions of leadership. This article is written around this theme. In presenting Tolstoy's treatment of it, attention will be called, in turn, to some of his references to the limits of authority, to his theory of the role of leaders, and to the factors to which he attributes the unresponsiveness of armies to directions of their commanders.

¹The quotations in this article have been taken, with the publisher's permission, from the Modern Library edition of the book. The following sections, which constitute about half of *War and Peace*, are the chief ones concerned with military activity: Part II, the last two-thirds of Part III, some of Part V, the first two-thirds of Part IX, most of Part X, portions of Parts XI and XII, Parts XIII and XIV, a section of Part XV, and the second part of the Epilogue. The other half of the book is devoted to "the actual life of men" away from the wars. The military sections can be separated conveniently from the others and can be read meaningfully by themselves. However, the book should be read entire, not only because literary surgery will reduce the impact of a memorable experience but also because the private, civilian lives of its characters interact with their public military careers.

²*War and Peace*, p. 1128.

Generals like Pfuhl imagine that in their plans "every contingency has been provided for,"³ but Tolstoy argues that it is inevitable that "every battle . . . fails to come off as those who planned it expected it to do,"⁴ and that historical accounts in which engagements follow plans simply are not true. If Tolstoy had been less of a "determinist" or if he had known about modern staff work, he might have given more credit than he does to the role of intelligence in military operations—at least in detecting and avoiding the impossible. Instead, he emphasizes repeatedly the failure of actions to fulfill plans: mix-ups occur when troops are shifted; terrible confusions prevail on battlefields; Napoleon issues many orders on occupying Moscow, but they are ineffective, "like the hands on the face of a clock, when detached from the mechanism."⁵ Such events convince Prince Andrey Bolkonsky that "in war the most deeply meditated plans are of no avail"⁶ and that there is not much to talk of "military genius": The outcome of battles is determined not by prior plans to use position, equipment, and men but by the spirit of the armies and the way they are led in meeting "unexpected actions of the enemy . . . that cannot possibly be foreseen . . ."⁷ He has sympathy for General Pfuhl's sincere insistence that his plan provides for everything and that present difficulties are due only to failure to carry it out "with perfect exactitude",⁸ but Bolkonsky takes little or no stock in such planning.

II

Tolstoy's analysis of the theory that history is made by great men is developed largely in terms of Napoleon and the campaign of 1812. Even the disastrous retreat from Moscow does not really disturb Napoleon's belief that "everything in the world depend[s] . . . on his will."⁹ His illusions of power are shared by many of the Russian generals and by Rastoptchin, the governor of Moscow, who fancies, "as every governing official always does,"¹⁰ that he controls the attitudes and acts of the city's inhabitants. At a few points, Tolstoy concedes that military leaders have some influence. Thus, in the presence of Prince Bagration, who tries to appear as though what is happening follows his orders or agrees with his intentions, men regain their composure and spirits and are anxious to display their pluck. At

³*War and Peace*, p. 238.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 940.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 946.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 595.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 595.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 604.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 583.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 834.

Borodino, Napoleon performs "calmly and with dignity his role of appearing to be in supreme control of it all,"¹¹ presumably with similarly bracing effects. Kutuzov exercises a beneficial, if not a very effective, restraint on Russians who attack the retreating French needlessly.

These concessions to leadership, however, are overshadowed by Tolstoy's much more frequent criticisms of the theory that leaders have power to control events.

... while the ocean of history is calm, the governing official holding on from his crazy little skiff by a pole to the ship of the people, and moving with it, must fancy that it is his efforts that move the ship on to which he is clinging. But a storm has but to arise to set the sea heaving and the ship tossing upon it, and such error becomes at once impossible . . .¹²

According to Tolstoy, Napoleon does not realize that "the powers of any commander-in-chief are far from great." By contrast, Kutuzov, the Russian commander-in-chief, is a wise old man whose long years of military experience have taught him that it is futile to oppose his will to "the inevitable march of events"¹³ and that the fate of a battle is determined not by the general's orders but by the army's spirit. For Tolstoy, then, leaders of men are neither free agents in bringing about historical phenomena nor effective controllers of events they may believe they have caused.

Men imagine they act of their own free will. In fact, however, they are

... unconscious instrument[s] in bringing about the historical ends of humanity . . . The higher a man's place in the social scale, the more connections he has with others, and the more powers he has over them, the more conspicuous is the inevitability and predestination of every act he commits . . .¹⁴

Generals are "the most slavish and least independent agents"¹⁵ of history. No military — or other — decision ever is made in a vacuum; it occurs within a stream of conditioning factors. Tolstoy notes, for instance, that, after Borodino, the Russian plan was to retreat on a direct line to the Tarutino camp, but the actual maneuver was an oblique march, which was not premeditated but arose "incident by incident, moment by moment from a countless multitude of the most diverse circumstances."¹⁶ Armchair generals fail to understand the actions

¹¹*War and Peace*, p. 741.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 836.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 704.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 570.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 712.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 929.

of a commander in the field because they do not know, or forget, the conditions which limit his freedom of action. He

... is never in the position of the *beginning* of any event [or] in a position to deliberate on all the bearings of the event that is taking place. . . .¹⁷

... the commander of an army has before him, especially at a difficult moment, not one, but dozens of plans. And each of those plans, based on the rules of strategy and tactics, contradicts all the rest. The commander's duty would, one would suppose, be merely to select one out of those plans; but even this he cannot do. Time and events will not wait. It is suggested to him, let us suppose, on the 28th to move towards the Kaluga road, but at that moment an adjutant gallops up from Miloradovitch to inquire whether to join battle at once with the French or to retire. He must be given instructions . . . at the instant. And the order to retire hinders us from turning to the Kaluga Road. And then after the adjutant comes the commissariat commissioner to inquire where the stores are to be taken, and the ambulance director to ask where the wounded are to be moved to, and a courier from Petersburg with a letter from the Tsar, not admitting the possibility of abandoning Moscow, and the commander's rival, who is trying to cut the ground from under his feet (and there are always more than one such) proposes a new project, diametrically opposed to the plan of marching upon the Kaluga Road. The commander's own energies, too, require sleep and support. And a respectable general, who has been overlooked when decorations were bestowed, presents a complaint, and the inhabitants of the district implore protection, and the officer sent to inspect the locality comes back with a report utterly unlike that of the officer sent on the same commission just previously; and a spy, and a prisoner and a general who has made a reconnaissance, all describe the position of the enemy's army quite differently . . .¹⁸

A general is limited not only by this "seamless web" of conditioning factors but also by his dependence on others to execute his commands. If Napoleon had not ordered his troops to advance, there might have been no war with Russia; but "if all the sergeants had been unwilling to serve on another campaign, there could have been no war either."¹⁹ The outcome of a battle is an uncertain thing that is determined in a moment of moral balance or vacillation. Bolkonsky reflects that "victory or defeat depends in reality on the soldier in the ranks who first shouts "Hurrah" or "We are lost." "²⁰ War is not a game of chess in which inanimate pieces are moved about by commanders. "There is not one will controlling lifeless toys . . . the whole is the resultant of the innumerable *collisions* of diverse individual wills!"²¹ Thus, at Borodino the vital decisions were made by

... the nearest officers in the ranks without any reference to Ney, Davoust, and Murat, far less to Napoleon himself. They did not dread getting into trouble for nonfulfillment of orders, nor for assuming responsibility because in battle what is at stake is what is most precious to every man—his own life . . .²²

¹⁷*War and Peace*, p. 778.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 778-79.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 569.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 606.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 669.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 755.

Men execute the plans of their leaders only because they desire to do so. The key to an understanding of historical events is to be found, then, not in the lives of kings, ministers, and generals, but in those of the masses of men whose behavior influences the leaders' plans and determines the extent to which they are carried out. The actions of masses of men, of course, are no more completely a matter of free will than are those of their leaders. When the former acquiesce in the plans of the latter, they act as a result of "an infinite number of varied and complicated causes."²³

The Epilogue of *War and Peace* states the upshot of Tolstoy's reflections on the power of leaders.

1. Power is a relation of a certain person to other persons in which that person takes the less direct share in an act, the more he expresses opinions, theories, and justifications of the combined action.

2. The movement of peoples is not produced by the exercise of power; nor by intellectual activity, nor even by a combination of the two . . . but by the activity of *all* the men taking part in the event, who are always combined in such a way that those who take most direct part in the action take the smallest share in responsibility for it, and *vice versa*.²⁴

Tolstoy observes that commands often are not followed or are contradicted. He concludes that they do not determine events. Rather, events determine the fate of commands. Men cannot foresee the "millions of obstacles"²⁵ that may interfere with a plan's execution. How is it, then, that they persist in the belief that they can order events? They can do so because they connect an event with the one of many prior commands or opinions which the result appears to fulfill, and they ignore the mass of commands which are not carried out. Tolstoy, however, advises us to cease looking for a cause of historical events "in the will of one man"²⁶ and to turn, instead, to a search for laws which control those events.

III

What are the factors which limit power—or coincidence with which determines the effectiveness of orders? For convenience, Tolstoy's general comments and numerous illustrations may be grouped into those concerned with (1) planning, (2) communications, (3) organization, and (4) morale.

1. *Planning*. As noted already, Tolstoy is inclined to minimize the role of military intelligence and to emphasize the effects of the complex and imperfectly understood settings of historical events. His remarks suggest, as B. H. Liddell Hart has argued, that the soldier's

²³*War and Peace*, p. 570.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 1131.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1127.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 928.

profession, perhaps, is more conducive than others to narrowness of mind. According to Tolstoy, Kutuzov was an exceptional leader in realizing, and acting on the assumption that, "the inevitable march of events"²⁷ was stronger and more important than his will. Napoleon, in contrast, misunderstood contemporary historical forces and his relation to them; so he prepared for an invasion of England, which never came about; and he intended to avoid an invasion of Russia, which, unhappily for him, did take place.

Apart from the failure of military plans to take account of historical trends, Tolstoy notes other deficiencies in the planning of generals. Some commanders, like the aged marshal who "likes to do everything himself,"²⁸ become absorbed in detail and have neither time nor disposition to view military operations in their general features, which is the business of generals. Others disregard reality. Napoleon is convinced that it is impossible for him to make mistakes and is not inclined to listen to others. This is the blindness of power. General Pfuhl is an extreme theorist who insists that his plans must be followed to the letter. This is the blindness of fanaticism.

Another difficulty with military planning lies in obtaining intelligence about the enemy. Tolstoy describes the Russians' troubles in keeping track of the rapidly retreating French: Accurate information was hard to get; and, when it was received, it often was out of date. Nor can the enemy's maneuvers and behavior be foreseen with certainty, as the battle scenes in *War and Peace* make amply clear. The Russians apparently did not expect Napoleon to invade Russia proper. The French, in turn, were not prepared for partisan warfare, and Napoleon "never ceased complaining . . . that the war was being conducted contrary to all the rules of war"²⁹ — a view shared by some of the Russian Regulars, disturbed by departures from custom and by the threat to vested interests in their profession.

A related difficulty is the distortion of military history which may be studied for lessons applicable to planning for future wars. Tolstoy asserts that "men always lie when they describe deeds of battle."³⁰

. . . men who have taken part in battles always . . . describe them . . . as they would have liked them to be, as they have heard them described by others, and as sounds well, but not in the least as it really had been . . .³¹

Soldiers do not differ from other men in personal and institutional

²⁷*War and Peace*, p. 704.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 346.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 972.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 609.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 221.

vanity. They are inclined to make heroes of themselves and to glorify their armies, even though falsification in the history of military institutions may have consequences more disastrous than in that of other organizations.

War and Peace describes problems of planning both before and during campaigns and battles. Through the eyes of Andrey Bolkonsky we see the "complicated play of interests, arguments, and passions"³² in councils of war. At the army's headquarters in June 1812, there are a great variety of opinions about the best way to meet the French invasion. Bolkonsky listens to military theorists, advocates of action, and those between these groups; to appeasers; to partisans of the minister of war, of General Bennigsen, and of the Tsar for the post of commander-in-chief; to those who think the Emperor should return to the capital; and, finally, to the "largest group, numbering ninety-nine to every one of the others . . . who care . . . only for the one thing most essential—their own greatest gain and enjoyment . . ."³³ We see how objective consideration of military plans is hampered by the pride of authorship; by the desire to demonstrate that one too has made up a plan even if it is irrelevant to the occasion; by the wish to put another in his place; by the contempt with which proposals of a foreigner are treated without regard to their merits; by the difficulty of phrasing questions properly: Bennigsen asks "Whether to abandon the holy and ancient capital of Russia, or to defend it?" but Kutuzov rephrases it: "The safety of Russia lies in her army. Is it better to risk the loss of the army and of Moscow by giving battle, or to abandon Moscow without a battle?"³⁴ Such experiences confirm Bolkonsky's conviction that it is "an absolutely obvious truth"³⁵ that there is no military science or military genius.

Proximity to operations does not make military planning appreciably easier or better. Tolstoy describes Nikolay Rostov approaching a battlefield unable to distinguish what is happening, and a colonel who does not know if his regiment has repelled a French attack or has been beaten by it. At Borodino, Napoleon himself is at a loss as he listens to reports on progress of the action.

. . . But all those reports were deceptive; both because in the heat of battle it is impossible to say what is happening at any given moment, and because many of the adjutants never reached the actual battlefield, but simply repeated what they heard from others, and also because, while the adjutant was galloping the two or three versts to

³²*War and Peace*, p. 607.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 598.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 782.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 605.

Napoleon circumstances had changed, and the news he brought had already become untrue . . .³⁶

. . . Upon such inevitably misleading reports Napoleon based his instructions, which had mostly been carried out before he made them, or else were never, or could never, be carried out at all.³⁷

2. *Communications.* Even a well conceived plan must be transmitted accurately if it is to have the effect intended. Tolstoy notes the importance of physical means of communication; e.g., retreating Russians fail to destroy a bridge that is useful to the French. He is aware, also, of human frailties which interfere with military communications. Commanders issue contradictory orders; or they fail to express their intentions clearly. Oral transmission is apt to mean distortion. Fear prevents messengers from delivering instructions; or they are killed before they reach their destinations. Long distances on a battlefield and the difficulty of locating particular officers in the confusion of combat are additional obstacles to effective communication. Again, men may choose not to be present to receive an order, as does General Yermolov who purposely is not at home and so delays a battle Kutuzov has ordered. Finally, they may be unable to understand, or they may choose to misinterpret, the instructions they receive: "‘You told me about burning materials . . . but about burning [the bridge] you never said a word.’"³⁸

3. *Organization.* *War and Peace* is rich in illustrations of faulty organizations which interfere with the execution of plans.

Tolstoy describes instances in which authority is defined unclearly, vertically and horizontally. Napoleon is angry with Murat because the latter assumes authority to accept, and is taken in by, a Russian offer of truce. General Dohturov has orders to attack the French, overtakes a whole army instead of the division he has expected, rejects a suggestion that he should act on his own judgment, and asks the commander-in-chief for further instructions. Denisov, who wants to act independently, succeeds in playing off against each other a German general and a Polish general, who want to use his troops, by telling each that he is serving under the other. At the start of the War of 1812, there is confusion in the Russian army because top command is divided, with Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, and Tormasov each in charge of part of the forces. The Tsar also is present, although not as commander-in-chief. After several major setbacks, aggravated by divided authority, the

³⁶*War and Peace*, p. 754.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 755.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 130.

Emperor is persuaded to appoint Kutuzov commander-in-chief with unlimited authority.

War and Peace contains some illuminating observations about laymen and experts in its account of relations between the chief of state and the army. Napoleon, criticizing the Tsar, remarks that "‘A sovereign ought not to be with the army except when he is a general,’"³⁹ i.e., a Napoleon. The Emperor Alexander's experience suggests that the head of a government ought not to assume personal command in the field unless victory is certain, since it is convenient to deflect blame for possible defeat to a scapegoat. Even a protracted visit with troops has drawbacks. A sight of the Tsar does have some utility in inspiring soldiers. So, at a review, Nikolay Rostov thinks: "‘By God! what would happen to me if the Emperor were to address me! . . . I should die of happiness’." On the whole, however, the disadvantages of Alexander's presence among his troops outweigh the advantages. Soldiers have to be diverted for his protection when he decides "‘to expose his precious existence to the risks of war.’"⁴⁰ His attendance at councils of war seems to encourage patriotic, but militarily senseless, proposals. In the campaign of 1805 the Tsar moves Kutuzov's forces into action before the commander is ready; and Bagration tells Nikolay Rostov to ask instructions of his majesty if he should meet him before he sees the commander-in-chief. The Tsar's presence with the army creates even more difficult problems in the campaign of 1812. He is attended by the imperial headquarters staff and many others who have no posts in the army but exercise influence. The officers of the army are at a loss to know in what capacity, personally or for the Tsar, these people address inquiries or advice to them, so they are not sure how to react. An "indefinite, conditional and fluctuating uncertainty of relations"⁴¹ and confusion in lines of command are brought into the army by the Tsar and his military court.

The Tsar does not have a sound conception of relations appropriate between headquarters and the field, so these difficulties are not removed entirely when he accepts advice to return to the capital. He leaves behind, to watch over actions of the commander-in-chief, representatives, including a chief of staff, who maintain private correspondence with the Emperor and undermine Kutuzov's authority. In addition, the Tsar sends inquiries and suggestions to the commander-in-chief.

³⁹*War and Peace*, p. 585.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 599.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 80.

Kutuzov points out the difficulties of devising directions from a distance, but for his pains he is rewarded with fresh instructions and additional "spies."

Tolstoy is aware that, while an organization tends to mold its members to its own pattern, it rarely succeeds completely since other institutions and interests compete for their loyalties and internal schisms and personal differences interfere with the process. The rivalries which obstruct unity of action are seen most clearly, perhaps, in allied military operations. An army abroad is handicapped even in the country of an ally, which is entitled to respect that is not due an enemy, but which is apt to resent so obvious an evidence of its self-insufficiency. An ally's army is dependent, and sometimes deliberately is made to feel its dependence. So, the Austrian minister of war makes Bolkonsky cool his heels, and the Russians have trouble in obtaining the services of Prussian doctors. It is difficult to become enthusiastic about an ally's victory after a defeat of one's own forces; there is perverse pleasure in a setback to an offensively confident ally; and it is an advantage to have a foreign general command a combined action which is reasonably sure to result in defeat. These comments suggest some of the difficulties which make failures of joint planning and operations more numerous than successes such as those of General Eisenhower and SHAEF.

Within an army, too, there are organizational and personal frictions that interfere with unified action. Uniformity in the national composition of fighting forces seems to be advantageous to development of morale and willingness to obey instructions. Napoleon appears to have been interested more in the welfare of the Frenchmen, than in that of the other two-thirds, of the polyglot force with which he invaded Russia; and, as a result, the latter's participation in the campaign probably left something to be desired. In the Russian army, enough of the more important positions were held by foreigners to cause a soldier to remark that "'Yermolov might well ask to be promoted a German'";⁴² but public sentiment dictated that, for the war of national liberation, a Russian should be named in place of the German commander-in-chief.

War and Peace notes rivalries between branches of an army. A cavalryman feels a sense of superiority over an infantryman, and, when he sees the latter on horseback, calls him jeeringly "'a dog astride a fence to the life!'"⁴³ Officers of the line blame those on the staff for their

⁴²*War and Peace*, p. 697.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 371.

troubles; and the points of view of soldiers at the front are different from those of men in the rear.

Tolstoy is sensitive, also, to the informal social hierarchy within the formal army organization. His connections get Andrey Bolkonsky a position on Kutuzov's staff. In some cases, knowing the right people results in receipt of the less dangerous military assignments. For a fellow officer in trouble, Nikolay Rostov delivers a petition to the Tsar through a friendly general in the Emperor's favor, and so he is able to get around the "proper channels" to which an ordinary person would be confined. The attitude underlying such practices is reflected in the question of the old gentleman who is disturbed by rumors of competitive tests for judicial appointments: "I ask you, count, who will preside over the courts when all have to pass examinations?"⁴⁴ Its operations are seen most clearly by Boris Drubetskoy, the chief careerist in the book, who assimilates the "unwritten code" and learns that

. . . quite apart from that subordination and discipline, which is written down in the drill-book, and recognized in the regiment and known to him, there was in the army another and more actual subordination, that which made this rigid, purple-faced general wait respectfully while Prince Andrey—of captain's rank—found it more in accordance with his pleasure to talk to Lieutenant Drubetskoy . . .⁴⁵

Tolstoy sees, too, the influence of personal relations. Thus, to review a position for a prospective battle, Barclay de Tolly sends a general who despises him, stays away a while, and returns to condemn the proposed battlefield on every point without having bothered to see it. At Kutuzov's headquarters in 1812 ". . . the struggle of parties . . . was even more complicated than usual. A was trying to undermine B's position, D to undermine C's position, and so on, in all the possible combinations and permutations . . ."⁴⁶ The difficulties of retreat from Smolensk are increased because Bagration delays junction of his forces with those of Barclay de Tolly, who is his junior in service and whom he dislikes. Bilibin's letter to Bolkonsky describes a similar situation in the earlier campaign:

. . . Buxhevdén is commanding officer by right of seniority, but General Bennigsen is not of that opinion, the rather that it is he and his corps who have the enemy, and he wants to seize the opportunity to fight a battle "on his own hand," as the Germans say. He fights . . . the battle of Pultusk . . . we retreat after the battle, but we send a message to Petersburg with news of a victory, and the general does not give up the

⁴⁴*War and Peace*, p. 397.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 228.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 932.

command to Buxhevdén, hoping to receive from Petersburg the title of commander-in-chief in return for his victory. During this interregnum we begin an excessively interesting and original scheme of manoeuvres. The aim does not, as it should, consist in avoiding or attacking the enemy, but solely in avoiding General Buxhevdén, who by right of seniority should be our commanding officer. We pursue this object with so much energy that even when we cross a river which is not fordable we burn the bridges in order to separate ourselves from our enemy, who, at the moment, is not Bonaparte but Buxhevdén. General Buxhevdén was nearly attacked and taken by a superior force of the enemy, in consequence of one of our fine manoeuvres which saved us from him. Buxhevdén pursues us; we scuttle. No sooner does he cross to our side of the river than we cross back to the other. At last our enemy Buxhevdén catches us and attacks us. The two generals quarrel. There is even a challenge on Buxhevdén's part and an epileptic fit on Bennigsen's. But at the critical moment the messenger who carried the news of our Pultusk victory brings us from Petersburg our appointment as commander-in-chief, and the first enemy, Buxhevdén, being overthrown, we are able to think of the second, Bonaparte. But what should happen at that very moment but the rising against us of a third enemy, which is the "holy armament" fiercely crying out for bread, meat, biscuits, hay, and I don't know what else! . . ."⁴⁷

4. *Morale.* Tolstoy's belief that what an organization does is determined less by its leaders than by the mass of its members has been noted already. He has Andrey Bolkonsky declare that military success depends not on position, arms, or numbers, but " 'on the feeling that is in me . . . and every soldier,' " and that " 'the side that fights most desperately and spares itself least will conquer.' "⁴⁸ "No one can ever be certain of the relative strength of the armies";⁴⁹ a battalion may be stronger than a division or weaker than a company. The decisive factor in battles, according to Tolstoy, is the spirit of the armies.

X is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire 30 times a minute. The men who have the greater desire to fight always put themselves, too, in the more advantageous position for fighting. The spirit of the army is the factor which multiplied by the mass gives the product of the force. To define and express the significance of this unknown factor, the spirit of the army, is the problem of science.⁵⁰

He argues that loss of men, abandonment of equipment, and even retreat of an army do not necessarily constitute a defeat. In addition to physical victories, there are moral victories. By ordinary standards, the Russians were defeated at Borodino. They started with five-sixths of the French strength, and they lost half their army while the French

⁴⁷*War and Peace*, p. 347.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 730.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 729.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 973.

lost only a fourth of theirs. But Napoleon found it impossible to continue the attack because

... the moral force of the French, the attacking army, was exhausted ... a moral victory, that which compels the enemy to recognize the moral superiority of his opponent, and his own impotence, was won by the Russians at Borodino ...⁵¹

To what does Tolstoy attribute the willingness of men to face death? What are the factors that determine the spirit or morale of an army? To some extent, it is a matter of discipline, of training which is calculated to unite a mass of men into one whole and to condition them to carry out orders from their superiors. In this process, uniforms and common routines have a strong influence, as Pierre Bezuhov observes in the "reckless determination and cold cruelty"⁵² written on the frowning faces of his jailors when they hear the drums beat retreat from Moscow. But there is much more to development of organizational personalities than such external devices. Tolstoy observes elsewhere that, if discipline and subordination are based on necessity and on qualifications that are recognized to be superior, they may have a cohesive affect; but, if they are based on arbitrary or pecuniary considerations, as often was the case in the Russian army, they produce pretentiousness, irritation, and envy which have a divisive effect. There is no constant correlation, however, between discipline and morale. Both are good in the French forces until they enter Moscow where the army disintegrates into a mob of mercenaries whom Napoleon is unable to reform into an effective military organization. Tolstoy paints a sorry picture of their disorganized and disastrous retreat. Among the pursuing Russians, morale is high but discipline leaves much to be desired. They attack needlessly in spite of Kutuzov's attempts to restrain them in order to spare their lives; and they let some easy victories slip their grasp because, instead of pressing the rout of the enemy, Cossacks stop to plunder camps abandoned by the French.

Partly, good morale is a matter of soldiers' not thinking about the fate that may await them, or, at least, of assuming that their comrades, rather than they, will be the victims. Nikolay Rostov sees some Frenchmen approaching and in pained wonder asks himself: "... Can they be running ... To kill me? *Me*, whom everyone's so fond of?"⁵³ On the eve of Borodino, Pierre Bezuhov passes some sol-

⁵¹*War and Peace*, p. 773.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 958.

diers who are amused by his hat and reflects:

"They were going into battle, and meeting wounded soldiers, and never for a minute paused to think what was in store for them, but went by and winked at their wounded comrades. And of all those, twenty thousand are doomed to death, and they can wonder at my hat! Strange! . . ."⁵⁴

Partly, also, morale is a matter of habituation to battle. The Rostov who, in his early engagements, knows what it is to be afraid, reaches the point where he has "not the slightest feeling of fear" and knows⁵⁵ that the scared cornet can be helped by nothing but time—though with time, too, the soldier may feel that his luck is running out. These, however, are negative factors which are far from accounting adequately for men's courage in the face of death.

What are some of the positive factors which determine the moral strength of an army? The prospect of victory is one. It must be enormously difficult for men to enter a battle if they are convinced that they will be defeated, though the recent war supplies numerous instances of hopeless resistance to the bitter end. After their moral victory at Borodino, the Russians are willing to attack the French, but their position compels retreat. At Austerlitz Kutuzov anticipates defeat correctly but the other allied generals foresee victory, as commanders on both sides usually do, or pretend to do.

Soldiers' ambitions to become heroes are another element of importance in an army's spirit. Tolstoy depicts not only officers who evade responsibility but also others who display initiative. Nikolay Rostov sees some French dragoons in disorder and, knowing that there is only a moment in which to act, leads his squadron of hussars in attack. Kutuzov has great difficulty in preventing unnecessary attacks resulting from "desire on the part of the generals to distinguish themselves."⁵⁶ A commander with twenty-two years of exemplary service wants to preserve his good record and disregards flying bullets to find out, and, if possible, to correct what has gone wrong with his troops. For Dolohov, who has been degraded to the ranks, an engagement is an opportunity to obtain reinstatement. For others, a battle means an opportunity for promotion to award those who display valor and to fill the posts of those who fall.

Loyalty to a unit or a leader is another factor in an army's morale. A soldier may derive strength from a sense of attachment to his military unit, which he may regard as a home, as precious as that of his

⁵⁴*War and Peace*, p. 717.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 613.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1020.

parents. So, a staff-captain remarks: " . . . it's the honor of the regiment is dear to us. . . ." ⁵⁷ Other attachments are personal. "How happy Rostov would have been if he could have died on the spot for his Emperor." ⁵⁸ Again, some Polish Uhlans display their devotion to Napoleon by ignoring a nearby ford and trying to swim straight across the Niemen; "they were proud to be swimming and drowning in the river before the eyes of that man sitting on the log and not even looking at what they were doing." ⁵⁹

Among the determinants of an army's spirit, however, Tolstoy attaches possibly the greatest weight to belief in some kind of "cause." In a religious people, it is important that their cause should be blessed. So, on the eve of the battle of Borodino, Russian soldiers derive strength from the sight of the holy ikon brought from Smolensk and from participation in religious services. Patriotism is another cause, perhaps the most effective in modern times. Tolstoy interprets the war of 1812 as a national war in defense of the fatherland. "The people had a single aim: to clear their country of the invaders." ⁶⁰ Bolonsky attributes the defeat at Austerlitz to the fact that " 'we had nothing to fight for then' " ⁶¹; but he predicts that at Borodino " 'whatever happens we shall win the victory.' " ⁶² The Russians, fired with hatred for the invading foreigners, make a mass exodus from Moscow, and the peasants follow a scorched earth policy to deny the enemy the material fruits of conquest. Other causes also may be invoked to strengthen the spirit of an army. Tolstoy remarks that, while such justifications may lack common sense and may be inconsistent, they have an "incontestable value in their own day."

They remove moral responsibility from those men who produce the events. At the time they do the work of brooms, that go in front to clear the rails for the train: they clear the path of men's moral responsibility. Apart from those justifications, no solution could be found for the most obvious question that occurs to one at once on examining any historical event; that is, how did millions of men come to combine to commit crimes, murders, wars, and so on? ⁶³

IV

Such are Tolstoy's observations about military administration, particularly about limitations on the power of leaders. Students should find in his philosophy a provocative statement of the roles of choice and chance in human affairs, and in his narrative a vivid portrayal of problems of administration which occur in all type of common action.

⁵⁷*War and Peace*, p. 120.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 573.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1011.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 730.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 730.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 1130.

OVERSEAS WAR—IN 1846!

BY LIEUTENANT IVOR SPENCER

I

The castle could not be taken by frontal assault, declared Winfield Scott, our general-in-chief. It would be necessary to land upon the beaches below the city. We should need one hundred and forty surf boats, capable of putting ashore five thousand men in the first minutes. Once upon the ground, our troops could invest the city from the rear. The castle of San Juan de Ulua, one of the hemisphere's strongest fortresses, could be taken later. For this great "combined operation," a huge convoy of not less than fifty good-sized vessels would be needed, carrying siege guns, shells and rockets, supplies of every sort, wagons, horses for the dragoons and "light" (field) artillery, and the initial army of 14,000—to be strengthened later. When city and castle had been taken, a direct advance could be made upon the capital, forcing the enemy to his knees.

So ran Major General Scott's memoranda of a plan of operations, submitted to the Secretary of War in October and November 1846. Its surprisingly modern features depict the greatest single operation of our war of 1846 to 1848 with the republic of Mexico. General Zachary Taylor, after defeating the enemy in two pitched battles, just east of the "Rio Grande del Norte" near its mouth, had lately occupied Monterey, roughly two hundred miles westward, after three days of costly fighting. Further advance from this quarter, across the near-desert country towards San Luis de Potosí, was scarcely possible, "Old Zach" admitted it himself. Hence came the new movement, as outlined in Scott's memoranda and already virtually decided upon by President Polk and his admirers. It would be the most sweeping military enterprise that the country had ever seen.

II

The fact is that the Mexican War, although fought with the rather limited and old-fashioned matériel of a century ago, posed many of the problems of the present war. Hard as it is to realize, this was our first overseas struggle. Unlike the contests that had begun in 1775 and 1812, it was fought upon foreign territory, and at a great distance as well. Messages from the seat of government and supplies from our northeastern manufacturing towns had to travel two thousand miles even to get to the Rio Grande area. Nor does one play upon words in calling it an "overseas" war. Men and supplies, alike for the cam-

paigns in northern and central Mexico, were carried by water. Shipping had to be provided not only for crossing the Gulf and skirting our eastern coast, but also for transit around Cape Horn to California.

III

As on the eve of World War II, our army in 1846 was distressingly small. It was also, to today's layman somewhat overwhelmed by the specialization of 1944, rather charmingly lacking in complexity. With men hardened by long service on the Indian frontiers, and with officers trained at "the Point," the 1846 army was an efficient little outfit. Yet there were only fourteen regiments in all, and these did not come up to the legal *maximum* of forty-two privates per company. There were only four batteries of field artillery, although these men had the skill that comes from ample target practice.

The army had neither signal corps nor intelligence section, and the quartermaster and engineer officers had no enlisted men under them. Serious as was the absence of quartermaster companies, it was the lack of "sappers, miners, and pontoniers," or, to use our simpler term, "engineers," that the army particularly held against an over-thrifty congress. Indeed, General Taylor afterwards tried to blame upon this factor his failure completely to destroy the enemy after his victories east of the Rio Grande. After hostilities began, our armed forces were raised from about eight thousand men to some fifty or sixty thousand, unfortunately chiefly by forming volunteer units led by officers of their own choosing. A particularly serious blunder lay in the setting of a twelve-months' term for the first fifty thousand of these volunteers, which in practice meant that commanders at times had to release men badly needed. All in all, the volunteers did better than the regulars were willing to admit. At Buena Vista, for example, although the volunteer companies did sometimes break and run in a manner reminiscent of the Bladensburg "races" of 1814, it was a preponderantly volunteer army that, outnumbered four to one, beat Santa Anna's great host. The other chief change made in the army was the establishment of an engineer company.

In 1846, the great changes in military technology that the next hundred years were to bring happily lay beyond the threshold. Some could be imagined, but none had been applied. Utterly unmechanized, our forces advanced by muscle power, the muscle of men, mule, and horse. The blue-clad troops plodded on afoot into the arid Mexican highlands, bragging their dream of an early revel in the Halls of Mon

tezuma. Behind, long trains of wagons and pack mules carried the bacon ("side pieces or middlings," Scott had said) and hard bread and all of the other necessities. Despatches, written *en clair* rather than in code, were carried by mounted courier. On the sea, our vessels were mainly sailing ships.

Flintlock muskets were the rule, rather than rifles, and the celebrated, new "repeating firearms" or "revolvers" of Samuel Colt were carried only by the cavalry (and not by the dragoons). Late in 1846 the War Department was trying to purchase the right to make "Colt's" in our arsenals, and was finding the inventor a hard bargainer. The new German explosive, gun-cotton, was just being tested by our ordnance officers. It was the same with communications. Railways, veteran carriers of some fifteen or sixteen years' standing, had no real part in this war. The little line that connected Vera Cruz and Jalapa, for example, played no part in Scott's advance. Presumably it had been stripped of rolling stock. The electric telegraph had been in operation in the United States for two years, and was rapidly being extended along the eastern seaboard in the war years. It was not until well into 1848, however, that New Orleans was connected with the East. Important tidings from the battlefield were rushed towards Washington by an impromptu pony express. Military employment of photography was, of course, still more remote. A few daguerreotypes were taken of our troops in Mexico, for souvenir purposes only, and one participant, Captain Robert Anderson, later the defender of Fort Sumter in 1861, remarked in one of his nightly letters to his wife his regret that he didn't have "a good daguerreotype apparatus" with which to picture the country for her.

Aside from these foreshadowings of change, there were a few instances of the actual application of new technology. Among our vessels in the Gulf, for example, there were not only paddle-wheel steamers but also "propellers." And most interesting was the use of rubber pontoons, for military bridges. Trains of well designed rubber pontoons were hastily manufactured and rushed to the field for use by the new engineer company.

IV

The United States entered its Mexican War, as it has many others, not only unprepared but also ignorant of the need to prepare. Winfield Scott, distinguished and cosmopolitan soldier that he was, understood both the need and the ignorance. He was courageous enough to

tell Secretary of War Marcy that a good four months would be required to enlist, train, equip, and transport the men for a real offensive. The administration was horrified. So too was the public, when the news of Scott's attitude began to leak out. Scott was dubbed a dotard, and people expected that Taylor would be at Mexico City within a few weeks—certainly by the Fourth of July! Polk and Marcy, able as they were, were inclined to take the popular view. Polk noted in his diary that the general-in-chief was "scientific and visionary," *i.e.*, a textbook general. A tiff occurred, and Scott was kept at home, leaving the less able Taylor in command of the first big push. It was the same afterwards, at the end of the winter, when Scott had left to complete arrangements for the Vera Cruz move. Polk thought that he was "wasting himself in the most extravagant preparations."

Yet the "scientific and visionary" Scott was eminently right. Volunteering was quick enough, in fact embarrassingly so, and very little time was needed for training. The men could shoot well, and the infantry drill was mastered in the days or weeks spent waiting for the steamers to take them down river and for vessels to transport them to the enemy coast. In other words, the chief delays in mounting the two big drives arose out of transportation problems. For Taylor, in the north, the plan was to advance up the Rio Grande. Light-draught river steamers were essential. Taylor was at fault in failing to anticipate the need, but even after requisitions were made there was difficulty in getting the craft speedily. They had to be brought from the upper Mississippi valley, and several were lost in the rough waters of the Gulf. In consequence, Taylor was delayed for upwards of three months. Then arose the wagon bottleneck, for the move overland to Monterey. Here again, the field commander lacked foresight. He could have gathered pack mules, but was content instead to blame Washington for not having guessed his alleged needs months earlier. The wagons were made hastily, but in far off Cincinnati and Philadelphia. Eventually Taylor went ahead without them, using pack mules after all and cutting his advance force to a dangerous level.

In order to cope personally with these problems, Quartermaster General T. S. Jesup early went to New Orleans and the Rio Grande. He may well have been rather disgruntled, privately, because on the eve of the war he had sought in vain for funds with which to stock up the Government warehouses with necessary materiel. Once at New Orleans he hurriedly chartered or purchased vessels at ports up and

down the Gulf and Atlantic coasts and all over the Mississippi basin. A great variety of goods was rushed to the war zone. Extensive warehouses and workshops were built at the mouth of the Rio Grande, and to that area Jesup sent hundreds, even thousands, of hired teamsters and laborers. There was considerable trouble with these men, who would not contract for more than six months' work at best, despite the high wages paid.

For the drive into central Mexico, the Quartermaster General made similar preparations, ultimately using Vera Cruz as his advance base. Careful plans which Scott drew up were of great assistance. On the other hand, Scott's requests for the numerous surf boats and for a great number of siege cannon—well justified as the orders were—strained our shipping and manufacturing facilities greatly. The young metals industry was considerably embarrassed by the order for heavy guns. Scott's expedition, held up by the slow arrival of transports, reached Vera Cruz many weeks behind schedule, and in fact near the start of the usual season for the dread *vomito* or yellow fever. Even then, few of the landing craft or siege guns were present. It was fortunately possible to get partial substitutes from the Home Squadron, which was convoying the army.

V

By November of 1847, fifty-four steamers, and four ships, two barks, eight brigs, thirty-four schooners, and two hundred and one surf boats and scows had been purchased or constructed. In addition, "several hundred" sailing and steam-driven vessels had been hired. By contrast with today, there was no danger from hostile men of war, although for a time, in truth, privateers were a potential worry. The greatest threat lay in the violent northers on the Gulf. As mentioned before, the river steamers had particular trouble upon the rough waters. Perhaps fifty vessels were lost in all.

Despite Polk's insistence upon economy, and the sincere exertions of the general staff, costs were exorbitant. Quartermasters did try to insist upon horses "sound in wind and limb, and free from faults and blemishes," to name one example, but vendors knew that the Government must employ the twelve-month term of the volunteers to the best advantage and also that it was anxious to avoid the *vómito*. Prices were raised in a twinkling. For a steamer not worth above \$100,000, for instance, \$180,000 was asked. Jesup and his subordinates were

wise enough, however, to avoid long haggling, knowing the truth of the adage that there can be no economy in war. As usual, the nation paid for its lack of preparation.

Postwar liquidation showed well enough the premiums that had been charged. Jesup reported in 1848 that the transports, for example, could not be sold "at even half their value." Most spectacular bit of selling was the auction at Vera Cruz in the last days of July 1848. The affair had been advertised, and it had as master of ceremonies the energetic and patriotic Mr. Freaner of New Orleans. None the less, because of yellow fever, the rapid departure of our troops, and a desire to avoid the cost of shipment, the Government took substantial losses. Storehouse after storehouse was sold complete with contents, so hastily that often no examination was made of the nature or condition of the goods inside. Some damaged surf boats went at no more than five dollars apiece. Vessels not fit to brave the journey homewards were sold as well as might be. While the steamer *Mary Summers* brought \$14,000 ("every cent she was worth"), the case of the ship *St. Louis*, at least, was notorious. After removal of a few fittings, she was sold for \$500. Major Cross, who was in charge, claimed that the vessel was in atrocious condition and that the local harbormasters declared her to be worth not above \$400. Yet the sale of a *ship*—no mere bark or schooner—at such a price revealed all too well the wear, wastage, and loss endemic in war.

VI

In the cacophony of public sentiment we find some features all too familiar today. People played politics with the war effort. Sentiment shifted readily from hearty-support to ill-mannered backbiting. Politicians jockeyed for advantage. And the public, eager, irrepressible, typically American, wanted to have a say itself in matters of high strategy. This was well revealed in the press.

Unlike World War II, the Mexican War was not "total" war, indeed. There was no draft. There were no war taxes, although the administration asked Congress to enact some. As usual, Congress was unwilling to go so far as the executive branch in this matter. Despite the war's light incidence upon the people, there was much controversy and ill will. Explanations are to be found, of course, in the well known anti-expansionist feelings of the abolitionists and in the less publicized conservatism of Calhoun and many other planters of the Southeast.

The Whigs, who in part represented these conflicting groups, criticized the war and all of its works. But the men of the Piedmont, the middle states, and the Mississippi valley, who were generally behind the war and were usually in the administration party, were far too unpredictable in their loyalty. Their captiousness reminds one of the present war's ups and downs of morale, although the problem was much worse in the earlier war.

At first, as after Pearl Harbor, there was a flood tide of enthusiasm, more reflex than reflective. Afterwards, naturally enough, came a let-down, which was strong enough to defeat the administration in the congressional elections of 1846. This may be compared, by and large, to the switchback in 1942. Then, as the greatest push of all—the movement upon the heart of the enemy's country—got under way, there was a new intensity of feeling. Between October of 1847 and February of 1848 this strong feeling was translated in many quarters into unbounded jingoism. Numerous editors and politicians were demanding the annexation of all of Mexico, to say nothing of shrill cries for overrunning the entire hemisphere. We may congratulate ourselves that the movement was warded off by the timely receipt of the peace of Guadalupe Hidalgo, by which the United States took New Mexico and Upper California.

The public's avid interest in the war was well shown in the newspapers. This was all the more true because there was no censor. The "thousand prying eyes and brazen tongues" of the press, to use the words of a contemporary, led to premature divulging of war plans. This was true of the Vera Cruz move, in fact. Newspaper strategists were as abundant as today, causing Secretary Marcy to note with much feeling that every journal had its own "cut and dried" plan of victory. Yet the press did well, everything considered. Led by the New Orleans printers, many papers sent their men into Mexico as correspondents. It was our first "war correspondents' war." There were scores of reporters on hand. Some went as soldiers, doing their writing on the side. Others, such as G. W. Kendall of the *Picayune*, were full-time newspapermen. Kendall, for example, arranged a pony express from Monterey to the Gulf and managed to rush news of the capture of that city to New Orleans in eight days. Copeland, his recent biographer, has termed him "the first modern war correspondent." As with later wars, a number of books about the struggle were afterwards written by the reporters and the participants.

VII

There is no space here in which to discuss the verve and gallantry of our troops, to tell of Colonel Jefferson Davis' cry ("Great God, if I had fifty men with knives, I could take that fort") or of Lieutenant U. S. Grant's planting of the howitzer atop the church roof near the San Cosme garita. Nor is there room to tell of Scott's bold generalship, which led the distant Duke of Wellington to comment that "Scott is lost. He has been carried away by successes. He can't take the city (Mexico), and he can't fall back upon his base." We are limiting ourselves to certain analogies between the warfare of the 1840's and of the 1940's.

The war of 1846-1848 was fought against a country weak in numbers and resources, poorly organized, and worse led. In response to a supposed "manifest destiny," it was the United States that was doing the conquering. The war seems petty in size and quite properly obsolete in technology, after a century. Yet in its analogies to the present struggle, as an overseas contest with trying problems of logistics and as illustrative of the traditional American attitude towards war, it had its lessons. Not, indeed, that we have learned the lessons! Our position with respect to war has continued to be vicarious, slapdash. We take our wars as we find them.

This was safer in 1846. Even Mexico was far away, then.

D'ESTAING, AN EARLY EXPONENT OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHARLES MORAN

I

The war concluded in August 1945 differed from previous conflicts in one important respect. In World War II we witnessed a blurring of the lines of demarkation between military and naval action, a tendency that had been accentuated by the unifying influence of air power. Not but that land and sea have always been closely interrelated in war. "Amphibian" is, however, a new addition to the vocabulary of warfare, one that indicates the inseparable nature of operations hitherto entrusted to distinct branches of the profession of arms. It may, therefore, be time to reconsider our findings on previous attempts to evolve a doctrine of joint warfare.

An analysis of the causes of French failures in war, especially in the eighteenth century, will show that these failures seldom if ever were due to lack of co-ordination between land and sea forces. Neither branch of the service was ever permitted to arrogate to itself the complacent title of "senior." What is more important, rank in one did not preclude the holder from exercising command in the other. In other words, the spectacle we have recently hailed as an innovation—army officers in theoretic and strategic command of naval units and vice versa—was a familiar one to France of the monarchy. Such command, moreover, was not limited to brief periods, such as debarkation operations, but extended through entire campaigns. A special rank, that of *Lieutenant Général des Armées Navales*, was frequently conferred on naval commanders in overseas expeditions. The career of one such officer, besides being connected with our early history, illustrates so aptly the practical working out of the principle involved that it may not be amiss to re-appraise his campaigns, especially as they have been persistently misunderstood not only by Anglo-Saxons but by many of his own countrymen.

Charles-Henri, Comte d'Estaing, was an aristocrat of the aristocrats, by birth. One of his ancestors had saved the life of Philippe-Auguste at the Battle of Bouvines in 1214 and as a reward had been permitted to sur-charge the lilies of France on his arms, a distinction seldom

granted to any but princes of the blood or the half-blood. The future admiral was born at the Chateau de Ravel, in the inland province of Auvergne, on November 24, 1729. His father had served in the Army so d'Estaing's boyhood surroundings did not incline him to the Navy. It is not surprising, therefore, to find d'Estaing a Musketeer before he had reached the age of ten. In 1746 d'Estaing, then a lieutenant in the *Régiment de Rouergue*, married the granddaughter of Marshal de Chateau Renault. The marriage was far from a happy one and the young couple soon separated. D'Estaing joined his regiment, serving in Flanders. For a while he was on the staff of Maurice de Saxe. At Maestricht, where he received his first wound, his conduct was such that he was promoted to the colonelcy of his regiment. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle put an end to the War of the Austrian Succession. In order to round out his military experience with some knowledge of diplomacy he accompanied de Mirepoix's mission to London. That any lasting peace with England was impossible was the main lesson he learned. D'Estaing assiduously continued his military studies. He was rewarded with the Cross of Saint Louis and a billet with Lally-Tollendal, then about to depart for India.

To follow d'Estaing's adventures with that extraordinary but unhappy commander would take us far afield. That d'Estaing had fought hard is best attested by the fact that the British governor, Pigot, was unwilling to exchange him, offering him a parole. This d'Estaing persistently refused to accept until finally the parole was limited to not serving again in India. D'Estaing then started for home but on arriving at the Ile de France in May 1759, he heard of the so-called *Cartel de l'Ecluse* which provided for the exchange of all *prisoners*. Did this cartel, which antedated his parole, apply to d'Estaing? A pretty point, as the equity lawyers say, but one that was to plague him for many a month. He began by weakening his case. Not being sure of his position he endeavored to have Pigot agree to apply the cartel to him. Pigot rejoined by informing him that he could obtain his release only upon payment of the usual ransom, a matter of seven hundred florins,¹ his rank now being that of brigadier general. Here d'Estaing decided to take the law in his own hands and to give the cartel his own liberal interpretation, a most liberal interpretation in fact as he was contemplating nothing less than naval operations in Indian waters!

¹The florin of the period was the equivalent of six shillings.

II

D'Estaing's entry into the naval service was certainly a case of "breaking in from the top." After watching the hesitating, vacillating methods of Admiral d'Aché, the French commander in Indian waters, he came to the conclusion that he could do better himself. During his entire naval career he was to prefer the irregular "blue" officers to the regular "red" officers, the two categories being commonly designated by the colors on the lapels of their uniforms. Was this attitude indicative of the democratic spirit he was later to proclaim? Possibly, but in the meantime it did not increase his popularity with the exclusive "Grand Corps." While awaiting transportation from the Ile de France d'Estaing resolved to try his hand at naval warfare. "I have applied myself to this sorry business of seafaring and have become nearly amphibious," he reported to his government. D'Estaing will always remain a controversial character. One achievement, however, cannot be denied him. He was the godfather of the expression that has become so popular in military and naval circles of late!

The major premise of d'Estaing's "amphibious" policy was simple and understandable. He always inclined in favor of military action for which the French forces seemed better fitted by training and tradition. He was more confident of damaging the enemy by land operations than by naval engagements. The occupation of some enemy territory, the destruction of a land station, were objectives he preferred to risking expensive and often irreplaceable material against a well equipped naval force. Leaving theoretical discussion concerning the proper sequence of operations aside, this much is certain. D'Estaing's success along the lines of his choice was such as to put on his critics the burden of proving that his strategy was faulty.

But to return to d'Estaing's first command afloat. By pledging his own credit he prevailed upon the governor of the Ile de France to entrust him with two vessels belonging to the French East India Company. They were the *Condé*, an armed transport of fifty guns which d'Aché had left behind as unseaworthy, and the *Expédition*, the frigate on which d'Estaing had taken passage from India. As an inducement he proposed to scour the neighborhood for supplies of which the colony was in dire need after d'Aché's protracted sojourn on his way to India. This minor objective, however, was soon to give way to more ambitious projects. D'Estaing was not a corsair at heart. He was, to quote his own language, an amphibian warrior.

Only sixty seamen and one hundred soldiers were available but, nothing daunted, d'Estaing recruited two hundred blacks. With this motley outfit the squadron put to sea on September 1, 1759, under the command of its originator who planned, however, to relinquish command in favor of the next in rank, an officer by the name of des Essarts, should an enemy be encountered who might raise the question of the parole, an obvious quibble.

All went well until nearing the coast of Arabia when the *Expédition* carried away her foremast and bowsprit. D'Estaing was unconcerned. Her officers suggested a return to port but d'Estaing, with a landman's contempt for nautical details, ordered them to continue on their way assuring them that the enemy would soon supply the missing spar. And so it happened.

On the 29th at daybreak the lookout on the *Condé* sighted a large ship convoying numerous smaller craft. D'Estaing gave chase and soon compelled the ship to heave to. She proved to be the *Mamoudy*. Her Arab captain claimed Portugese registry but d'Estaing decided that she was British owned and therefore a good prize. Three of the smaller craft were destroyed for the same reason; the others, obviously the property of Goa merchants, were released.

From his prisoners d'Estaing learned of a British ship, the *Merry*, then in the harbor of Muscat on the eastern coast of the Bay of Oman. Leaving behind the *Expédition* and the *Mamoudy* who were slow sailers, he proceeded to that port which he entered at nightfall under British colors. All hands had been sent below except those who could speak English. The boarding officer was courteously received and at first fell into the trap. Just as he was giving d'Estaing the desired information concerning the exact location of the *Merry* some of the *Condé's* undisciplined crew aroused the suspicions of the oarsmen of the gig waiting at the ladder. The rowers jumped overboard, dove to avoid the bullets and swam ashore to give the alarm. D'Estaing was compelled to fight for his prize.

Two boats were lowered; d'Estaing accompanied them as an "observer." The *Merry* was captured without resistance. Soon, however a swarm of boats put out from the shore. Des Essarts held them off with a skilfully directed gunfire and after considerable effort took the *Merry* in tow with the *Condé*. Past batteries and over dangerous reefs he made good his escape and rejoined the *Expédition* and the *Mamoudy* which by that time had reached the harbor. D'Estaing

showed his appreciation of the gallantry of his men by foregoing his share of the prize money. His total losses had amounted to one officer and five men wounded. His debut in his new profession had been as neat a "cutting out" job as any sailor, regular or irregular, could hope for.

D'Estaing now turned his attention landward. The British base at Bandar Abbas lay temptingly near on the Persian side of the Gulf of Oman. He reached that port on the evening of October 13th, just in time to capture the frigate *Speedwell* which had run aground trying to escape and had been abandoned by her crew. Landing that same evening with two small pieces and two mortars he laid siege to Fort Gombrun. After a short bombardment the governor, Sir Alexander Douglas, capitulated. One of the terms of the capitulation effected an exchange of d'Estaing for seven British officers, an ingenious device, to say the least, but one that further complicated his status as the cartel covering exchanges did not apply to naval officers, to which category d'Estaing had unintentionally transferred himself. Hardly had the capitulation gone into effect than several thousand Persians, supposedly allies of the British, appeared on the scene. For a while d'Estaing's position was a precarious one. The native chiefs, however, were eventually placated and d'Estaing, after arming the *Mamoudy* with the guns of Fort Gombrun, which he destroyed, departed with twenty thousand rupees besides other booty and the spars of the *Speedwell*, thereby making good his prediction.

Although d'Estaing could well afford to rest on his laurels the possibility of injuring Great Britain by destroying her trading posts in Sumatra was too inviting to resist. He accordingly sent his prizes to the Ile de France while he crossed the Indian Ocean with his two vessels. After a slow passage he touched at the Dutch *comptoir* of Ayer Bangis on February 4, 1760, and three days later was off the British post of Natal. Although defended by a garrison of one hundred men, forty of whom were Europeans, and eighteen cannon Natal surrendered without firing a shot. Considerable booty was captured including some fresh food of which the French were in great need, scurvy having broken out among them. Here d'Estaing left the *Condé* and his sick and with a few volunteers set sail for Tapanooly in the *Expédition*. This post, situated in the northern part of the island, was defended by two batteries and a garrison of eighty-five Europeans and two hundred Malays. D'Estaing, nevertheless, landed his small force

in the morning of the 15th and boldly led the attack. Taken by surprise the British surrendered after a brief resistance.

What to do with his captures was now the question. Having no means of garrisoning them d'Estaing decided to destroy the forts at Capanooly and to allow the Dutch to occupy Natal. Then turning south he appeared before Benkulen, the principal British post in Sumatra. The town was defended by an imposing masonry bastion called Fort Marlborough. The garrison consisted of five hundred mixed troops and fourteen hundred Malay auxiliaries. At the first shots fired by the French ships the natives abandoned the fort which d'Estaing promptly seized. Here he established himself and began sending parties into the fever-ridden jungle in pursuit of such forces as still held the field while the *Expedition* reduced the last British outposts on the coast.

Physically, however, D'Estaing was at the end of his tether. His forces were decimated. Of thirty-three officers only five remained, three of them dangerously ill. All the work, including the navigation, fell on d'Estaing's shoulders. Gathering the survivors aboard the *Expedition* and abandoning the *Condé* which could go no further he laid his course once more for the Ile de France. With a handful of men and the most meagre of resources he had in the ten months of his "amphibious" operations inflicted damage on his enemies estimated at forty million *écus*, about one hundred million francs, present currency. What was even more important, he had not limited himself to a "guerre de course." He had actually occupied British possessions, although it was France's allies, the Dutch, who reaped what he had sown.

D'Estaing's luck was now to abandon him. Just as the *East Indiaman*, on which he was making the homeward journey from the Ile de France, was about to enter the harbor of Lorient she was captured by a British squadron and taken to Plymouth. As might be expected, d'Estaing was forthwith thrown into prison charged with breaking his parole. Fortunately he had made many friends during his visit to London with Mirepoix, among them George III, then Prince of Wales. They secured his release. Returning to France after an absence of four years more trouble awaited him. A tactless bureaucracy began investigating his transfer of the fort at Natal to the Dutch, his enemies suggesting that his reasons for so doing were far from disinterested. In view of his poverty, he still being in debt to the governor of the Ile de France for the vessels he had chartered, this was

adding insult to injury. With righteous indignation d'Estaing advised the Ministry that they had better inform themselves of the facts "before putting questions couched in humiliating terms to a gentleman concerning the cession of a fort in the interests of the King's service." The incident was thereupon closed but it left a resentment that undoubtedly affected d'Estaing's loyalty to the Crown in later years.

III

The Treaty of Paris, which put an end to the Seven Years War, ended d'Estaing's active service for the time being. In fairness to his government it should be said that he was rewarded for his work in that war by being named governor of the French Antilles, a promotion that displeased the "Grand Corps" greatly as they persisted in considering him an intruder. Whether or not that term should be applied to him he certainly was an innovator. While en route to Saint Domingue he made a remarkable discovery. The antipathy of seamen for marines was "most unjust." He therefore endeavored to make the two services better acquainted with each other. The method he chose was to initiate the marine contingent of the *Brilliant* in the mysteries of seamanship, to the great disgust of the regular officers present.

His solicitude was not limited to the Marine Corps, however. D'Estaing never wearied in his efforts to improve the condition of the French seamen. On one occasion the boat sent to rescue a man overboard returned without having discovered the victim. D'Estaing ordered the search continued and after an hour the man was recovered. Having learned that the sailor in question had fallen overboard while intoxicated he started an investigation concerning the wine ration. Although the allowance was a reasonable one the tipplers had found a means of increasing it by purchasing that of the apprentices. D'Estaing ordered that the boys receive the commuted value of their ration so as to put a stop to so objectionable a practice. Such minor details as the handling of the ship's mail received his careful attention. As a result, in spite of his strict notions of discipline, d'Estaing was most popular in the fo'castle.

D'Estaing's experience as a colonial governor need not detain us. Suffice to say that during this two years of office he handled a difficult situation with tact and firmness and familiarized himself with the region in which he was later to operate. That the "amphibious" nature of the area impressed him is more than likely. In after years D'Estaing

was never to lose sight of the bargaining power the possession of the various islands represented, a matter that is not entirely naval, nor military, nor economic, but a blending of all three. One of his civilian officials has given us a moral portrait of the man that is both graphic and prophetic.

Great intelligence and activity; less judgment; his heart on a par with his birth; morally honest but subject to violent fits of temper; given to display, perhaps because he considers it necessary to one in his position; impenetrable secrecy; seeks popularity and avoids certain honors in order to gain greater ones. As for talents, they are outstanding, also a marked aptitude for office work which to him seems a recreation. However, a love of system and of reform dominates him and neutralizes his good qualities. To his way of thinking the state must subjugate everything. This belief distorts his point of view and renders it too vast to fit into the sphere of the public weal, either in theory or in practice.

Could d'Estaing by any chance be an early "new dealer" as well as an early amphibian?

On his return to France in 1766 d'Estaing was appointed Governor of Brest where he found ample opportunity as well as urgent need for "system and reform." It was not until 1778 that d'Estaing, now a Vice Admiral, was to see active service again. When France decided to come to the assistance of the Thirteen Colonies d'Estaing was entrusted with the command of the "Armées de Terre et de Mer" that were being assembled in Toulon for service in America, a signal honor indeed. He had already been promoted to Lieutenant General in the last months of the Seven Years War. His instructions were to do "whatever he considered most suitable," to attack the British "wherever he could damage them most." If he felt himself at a disadvantage he was authorized to seek refuge in Boston or *to proceed to the Antilles*. In any event he was not to leave the American continent until he had fought "an action advantageous to the Americans, glorious for the arms of the King and of a nature to prove at once the protection" France extended to her allies. Seldom has the commander of an expeditionary force been given such wide discretion. How well he acquitted himself of this mission is one of the mooted matters of history.

On April 13, 1788, d'Estaing set sail from Toulon. His fleet consisted of two 80's, six 74's, one 50 and five 26-gun frigates, with 9,842 officers and seamen and 2,548 marines. On July 7th he dropped anchor in Delaware Bay, an unconscionably long passage, even allowing for light winds. During his crossing he seems to have construed his in-

structions to harass British shipping as an excuse to chase every sail he spied. His dilatoriness robbed him of his best opportunity of fighting the engagement mentioned in his orders. Had he arrived in the Delaware two weeks sooner he would have found Howe's fleet, which then consisted of only six 64's and three 50's. Howe and Clinton, however, had received ample warning. The British forces, both army and navy, had retired to New York where they securely established themselves.

D'Estaing thereupon proceeded to follow Howe to New York and arrived off Sandy Hook on July 11th. Here he was met by Colonel Laurens whom Washington had sent with the view of combining an attack on New York, the French fleet to engage Howe while Washington and Gates descended from the north on General Clinton. Unfortunately the American pilots were unanimous in declaring that only four of the French vessels could be gotten over the bar. Critics of d'Estaing's action in abandoning the projected operation argue that since Howe had gotten his vessels safely across d'Estaing could have done likewise. In view of the fact that Washington had suggested an attractive alternative, the recapture of Newport, d'Estaing can hardly be blamed for choosing the more prudent course. By July 29th he was in the middle passage between Rhode Island and Conanicut Island and had sent two frigates into the western passage between Conanicut and the mainland and two more in to the eastern passage, the so-called Sakonnet River.

The British garrison at Newport consisted of approximately 6,000 men, many of whom were Hessians. Earthworks, more numerous than formidable, had been hastily erected at strategic points. The American forces under the command of General Sullivan were located principally at Providence and numbered about 3,500 Continentals and 7,000 militia.

As soon as d'Estaing appeared in Narragansett Bay General Sullivan went on board the flagship *Languedoc*. If General Pigot² could be bottled up in Newport and compelled to surrender a major victory would have been won. Unfortunately the American troops would not be ready for several days and in the meantime Howe might appear. Moreover differences of opinion soon developed. The two commanders had great difficulty in understanding each other. LaFayette acted as interpreter and intermediary but does not seem to have been very successful in promoting harmony. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion

²Not to be confused with the governor of Madras.

that LaFayette, a Frenchman holding an American commission, was "playing both ends against the middle" in order to enhance his importance.

On August 3rd d'Estaing wrote to Washington

It is difficult to find any consolation for the many insurmountable obstacles which stopped me at Sandy Hook. In vain did I offer at a meeting of your pilots fifty thousand *ecus* to anyone who could find the necessary water. Action alone can lessen my regrets but five days have passed since the fleet arrived in Rhode Island and we have done nothing yet.

A joint attack was finally agreed upon for August 10th. In the meantime the fleet was not inactive. Suffren took his two frigates, the *Fantasque* and the *Sagittaire*, around Conanicut Island and frightened the British into destroying several vessels. On the 8th d'Estaing engaged the shore batteries in a rather harmless bombardment and the next day began landing his contingent on Conanicut Island in flat boats furnished by Sullivan.

At this stage of the proceedings d'Estang received word from Sullivan that in order to take advantage of the abandonment of some earthworks by the British he had landed on Rhode Island with 2,000 men and was in need of artillery and ammunition. This departure from the agreed schedule threw d'Estaing into one of his "fits of temper." Colonel Laurens, who was attached to the French forces, was amazed at what seemed to him a senseless dispute on a matter of precedence. more serious news, however was to reach d'Estaing shortly. While the disembarkation was proceeding the lookout on the flagship spied a fleet of thirty-six sail, among them fourteen large ships. It was Howe. In order to avoid being caught between a hostile fleet and the shore batteries d'Estaing decided to recall his men and to put to sea.

On the next day, August 10th, the wind having veered to the north, d'Estaing sailed down the middle channel, Howe, who evidently considered his fleet the weaker, likewise headed for sea, d'Estaing in pursuit. The French were gaining. On August 11th an engagement seemed imminent. The wind by this time had become a gale. Both fleets were scattered. The *Languedoc* had her bowsprit carried away. The foremast, mizzen mast and mainmast followed, also the rudder. D'Estaing had to transfer his flag to the *Hector* temporarily. All the other vessels were more or less damaged. It was not until the 14th that he could rally his fleet. On the 21st he called at Newport. Sullivan and LaFayette came once more on board the *Languedoc*. By this time the nerves of all concerned were on edge. D'Estaing endeavored to ex-

plain his reasons for discontinuing operations around Newport. Sullivan was furious. The two commanders parted on bad terms, d'Estaing to make his way as best he could to Boston, Sullivan to pursue his operations against Newport.

On reaching Boston d'Estaing was delighted to find his only missing ship, the *César*, which had fought a successful engagement with the *Iris*. Soon d'Estaing received an irate letter from Sullivan. The attitude of the Bostonians was decidedly hostile. Several riots occurred. In attempting to quell one of them one French officer was killed, another wounded. D'Estaing's moderation was exemplary. As a result the ill-feeling subsided in time. General Gates wrote him a warm letter of commendation and the city tendered him a banquet. In the meantime Byron had joined Howe and d'Estaing was in danger of being blockaded in Boston. He accordingly took advantage of another storm that had driven the British fleet away to slip out of Boston on November 4th and made for Martinique. Although his operations had not produced the results hoped for they had greatly assisted the American cause. He had caused Howe to relax his blockade of the American coast and had undoubtedly hastened Clinton's evacuation of Philadelphia. When Congress reconvened in that city one of its first acts was to pass a resolution of thanks which was duly forwarded to d'Estaing.

His failure at Newport, however, had been a keen disappointment to his American allies who could not understand why he did not take a defensive position between Gould and Conanicut Islands and press the siege of that city. Viewed in retrospect d'Estaing's decision is perfectly clear. He was counting the days until he could sail for the Antilles. Rhode Island savored too much of Sumatra. It was his allies who would reap the benefits of his efforts. He now had the men as well as the ships with which to engage in some operations that would benefit France. Amphibious warfare was to begin in earnest.

On December 9th d'Estaing dropped anchor in the harbor of Fort Royal, Martinique. His first concern was to increase the number of troops at his disposal by levies made in the adjoining islands. On the 14th he received word that Saint Lucia, then in French hands, was being attacked by Admiral Barrington with seven ships and a force of about 4,000 men commanded by General Grant. By this time d'Estaing had some 5,000 men ready, having in a short space of time nearly doubled his land forces. He put to sea at once with twelve ships. At daybreak he was before the Grand Cul de Sac where he found Barrington-

ton at anchor under the shelter of some shore batteries. The wind was light. As the French vessels attempted to deploy they came successively under the combined fire of the British from the harbor mouth. Leaving one ship and two frigates to watch Barrington, d'Estaing withdrew and prepared to land the following morning near Port Castries to the north. From there he proposed to advance in three columns and dislodge the British who had occupied a considerable portion of the island. Although the French carried the first redoubt the attack stalled. The French losses were heavy, d'Estaing being among the wounded. Leaving Saint Lucia reluctantly to its fate d'Estaing reembarked and returned to Fort Royal. Soon Byron joined Barrington giving the British numerical superiority, of which they took advantage by seizing the islands of Saint Bartholomew and Saint Martin. This success, however, was short lived. A few weeks later d'Estaing dispatched a force which promptly ousted the invaders.

Several months of inactivity followed during which d'Estaing continued his recruiting, thereby incurring the ire of the dynamic but petulant civil governor of the islands, the Marquis de Bouillé. Although lack of harmony between the Army and the Navy never plagued the French services, the mutual jealousy between the civil authorities and the armed forces was the curse of colonial France during the Ancien Regime. In the meantime d'Estaing was meditating his next move. Various projects, ranging all the way from an expedition to Bermuda and Halifax to a revival of the defunct institution of buccaneering, were considered. Here d'Estaing received an invitation from some unexpected allies, the remnants of the Carib Indians relegated to the island of Saint Vincent. In a flowery communication their chief, Château-Gué, implored d'Estaing to free them from British "tyranny." The idea appealed to d'Estaing for the reason that he hoped that Saint Vincent might at some later date be exchanged for Saint Lucia. This is exactly what happened at the peace conference. Taking advantage of Byron's absence at Saint Christopher, where he had gone to organize a convoy, d'Estaing dispatched a force consisting of four British prizes and one corvette under the command of the Chevalier de Saint Romain, the officer who had distinguished himself at Saint Martin. One hundred and fifty men were embarked. The expedition sailed during the night of June 9-10, 1779, and was off Kingtown on the evening of the 15th. The only two vessels on the station were promptly captured. Taken completely by surprise the British governor, Sir Val-

entine Morris, found himself between the devil and the deep sea, the devil being Château-Gué and his 600 Caribs now on the warpath. He capitulated and a French military government was duly installed, in spite of the protests of Bouillé who claimed that as civil governor he should administer the island.

While these operations were in progress d'Estaing had been receiving reinforcements in dribblets. In February (1779) de Grasse arrived at Martinique with four ships from Brest. In April a convoy of thirteen vessels commanded by Vaudreuil arrived from Sénégal. Its escort consisted of the *Fier* and two other ships. Finally on June 17th La Motte-Piquet reported with five ships and, what was even more welcome, two good regiments, the Irish regiment of Dillon and the First Legion of Lauzun. D'Estaing's command now consisted of twenty-five ships-of-the-line, ten frigates and three corvettes, mounting in all some two thousand cannon. His troops totaled approximately six thousand men.

Grenada was the island selected. On July 1st d'Estaing put to sea and on the following day anchored off Boismorice Point, three miles north of Georgetown. No time was lost in landing the troops. The first wave promptly seized the heights of la Molinière from which they commanded the beach and dominated Fort Saint George. The British retired to the Morne de l'Hôpital, a strong position. Lord Mac-Cartney, the governor of the island, refused d'Estaing's overtures so the French prepared to storm the British defenses early on the following day. At two o'clock in the morning the assault troops were formed in three columns half a mile from the Morne. The French had no field artillery and d'Estaing was unwilling to weaken the batteries of his fleet in view of a possible attack by Byron.

The action was begun by a detachment d'Estaing had sent by a roundabout trail to take the British position in the rear. At this signal the three columns advanced in the face of murderous fire from the earthworks and a crossfire from the *York*. Soon the *Fendant* arrived on the scene and neutralized the fire of the British vessel. D'Estaing led the charge. With perfect timing the four French columns leapt over the trenches. The British hastily abandoned the Morne. At day-break Mac-Cartney sent a flag of truce and requested terms. They proved so severe that the British preferred unconditional surrender. Eighty-seven officers, nine hundred odd enlisted men, one hundred and twenty-eight cannon and three standards fell into French hands.

Two days later Byron appeared with twenty-one ships, too late to save Mac-Cartney. D'Estaing sailed out to meet him and a spirited engagement ensued in which Byron had somewhat the worst of it. He was unable to land his forces and withdrew, expecting to be pursued. D'Estaing, however, decided to rest on his laurels and to consolidate his position in Grenada.³ He had inflicted on his enemies, to quote Admiral Mahan, the most disastrous defeat since Beachy Head in 1690, as far as results were concerned. D'Estaing's critics point out that at Grenada, as at Saint Lucia, he neglected to destroy a smaller British fleet. Possibly, but destroying British fleets is not always as easy as it seems. D'Estaing preferred trying to defeat British land forces. He certainly had succeeded in winning a major victory at Georgetown. The fact that at the peace Grenada was returned to the British does not mean that the victory was a sterile one. With a diplomatic sense equal to his military sense he enabled the French negotiators to sit down at the conference table with four trump cards in their hands. Had d'Estaing been a bridge enthusiast he would probably have counted the hand as follows: Grenada was the ace of trumps, Saint Vincent the king, Saint Bartholomew the queen and little Saint Martin the knave.

While d'Estaing was in the West Indies the situation in South Carolina became serious, General Provost, who had occupied Georgia, was threatening to attack Charleston. Governor Rutledge therefore sent an urgent appeal to d'Estaing, in which he was joined by the French Consul, Bompard, and the Marquis de Brétigny, who commanded a regiment of French volunteers. American support and an easy victory was assured by these gentlemen. D'Estaing, who always had the American cause at heart, resolved to make one more attempt in behalf of the American colonists before returning to France. After all, he still had that victory on the American continent to achieve. Although his forces were badly depleted and he must perforce leave substantial garrisons behind him he contrived to fit out an expedition. His fleet consisted of twenty-two ships, ten frigates and some transports. His troops numbered about three thousand five hundred men, among whom were many volunteers and five hundred colored levies recruited in Saint Dominique. Hardly a homogeneous army! But then d'Estaing was a past master at getting the most out of weird auxiliaries.

Leaving Saint Domingue on August 15th d'Estaing reached the

³The French losses in killed and wounded had been over one thousand, on land and sea. Admiral Mahan's account of the naval phases of the campaign renders a repetition here unnecessary.

latitude of Savannah when once more he was beset by a violent storm. His ships were so badly damaged as to render further progress difficult. He thereupon changed his plan and instead of going to Charleston decided to wrest Savannah from the British, a decision in which his American allies concurred.

Again d'Estaing was to have an unfortunate experience with American militia. The promised help dwindled to two thousand men commanded by General Lincoln. Fortunately the British garrison of Savannah was said not to exceed thirteen hundred men.

On September 13th d'Estaing landed a detachment of five hundred men from his Irish regiment and personally reconnoitered the ground. A siege was decided on, General Lincoln being assigned the task of preventing the garrisons of Beaufort and Ebenezer from coming to the rescue of Provost, a mission he signally failed to accomplish. D'Estaing soon found himself faced by a defending force of about 2,085 regulars, 80 Indians and 4,000 colored troops. Nevertheless the siege was begun on September 22nd. By October 9th it had progressed far enough to permit an assault which was set for daybreak of the 10th. On arriving at Spring Hill, the point chosen for the main attack, d'Estaing was greeted by the sound of bagpipes. Provost had gotten wind of the proposed operation, thanks to the total lack of security measures among the American militia, and had placed his best troops at the danger point. The assault was repulsed with heavy loss. Pulaski was among the killed, d'Estaing was slightly wounded in the arm early in the engagement and later severely in the leg. The French losses amounted to fifteen officers and one hundred and sixty-eight men killed, forty-three officers and four hundred and eleven men wounded. D'Estaing was compelled to raise the siege although he remained in his trenches long enough to permit his American allies to make good their retreat.

By the 20th the French forces were re-embarked. D'Estaing's American campaign was over. Since leaving Toulon he had captured or destroyed 109 British vessels, 24 of which were warships. The value of his captures had reached the total of 1,666,387 livres, 16 sols, 4 deniers. D'Estaing was nothing if not precise. Modern historians have nevertheless severely criticized d'Estaing's strategy because he pursued "geographical objectives." Our opponents in the War of Independence probably disapproved of his strategy because he had attained these objectives!

After a stormy passage the *Languedoc* reached Brest on December 5th. Once again d'Estaing's homecoming was an unpleasant one. The officers of the regular navy received him coldly. Marie-Antoinette, writing to her mother, the Empress Marie-Therese, said: "We must hear Monsieur d'Estaing *and his officers* before we can judge of his success." The Austrian Ambassador, Mercy d'Argenteau, was even more unappreciative. "This general," he warned the Empress, "is clever and intriguing enough to extol beyond measure his pretended successes." In the city, however, d'Estaing was lionized. "Veni, Vidi, Vici, or the Capture of Grenada" was the name of one play presented. After the surrender of Georgetown d'Estaing had given a commission and the *accolade* to a sergeant, Houradour by name, in recognition of his bravery. Engravings representing this event were on display in all shop windows on the Boulevards, to the delight of the liberal party, and the usual bad poetry was published by the ream.

Still suffering from his wound that compelled him to use crutches, d'Estaing retired to his house in Passy. The war against England continued, Spain now having joined France. The new alliance was now planning a combined amphibious expedition that in scope and magnitude not only exceeded anything previously known but was such that only our recent North African expedition can be in any way compared to it. In spite of his many enemies at court d'Estaing was selected as the officer best fitted to command the Franco-Spanish force being assembled at Cadiz. Although his health was far from good d'Estaing set out for his new post on July 19, 1780, and after a trying overland journey was courteously received by Charles III at La Granja.

The usual delays in the formation of his command ensued so d'Estaing had ample time to visit the camp at San Roque and inspect the siege operations of Gibraltar. With an eye trained to warfare in two dimensions, he at once saw the folly of attempting to carry the imposing fortress by force. He did, however, make one prediction that has since been frequently repeated. The difficulty of preventing Gibraltar from being blockaded by land and sea might in time prove irksome to Great Britain and lead to a voluntary surrender of the fortress to Spain. It was not until the latter part of 1782 that the armada was ready. It consisted of five 110's, one 80, twenty-eight 74's, one 70, seven 64's, and ten frigates. The Spaniards had contributed slightly more than half in numbers, the French considerably more than half in weight of metal. The total number of guns was over thirty-three hun-

dred. Over one hundred transports were attached to the fleet and twenty-two thousand troops were to be shipped. The destination of the expedition was to have been the West Indies where the allies now proposed to eliminate Great Britain once and for all. D'Estaing's flagship was the *Glorieux* on which he had established his headquarters as far back as September 26, 1780. He was, however, to be denied the opportunity of becoming one of the greatest conquerors of history. Thoroughly alarmed, Great Britain made overtures of peace. Just as d'Estaing was about to sail the preliminaries were signed at Versailles. The armada was dissolved. Before taking leave of the King of Spain d'Estaing was promoted to the dignity of a Spanish Grandee, a strange honor for one who was soon to espouse the Revolutionary cause.

On his return to France in the spring of 1783 d'Estaing was well received at court and two years later was rewarded with the governorship of Touraine. Peace, however, was not his even in that lovely land. D'Estaing's democratic tendencies, which his American experience had intensified, led him to endorse the popular movements of the day. What were his motives, pique, ambition, conviction? Who can tell? Although he had been a member of the *Assemblée des Notables* that met in 1787 he refused two years later to serve in the *Etats Generaux*. Emulating another veteran of the American War, LaFayette, commander of the Paris National Guard, he accepted the position of commander of the Versailles National Guard. His second in command was a young Versaillais soldier who had likewise served in America. His name was Alexandre Berthier. It would be interesting to know how much the future Chief of Staff of Napoleon learned from the former Aide de Camp of Maurice de Saxe.

The appointment to the command in question was to prove d'Estaing's death warrant. History contains few examples of a man achieving lasting fame by abandoning the caste to which he was born. D'Estaing was not to prove an exception. The post made him the jailer as well as the protector of the royal family. Torn between his duty to the nation and his loyalty to the Crown his position was an impossible one. Although he dissuaded the Queen from a projected flight in September 1789 he was ultimately charged with complicity in a similar project that took place one month later. Powerless to protect the royal family when the mob invaded the palace on October 5th, he and LaFayette escorted the king on his tragic journey from Versailles to the

Tuileries. Shortly thereafter he resigned his command of the Versailles National Guard.

From then on d'Estaing was frankly in the republic ranks. The last of his name, he had nevertheless become a *ci-devant*. On January 1st, 1792, he was rewarded by a nomination to the rank of Admiral. He declined the promotion unless the Assembly would pass an act permitting him to accept without prejudice to his rank in the Army. Still amphibious! His ambition, the rank of marshal which in France is given to Naval as well as Army officers, he was never to attain. Failing to secure active service, his conduct at Versailles having displeased both factions, he retired to Pomponne. In the meantime his wife had died. Litigation concerning her estate left him painfully short of funds. Creditors, however, were not the only ones to hound him. The Terrorists had marked him as their prey. Fouquier-Tinville summoned him as a witness in the trial of *la Veuve Capet*. He was taken to Paris and confined in the prison of Sainte Pélagie. "Abandon all hope, ye who enter here!"

D'Estaing's testimony at the trial of the Queen has been grievously misinterpreted. A too marked display of loyalty would have helped neither himself nor Marie-Antoinette. He began his testimony by saying that he was prejudiced against the accused as he considered that she was responsible for his failure to be promoted to marshal but that, nevertheless, he would tell the truth. This he undoubtedly endeavored to do. When asked if he had any knowledge of an attempt of the accused to seek safety in flight on October 5th, 1789 he courageously replied that when the accused was urged to flee she answered: "If the Parisians have come to assassinate me it will be at the feet of my husband. I will not flee." "That is true," interrupted the Queen, "I made the answer the witness quotes."

From the witness stand to the dock the transition was brief. That evening d'Estaing was transferred to the Conciergerie charged with "complicity in the schemes and plots of the traitor Capet and of Marie Antoinette against the sovereignty of the people." The charge was vague enough to include participation in all projected flights including the actual dash from the Tuileries for Varennes in June 1791. With none was d'Estaing in any way connected. His defense was a recital of his many services to France, his conviction a foregone conclusion.

"After my head has fallen, send it to the British. They will pay you well for it!" Having delivered this parting shot at the Revolutionary tribunal the Citizen Admiral, the only one to mount the revolutionary scaffold, passed out of the courtroom bound for the Place de la Révolution. That evening his decapitated body was tossed into the ever-lengthening trench in the Madeline cemetery together with thirty-two other victims. The date was 9 Floréal, An II (April 28, 1794).

What are we to think of d'Estaing's part in the sinister drama of the Revolution? Can we sit in judgment on the acts of any of those who, in a burst of enthusiasm, joined a current they hoped to control but which ultimately dragged them into the mire of atrocity? His *Etat de Service* closes in 1780 with the following notation. "Distinguished himself on several occasions, a man of genius, very courageous." Let us adopt as our verdict this laconic final entry in the long and honorable service record of the soldier who became a sailor, the sailor who remained a soldier.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

A new panel of trustees for the three year term ending December 31, 1948, was elected at the annual meeting of the membership of the Institute, held at the National Archives on January 31, 1946. Of the five trustees elected, four were retained in office, having served on the Board during the past three years. They include Major H. A. DeWeerd, professor of history at the University of Missouri, currently serving as historian of Operations Division, War Department General Staff; Lieutenant Colonel Jesse S. Douglas, formerly managing editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, now engaged in historical work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advance Study, at Princeton, N. J.; and Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress.

The single newly elected Board member is Dr. Troyer S. Anderson, historian of the Office of the Under-Secretary of War. Dr. Anderson, a former Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, who has served on the faculties of Brown, Bryn Mawr, and the University of Iowa, was recently appointed professor of history at Hunter College. In addition to his research in phases of World War II, Modern European History and the American Revolution provide him his main field of interest. At the last joint meeting of the American Historical Association and AMI, held in Chicago in December 1944, he discussed "The Influence of Military Production and Supply upon History." He



DR. ANDERSON

contributed also to the panel discussion regarding "The Atomic Bomb and Its Implication" held at Georgetown University on December 11, 1945, under the joint sponsorship of AMI and the Army Industrial College.


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At the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees, held at the office of the *Infantry Journal* on February 15, 1946, Brigadier General Donald Armstrong and Colonel Joseph I. Greene were re-elected to the Offices

of President and Vice-President of the Institute respectively. Both long-time members of AMI, General Armstrong is now Commandant of the Army Industrial College, and Colonel Greene is Editor of the *Infantry Journal*.

Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, Dr. Stuart Portner, and George J. Stansfield, all of the National Archives, will continue to serve in 1946 as Provost, Editor, and Librarian respectively.

Recommendations of the Provost were accepted by the Board to the effect that the offices of Secretary and Treasurer be separated, that the office of Secretary be hereafter designated General Secretary, and that the office of Membership Secretary be established.



MAJOR MOYER



LEO L. GERALD

Captain Thurman S. Wilkins of The Adjutant General's Office, having served during the past year as Secretary-Treasurer of the Institute, was named General Secretary.

Major Maynard G. Moyer, West Pointer, now assigned to the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, where his duties keep him in close liaison with historical activities in the various major commands of the military establishment, was elected Membership Secretary.

Leo L. Gerald, in charge of the Army Branch of the War Records Office, National Archives, was elected Treasurer.

In its report to the Board the nominating committee submitted a recommendation for the appointment of an Executive Committee for the coming year, as permitted by the by-laws of the Institute. By resolution, Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, Lieutenant Colonel Jesse S. Douglas, and Colonel John M. Kemper were assigned to serve thereon.

"The Battles of Bladensburg and Baltimore, with special reference to Military History in General" were discussed by Neil H. Swanson, executive editor of *The Baltimore Sun*, before the open meeting of the Institute, at the National Archives on January 31, 1946. In referring to General Armstrong's favorable review of *The Perilous Fight* for *The Infantry Journal*, Dr. Swanson admitted that some people had felt suspicious of the color he had managed to bring into the book. But in history, he insisted, vividness need not be inconsistent with accuracy and integrity: not until American historians in general manage more vivid re-creations of their subjects can history hold the proper meaning or reality for the American people. With the aid of a blackboard Dr. Swanson detailed the action at the Battle of Bladensburg, where the British routed the American forces, and at the Battle of Godly Wood, for Fort McHenry and Baltimore Harbor. In his opinion a study of those five weeks during the War of 1812 point military lessons never before sufficiently exploited by students of tactics in America.

* * *

The most recently elected Life Member of AMI is Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Clark, of Stuart, Virginia. Colonel Clark informs us that he obtained his commission in the Reserve Corps upon graduation from the Virginia Military Institute in 1937. Before the war he was an instructor of Chemistry at VMI; and though commissioned in the Field Artillery, he has served in the Quartermaster Corps since 1941.

* * *

On March 7, 1946, the Board of Trustees, meeting in the office of Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, went on record in favor of the establishment of a national war museum. It was agreed to be the sense of the Board

that the development in our democracy of an adequate understanding of the problems of national security indispensably requires the provision of visual means of understanding in addition to the written word; that to this end it is of great importance that there be established as soon as possible a national war museum.

It was further agreed to be the sense of the Board

that, for the same reason, it is of great importance that the activities of all government agencies now concerned with the production or preservation of pictorial works including paintings, prints, photographs, and motion pictures be brought into closer relationship with respect to military and naval subject matter of such materials through the establishment of an inter-agency committee on "Military and Naval Pictorial Materials."

In its discussion of the conception of a war museum, which has long been considered by officials in Washington, the Board recognized that unparalleled amounts of museum materials accumulating in relation to both World Wars, especially World War II, are rapidly bringing the matter to a head; for some attention must be paid to the preservation of such properties. The Board feels that such a war museum should be soundly military, rather than militaristic, and that it should be historical. Not only should it provide entertainment and instruction for the general public; it should also have ample facilities for research on the part of specialists. It should serve to guide the American people toward a sound and realistic attitude regarding national security.

In the opinion of the Board a national war museum would not be in competition with other scientific or technical museums, such as the excellent Air Forces collection at Wright Field or the Ordnance collections at Aberdeen Proving Grounds or elsewhere. Nor need it compete with the various art museums. There are ample materials and ample need for all such establishments.

A photograph of the trustees and officers present at the meeting in Dr. Evans' office will be published in the next issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Squadron Leader Charles Gardner of the RAF participated in the Burma campaign.

Elias Huzar and Donald Morrison, formerly of the Bureau of the Budget, are now Assistant Professors on the Faculties of Cornell University and Dartmouth College, respectively.

Lieutenant Ivor Spencer, formerly on the faculty of The Citadel, is now engaged in historical work with the Navy Department.

Lieutenant Commander Charles Moran also is participating in the historical program in the Navy Department.

PICTURE CREDITS

Guild Photographers, Washington, D. C., for the picture of Mr. Gerald; War Department Bureau of Public Relations for the pictures of Major Moyer and Dr. Anderson; and the Library of Congress for the reproductions of prints in Dr. Irvine's article.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE FIRST BRITISH REGULARS IN NORTH AMERICA

BY DALLAS IRVINE

I

Soft smoke from the gunner's lighted match curled away on the wind. The touchhole in the breech of the gun before him was choked with powder ready to receive the smouldering fire. Out on the bay the two British frigates kept their course steadily on wind and tide, ports open, guns run out, and red-and-white ensigns flying. The gunner looked inquiringly at "Heer General" and spoke. But Peter Stuyvesant did not hear. Stiffly, among his guns, Peter Stuyvesant stood facing the supreme crisis of his life.

From the two frigates bristling in around the point of Governor's Island¹ his gaze shifted round to the Brooklyn shore where, back of the ferry landing, he could see armed bands, mounted and unmounted, of English colonists from Connecticut and the eastern end of Long Island. And the uniforms of a force of British regulars. Perhaps twice as many regulars as he had to defend the fort! Perhaps twice as many militiamen as he had to defend the town! His gaze returned to the bay, flicked for an instant at the sails of two other British ships coming up behind Governor's Island, and then fixed on the foremost of the two frigates standing in under the guns of the fort on their way into East River. For seven whole days since the British squadron had first come to anchor in the lower bay he had succeeded in postponing this inevitable decision by holding parley after parley with the enemy. Now the final fateful moment leapt at him like a beast of prey.

But while he gave himself one last moment of glowering irresolution, two men of God in the black cloth of their calling came up behind him at the parapet. One spoke; he turned. Each laid a hand upon an arm and, arguing in turn earnestly and firmly, they led him back from

¹Modern geographical names are used in this narrative whenever the contemporary names are not likely to be familiar to readers with only a general historical knowledge with respect to the area.




NEW AMSTERDAM IN THE 1650'S

the parapet and, presently, off the gun platform. The soldiers at the guns turned to stare and to glare at their departing backs. When the "Heer General" had gone the master gunner looked once more at the British ships, muttered some minor blasphemy, and extinguished the match on his linstock.

While the two British frigates dropped anchor in the East River near the ferry and while the two other British ships anchored off Governor's Island so as to box in the harbor, the Director General of New Netherland stomped out the north gate of the fort at the head of a hundred soldiers to guard against a British landing from the side of East River. But the Dutch soldiers, once in the town, began to talk of looting, for it was apparent to all that the British would inevitably take the place. The burghers, already fearful of the hatred of the Connecticut and Long Island auxiliaries in the British force and alarmed by rumors that a large number of northern Indians were prepared to aid the British, now became distraught. After passing a tense night they proceeded to submit a remonstrance to the Director General and his council, asking acceptance of the terms of the British commander. Men, women, and children thereafter gathered, beseeching the Director General to spare them the consequences likely to follow upon the town being taken by assault. To this pleading of the people the old man finally yielded. Commissioners were appointed and word sent across East River to the British commander, who appointed commissioners in his turn. Next day the British and Dutch commissioners met by agreement at Stuyvesant's "Bouwery," or farm, and agreed to articles of capitulation.

The Sabbath intervened. Then, on the morning of Monday, August 29, 1664, the evacuation and occupation began in accordance with the terms of the capitulation. Out of the fort marched the soldiers of the Dutch garrison with the "honors of war": their arms in hand, their colors flying, their drums beating, their matches lighted, and bullets in their mouths. Turning to the west on Beaver Street, they marched down toward the bank of the Hudson. Behind them the red, white, and blue flag of the United Provinces came fluttering down and the red, white, and blue flag of the British nation went jumping up, hoisted by a corporal's guard of British soldiers. Down to the bank the Dutchmen marched, old Peter Stuyvesant at their head. There they glumly

*From Arnoldus Montanus, *De Nieuwe en onbekende Weereld* (Amsterdam, 1671), p. 124. See Isaac N. P. Stokes, *The Iconography of Manhattan Island, 1498-1909* (6 vols., New York, 1915-28), I, 142.



SOUTHERN NEW NETHERLAND IN THE 1650's^b

embarked in the Dutch West India Company's ship *Gideon*, lately come from the Netherlands, for transport back to the homeland. Stuyvesant himself stayed on shore and shortly retired to his farm.

Meanwhile the British regulars, having crossed the East River to a point above the town, were drawn up near an old mill that stood on the river bank. There were three full companies of them, one company belonging to the British commander, Colonel Richard Nicolls, and two captained by two other of the royal commissioners, Colonel George Cartwright and Sir Robert Carr. When the Dutch soldiers were safely out of the way Colonel Nicolls marched in through the northeast city gate with his own and Sir Robert Carr's company. At the city hall the burgomasters joined him, and the column marched on and to the right and into the fort. There the burgomasters formally recognized his authority, greeted him graciously, and listened to his announcement that New Netherland would henceforth be called New York and Fort Amsterdam henceforth be called Fort James.²

The first British regulars ever to land in North America now mounted guard in the fort on the tip of Manhattan Island. But what manner of troops were these, and how came they to be where they were? Alas! secrecy of purpose, loss of records, and the lapse of hundreds of years let us see only as through a glass, darkly. Yet something may be told.

Soon after the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne of England in 1660 in the person of Charles II that monarch had resolved to send commissioners to New England to call the Puritan colonies to order and to solve problems of boundaries in that area that pressed for solution. At the same time the king's militaristic brother James, Duke of York, longed for the chief command in a war against the Dutch, whose

²The story of the fall of New Amsterdam as brought out in the course of subsequent altercation between Stuyvesant and his superiors is to be found in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, edited by Edmund B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow (15 vols., Albany, 1856-87), III, 363-510 *passim*. Other contemporary Dutch accounts and copies of documents drawn up incident to the capitulation appear in the New York Historical Society's *Commemoration of the Conquest of New Netherland* (New York, 1864), pp. 64-73. Most of the documents exchanged between Stuyvesant and Nicolls are reproduced in Samuel Hazard's *Register of Pennsylvania*, IV (1829), 30-31, 41-44. Detailed British accounts of the surrender are lacking because of the fact that all the first British dispatches and reports were lost in the ship *Elias*, which was wrecked near Lizard Head in returning to England with them. Information from Dutch sources about the British forces is not very reliable, as various irreconcilable statements serve to show. For further data on sources see Mrs. Schuyler Van Rensselaer, *History of the City of New York in the Seventeenth Century* (2 vols., New York, 1909), I, 531-33, and the footnotes in John R. Brodhead, *History of the State of New York* (2 vols., New York, 1853-71).

^bPart of folding map at front of Adriaen van der Donck, *Beschryvinge van Nieuw-Nederland* (2d ed., Amsterdam, 1656). See Stokes, I, 154.



VICINITY OF NEW YORK IN THE 1660's^c

religious and republican sentiments he detested and whose commercial preëminence was the chief obstacle in the way of his own "big business" venture overseas, the new Royal African Company. A further element in the situation was the fact that the navigation act of 1660, even as strengthened in 1663, was being flagrantly evaded in America through an illicit trade in tobacco carried on via New Amsterdam. Since Charles II was chronically in straits for money, and since the customs were for him a major source of revenue, it was deemed a serious matter when the farmers of the customs protested, late in 1663, that ten thousand pounds sterling of revenue, or more, was being lost annually as a result of this trade. Moreover, the whole system of mercantile exclusionism, on which the strength of nations was conceived to depend, was threatened with failure by any such leak in the dykes erected for the protection of British shipping against foreign competition.³

Early in 1664 the occupation of New Netherland by main force in time of peace was resolved upon, but in order that the occupation might not appear to be too flagrant an aggression of the British crown a patent for territory including the Dutch colony was issued to the Duke of York. Five days later, Colonel Richard Nicolls, who had campaigned with the Duke under Turenne and who was currently a groom of the bedchamber to the Duke and captain of the Duke of York's garrison company at the naval base of Portsmouth, was commissioned to raise, by beat of drum or otherwise in London and Westminster, a force for service in America. A fortnight later this trusted adherent of the Duke of York was commissioned by the Duke to be deputy governor of his newly acquired territories across the sea. In the latter part of April Nicolls was also appointed by the king to be the principal one of four royal commissioners for settling the affairs of New England, two of the other commissioners being captains, or being made captains, of companies in the expeditionary force.⁴

About the middle of May, 1664, the expedition sailed from Portsmouth in three of the king's ships and a hired transport. The king's ships were the *Guinea*, of 36 guns, the *Elias*, 30 guns, and the *Martin*,

³Brodhead, II, 1-15.

⁴*Ibid.*, II, 15-20; Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: America and West Indies, 1661-1668* (London, 1880), nos. 686, 1362; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1663-1664* (London, 1862), p. 578.

⁵Part of "The Nicolls Map, 1664-1668," reproduced on folding sheet at front of David T. Valentine, *Manual of the Corporation of the City of New York* (28 vols., New York, 1842-70), 1863. See Stokes, I, 210-12.

16 guns. The transport, with 10 guns, was the *William and Nicholas*. Against prevailing southwest winds these ships beat their way slowly westward for nearly ten weeks. Then, near the end of the voyage, the *Guinea*, carrying Nicolls and Cartwright, became separated from the other ships in a fog and put into Boston, while the other ships put into Portsmouth harbor. Nicolls at once wrote ahead for assistance from Connecticut and began prodding the Massachusetts authorities into reluctant steps toward providing other assistance. Having been joined by his other ships, however, he sailed at the end of July for the western end of Long Island, which was the appointed rendezvous with the Connecticut forces.⁵

On Tuesday, August 16, the *Guinea* sailed in past Sandy Hook, with Nicolls aboard, in order to reconnoitre the lower bay of what is now the port of New York. On Thursday the three other ships arrived, and all four cast anchor inside of Coney Island, in what is now called Gravesend Bay. Contact was soon made with the auxiliary forces arriving from Connecticut and eastern Long Island. A party of fifty men was landed on Staten Island at a point opposite the ships' anchorage to seize a small blockhouse, which was found to be garrisoned only by six decrepit old soldiers. Every Dutch craft that showed itself on the waters of the bay was pursued and taken. In short, the port of New Amsterdam was completely blockaded on the side of the sea.⁶

For nearly a week, while he insured that the English colonists on Long Island would submit to the government of the Duke of York, Nicolls carried on a leisurely exchange of notes with Stuyvesant, who was only too anxious to gain time in which to gather strength and to improve the lamentably neglected defenses of New Amsterdam. Then, on Thursday, August 25, 1664, Nicolls landed his troops on Long Island, at the same place where General William Howe's redcoats were to land somewhat over a century later for a similar purpose. From their landing place the three companies marched overland to the Brooklyn ferry, to which the colonial auxiliaries had already marched ahead of them. From the green Brooklyn shore they looked over at a town that they and their successors in the ranks of British regulars were to

⁵Brodhead, II, 20-24; William Smith, *The History of the Late Province of New York* (2 vols., New York, 1830), I, 16-18.

⁶*Col. Docs. N. Y.*, III, 372, 410-11, 438, 443; Brodhead, II, 24.

garrison, with a few short interruptions, for an interval of one hundred and nineteen years.⁷

But this was not the only garrison British regulars were to maintain on this continent for years on end. At various places and at various periods other garrisons were to be maintained for such intervals of time that the presence in North America of troops of the British standing army may be said to have been a normal feature of the British colonial system from this time onward.

Such an assertion does not accord very well with traditional conceptions of American history. But the traditional conceptions of American history were established many years ago by writers in whose hearts still burned the hatred of British redcoats that was aroused in this country by the course of events from the Boston Massacre of 1770 to the burning of the White House by British troops in 1814. For such writers the significance of British regulars on garrison duty in the colonies was embodied in the clause of the Declaration of Independence that asserted of a demonological George III: "He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures." Under the influence of this point of view it has been natural to let the dismal episode of Braddock's defeat be the first appearance of redcoats on the scene in history books. For they could thus be made to appear as stupid brutes led by an eighteenth-century Colonel Blimp while American militia simultaneously appeared as a keen and valiant yeomanry led by that paragon of all virtue and destined military hero of the fight for American liberty, George Washington. Yet there was a time, before the French and Spanish were uprooted from the eastern half of the continent, when American colonies sometimes begged for garrisons of British regulars⁸ or protested against the prospective removal of British troops with all the vigor of a nineteenth-century congressman opposing the abandonment of an army post in his district.⁹

British regulars were not only no late importation into the North American colonies but about as early an importation as they very well could have been. For they were on duty in North America perennially from within a few years of the time when a permanent standing army

⁷*Col. Docs. N. Y.*, III, 410-15, 443-44, 501-502; *N. Y. Hist. Soc., Commemoration of the Conquest of New Netherland*, pp. 70-73; Brodhead, II, 24-33.

⁸William R. Smith, *South Carolina as a Royal Province* (New York, 1903), p. 193.

⁹Stanley M. Pargellis, "The Four Independent Companies of New York," in *Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students* (New Haven, 1931), p. 120.

is commonly reckoned to have been first established in Great Britain.¹⁰ In a limited way America thus shared that institution practically from its beginning. And that institution performed for the British North American colonies as a whole the same functions that were subsequently to be performed in much the same way by the standing army of the United States. Functionally, and in various other respects, the establishment of British regulars long maintained in North America is more properly to be considered the forerunner of our own regular army than is the force constituted by the colonial militias. The colonial militias were admittedly one great source out of which our later military institutions were generated but not the only one and, so far as pertains to our establishment and maintenance of a regular army, not the important one.

For a long time before 1660 there was a professional English soldiery in the regular employ of the United Provinces and a professional Scotch soldiery in the regular employ of France.¹¹ Under Cromwell, moreover, the soldiers of the Long Parliament's New Model Army served so long and became so thoroughly professionalized that they must be considered to have constituted a professional standing army.¹² The army of Cromwell, however, was disbanded as an army at the time of the Stuart Restoration to be replaced by another force out of which and around which grew up the British standing army of subsequent times. Not until the Stuart Restoration, therefore, can a permanent standing army be considered to have come into existence in England.

An act of Parliament of September 13, 1660, provided for the disbandment of the New Model Army except such soldiers as the king might think fit to "provide for at his own charge."¹³ Since the requirement that the king pay for any troops out of his own pocket was conceived to be a sufficiently drastic limitation on the number of men that might be employed, no specific limitation of numbers was imposed. All the fortresses of the realm were to be restored to a condition identical with their condition in 1637. By another act of parliament a little

¹⁰The word "regular" is used by the writer to refer to the soldiery of a permanent standing army. Since such armies have normally consisted of professional soldiers or of professional soldiers plus other elements, the word as so used ordinarily implies a professional soldiery or a soldiery dominated by the outlook of its professional elements. It does not, however, mean the same as the word "professional," for the latter term also covers forces of professional soldiers hired as mercenaries for particular occasions.

¹¹John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (13 vols. in 20, London, 1899-1930), I (2d ed., 1910), 62-63, 134, 157, 189.

¹²*Ibid.*, I, 283.

¹³*Statutes of the Realm*, 12 Car. II, c. 15; Charles Firth and Godfrey Davies, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army* (2 vols., Oxford, 1940), I, p. xxxiii.

later in this same year the special military tenures that had previously provided for the maintenance and to some extent for the defense of fortresses were abolished along with all other military tenures.¹⁴ The cost of maintaining and garrisoning fortresses thus became wholly a charge against the crown, to which, however, certain permanent revenue was granted in compensation for the abolition of military tenures. Thus, as a result of action by parliament, there was no longer any feudal impediment and no legal impediment but merely a fiscal impediment to the raising and maintaining of a military force of large size.

The military force that was now actually established was in part newly raised, in part taken over from the New Model Army, and in other part taken over from the royalist forces in Flanders.¹⁵ From the New Model Army was taken over the troop of life-guards and regiment of foot of General George Monk, last commander-in-chief of that army, who, having engineered the Stuart Restoration, became Duke of Albemarle and commander-in-chief under Charles II. To comply with the act of parliament for disbandment of the New Model Army both units were paraded on Tower Hill on St. Valentine's Day, 1661, to go through a ritual of being disbanded and of being reconstituted immediately afterwards as units in the service of the king. The foot regiment continued to be called the "Lord General's Regiment of Foot" or, popularly, the "Coldstreamers."¹⁶

From the royalist forces in Flanders formerly commanded by the Duke of York two like units were drawn. One was the Duke of York's troop of life-guards. The other was the "King's Regiment of Guards" that had fought for royal Charles in exile.¹⁷

One troop of life-guards, one regiment of horse, and one regiment of foot were newly raised. The "Royal Regiment of Horse" was soon known, from the color of its uniforms, as "The Blues." The foot regiment, which was designated "His Majesty's Regiment of Foot," is not to be confused with the "King's Regiment of Guards," mentioned

¹⁴*Statutes of the Realm*, 12 Car. II, c. 24; Charles M. Clode, *The Military Forces of the Crown* (2 vols., London, 1869), I, 7, 355-56. The militia had traditionally been the main reliance for the defense of the country's frontiers in time of danger (*ibid.*, I, 9, 24).

¹⁵Fortescue, I, 291-94.

¹⁶Clifford Walton, *History of the British Standing Army, A. D. 1660 to 1700* (London, 1894), pp. 1-4; Firth and Davies, I, 57, 195, II, 543-44. The designation "Coldstreamers" refers of course to the town of Coldstream, on the boundary between Scotland and England, where Monk's army encamped for nearly a month in the winter of 1659-60 before entering England from Scotland to resolve the tangled political situation in the southern kingdom.

¹⁷Charles H. Firth, "Royalist and Cromwellian Armies in Flanders, 1657-1662," *Royal Historical Society, Transactions*, new series, XVII, 101-103.



GEORGE MONK, DUKE OF ALBEMARLE
Commander-in-Chief of the English Army, 1659-1670d

above, which was amalgamated with it in 1665.¹⁸ The new foot regiment and the "Lord General's Regiment of Foot" soon began to be referred to regularly as foot-guards and the new regiment of horse to be referred to regularly as horse-guards.¹⁹ As guards these regiments were in addition to the three troops of mounted life-guards mentioned above and to two small ceremonial corps that had ceased to have any practical military significance: the Yeomen of the Guard, dating from the reign of Henry VII, and the Band of Gentlemen Pensioners, dating from the reign of Henry VIII.²⁰

For a time after the Stuart Restoration there was a relatively large British garrison across the English Channel in the fortress of Dunkirk, which Cromwell had acquired from Spain in 1658 by force of arms. This garrison was composed in part of Cromwellian regiments and in other part of regiments representing the royalist forces that had fought against Cromwell in Flanders. The garrison ceased to have reason for being, however, when Dunkirk was sold to France in 1662. In the meantime Charles II concluded a treaty with Portugal providing, among other things, that he furnish a force of auxiliaries to assist Portugal in her war for independence against Spain and that he receive from Portugal the strategically located fortress of Tangier in Morocco. For the defense of this place against the wild Moors a new regiment of foot and a new troop of horse were raised in 1661. Some of the troops at Dunkirk were also transferred to Tangier in 1661, to be absorbed in 1663 into the Tangier regiment. In 1662 some of the cavalry at Dunkirk was transferred as auxiliaries to Portugal. In November of that year the "King's Regiment of Guards," which had formed part of the garrison, was transferred to England and the remainder of the garrison disbanded.²¹ The considerable Cromwellian garrison of Jamaica was also disbanded in 1662.²²

In perhaps a score of fortresses at home garrisons of from one to six independent companies were retained, amounting altogether to perhaps half a hundred companies or more.²³ The number of companies was

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 103; Walton, pp. 5-8.

¹⁹Walton, pp. 3, 5, 8.

²⁰Francis Grose, *Military Antiquities Respecting a History of the English Army* (3d ed., 2 vols., London, 1812), I, 113-20, 175-77. There was also a small number of sergeants-at-arms, perpetuating a personal guard said to have been formed originally by Richard I (*ibid.*, I, 173-75).

²¹Firth, *loc. cit.*, pp. 101-10; Walton, pp. 11-12.

²²Firth and Davies, I, p. xxxvi.

²³Charles Dalton, *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714* (6 vols., London, 1892-1904), I, 10-16.

⁴From George A. Raikes, *The History of the Honourable Artillery Company* (2 vols., London, 1878), I, op. p. 210.

at any rate not far different from the number of companies of foot and troops of horse forming the king's guards. For this reason it grew to be common official practice under Charles II to refer to the force of regular troops maintained by the crown as the "Guards and Garrisons" and thus to avoid use of the opprobrious term "standing army" and even of the term "army." The number of men included in the garrisons was appreciably greater than the number included in the units of guards.²⁴ But the garrison troops, it should be said, were of greatly inferior quality, being made up mainly of soldiers incapacitated for any very active service by age or other disability.²⁵

In Scotland three regiments of foot and a troop of horse of the New Model Army were not disbanded in 1660 but retained in service until 1662, when they were transferred as auxiliaries to Portugal. Meanwhile two troops of Scotch life-guards were raised, and in 1662, after the English troops were gone, a regiment of Scotch foot-guards was raised. An independent company of foot garrisoned Edinburgh Castle. In Ireland a considerable force of Cromwellian troops was retained but in scattered independent troops and companies rather than complete regiments. In 1661 there remained on the Irish establishment 30 troops of horse and 66 companies of foot.²⁶

The regular military forces of Charles II may now be summarized for the year 1663 as follows:

English establishment:

- 3 troops of mounted life-guards
- 1 regiment of horse-guards
- 3 regiments of foot-guards
- 1 troop of Tangier horse
- 1 regiment of Tangier foot
- garrisons of home fortresses

Scotch establishment:

- 2 troops of mounted life-guards
- 1 regiment of foot-guards
- garrisons

Irish establishment (no exact data)

²⁴The following figures are given for the year 1663: standing regiments, 3,574 men; garrisons and independent companies, 4,878 men (Walton, p. 496). These figures are comparable with the following for 1659: mobile army, 23,602 men; garrisons, 4,740 men (Grose, I, 304).

²⁵Clode, I, 9, 53.

²⁶Charles Dalton, *The Scots Army, 1661-1688* (Edinburgh, 1909), Part I, p. 5, Part II, pp. 3, 10, 13, 34; Firth and Davies, I, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.

To the foregoing was added during the course of the year 1664, on the English establishment, another regiment of foot known as the "Lord High Admiral's Regiment." This regiment was raised by the Duke of York as lord high admiral for service on shipboard in anticipated naval warfare against the Dutch and was the forerunner of the later British marine force.²⁷

The principal officers and officials besides the king, one of the secretaries of state, and the lords of treasury that were concerned with the administration of the English establishment were as follows:²⁸

Commander-in-chief—(military personnel and operations)
 Master of the ordnance (in commission 1664-70)—(ordnance)
 Paymaster general—(pay)
 Mustermaster general—(inspection)
 Scoutmaster general—(intelligence)
 Secretary-at-war—(clerical work)

The English establishment was governed partly under several fifteenth-century statutes providing for the punishment of desertion, mutiny, and like offenses and partly under the royal prerogative. Discipline was maintained by what amounted to military law. In time of war articles of war were issued providing for punishments extending to life and limb. In time of peace such punishments could not be imposed without the risk of coming into collision with the civil courts. But other disciplinary measures, often of a drastic kind, that did not result in conflict with the civil courts were regularly administered by military commanders and courts-martial. The civil courts and parliament obdurately insisted, however, that the disciplining of troops in time of peace could not legally involve anything exceptional to the

²⁷Walton, pp. 502-503; Dalton, *English Army Lists*, I, 42.

²⁸Walton, pp. 615-16, 622, 640-42, 720-21, 767; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1660-1661* (London, 1860), pp. 74, 490, 499, 556. At this time and for long afterwards there was not one integrated system of military administration but rather several distinguishable systems flourishing simultaneously, as follows: (1) the autonomous system of administration for each regiment and in simpler form for each independent troop or company, (2) the autonomous system of administration for each garrison, differing in complexity according to the size and importance of the garrison, (3) the system of super-regimental administration set up temporarily for a field army, expeditionary force, or army of occupation when such an army or force was called into temporary being, and (4) the system of central administration for all the nation's land forces. The history of the interrelated development of these systems is among the most difficult of subjects in the field of military studies. Because this is the case it is not practicable in connection with the writer's present purposes to account for the performance of all the necessary administrative functions. There must be recourse to simplification by omission. Thus no reference is made to machinery for the administration of supply in the field or abroad or for the central administration of military justice.



ENGLISH SOLDIERS OF THE TIME OF CHARLES II.



INFANTRY COMBAT IN THE TIME OF CHARLES III¹

ordinary civil law. Parliamentary recognition of the need for a standing army and of a special kind of law for its internal governance still lay in the future. The Mutiny Act was not yet.²⁹

The pay of troops was supposed to provide for all the necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. In providing pay, however, the crown dealt, through the paymaster general, with the colonel of each regiment and captain of each independent troop or company as though he were a contractor for the services of his men. The soldier was entitled to receive only a portion of his pay calculated to provide him with food and shelter. Another portion was held back by the central administration for supplies or articles furnished in kind and for the fees and per-

²⁹Walton, pp. 529-85 *passim*, 809.

¹From John Luard, *A History of the Dress of the British Soldier* (London, 1852), op. p. 84.

²From reproduction in Henry D. Traill and James S. Mann, eds., *Social England* (6 vols., London, etc., 1902-1904), IV, 511, of an illustration in *The Military Duties of the Officers of Cavalry* (London, 1678), translated by Archibald Lovell from De La Fontaine, *Les devoirs militaires des officiers de la cavalerie* (Paris, 1675).

centages by which the officials of that administration largely subsisted and grew fat. The remainder was retained by the soldier's commander, supposedly to pay for clothing furnished, but for the most part actually as pure profit.³⁰

Formal uniforms were usually red, faced with some other color, but there were many exceptions. Thus the regiment of horse-guards wore blue coats, the lord high admiral's regiment yellow coats, and pikemen and drummers frequently coats of a color to distinguish them from the other men in their units. But whatever the color of formal uniforms, it appears that the soldier was often actually clothed informally in poorer garments of blue or gray.³¹

Cavalry was equipped with iron helmet and cuirass and armed with sword and pistols. The guard cavalry had newly been given, also, slung carbines and cartridge boxes. Infantry was armed about one third with pikes and two thirds with matchlock and flintlock muskets, the latter being in the process of supplanting the former. The infantry still fought six ranks deep normally but was beginning to use thinner formations on occasion.³²

Such, then, was the army that was represented by the three foot companies of Nicolls, Cartwright, and Carr in the conquest of New Netherland.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 640, 652; Fortescue, I, 320-21.

³¹Cecil C. P. Lawson, *A History of the Uniforms of the British Army* (2 vols., London, 1940-41), I, 15-24, 74-76; Walton, pp. 371-72.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 419-21, 427, 430-33; Fortescue, I, 329-30.

A 1745 PLAN FOR . . . A NATIONAL MILITIA IN GREAT BRITAIN AND . . . AMERICA

BY FRED K. VIGMAN

During 1745, coincident with the invasion of Scotland by the Young Pretender, there appeared in London, and soon thereafter in the American colonies, the second and revised edition of a work which summarized the rising sentiment for the reorganization of the militia system of Great Britain and against the continued dependency on Continental mercenaries. The book, *A Plan for Establishing and Disciplining a National Militia in Great Britain, Ireland, and in all the British Dominions of America*,¹ reflected the mounting apprehension of the governing Whigs over the adequacy of the military establishment for defense of a growing colonial empire, political equilibrium on the Continent, and defense of the homeland.

The *Plan*, an anonymous work in the manner of the times, was only one of many polemical books and pamphlets on a subject that had been the center of protracted political struggles since 1740. In that year the regular force was increased to 51,515 men in consequence of the fear of the disturbed condition on the Continent following the death of Charles V. An open break with France was imminent, and invasion by the French, Spanish and the Stuart pretender was the greatest fear of the time.²

The antiquated and vestigial feudal form of the militia system extant, and the fear of a standing army since the days of the New Model Army, had at this critical juncture brought an impasse in the formulation of a military policy for Great Britain. To the monarchy the practice of hiring mercenaries was a congenial *modus vivendi*; to others like Walpole it was an unavoidable necessity. The resultant deadlock not only favored the position of the "auxiliaries," principally the Hanoverians, but created a sense of failure to evolve a military policy suitable for the times.

The attack on the system of hiring mercenaries, while often nega-

¹A Plan/for/establishing and/Disciplining/a/National Militia/in/Great Britain,/Ireland,/and /in all the British Dominions/of America./to which is added,/An Appendix, containing Pro-/posals, for improving the Maritime/Power of Great Britain,/a new edition, with a Preface/suited to the present State of Affairs./London:/Printed for A. Millar, over-against/Katherine-street in the Strand; and sold/by M. Cooper in Pater-noster-Row. 1745./ (Price stitch'd 2s.)

²Walpole had information that France had 200,000 regulars and 60,000 militiamen, of which half were newly raised in readiness for a possible invasion of Great Britain.

tive (which Walpole was quick to point out), expressed the prevailing sense of frustration. Walpole, in defending his stand on the question, charged that

All these topics were blazoned out to the public, in a set of the most flagitious and indecent writings that ever appeared in England. . . . [And in consequence of such agitation,] . . . a secret spirit of discontent began now to insinuate itself into some of the officers of the army, both at home and abroad upon account of the Hanoverian troops.

While he did not mention it by name it was understood that one of the most "flagitious" of the anti-Hanoverian pamphlets was Chesterfield's and Waller's *The Case of the Hanover forces in the pay of Great Britain*.

By 1744 the agitation over the question reached a high pitch in parliament, and the "secret spirit of discontent" blazed so fiercely that Lord Stair and the Duke of Marlborough, commander and major-general respectively of the British regulars, felt constrained to resign their commands.³ Newcastle, the Whig leader, believed that a reconciliation and agreement could be reached with the Tories on a question that seemingly affected them in the same manner.

Published at this critical juncture, the *Plan* was not merely another work attacking the mercenary system *per se*, but one sounding a note of national unity, and stressing the need for a fundamental overhauling of the military establishment. The writer sought to rouse the leading elements of the country to an understanding of their own stake in a better orientated military policy. It was in effect a plea to the Tories for a national united front against the Continental bloc, headed by France and Spain. The proposals in the *Plan* were more comprehensive than in other works on the subject in that the nature of the impending struggle with France was seen as one for colonial empire and not limited to political hegemony on the European continent. Thus anticipating the war of 1756, the author envisaged the following role for the American colonies in a reinvigorated militia system:

. . . it is to be wished the law [for establishment of a national militia] may extend to every part of the British dominion, where it is practicable; more especially to our provinces, and great cities of North America, situated near a restless, enterprising neighbor, now at enmity, whose interest it is to subdue by fraud or force all those countries lying between his dominions and the sea. . . . For preventing therefore such fatal incroachments on the British dominions no means can be so effectual as the

³When the Stuart invasion was under way Lord Stair and Marlborough offered their services again.

establishment of a general militia well train'd to arms in those provinces, where the governor of each may be invested with the same powers which are exercised by the lords-lieutenants of counties in this kingdom.

II

The author of the *Plan* pleaded for a national militia system by stressing the unreliability of hired auxiliaries, and by holding that an increase of the regular army commensurate with the needs of Great Britain would be too great a burden on the population. In line with Newcastle's approach, he directs much of his arguments to unconvinced Whigs and Tories, especially the county squirearchy.

The profession of a soldier, like all other arts, has its craft, pretending that military discipline is to be acquired only by long practice; but general experience vouches the contrary. Innumerable instances from ancient history, and many late example, prove beyond all contradiction, that the essential parts of discipline may be learned very soon, under a right direction. But supposing it is true, that some length of time may be requisite for that purpose, must there not be a *beginning*? and is there any time more urgent than the present, when we think it necessary to call in foreign assistance against invasion? Is the safety, the very being of this great and mighty nation, to depend upon an handful of auxiliaries, and perhaps an untrained rabble when it might become invincible by arming all the people of property. Who are so capable of defending the national wealth as those who have the largest share? Can we expect that mercenaries who have little other interest in the nation than a small pay, should fight as obstinately as those who possess the greatest dignities and the largest fortunes? . . . Neither riches or populousness are able to give security to a nation untrained to arms.

The author of the *Plan* utilizes the fear of a standing army, a fear grown morbid since Cromwell's time and often the mainspring of Tory opposition to a revision of the military establishment of Great Britain. The regulars are likened to the mercenaries in that

. . . whenever they become a distinct body of mercenaries, making the profession of arms the only means of subsistence, their interest is opposite to that of the people in general . . . their pay is at best a grievous burthen [burden] upon public industry.

In support of his argument of the alleged subversive potentialities of standing or professional armies, the author cites examples from Roman history and that of the Janizaries of the Ottoman Empire. He then quotes Machiavelli [termed Machiavel] to the effect that

. . . a well-constituted kingdom or commonwealth will not suffer any of their citizens or subjects, or any other good men, to make war their profession.

The militia system then extant in Great Britain was the vestigial remains of the feudal system—a system whereby the eligible males were

to give fourteen days a year for training (as against the late feudal tenure of thirty days service by manorial tenants). Because of its quasi-feudal form, the militia lent itself to the intermittent outbreaks of the more quarrelsome lords, and was divisive in that it called forth local rather than national loyalty.⁴ The city militia of London was likewise a unit unto itself and the instrument of The City rather than of the nation as a whole.

The author of the *Plan* was cognizant of these realities when he outlined his plan that was to create a national militia, though administered on the old familiar county basis.

. . . some playwrights, and many state-witlings, have taken frequent occasions of ridiculing a militia in general, made under the false colours of the particular nominal militia of London. But tho' a band of porters (the substitutes of indolence) badly armed, and not at all disciplined, are fit objects of ridicule because making a shew of what they really are not; will therefore a regular, well-disciplined militia be so too? What say the witlings to the militia of Switzerland, the only army properly called a militia in all Europe.

Warming to the subject the author becomes perhaps too enthusiastic about the role of militias, and stretching the term a bit too tenuously, historically considered, claimed for it a decisive role in military history.

It is remarkable that nine of the greatest military exploits recorded in history were performed (not by mercenary armies, but) by well trained militias. . . .

III

In some respects, the suggestions put forth in the *Plan* were familiar, though considered impractical principally the proposal for a form of universal conscription in that militia service was to comprehend

. . . all men capable of bearing arms, from the age of 18 to that of 50 years; except such as may be exempted by law.

Critical of the quasi-feudal discipline in the regular forces, where too often the men were treated like recalcitrant peasants, the author pro-

⁴"The capital question therefore still remains; not who shall pay, but who shall fight. . . . This naturally leads us to consider what may be expected, feared or hoped from the Establishment of a National Militia. . . . An English Militia cannot be so dangerous now, as in former times, because the Commons are discharged from those slavish military Tenures, which so often brought them into the Field, to butcher each other in former Days, at the Command of a seditious or revengeful Lord." *An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times*, by the Author of *Essays on the Characteristics*, etc. Vol. II, London, (1758).

posed a higher and more effective type of discipline as befitted a national militia.

In a right institution of this kind no military tyranny ought to be practised; nor need any man be obliged to more than a few hours exercise between the rising and setting of the sun once a month. No corporal punishment should be inflicted, but all military discipline encouraged by example and rewards, or enforced by pecuniary fines.

The details of the organization of the national militia which the author of the *Plan* then outlined at great length are of such a nature as to seemingly contradict his notions of a democratized national militia, viz.

That the militia of each country be divided into two branches, viz. the superior militia composed altogether of men of property, and the subordinate militia of the common people.

The contradictions are compounded when he recommended

That a well-constituted militia should chuse [choose] their own officers up to the rank of generals, is highly reasonable, because the choice will naturally fall upon men of the best character, from whom there is no fear of injustice, or military oppression. . . .

Why then was the author so elaborate in his details for a militia formed of two branches, dividing the gentry from the commonalty? The most feudal encrusted Tory would hesitate to make such a proposal at the time.

It was a bold political tack, a bid for Tory support. By appealing to their sense of property, pride or arrogance as the case may be, he hoped to attract their interest in the projected national militia. He also realized that they commanded the services of considerable numbers of retainers of all kinds who would make good militiamen. Thus he offered the county gentry this novel arrangement for the use of their retainers.

. . . the cavalry of the subordinate militia be composed wholly of noblemen's and gentlemen's servants, or petty tenants not qualified to [en] roll in the horse or foot of the superior militia. . . .

. . . Thus an idle set of people, kept too often as the trappings of grandeur, may serve all the present purposes, and become a most useful order of soldiers. . . .

The Tories and some Whigs were indeed a stumbling block in the efforts to rebuild the military establishment of Great Britain. When in 1740 the regulars were augmented, Lord Gage, speaking against the increase, charged that he could see

. . . but one reason for raising, at this present juncture, this additional number of troops, and that is to strengthen the hands of the minister against the next election, by

giving him the power of disposing of commissions to the sons, brothers, nephews, cousins and friends of such as have interest in boroughs. . . .

When, as a result of the agitation for a militia and the enlightening experiences of 1745, Colonel George Townshend introduced in 1756 a bill for a militia of 60,000 men, it was opposed by the Tories. They would only agree on a compromise that cut the number of militia to be raised to 32,000, and even then insisted that the country would be turned into a military camp.

IV

Soon after the passage of the compromise militia act of 1757, training was instituted in a number of counties. The new militiamen of Norfolk impressed the leaders of the militia organization and the regulars to a degree that they ordered a manual to be drafted embodying the methods in use in that county. *The Norfolk Discipline* as the manual was termed was soon a standard work in Great Britain and in the American colonies. Thomas Pickering adapted it for use of local America militia, and it was the Pickering edition that was one of the few manuals read and used by Washington, before and after his assumption of command of the American forces in the War for Independence.

Great Britain was not destined to establish a national militia as envisaged by the author of the *Plan*, although the controversy on the subject continued unabated until after the Napoleonic wars. In the period under survey, expediency won the day, and the employment of mercenaries and regulars in the war to fight the rebellious American colonies put a quietus on the intense agitation of the five years between 1740 and 1745. It remained for the American colonists to improvise an army from the variegated militia systems, and demonstrate the historical superiority of the citizen soldier over the mercenary if not the regular.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Perilous Fight, by Neil H. Swanson. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 555. \$3.50.)

Mr. Swanson's newest book is an historical narrative of the last days of the British invasion of Maryland in 1814. It covers the period from the Battle of Bladensburg to the withdrawal of the British Fleet down the Chesapeake Bay after the unsuccessful attack on Baltimore. *The Perilous Fight* is by long odds the most accurate, detailed, and best documented account of the events it describes that this reviewer has seen, and he has seen a great many. What is more, the book is also the most interesting description of a military campaign that has appeared for many a year.

Professional historians, at least those who seem to believe that solemnity is a criterion for the accuracy of historical writing, will probably object to the style of the work. For the most part it is written from the point of view of the 1814 G.I. The G.I.'s point of view is not a bad point of view from which to write history—after all, he has a lot to do with making it. Few books, and none of them histories, since Stephen Crane's *Red Badge of Courage*, have put the reader in the front lines with a musket in his hand as does *The Perilous Fight*. The sound and fury, the smell of battle, the fear of death, and thoughts of the best girl experienced by the veteran and the rookie before, during, and after an action seem to be the experience of the reader. It is excellent writing, and even better reading.

The Perilous Fight, however, is a great deal more than those things. It is an accurate historical document, based on thorough and painstaking research, which makes clear what had been a badly covered and muddled period of American military history. When describing the various actions fought during the period covered, Mr. Swanson writes for the infantry and the gunners in their own language, but in the other sections, in the sections which explain what caused the American defeat at Bladensburg and the burning of Washington, and how the same men who had fled from that field fought a courageous and successful battle against the veterans who had defeated them, his style is trenchant and his arguments cogent. Few will be found to cavil at his presentation.

The difference between the American Army at Bladensburg and the American Army at North Point lay not in the difference in the troops—they were essentially the same men; but in the difference between their high commands. It was the difference between Will Winder and Sam Smith, between a commander who was not quite sure what he wanted to do, who was heckled, and nagged, and superceded by cabinet members, and who finally did the wrong things; and a commander who knew what he wanted to do, who was skillful enough to avoid political interference, and who finally did the right things to assure a victory.

Mr. Swanson's informal approach to the subject not only makes the subject matter interesting to the military-minded and to the casual reader, it also permits the author to paint a much better and clearer picture of the principal commanders who took part in the events. Most histories are content with telling what men did; this history tells what they did, how and why they did it, and finally what manner of men they were. In spite of the informality, in spite of the chronology of the book which does not

always follow that of the events but is never confusing, the account is written objectively and without bitterness.

The Perilous Fight is a fine achievement. It describes a military campaign clearly and honestly and in a way that is easy to follow; it presents an excellent picture of the times and the customs and the thinking of America a hundred and thirty years ago, and it draws an object lesson on the evils of procrastination in military affairs which well merits the attention of every citizen of the United States now and in the future.

The illustrations by John G. Stees are attractive and add to the appearance of the book, while Frank Onken's maps are of great assistance in following the marching, countermarching and fighting of the armies so well described in the text. The only proper quarrel one can have with the volume is a quarrel with the publisher and not the author. Footnotes belong at the foot of a page and not in the back of the book. Casual readers may not like footnotes, but those in this book are well done, and are of considerable importance to the narrative. Placing them in the back is an imposition on the serious reader.

JOHN PHILIPS CRANWELL,
Washington, D. C.

Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, edited by Major H. A. DeWeerd. (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1946. Pp. 263. \$3.00.)

Probably no soldier in history, whose duties have been those of administration rather than command in the field, has won more instant and universal recognition of the greatness of his work than has General of the Army George C. Marshall. This recognition has stemmed, not only from the vastness and complexity of the task which he carried to such a brilliant conclusion, but also from a profound respect for the character of the man. Further knowledge of what went on in the inner councils of government during the war years may amend this or that detail of the picture, but it seems certain that no major revision will be necessary.

This volume of selected speeches and statements of General Marshall which Major DeWeerd has brought together—and to which he has contributed an excellent foreword—will probably find its major usefulness, not in changing our picture of the Chief of Staff, but in drawing attention more sharply to some of the problems he had to face. These problems, in the flush of victory, we might otherwise be tempted to forget.

Great as was the part played by General Marshall in the councils of the United Nations after we entered the war, it may well be the ultimate verdict of history that his greatest achievement was that of laying the foundation of a great American Army during the two years and a half when the nation blew alternately, and frequently simultaneously, hot and cold in its view of what the United States ought to do. It is thus fortunate that the paucity of public statements by General Marshall after Pearl Harbor has assigned the larger part of this volume to what he said during the months of public indecision.

Certainly few nations have entered great crises in their history more plagued by obstacles to prompt and farsighted action than was the United States in 1939. We felt threatened, yet could not nerve ourselves to more than half measures. While the nation was in this mood, the creation of an Army, and the balancing of our direct defense needs with those for sending assistance to the nations actively at war with Hitler, demanded from the Chief of Staff of the Army both professional skill and statesmanship

of the highest order. How ticklish the whole business was comes out again and again in General Marshall's statements, especially in his testimony before committees of Congress. In a bewildering complexity of legal and administrative detail, he faced a thousand pitfalls, a plunge into any one of which might have wrecked the program for the expansion of the Army. Had it been wrecked, or set back several months, who can say where we would be today?

As one admires the sure-footedness with which General Marshall steered his way through these dangers, finding his path both by technical insight and force of character, admiration is tempered by alarm. Is not something vitally wrong when public opinion faces danger in so bewildered, and even perverse, a frame of mind that only an extraordinary combination of tact and technical skill can secure the acceptance of the minimum measures necessary for safety? Of course, General Marshall was not alone responsible for these measures. Without brilliant leadership by others, both above and below him, his efforts would have failed. But it is difficult to see how success could have been gained had General Marshall been deficient, or even merely average, in any of the many capacities required by his difficult assignment.

That question is academic so far as it concerns the history of the Second World War, but it has real importance for the future. In providing for our national safety, are we always to trust Fate to provide us so unusual a man, a man who can steer our military preparations through the thickets of confusion and uncertain purpose with such skill that, when danger finally pounces, we will not be caught entirely unready? There is danger as well as greatness in the career of General Marshall, danger that we may count too surely upon finding someone like him to save us from future ineptitude and delay in facing danger. It is to be hoped that the volume prepared by Major DeWeerd, at the same time that it gives us further insight into the achievements of a great Chief of Staff, will warn us against confronting any of his successors with so nearly impossible a task.

TROYER S. ANDERSON,
Washington, D. C.

The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1945. Pp. 123. \$1.00.)

(Biennial Report of The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War, supplemented by a separate Atlas of 101 pages containing a series of bimonthly Situation Maps.)

General George C. Marshall's report, a continuation and amplification of his biennial report for 1941-43, is an historical document of prime importance. No one in this country can speak with greater authority than General Marshall on the matters covered by this report. He had been Chief of Staff continuously for six years when he submitted it; consequently, had been in position to know intimately the background and development of events that culminated in the unconditional surrender of Italy, Germany, and Japan. He reports, at a time when secrecy on most matters is no longer necessary, directly to his immediate superior, the Secretary of War; and authenticates the document by signing it. He assumes personal responsibility for the accuracy of facts and the soundness of recommendations presented. We thus have, shortly after V-J Day, a history of the last two years of World War II as seen by our great wartime Chief of Staff.

Public demand for General Marshall's report has already put it in the "best seller"

class. Publication of General Eisenhower's final report on the war in Africa and Europe, General MacArthur's final report on his share of the war in the Pacific, and the final reports of various army commanders, will be awaited with keen anticipation. Only a small portion of General Pershing's final report, as Commander-in-Chief of the AEF in World War I, has ever been made public; the bulk of that report, packed with valuable information, has lain buried in the archives for many years during which it might have been studied. From the historian's viewpoint and that of the professional soldier, it is highly desirable to have documents of this type published as soon as public security permits. General Marshall's report, supplemented as it is with Order of Battle data and bimonthly situation maps, establishes a high standard of excellence, and its timely publication enhances public interest in it.

C. C. BENSON,
Colonel, USA

The Balance of Tomorrow, Power and Foreign Policy in the United States, by Robert Strausz-Hupé. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1945. Pp. 302. \$3.00.)

Since the American tendency is to think emotionally about our postwar relationship to other countries, especially to Soviet Russia, a calm assessment of the comparative power of nations and of our foreign policy in the light of that power, comes as a welcome and timely work.

Mr. Strausz-Hupé believes that circumstances have thrust initiative in world affairs upon us, that "no plans and blueprints for systems of security and peace can alleviate this burden." For "security and peace cannot be planned; they have to be won every day." They have to be won in the game of power politics and the stakes of the game "determine who can sit in and play. . . . The chips are the country's total resources, human and material. . . . No nation can hope to keep on playing that has not counted the chips, does not know what they are worth, and has no clear idea as to how much each player is able to put up." From this attitude, Mr. Strausz-Hupé goes on to discuss population and power, raw materials and power, organization and power, and world politics and power, summarizing in a clear and succinct fashion the world situation in each of these respects.

It is a book of hard, vital facts. Without a general knowledge of war potentials such as Mr. Strausz-Hupé gives us, no citizen can possibly reach a sensible approach to peace and war. Little that he says is debatable, one exception being his assessment of our present economic strength. For how can such power items as coal and uranium deposits, forests, and population be argued with? Extensions of population growth into the future may doubtless be subject to difference of opinion between experts, but its laws are sufficiently established to furnish us material for more than a well-informed guess.

These matters could have been presented most luridly. A less restrained, a less responsible analyst of the world might have written of "danger spots" and "tinder box areas." But Mr. Strausz-Hupé shows evidence of appropriate humility before the mighty facts with which he deals.

JOSEPH I. GREENE,
Colonel, USA

The Fortress Islands of the Pacific, by William Herbert Hobbs. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: J. W. Edwards. 1945. Pp. 186. \$2.50.)

With the United States again confronted, as in 1848 and in 1898, by the perplexing problem of how much territory to retain as spoils of war, nothing could be more

timely than a fresh study of the countless islands that dot the Pacific from Bora Bora to Iwo Jima and from Attu to Palawan. With extremists of every type now being heard, from neo-imperialists who would keep all soil won by our arms (even that belonging originally to our allies) to prophets of the atomic age who regard armies and navies as obsolete, nothing is more needed than a critical appraisal of these islands, many of which are forever enshrined in the military annals and hearts of the American people.

This attractive little volume by an eminent geologist answers only in part that need. Where Professor Hobbs classifies the various arcuate and strewn islands, traces their origin, and describes their salient characteristics, he is on firm ground; for he has personally explored much of the area. He patiently treats every important atoll, examining its climate, resources, population, and history. One entire chapter is devoted to hurricanes. This portion of the book is charmingly illustrated with pen and ink sketches and by clear, simple maps. Although scholars will prefer for a general survey Robson's *Pacific Islands Handbook: 1944* (1945) and for a restricted topic Bryan's *American Polynesia and the Hawaiian Chain* (rev. edn., 1942), Professor Hobbs provides more useful information in brief compass than any other writer.

When, however, the scientist turns strategist, he has less appeal for readers of this journal. The pages dealing with policy suffer from undue brevity, from oversimplification, from lack of political realism, and from the handicap of being written under wartime restrictions. Although the author clearly recognizes that all islands are not equally useful for bases, he declines to name those we should develop first. He evades the question of Guadalcanal and Tarawa, which possess more sentimental than military value; and he shows less courage than Admiral Spruance in grasping the thorny issue of Okinawa. Professor Hobbs does advocate retention of all former Japanese mandates, of Rabaul, and of sites in the Solomons. He would greatly strengthen our pre-war holdings and would acquire facilities for airstrips and anchorages at Neumea, Espiritu Santo, Biak, Moretai, Tarakan, Brunei Bay, Iwo Jima, and Chichi Jima. But on the whole, his vague generalities have less to recommend than the Navy's recent proposal to concentrate on nine overseas Pacific bases: Kodiak, Adak, Hawaii, Balboa, Guam-Saipan-Tinia, Manus, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and an unnamed place in the Philippines.

Military censorship is partly responsible for some of the book's limitations. The author could not use the vast amount of valuable data compiled by intelligence officers during the war. He could not have known, writing early in 1945, how important Manus had become as a fleet base and Ulithi as a fleet anchorage. He could not have guessed that new techniques by our service forces enabled entire fleets to replenish, refuel, and rearm at sea for indefinite periods, thereby reducing the need for a network of advanced bases. He must, however, bear the blame for needlessly underestimating the importance of Guam and for constantly confusing Palau with Peleliu.

Despite these defects, many of which are sins of omission, Professor Hobbs has produced, within the limits he set for himself, a valuable compendium. It contains a useful bibliography and index; considering the multitude of strange names there are very few typographical errors. It would be unfortunate if this volume were overlooked just because it is too cursory for the general reader and, in places, too elementary for the specialist. Both will find much of value in its pages.

R. W. LEOPOLD,
Lieutenant, USNR

48 Million Tons to Eisenhower, by Lieutenant Colonel Randolph Leigh. (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 179. \$2.00.)

Like all books, this one on supply activities in the European Theater of Operations from D-Day to V-E Day has been written with a purpose and a definite audience in mind. The jacket explains that one million copies of Colonel Leigh's story were printed in France under reciprocal aid (less elegantly often referred to as "reverse lend-lease") and distributed to soldiers in the theater. Now the Infantry Journal has made copies available to readers in the United States.

Colonel Leigh has put together many outstanding facts and incidents to portray the magnitude of our logistics effort in Europe. Thus, from June 1, 1942, to May 31, 1945, the ETO received 47.6 million tons of supplies, all but 13.3 million from the United States, contrasted with 8.3 million tons from all sources for the AEF in 1917-1918. The great supply differences between World War I and World War II in Europe are often referred to. And we learn that Engineer troops of the Communications Zone constructed 223 major highway bridges in northwestern Europe, and that the military telephone center in Paris handled 25,000 calls a day while the Signal Center sent and received 7,500 messages every 24 hours.

There are vivid accounts of many of the supply problems during the initial assault through Normandy and the later drives across France and into Germany. The difficulties of unloading over the open beaches, the unfortunate fate of Mulberry A wrecked in the great storm of June 19-22, and the importance of Cherbourg are fully emphasized. Colonel Leigh uses his ability well in describing the achievements of the Red Ball Highway Express and the exploits of the military railway service. Railroading in France in the summer of 1944 was no routine matter. How engineers and crews explored their way forward at night, suffered wrecks and death, and still delivered the supplies is a story which pays tribute to all men of the Communications Zone.

This is essentially a story of accomplishment. Colonel Leigh at the outset denies that it is a "definitive history." He has recorded the size and the importance of Communications Zone activities in achieving our victory over Germany. The account is of uneven character, reflecting no doubt the variations in the material from which Colonel Leigh worked. Thus, the Medical story appears to less advantage than it deserves. And the presentation of the subject does not always clearly differentiate the "build-up" in England preceding D-Day from the operations which followed. The supply work in the assault across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany receives only passing mention.

The reader will find no critical review of supply deficiencies here. Nothing is said, for example, about the practice of holding ships as floating warehouses, with consequent reduction in shipping available from the United States. The winter clothing situation, the failure to set up intermediate depots after the break-through, the ammunition problem—these are passed over.

As a reminder of the importance of supply factors in modern warfare, as a record of "highlights" in supply work, this is a valuable little book. The war was not won by the combat soldier alone. Probably generals and privates need to be told this occasionally. But this is not a treatise for careful study and debate in our service schools where the logistical aspect of war must receive ever more attention in the years to come.

JOHN D. MILLETT,
Colonel, AUS

Up Front. Text and Pictures by Bill Mauldin. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co. 1945. Pp. 228. \$3.00.)

Up Front has apparently been a national success. Mauldin did not draw his cartoons for the public. "I simply try to draw for the guys," he writes, and professes surprise that anybody wanted to put them into a book for civilians. But the public seems to have eaten them up. His Willie and Joe, like Terry and Joe Palooka, have become national characters, with the great difference to their credit that they are real—grimly real. By the time this review appears, its readers will have read *Up Front*—or should have. It seems therefore less appropriate to describe it than to give some thought to what it means that Willie and Joe, and Bill Mauldin, are receiving a popular triumph.

I suspect that it means something important, and also creditable, regarding a public often maligned by the intellectuals and misjudged by the advertisers. The popularity of Mauldin, Willie and Joe bristles with paradoxes. Willie and Joe do not look like U. S. infantry soldiers, or like Mauldin who is one, and Mauldin knows this. They look like bums. Mauldin is determined that not a scrap of glamor shall attach to the life of the doughfoot or his fate, and he makes sure that it doesn't. He makes sure you are left in no doubt that "in the infantry," to quote Ernie Pyle, "a soldier had to become half beast in order to survive." Willie and Joe are funny, but the cartoons will not let you laugh at them. The cartoons are bitter, and Mauldin's prose, for all its warmth and humor, is bitter. They are bitter and exclusive. The cartoons were drawn solely to please the riflemen and their companions up front: if public interest in them "means that people are interested in seeing how the dogfaces look at themselves," writes Mauldin, "that's swell." He glories in belonging to this lowly company of "basic guys" whom their experience has made the most exclusive fraternity on earth. Their faces pushed into the mud, homesick, miserable, weary and scared, they didn't "shirk hazards because they didn't want to let their buddies down." They did the necessary to render their country victorious, because there was something in them that made it necessary. Bill Mauldin and Ernie Pyle are the supreme expositors of that something. It is something that makes us feel good if we are human. It makes us delight in Willie and Joe and hope we would be as good as they are.

Americans are supposed to be fall guys for glamor and gadgets, in peace and war. But our national heroes that have lasted are not glamorous: Lincoln made the grade, but Alexander Hamilton, for all that we owe him, never has. No doubt rightly, we set out to win this war with machines and superior gun- and bomb-power on land, and sea, and in the air. It was presently evident that we had underestimated the amount of infantry we would need and we had to wear out what we had. Again, the great majority of the men put into the infantry were just run-of-the-mine Americans, the doggies of Bill Mauldin's cartoons—and not a great many Bill Mauldins. The nation, as it has turned out, not only needed them in order to win, but also needed the character they showed, to justify its own self-confidence and self-respect. Now they are getting their come-uppance. Once the public had an eye only for wings. Now no decoration yields more honor than the blue badge of the combat infantryman. The men who wear it have the satisfaction of knowing and showing that plain, ordinary American youngsters can meet the supreme challenge to human character under almost unendurable conditions and, stumbling, griping, and joshing like Willie and Joe, come through, or die, in possession of themselves. The result is that they have achieved an exclusive pride, and no American worthy of the name does not envy their certainty and search his

heart to be sure he is worthy of it.

Bill Mauldin has been able to put this issue across because, as his writing shows, he is the irreducible and irrepressible American individual. He takes delight in puncturing "stiff shirt fronts" and he represents, as he recognizes, the permanent American seditiousness under military discipline, together with an American willingness to accept it when it is necessary to get things done. He is humorous, decent and tolerant, but tolerant within strict limits. He puts the case for the other side; but if anybody stepped on him or his gang, he gets in the last crack and it is sharp.

As for the writing in his book, it is as fine American prose as is being written by anybody. *Up Front* takes its place with Ernie Pyle's two volumes on my little shelf of books about Americans at war that cannot be displaced. Mauldin pretends merely to be commenting on his adventures as an army cartoonist and giving you background for his cartoons. But there is hardly an aspect of the life of U. S. soldiers overseas which he does not touch with a comment that brings it to a focus from the point of view of the men who did the fighting, and at the end there is a passage which makes the book as broad as humanity.

KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD,
Lieutenant Colonel, AUS

Per Ardua. The Rise of British Air Power 1911-1939, by Hilary St. George Saunders. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. 356. \$3.75.)

Mr. Saunders, whose timely reports on the air war in Britain¹ were widely read in the United States, has now undertaken to write a short history of the RAF. *Per Ardua* carries the narrative from 1911 through World War I and the long truce which terminated in September 1939; presumably the narrative will be brought down to VJ-Day when security regulations permit.

As the author frankly acknowledges, the present volume, save for the last two chapters, leans heavily upon the official history of *The War in the Air*.² To that work he directs the "serious student of air warfare," but since its six stout volumes may appear formidable to others, the person with a casual interest will find Mr. Saunders' little book useful as well as readable. He brings to his task a real talent for telling a story and it may seem ungracious to suggest that he has exercised that talent too frequently in his notices of individual exploits. Probably the nature of much of the air action of 1914-18 justifies such an approach, and the universal appeal of derring-do may explain why the author has recorded most of the instances (15 out of 19) in which the Victoria Cross was awarded to airmen. But in a short book the inclusion of such colorful details must inevitably result in the slighting of other matters about which even a casual reader might entertain a pardonable curiosity. Thus the four pages devoted to the naval shelling of the *Konigsberg* in the Rufiji Delta (in which air activity was limited) constitute, at a guess, more space than is contained in the scattered references to pilot and crew training. Training is a dull affair at best, but inasmuch as the air war is interpreted as a victory of RAF air discipline over long-continued German superiority in materiel, the method of indoctrination might seem more significant than potshooting at a holed-up German cruiser.

But this is a matter of individual taste, and certainly there is much in the book which is illuminating to those interested in military aviation of the present day. One who

¹*Battle of Britain* (1941); *Coastal Command* (1942); *Bomber Command* (1941).

²*The War in the Air* (Oxford, 1922-37); vol. I by Sir Walter Raleigh; vols. II-VI by H. A. Jones.

reads with World War II standards in mind will be alternately shocked at the primitive nature of the planes in which men fought in 1914 and astounded at the progress made by November 1918. By that latter date had appeared most of the fundamental bases of air power as it was conceived in the days before Hiroshima—both in respect to the weapons and to the concepts which guided their use. The bomber had not achieved the relative importance it was later to enjoy, but by Armistice Day strategic bombardment as we understand it had been initiated: the Independent Air Force (forerunner of USSTAF and the Twentieth Air Force) provided the necessary means of control and a doctrine had been enunciated which was a quarter-century later to bear fruit in the Combined Bomber Offensive.

In view of current debates over the status of the AAF in any possible reorganization of the armed forces, the chapters dealing with the creation of the RAF and the later schism of the Fleet Air Arm are most timely. The cases are not wholly parallel since the RAF won its freedom from the older services during the heat of battle while the AAF achieved its quasi-autonomy just as a war began. But the pattern of arguments advanced by the several interested parties in 1917 and in 1945 is similar enough to suggest that in such matters cleavage follows lines of service ideology rather than of national thought.

JAMES L. CATE,
Major, AUS

The Story of the Second World War, edited with historical narrative by Henry Steele Commager. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1945. Pp. 578. \$3.)

History of World War II, by Francis Trevelyan Miller, with a Board of Historical and Military Authorities. (Philadelphia, Toronto: The John C. Winston Co. Pp. 966. \$5.)

In the present, essentially suspensive situation of feelings or convictions and knowledge about the Second World War, any history of it is bound to prove unsatisfactory at least to critical readers, reviewers included. With every day we are apt to learn more about how the war has more really been fought. The Pearl Harbor inquiries and the Nürnberg war crimes trials—whichever interest, that of justice or historical truth, is served better or less well in either case, seems as yet uncertain enough—are constantly reminding those who have survived to read, how much more they will have to take into cognizance and consideration before more final judgments on the war, its issues and battles, means and ways of fighting, become possible. But, then, the books, whether called "story" or "history," still being published about the war as a whole are hardly designed to meet this critical attitude. They are meant to satisfy a presumably still strong general interest before the inevitable slump sets in, something pointed to in 1921—expressions like "dead as a war book." They must therefore above everything else be readable, possibly enthusiastic, uncritical.

These requirements make their style and semantics,¹ rather than any claims to historicity on their part, the outstanding features. In parts they seem based on the conviction that people's thought about the war is above all metaphoric, and not technical, that they want to see the ancient battle-images—"savage hand-to-hand fighting," and all that—once more applied, only in a new time and new places. (Besides, when one observes the obsession of American war writers with the white charger on which the

¹There is a sober little commentary on "The Semantics of War Correspondence" in the December 1945 issue of *The Infantry Journal*.

heads of the enemy states were said to have intended to ride to victory over us (Commager, 160; Miller, 127), the folklore of this literature would also seem in need of analysis.

Unwarned by the rapid oblivion into which practically all war correspondents of the past have fallen, unrepelled by the ephemeral nature of their writings, strongly attracted by the presumable, thought often doubtful, eyewitness-ship of these observers, Prof. Commager has built his story of the Second World War for the larger part out of excerpts from the books of such writers. To us the parts prove no more enduring than the wholes of such books, their brass being of a rather non-perennial character. Others laid under contribution are Winston Churchill, definitely the greatest orator of the war, and various speakers and actors from the Allied side, while the enemy side is on the whole left unrepresented. These morsels, chosen in the main for their readability rather than for their military information or judgment, are connected by the compiler's own narrative rather than criticism or analysis. Where something of the latter is attempted, it seems hardly searching, as when explanation for the occurrence of the Second World War is found "in the breakdown of collective security and the growth of international anarchy" since 1918 (12). The outcome reminds one a great deal of the emergency buildings presently being erected with whatever materials happen to be at hand.

While the professional historian allows "here and there an historian or critic compulsively attempting some degree of objectivity," to have his say, there is hardly one among them who might be called military historian or critic with the sole exception of Hanson Baldwin who is quoted once. There are no excerpts from the writings of General Fuller or Admiral Keyes, nor from the reports of General Marshall or Admiral King. While we are duly grateful for the exclusion of Quentin Reynolds or Ilya Ehrenburg, the absence of such writers as Ward Price, Pertinax, Robert Sherrod, David Rame, Jordan (Tunis Diary) seems at least by comparison less justifiable. Commager permits the war correspondents "to loom large, for no other war was ever so fully covered." But was war correspondence ever so poor in military insight, or for that matter independence of judgment or knowledge? (See for example the nonsense about guerrillas on pp. 292-3). Perhaps that is so because for at least one correspondent the European bartender proves in war as he was in peace the newsman's indispensable standby (140).

Towards these contributors Commager assumes a non-critical and non-responsible attitude, stating that he has not "inquired too closely into the credentials of the contributors, nor attempted to correct errors, or what seem to be errors, of fact or of opinion." This is the escape formula for such contradictory statements on different pages (47 and 98) about the sinking of the German Cruiser *Bluecher*, once in Oslofjord in 1940 by land batteries and again by a British submarine elsewhere. Other statements as to the difficult problem of comparative strengths of partners to a battle or the comparative casualties are left to clash as well (221 vs. 224). War propaganda even if of the most unbelievable kind is left unquestioned, such as a case of "well poisoning" by the enemy (405), which would seem more in keeping with war metaphor—and one of the oldest and unlikeliest at that—than fact. Battle descriptions are admitted as such even if the authors were not on the spot but in New York or Chicago. The treatment of Russia, her rôle in the Fourth Partition of Poland, her halt along the Vistula while the Polish insurrection fought in Warsaw for nine weeks—"the Russians were stopped"

instead of perhaps: they stopped, along the Vistula—is in keeping with the soft pedaling probably necessary during, but not after the close of a war of coalition. The occupation of Kiska “proved a not unwelcome anti-climax. There were no Japanese there” (487), instead of what it more actually was—the most embarrassing thrust into the void that occurred during the whole war.

While, to use a homely metaphor, Professor Commager’s story—a declaimer—is serving up war literature in cold cuts, embedded in the aspic of an indifferent narrative, Mr. Miller’s history—a claim—strokes one like Spam done over in a pressure cooker. To demonstrate how much this is a matter of taste: a Roosevelt address of 1941 is “a clarion call resounding through the world. It became the ‘Sermon of the Mount’ to the distressed peoples and nations of the earth” (6), and ten excerpts from the war president’s statements are actually called “Ten Commandments of World War II.” The main stylistic features of the work are the superlative—nearly one per page, or so it seems—the cliché, including the ineradicable romantic notions about bayonet fighting and guerillas, the piled-up adjective, the unrelenting drive of bombast. A sample? “Blitzkrieg of Nazism rampant burst upon Western Russia in a titanic crescendo of destructive terror” (364). War is ever conceived as “superhuman,” and not, or not also, as “only too human.” This never relenting language seems designed for at least two purposes, to re-induce the supposed feverishness of wartime opinion and to master the unprecedented quantum of the late world war, if not also to serve as the battering ram for the book agent knocking at the door of American homes whose inhabitants are offered, it is said, an opportunity to share in the experiences of their fathers, sons and daughters still or recently in the services. Numerous photos, not always correctly captioned, rather than illustrating the war, bring out a measure of pictographic popularity: there are 13 photographic appearances of Roosevelt, 12 each of Churchill and Eisenhower, 11 of MacArthur, 9 of Hitler. But there are in this folk book no maps worth mentioning, though the text often goes into topographic detail. Are people not presumed to care for maps? or for an index to nearly 1,000 pages of text? Still greater seems the editor’s disregard for his public’s care for the by now knowable facts. For a hundred errors of political and military history, technique or language could be pointed out with ease.

ALFRED VAGTS,
Sherman, Connecticut

Armament and History, by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1945. Pp. 207. \$2.50.)

General Fuller needs no introduction to the student of military science. A tireless researcher, a conscientious historian, and a writer of the first order (quite apart from being a brilliant soldier), his contributions to the literature of warfare are many and authoritative. This, his most recent, impresses me as particularly timely and of absorbing interest.

The present offering comprises seven short chapters. Of these the first, bearing the same title as the volume itself, is by way of general introduction. Those which follow are successively devoted to the ages of: Valor, Chivalry, Gunpowder, Steam, and Oil (to this subject—two chapters).

That Fuller was the first to envision the propriety of thus compartmenting the treatment of the history of warfare—and armament—is but another stroke to his credit. And it becomes immediately apparent that such an approach is extremely happy, and thoroughly logical. Under his deft handling the story of each of the “Ages” unfolds

as an engrossing, and self-sufficient, monograph. Together they constitute a brief yet comprehensive epitome upon *Armament and History*.

Ever prepared to document his observations, Fuller's little volume is spiced with 300-odd reference notes to works many of which (Clauswitz, Oman, Polybius, Vegetius) will be familiar to the casual reader. At the same time, he has included others—highly valuable yet rarely quoted. Among such I was pleased to find *Taylor* (Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529) and *Robertson* (Evolution of Naval Armament—1921). And while he naturally leans heavily upon British sources, and scoffs at the idea of Berthold Schwarz, a German, as the inventor of artillery (just as the *herrenvolk* reject Roger Bacon, an Englishman, as the discoverer of gunpowder; such is the influence of nationalism), he is not beyond quoting an American author when it suits his purpose. Thus Mumford's "Technics and Civilization" receives frequent mention, as does Vagts' "A History of Militarism."

Next to the last reference note in the final chapter consists of a 900-word commentary by the author upon the appearance of the atomic bomb. Included are brief speculations upon the possible future employment of this instrument.¹

Fuller looks upon the future darkly. Let us hope that he may prove less gifted as seer than as historian. But by all means, read his message. It deserves, indeed it demands, your thoughtful attention.

CALVIN GODDARD,
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

The First Americans in North Africa: William Eaton's Struggle for a Vigorous Policy against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805, by Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. Pp. 227. \$3.00.)

The day John Adams left the White House he signed a bill which during the first part of Jefferson's administration reduced the navy by more than half. With Congress and Jefferson's own supporters loath to save the service, the new president could do little about his conviction that the possession or use of a navy was one form of force not incompatible with the idea of a republic. The reduction of the navy continued apace in spite of war clouds gathering over Mediterranean waters where Yankee ships paid frequent visits. When the Pasha of Tripoli ordered the flagpole before the American consulate in Tripoli hacked away as a token of war in May, 1801, and when Jefferson hesitated slavishly to follow the examples of Washington and Adams in buying peace with further tribute, the administration was faced with waging, by means only of a hamstrung Navy, a distant war toward which Congress and the nation felt nothing but indifference. An able and serious study of that bizarre "war," as bizarre indeed in certain of its incidents as the plot of a comic opera, is offered in *The First Americans in North Africa*.

As the sub-title of the book indicates, the account focuses itself upon the rôle that the adventurous and erratic American consul at Tunis, later naval agent and general, William Eaton, played in the struggle. Arriving in Barbary in 1799 as one of three American consular officials instructed to improve American relations with the Barbary States, Eaton had soon been convinced by his haggling with the Bey of Tunis that only a more vigorous policy on the part of the United States could successfully counter the perennial demands of the Barbary corsairs, who preyed on Mediterranean trade from historic habit. Quick to measure the pirates' mettle, Eaton had foreseen how

¹The British edition, I understand, carries a full (added) chapter on this subject.

easily their bluffs could be called by a determined opponent, and in his reports to the State Department he repeatedly recommended firmer measures against them, armed retaliation on a major scale if necessary, rather than the meek exchange of tribute after the European practice.

With growing impatience Eaton watched the ineffective campaign waged against the pirates by an American squadron under Commodore Dale, intent primarily on negotiation rather than combat. His disposition was not improved by the even weaker maneuvers of Commodore Morris, Dale's successor ("A more incompetent officer could hardly have been found"), whose evasion of fighting was equalled only by the enemy's lack of enterprise. Convinced in the efficacy of force, Eaton had early conceived a scheme to organize an overland expedition against Tripoli, on behalf of Hamet Karamanli, whose throne had been usurped by his brother Yusuf, and who pledged, if restored to power, a puppet regime favorable to the United States. Successful in selling the project to Jefferson in 1803, Eaton, now a "general," organized his ragamuffin band in Egypt, while American ships under the command of Commodore Preble at last began to press the war against the corsairs. Hamet and his quarrelsome Arabs proved of little help and much trouble; Eaton could depend only on the courage of Lt. O'Bannon and his seven Marines, whose exploits in the march against Derna have caused the "shores of Tripoli" to vie with "the halls of Montezuma" in the Marine Corps Hymn. Eaton's unique expedition, whose threat terrified the Pasha into negotiating for peace with Preble's successor, contributes the high point of the book, the "General's" subsequent "disappointment," his fame (or notoriety), affording merely denouement.

The basis for *The First Americans in North Africa* is the collection of Eaton manuscripts now in possession of the Huntington Library. No prior work of any note seems to have been done on the papers since Charles Prentiss prepared a biography of Eaton in 1811, in spite of light which the collection sheds on American relations with the Barbary States and on Jefferson's frequently misrepresented attitude (vs. that of Congress) towards the navy. The authors have made distinguished use of their materials. Their volume should prove of enduring interest to students of American military, naval, and diplomatic history. It is recommended with equal enthusiasm to the bibliophile who appreciates a format of beauty and distinction.

THURMAN WILKINS,
Captain, AUS

The Military Staff, Its History and Development, by Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hittle, USMC. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service Publishing Co. 1944. Pp. 201. \$2.00.)

The young author of this book has undertaken to fill the need for a comprehensive review of the evolution of the military staff from its earliest forms to the present. He finds that the staff concept had a long struggle to be born though institutionalized in its modern form by Gustavus Adolphus in the seventeenth century. After a survey of its earlier manifestations and the system used by the Swedish king, he follows its history in Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States.

Certain broad traits of its development are thoroughly and properly emphasized. Military staff work is represented as an inevitable response to size and specialization in military forces. It is made clear that staffs as we have them have developed from multiple sources. The evolution of the modern staff, while continuous, has not followed,

in the case of any nation, a continuous upward curve. Military leaders, with brilliant exceptions such as Gustavus Adolphus, Cromwell, Marlborough, Napoleon, Wellington, and the Germans since Scharnhorst, have been singularly slow to recognize the necessity of organized staff work or of training specialists to perform it, except as this necessity was forced on them. As a result, its development has been largely empirical and has not been supported by a coherent and growing body of theory. The author sees that the secret of effective staff work has not been found in any particular form of organization, or even in a staff corps, but in the knowledge needed for command raised to the dignity of a science and studied and taught as such, until it is generally shared by the leaders of a military organization.

The author is so convinced of the importance of staff work that he finds it hard to comprehend the halting development and the lapses in the evolution of staff theory, organization and procedures. He finds no answer to the question, which the record evidently raises in his mind. In our own case the reason is probably to be found partly in a failure of perspicuity in our military leaders, partly in our national faith in the Jack-of-all-trades principle, coupled with a democratic anxiety about the power that the military organization might exercise if allowed to develop an esoteric science, which a general staff corps might monopolize. As Colonel Hittle shows, the Spanish American war confronted us with the alternative of giving up war or reforming a military organization too unschooled to make an intelligent plan for war and too chaotic to carry one out; and in Elihu Root we had a statesman who drove the lesson home. He started at the root of the matter by founding the War College, to cultivate the science without which his War Department General Staff might well have been ephemeral. Leavenworth and the service schools broadened the foundation, and General Pershing and the Harbord Board formalized the superstructure on the basis of foreign models and our own needs.

The reader will be attracted by the interest, alertness and comprehensive grasp of his subject which the author displays and by the freshness of expression which his enthusiasm often brings into his writing. With more time, he would no doubt have cut out many repetitions, and become wary about some of the less important historical inferences he draws. But the book was needed and he got it out. It is to be hoped that with more time and a practiced hand he will presently write the firm, thoroughly-rounded treatise on the subject for which he has laid the foundations.

KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD,
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

The Coming Age of Rocket Power, by G. Edward Pendray. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1945. Pp. 244. \$3.50.)

Mr. G. Edward Pendray, one of the founders and onetime president of the American Rocket Society, has written a book on his favorite topic which will not only be interesting reading for the layman but may also serve well as an introduction to this field for engineers who were violently disinterested in rockets until V-2 came along.

A large portion of the book is devoted to the highly intriguing but generally still unknown history of the powder rocket, which embraces such divergent activities as the highly organized official work on projectile rockets and the more or less faltering attempts of individual experimenters to utilize rockets as a prime mover for vehicles of various types. Mr. Pendray has succeeded in tracing not only the broad lines of

development clearly, but also in indicating the multiple cross-influences that took place among the various independent inventors and groups of inventors. But while he proves himself a master of the broad stroke in painting this complicated picture, Mr. Pendray's attention to detail is not meticulous enough to make his book a reference work. Foreign names like Riedel and Schmiedl are consistently misspelled (they are rendered as Reidel and Schmeidl) and there prevails a complete disregard for ö and ü which makes some names hard to recognize (for example Huckel instead of Hückel). Even some factual information is wrong: the shells of the German *Paris Gun* of 1918 are stated to have weighed 700 pounds,—260 pounds would be closer to the mark.

Another large portion of the book is devoted to a highly skilled explanation of the difficulties encountered by any designer who tries to improve rockets, especially rockets for liquid fuels which are highly superior to the dry fuel type, except for short range projectile work. When Mr. Pendray wrote his book enough of V-2 was already known to point at some of the solution found and applied by the experimenters of the Peenemünde rocket research institute of the Third Reich. While the account of the work in the field of rocket research done so far deserves unlimited praise, the book falls off in a sharp curve when it comes to predictions.

There is a discussion of the problems of space travel, in this particular case a moon-trip which is on a consistently pessimistic note. As if to make up for that there is also a curiously strained and forcefully optimistic discussion of the possibilities of passenger carrying rockets between two points on earth. The space station, a goal which might be attained comparatively easily and which would be of enormous importance, is not mentioned at all. It so happened that it was an actual plan of the experimenters of Peenemünde.

However, these are things which can be remedied in successive editions; the value of the book as a "first primer" is considerable.

WILLY LEY,
Washington, D. C.

Psychology for the Armed Services, edited by Edwin G. Boring. Prepared by a committee of the National Research Council. (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 533. \$3.00.)

This book was prepared with the collaboration of many specialists in academic and clinical psychology, under the direction of a subcommittee of the National Research Council. It outlines the military application of psychology to observation, performance, selection, training, personal adjustment, social relationships, opinion and propaganda. Accordingly, the twenty-four chapters are devoted to the eye (including visual adaptation, color and camouflage), the ear, smell, equilibrium, bodily orientation, topographical orientation, efficiency and fatigue, physical condition, selection, learning, teaching, motivation and morale, personal adjustment, emotional disturbances, sex, leadership, rumors, panic and mobs, techniques of assessing opinions, propaganda and psychological warfare, racial differences. This broad canvas catalogues every field in which military psychologists have played any role, even at times a minor one.

The reviewer feels, however, that the text is strangely elementary and cursory to appear under such distinguished auspices. True, it is written for a lay audience, presumably of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and for them many of the chapters will have undoubted value. Yet it may well be asked whether these same chapters might not have been far more effective if they had been prepared as individual

brochures, with more extensive use of diagrams, illustrations, and other visual aids, and with more detailed elaboration of technical information.

As written, each chapter contains an inadequate survey of technical data: *e.g.*, on the physiology of the sense-organs, general physiology, and general hygiene, occasionally grappling with more complex problems, such as those of anoxia and equilibration. Nor are they free from inaccuracies and misinformation, as in the effort to contrast mental and physical fatigue on pages 173 and 174, or the discussion of alcohol on pages 213-218, and of benzedrine on page 233, and the casual dismissal of hyoscine in the discussion of motion sickness, in spite of the work done in this field at the Navy's School of Aviation Medicine. More important errors arise through the systematic neglect of the role of emotional factors in the physiological adjustments. For instance, there is no allusion to the most important problem in relation to accidents, namely the accident-prone personality. Largely because of this blindness to emotional issues, the practical admonitions are compounded equally of common sense and common fallacy.

Again in the chapters on selection and classification the more clinical phases of the problem are dealt with inadequately. There is no full discussion of personality problems, nor of the subtle role of masked neuroses and masked emotions both in relation to induction and to the succeeding stages of classification. It is remarkable, for instance, that the lesson of the failure of classification in the air forces is nowhere mentioned. This experience proved statistically that it is impossible to make selection and classification on the basis of intellectual and organic aptitudes alone. At each end of the spectrum of human aptitudes the tests showed up those with the highest and lowest native endowments, and found that at the extreme the test scores correlated well with subsequent success or failure in training. But these ends were numerically the two smallest groups. In the vastly larger middle area, success in training failed to correlate with predictions from tests more closely than with random selection. For the majority then such tests must include subtle emotional factors and masked neurotic traits as well as the minor variations in aptitudes. This proved to be true of vulnerability to combat stress as well; and illustrates with precision the point at which the work of the psychologist falls down, unless it is amplified by and coordinated with that of the psychiatrist.

The chapters on training and learning are marred by lists of obvious aphorisms, which will not be needed by those who can use them, and which will be useless for those who really need them. These preachments in scientific guise are among the most unpsychological pages that this reviewer has ever found in a psychological text. It is distressing to find distinguished psychologists perpetuating the popular fallacy that techniques of learning can be acquired through exhortations and rules of conduct.

The descriptions of the problems of personal adjustment suffer through many elementary errors both in the definition and illustration of such basic terms as identification (p. 355), defense mechanisms (p. 353), and many others. Again on page 399, in a generally liberal and well-intended discussion of sex problems serious misinformation is offered about the relationship of gonadal functions to general energy and vitality; and again on pp. 411-412 certain accepted fallacies about hypnotism are endorsed. . . .

The reviewer of this volume cannot accept it as a mature expression of that which psychology has to contribute to the armed services. To him the deficiencies of the volume indicate that it is about time to put an end to the disastrous cleavage which exists between the psychiatrist and the clinical psychologist. Their fields of activity overlap in every detail, so that it is literally impossible for one to function wisely and

maturely without the coordinated and cooperative effort of the other. This book could not have contained these many flagrant and invalidating errors had it not been written by psychologists alone. Had it been written by psychiatrists alone it would have been equally full of errors: but the errors would have been different. The fact that it was written in this way is merely an expression of the anomalous situation which exists both in academic circles and in the armed services today: in both of which clinical psychology and psychiatry behave as though they were rivals for a single empire instead of operating jointly and as part of one unified discipline. The inevitable result is just such a book as this: in which everything which has to do with the techniques of clinical psychology is sound and excellent, but in which the physiology is second hand and the interwoven clinical psychiatric problems are treated with fumbling inaccuracies and amateurishness. The reviewer is convinced that this sterile situation will continue until the two disciplines are combined into one, both in our universities and in our military forces.

LAWRENCE S. KUBIE,

New York

NOTES

Universal Military Training, by Colonel Edward A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Whittlesey House. 1945. Pp. 374. \$3.00). Colonel Fitzpatrick urges the adoption of universal military training in an informative but poorly organized book. He goes into every aspect of national security and military organization which touches on his subject, and much sincerity and little bias is apparent in his approach.

USS Seawolf, Submarine Raider of the Pacific, by Gerald Frank and James D. Horan (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1945. Pp. 197. \$2.75) retells the exploits of this 1,500-ton submarine on her nine missions during 1941-1942 as seen by Chief Radioman Joseph M. Eckberg, "The Sound Man." It provides an interesting picture of strategically important submarine warfare.

Minerals of Might, by William O. Hotchkiss (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: The Jacques Cattell Press 1945. Pp. 206. \$2.50) is an extremely interesting popularly written historical discussion of the relation of natural resources to the national economy and the ability of a modern nation to make war. His conclusion is that no nation can become or remain great without a wise policy of guarding its mineral wealth.

United Nations Government, by Amos J. Peasley (New York: Justice House. 1945. Pp. 183. \$2.00) outlines the history of American participation in the United Nations Organization as seen by a prominent international legal authority who represented the American Society of International Law at the San Francisco Conference.

Ask No Quarter, by George Marsh (New York: William Morrow and Company. 1945. Pp. 572. \$3.00) is a well written historical novel of Colonial Newport whose description of the great swamp fight of 1675, as well as naval warfare of the period, is of interest to the military historian.

The U. S. Marines on Iwo Jima, by Captain Raymond Henri and others (Washington, D. C.: The Infantry Journal. 1945. Pp. 312. \$0.25) is another reprint in the Fighting Forces Series of military histories of permanent value. This account of the strategically important battle for a bombing base against Japan is well illustrated by maps and photographs and presents a clear picture of operations as seen by five combat correspondents.

Lieut. John Davis, RNVR, in *Lower Deck* (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 186. \$2.00) has written a vivid and truthful picture of how a 5-inch gun crew on a British destroyer lived, thought, occasionally slept and very occasionally relaxed in the Mediterranean in April and May, 1942. The action includes convoys to Malta, the sinking of a U-boat, a night battle with Italian cruisers and the ship's being sunk in a commando raid.

Take It Easy, The Art of Conquering Your Nerves, by Arthur G. Mathews (New York: Sheridan House. 1945. Pp. 239. \$2.98) shows the scientific connection between conditional frustration and

bodily ills and is designed for the use of the general public as well as being important for ex-service men and women.

War Through Artists' Eyes, selected by Eric Newton (London: John Murray; Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 96. \$3.75) illustrates in color and black and white the work of British War artists covering all phases of the war effort.

Britain and the South Seas, by Sir Harry Luke (New York: Longmans Green and Company [British Information Services] 1945. Pp. 72. Free) contains a brief historical account of the peoples and the governments in the South Pacific in relation to English imperial expansion.

SEAC Souvenir, Part Two (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1945. Pp. 20. \$0.10) contains a brief official account of the military history of the South East Asia Command to May, 1945.

From Pearl Harbor Into Tokyo (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System. 1945. Pp. 313. \$0.25) is the story of the war in the Pacific as told by the broadcasts by the war correspondents and important leaders over Columbia from the attack on Pearl Harbor to President Truman's Proclamation of VJ Day. For the first time, a new weapon and tool—radio—is used in large-scale warfare.

Arnhem Lift, by Sgt. Louis E. Hagen (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Incorporated. Pp. 90. \$1.00) contains the eyewitness account of a German-born English paratrooper of the British First Airborne Division's landing and week's battle at Arnhem in 1944. It was originally published by the Pilot Press, 1945.

With the Red Devils at Arnhem, by Marik Swiecicki (London: Max Love Publishing Company; Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 92. \$2.20) is a translation from the Polish of the part played by the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group as part of the British First Airborne Division and it is illustrated with combat photographs. It provides further information on this great airborne landing.

The Mightiest Army, by Colonel Karl Detzer (Pleasantville, New York: The Reader's Digest Association. 1945. Pp. 168. \$0.35) is the story of the United States Army from 1941 to 1945. Its succinct summary of operations of our army is well illustrated by photographs from planning to battle and diagrams is well worth reading.

In contrast, Brigadier General John Charteris' account of *The British Army To-day* (New York: British Information Services. 1945. Pp. 62. Free) is a well illustrated description of new various British arms and services actually maneuvered in battle.

The Gun Digest, by Charles R. Jacobs, Editor (Chicago: Klien's Sporting Goods. 1944. Pp. 162. \$1.00) is a complete guide to modern American rifles, shotguns, handguns and accessories containing articles on the history of small arms and on the choice of a use of various weapons.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Post War Developments

United Nations Primer, by Sigrid Arne (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 156. \$1.25).

Federalism and Regionalism in Germany, by Arnold Brecht (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 218. \$2.50).

The Pan-Germanic Web: Remaking Europe, by Vladimer Grossman (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1945. Pp. 187. \$2.00).

War Crimes, by Manfred Lachs (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1945. Pp. 108. 7/6).

Uranium and Atomic Power, by Jack A. DeMent and Henry Carl Dake (Brooklyn, New York: Chemical Publishing Co. 1945. Pp. 353. \$4.00).

Germany Is Our Problem, by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1945. Pp. 252. \$2.00).

Japan and the Son of Heaven, by Willard Price (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1945. Pp. 239. \$2.75).

Italy and the Coming World, by Don Luigi Sturzo (New York: Roy Publishers. 1945. Pp. 316. \$3.50).

Contemporary Scene

Shinto, The Unconquered Enemy, by Robert Ballou (New York: The Viking Press. 1945. Pp. 250. \$2.75).

The Dungeon Democracy, by Christopher Burney (London: William Hineman, Lt. 1945. Pp. 100. 6/).

Czechoslovakia, Land of Dream and Enterprise, by Jan Cech and J. E. Mellon (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 184. \$4.50).

Rosenberg's Nazi Myth, by Albert Chandler (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1945. Pp. 155. \$1.75).

The German Talks Back, by Heinrich Hauser (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 238. \$2.50).

The March of Evil, by A. R. Learner (New York: F.F.F. Publishers, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 79. \$0.50).

The Senate and the Versailles Mandate System, by Rayford W. Logan (Washington, D. C.; Minorities Publishers. 1945. Pp. 118. \$2.00).

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, by Harriett L. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. Pp. 299. \$2.50).

The Nazi Kultur in Poland, by Ministerstwo Informacji, Poland (London: H.M.S. Off., 1945. Pp. 220. 5/).

The Rise of Polish Democracy, by William Rose (London: Bell. 1944. Pp. 253. 10/6).

Dilemma in Japan, by Alexander Roth (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1945. Pp. 302. \$2.50).

Europe in Revolution, by John Scott (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1945. Pp. 286. \$3.00).

Poland and Russia, 1919-1945, by James Shotwell and Max M. Laserson (New York: The King's Crown Press. 1945. Pp. 120. \$2.25).

The Arab Island, by Freya Madeline Stock (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1945. Pp. 259. \$3.50).

U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy, by Victor A. Yakhontoff (New York: The Coward-McCann Co. 1945. Pp. 324. \$3.50).

National Warfare

Men, Mind and Power, by David Abrahamsen, M.D. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1945. Pp. 163. \$2.00).

Universal Military Training and National Security, by Paul R. Anderson, Editor (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1945. Pp. 211. \$2.50).

The Curtain Falls, by Count Folke Bernadotte (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1945. Pp. 154. \$2.00).

The Art of War on Land, by Alfred Buene (London: Methun. 1944. Pp. 227. 12/6).

- Soldiers of God*, by Christopher Cross and Major General R. Arnold (New York: E. P. Dutton Company. 1945. Pp. 236. \$2.75).
- Watchwords*, by John Fuller (London: Skeffeham. 1944. Pp. 142. 12/6).
- Government Control in War*, by Lord Hankey (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 88. \$1.50).
- Field Marshall Bernard L. Montgomery*, by Mil Larsen (Grand Rapids, Michigan; Zondervan Publishers. 1945. Pp. 110. \$1.25).
- L'Egypte et la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, by Jean Lugol (Le Cairo, Imp.: E & R Schindler. 1945. Pp. 440).
- Armistice and Germany's Food Supply, 1918-19*, by Bernard Menne (London: Hutchinson. 1944. Pp. 96. 1/).
- Marshal Tito*, by Michael Padev (London: Muller. 1944. Pp. 126. 5/).
- Superiority of Fire*, by Major C. H. B. Pridham (London: Hutchinson. 1945. Pp. 146. \$2.10).

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS
World War II

- Jungle Warfare*, by the Australian Army (Canberra; Australian War Memorial. 1944. Pp. 208).
- Red Surgeon*, by George Borodin (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1945. Pp. 224. \$4.50).
- Road to Rome*, by Christopher Buckley (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1945. Pp. 334. 12/6).
- Maquis-Victories*, by Jean Dubain (New York: Didier Publishers. 1945. Pp. 188. \$1.50).
- The Golden Carpet*, by Somerset De Chair (London: Faber and Faber. 1944. Pp. 224. 5/).
- The 84th Infantry Division in the Battle of the Ardennes*, by Theodore Draper. Pp. 55. —).
- Southwest Pacific Sketchbook*, by Cedric Emanuel (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1945. \$3.75).
- Five Thousand Miles Toward Tokyo*, by Peyton Green (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1945. Pp. 188. \$2.50).
- Out of Carnage*, by Alexander R. Griffin (New York: Howell, Soskin. 1945. Pp. 327. \$3.00).
- Stand by to Beach*, by Gordon Holman (London: Holder and Stoughton. 1944. Pp. 223. 7/6).
- Dog of the Desert*, by Ion D. Idriess (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs Merrill Company. 1945. Pp. 247. \$2.50).
- Back to Life*, by Herbert I. Kupper, M.D. (New York: L. B. Fischer. 1945. Pp. 220. \$2.50).
- Mike Maroney, Raider*, by David S. Lavender (Philadelphia; Westminster Press. 1945. Pp. 242. \$2.00).
- General Le Clerc, Combattants et Combats en France*, by le div. blindée (Paris: Arts et Metiers Graphiques. 1945. Pp. 316).

My Favorite War Story, editors of Look (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill. Pp. 155. \$2.50).

With Love, Jane, by Alma Lutz, editor (New York: The John Day Company. 1945. Pp. 213. \$2.00).

Well Done!, by Morris Markey (New York: The Appleton-Century Company. 1945. Pp. 231. 2.75)

The War, Fifth Year, by Edgar W. McInnis (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 416. \$2.50).

I Dream of the Day, by Caleb Milne (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1945. Pp. 122. \$2.00).

A Ribbon and A Star, by John Monks, Jr. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1945. Pp. 242. \$2.75).

World War II in Pictures, Herman C. Morris and Harry B. Henderson, editors (Cleveland: World Publishing Company. 1945. Pp. 512. \$5.95).

The Tide Turns, by H. C. O'Neill (London: Faber and Faber. 1944. Pp. 244. 8/6).

Journey Underground, by Flight Officer David G. Prosser (New York: E. P. Dutton Co. 1945. Pp. \$2.75).

G. I. Parson, by Francis W. Read (New York: Morehouse & Gorham. 1945. Pp. 125. \$1.50).

Officially Dead, by Quentin Reynolds (New York: Random House. 1945. Pp. 224. \$2.75).

Persian Gulf Command, by Joel Sayre (New York: Random House. 1945. Pp. 156. \$2.00).

Inside Rome with the Germans, by Jane Scrivener (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 215. \$2.50).

Sea Warfare

Power in the Pacific, by U. S. Navy (New York: Museum of Modern Art. 1945. Pp. 32. \$1.00).

Rendezvous by Submarine, by Travis Inghram (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran Company. 1945. Pp. 255. \$2.50).

Sea, Surf and Hill, Commander Arch A. Mercey and C. Sp. Lee Grove, editors (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1945. Pp. 367. \$3.00).

Escort Carrier, by John Moore (London: Hutchinson. 1944. Pp. 48. 5/).

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Parachute to Berlin, by Lowell Bennett (New York: The Vanguard Press. 1945. Pp. 252. \$2.50).

Wings Across the World, by Hugh B. Cave (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1945. Pp. 175. \$2.50).

Middle East, 1940-1942, by Phillip Guedalla (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1944. Pp. 237. 12/6).

Big Distance, by Captain Donald Hough and Captain Elliott (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1945. Pp. 274. \$3.00).

Aviation Facts and Figures, Rudolf Modley, editor (New York: The McGraw-Hill Company. 1945. Pp. 182. \$2.50).

"Flying Officer, R.C.A.F.", M. H. Myerson (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 282. \$2.75).

Air Power and the Expanding Community, by Oliver Saewart (London: Newnes. 1944. Pp. 232. 15/).

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The Chain of Command, by Barrie Stavis (New York: Bernard Ackerman. Pp. 61. \$1.00).

War Years with Jeb Stuart, by Lieut. Colonel William Blackford. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1945. Pp. 335. \$3.00).

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The Cossacks, by Maurice Hindus (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 335. \$3.00).

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The Letters of Lafayette to Washington, by Marie Lafayette (New York: Hubbard. 1944. Pp. 417. —).

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Dark Rainbow, by Gerald Butler (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Incorporated. 1945. Pp. 211. \$2.50).

Where My Love Sleeps, by Clifford Dowdey (Boston: Little Brown and Company. 1945. Pp. 298. \$2.50).

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Leave Cancelled, by Nicholas Monsarrat (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1945. Pp. 124. \$2.00).

The Kenneth Roberts Reader, by Kenneth L. Roberts (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 471. \$3.00).

Customs and Antiquities

The Crusades, by Harold Lamb (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran and Company. 1945. Pp. 879. \$4.00).

The First Model Maxim Automatic Machine Gun, by Roger Marsh (Hudson, Ohio. 1945. Pp. 12. \$0.50).

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"Military Security and the Atomic Bomb," by Dr. Louis N. Ridenour, in *Fortune* November 1945, pp. 170-1, 216-23.

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"Rationalizing the Fighting Services," by F. A. de V. Robertson, in *Nineteenth Century* (Br), October 1945, pp. 162-67.

- "Universities and Research," by D. L. Thomson, in *Canadian Chemistry and Process Industries*, September 1945, pp. 614-15.
- "How They Made Peace," by Ludwig Marcuse and Harold von Hofe, in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, October 1945, pp. 339-52.
- "The UNO and World Security," by Jay Franklin, in *Antioch Review*, Fall 1945, pp. 378-87.
- "Justification of Power in Democracy," by Mark Vishniak, in *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1945, pp. 351-76.
- "The Problem of Neutrality," by C. G. Dehn, in *Agenda* (Br.), August 1944, pp. 11-17.
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- "Japanese American Relocation: Final Chapter," by Dillon S. Myer, in *Common Ground*, Autumn 1945, pp. 61-66.
- "The Five Strongholds of Peace," by Leopold C. Klausner, in *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1945, pp. 120-36.
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- "The Vision of a World at Peace," by Sumner Welles, in *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1945, pp. 481-96.
- "Victory in the Pacific," by Hanson W. Baldwin, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1945, pp. 26-39.
- "The War in the Pacific—A Retrospect," by H. G. Thursfield, in *National Review* (Br.), October 1945, pp. 297-303.
- "Japan Surrenders," by the editors of *Current History*, September 1945, pp. 184-92.
- "Japan's Economic Imperialism," by Fritz Sternberg, in *Social Research*, September 1945, pp. 328-49.
- "After Eight Years Victory!" entire issue, *China at War*, August 1945.
- "Russian Policy in the Far East," by Robert J. Kerner, in *Yale Review*, Autumn 1945, pp. 119-38.
- "Russia and the Dardanelles," by Thomas Anthem, in *Contemporary Review* (Br.), October 1945, pp. 222-26.
- "Russia and Central Europe," by Hans Rothfels, in *Social Research* September 1945, pp. 304-27.
- "Berlin Today," by Robert Powell, in *Fortnightly* (Br.), October 1945, pp. 234-39.
- "Soviet Influence in Latin America," (by Hernane Tavares de Sa, in *Asia and the Americas*, November 1945, pp. 514-16.
- "Social Policy in Occupied Czechoslovakia 1938-1944," by J. W. Bruegel, in *International Labour Review*, August-September 1945, pp. 154-75.
- "Paal Berg, Underground Leader," feature in *American-Scandinavian Review*, September 1945, pp. 199-202.
- Round Table*, all issues.
- The War Illustrated*, Sir John Hammerton, editor, all issues.

Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, all issues.

The American Review of the Soviet Union, August 1945, entire issue.

Population Bulletin, Population Reference Bureau, all issues.

Logistics Volume I, No. 1, October 1945, entire issue.

LAND, SEA, AND AIR WARFARE

The journals listed below are uniformly excellent sources of information on all aspects of the war. As with previous issues, no attempt has been made to list titles separately.

U. S. SERVICE JOURNALS. *Command and General Staff School Military Review*, *Field Artillery Journal*, *Infantry Journal*, *Cavalry Journal*, *Coast Artillery Journal*, *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Army Ordnance*, *Firepower* (Ordnance), *Recognition*, *Intelligence Bulletin*, *Military Engineer*, *Chemical Warfare Bulletin*, *Quartermaster Review*, *Army Transportation Journal*, *Yank*, *Stars and Stripes*.

U. S. AIR SERVICE JOURNALS. *Air Force*, *Aircraft Recognition*, *Air Force General Information Bulletin*, *Air Force Training Aids Division Bulletin*, *US AAF Informational Intelligence Summaries*, *US AAF Information Bulletins*, *Impact*, *Tactical and Training Trends* (series), *MIS Campaign Studies*, *Naval Aviation News*.

NON-SERVICE AIR JOURNALS. *Air News*, *American Pilot*, *Flying*, *Wings*, *Plane Talk*, *Skyways*, *Sperryscope*, and *The Aeroplane* (Br.).

BRITISH EMPIRE JOURNALS. *RAF Quarterly*, *RAF Journal*, *RAF Mediterranean Review*, *RCAF Bulletin*, *Royal Australian Air Force Monthly Bulletin*, *Evidence in Camera*, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, *The* (Br.) *Army Quarterly*, *Journal of the Royal Artillery*.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

"Radio That Hastened Victory [OWI]," by Wendell Sether, in *Free World*, November 1945, pp. 30-33.

"Military Occupation Can't Succeed," by "A Member of the RAF" [anonymous], in *Harper's*, November 1945, pp. 385-90.

"Art in the Third Reich," by Alfred H. Barr, Jr., and Lincoln Kirstein, in *Magazine of Art*, October 1945, pp. 210-41.

"War Crimes and the Crime of War," by Max Radin, in *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1945, pp. 497-516.

"The Religious Sect in Canadian Politics," by S. D. Clark, in *American Journal of Sociology*, November 1945, pp. 207-16.

TECHNICAL

"The Atom: New Source of Energy," by James H. McGraw and editors, in *Engineering and Mining Journal*, September 1945, pp. 66a-66h.

"Generation of Atomic Power from Elements," by H. Gregory Shea, in *Electronic Industries*, October 1945, pp. 90-94.

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"Materials for Producing the Atomic Bomb," by Kenneth Rose, in *Materials and Methods*, October 1945, pp. 1054-57.

"Proximity Fuse," by F.R. [editorial writer], in *Electronics*, November 1945, pp. 110-11.

- "Report on Wartime Electronic Developments," summary of sources and editorials in *Electronics*, November 1945, pp. 92-119.
- "Flying Bombs and Rockets," by Nigel Tangye, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1945, pp. 40-49.
- "Airfields in the Pacific," by Lt. Comdr. William F. Luce, in *Civil Engineering*, October 1945, pp. 453-55.
- "Oiling World War II," by the editors of *World Petroleum*, November 1945, pp. 52-61.
- "Scientists Garner Secrets of German Oil Research," by Ruth Sheldon, in *World Petroleum*, November 1945, pp. 66-69.
- "Summary Report on the Production and Performance of German Synthetic Tires and Other Transportation Items," feature article in *Rubber Age*, October 1945, pp. 71-78.
- "Acetylene Industry in Wartime Germany" [petroleum substitutes], by R. Leonard Hasche, in *Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering*, October 1945, pp. 116-19.
- "Four Years of Swiss Research Reveals New Power Patterns," by Stanley Tucker, in *Power*, November 1945, pp. 64-69, 154, 182.
- "The Navy Gave Them Power," by George W. Grupp, in *Diesel Power*, October 1945, pp. 1198-1201.
- "Electric Versus Steam-Driven Auxiliaries," by E. A. Stevens, Jr., in *Marine Engineering and Shipping Review*, October 1945, pp. 151-58.
- "Army-Developed Water Supplies on Middle Pacific Islands," from Public Relations Office, USAF, MIDPAC, in *Water Works Engineering*, October 31, 1945, pp. 1250-52.
- "Selecting Materials for the Jeep," by Roger F. Mather, in *Machine Design*, November 1945, pp. 111-16.
- "Experimental Stress Analysis Improves Design," by Martin A. Erickson, in *Tool Engineer*, October 1945, pp. 18-26.
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- "Aids to Aluminum Spot Welding," by Norman Grange [Boeing Aircraft], in *Welding Engineer*, October 1945, pp. 44-45, 83.
- "Processing and Fabrication of Stainless Steel Sheet and Plate Products," by H. S. Schaufus and W. H. Braun, in *Steel Processing*, October 1945, pp. 625-29.
- "Mechanical Parts Made from Powdered Metals," by Richard P. Seelig, in *Steel*, November 19, 1945, pp. 116-19, 156-78.
- All issues of the following: *Military Surgeon*, *Bulletin of the U. S. Medical Department*, *Journal of the Royal Medical Corps*, *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, *Air Surgeon's Bulletin*, *Journal of Aviation Medicine*, *Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences*, *Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society*, *Journal of Aeronautical Meteorology*, *AAF Technical Data Digest*, *Aviation Engineer Notes* (Office Air Engr AC/AS Hq AAF), *Transactions of the American Society for Metals*, *Metal Progress*, *Engineers' Direct* (review of foreign engineering progress).

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- "From Jimmu Tenno to Perry: Sea Power in Early Japanese History," by Arthur J. Marder, in *American Historical Review*, October 1945, pp. 1-34.
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- "Frederich Ebert und die Tragödie der Deutschen Demokratie," by Arnold Brecht [New York City], in *Deutsche Blätter* (Chile), July-August 1945, pp. 23-26.
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